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Digitalisation	  and	  convergence	  continue	  to	  transform	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  audio-­‐visual	  
content	   is	   supplied	   and	   consumed.	   This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   implications	   for	   the	  
legacy	   regulatory	   frameworks	   of	   the	   analogue	   era.	   It	   explores	   the	   relationship	  
between	   the	   prevailing	   approach	   to	   concurrent	   regulation	   under	   sector-­‐specific	  
legislation	   and	   general	   competition	   law,	   and	   the	   competitive	   conditions	   for	   the	  
supply	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia.	   Theories	   of	   harm	   for	   the	  
assessment	   of	   market	   power	   relating	   to	   horizontal	   concentration	   of	   ownership,	  
exclusive	  rights	  and	  refusal	  to	  supply,	  are	  also	  reviewed.	  	  
	  
Whilst	   acknowledging	   an	   enduring	   role	   for	   sector-­‐specific	   regulation,	   the	   thesis	  
advocates	   an	   increasing	   residual	   role	   for	   the	  enforcement	  of	   general	   competition	  
law.	   This	   is	   supported	  by	   the	   reinforcing	  effects	  of	  digitalisation	  and	   convergence	  
upon	   the	   network	   industry	   aspect	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   and	   the	   multi-­‐sided	   platform	  
characteristics	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   providers.	   The	   thesis	   identifies	   the	   need	   for	   greater	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  dynamic	  aspect	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context.	  This	  
calls	   for	   a	   broader	   conceptualisation	   of	   competition	   which	   critically	   reflects	   the	  
growth	  of	  online	  streaming,	  the	  global	  phenomenon	  around	  premium	  drama	  and	  the	  
rise	  of	  multi-­‐media	  firms	  in	  a	  global	  communications	  sector.	  	  
	  
These	   findings	   are	   significant	   and	   timely	   because	   failure	   to	   employ	   a	   sufficiently	  
broad	  concept	  of	  effective	  competition	  may	  perversely	  deter	  competitive	  conduct	  
and	  unduly	  impede	  the	  investment	  incentives	  that	  are	  critical	  to	  premium	  pay-­‐TV.	  It	  
may	  also	  produce	  outcomes	  that	  are	  ostensibly	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  normative	  basis	  
for	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation.	  The	  thesis	  suggests	  reform	  at	  the	   interface	  between	  
sector-­‐specific	   legislation	   and	   general	   competition	   law,	   and	   refinement	   of	   the	  
principles	  of	  competition	  law	  in	  their	  application	  to	  premium	  pay-­‐TV.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  
proposes	  a	  model	  of	  regulation	  which	  aims	  to	  more	  effectively	  balance	  the	  shared	  
interest	  of	  viewers,	  as	  consumers	  and	  citizens,	  in	  the	  future	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
and	  the	  wider	  communications	  sector.
	  	  1	  
CHAPTER	  1	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  THESIS	  
	  
1.1	   Thesis	  Aim	  and	  Objectives	  
This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   legal	   frameworks	   for	   regulating	   the	   supply	   of	  
premium	  content,	  which	  is	  typically	  defined	  as	  live	  sporting	  events	  and	  first-­‐
run	   Hollywood	   movies,1	   on	   pay-­‐TV	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   (“UK”)	   and	  
Australia.	   It	  critically	  evaluates	  how	  effectively	  concurrent	  regulation	  under	  
sector-­‐specific	   legislation	   and	   general	   competition	   law	   addresses	   the	  
structural	   tendency	   towards	   the	   concentration	   of	   market	   power	   in	   the	  
television	  broadcasting	  of	  premium	  content	  and	  the	  migration	  of	  premium	  
content	   to	   pay-­‐TV.2	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   to	   evaluate	   the	   relative	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  frameworks	  in	  the	  UK	  (including	  at	  the	  European	  Union	  
(“EU”)	   level,	   where	   relevant)	   and	   Australia,	   in	   balancing	   public	   interest	  
considerations	  and	   the	  maximisation	  of	   consumer	  welfare	   in	   the	   supply	  of	  
premium	  pay-­‐TV.3	  For	  this	  purpose,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  strong	  dynamic	  aspect	  
of	   competition	   in	   the	   supply	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	   content	  and	   services	   in	   a	  
converged	  digital	  environment.	  	  
	  
The	   initial	   research	   objective	   is	   to	   identify	   how	   the	   specific	   economic	  
characteristics	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  (particularly	  pay-­‐TV	  as	  a	  network	  industry	  
and	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms)	  confer	  a	  key	  role	  for	  premium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  ‘Premium	  Pay	  TV	  Movies:	  Market	  Investigation	  Reference	  to	  the	  Competition	  Commission’	  (Office	  
for	   Communications,	   2010)	   1-­‐2	   (UK)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/72008/pay-­‐tv-­‐movies-­‐decision.pdf>	  
accessed	   13	   August	   2017.	   ‘Report	   to	   Senator	   Alston,	   Minister	   for	   Communications,	   Information	  
Technology	  and	  the	  Arts,	  on	  Emerging	  Market	  Structures	  in	  the	  Communications	  Sector’	  (Australian	  
Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Commission,	   June	   2003)	   5	   (AU)	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Emerging%20market%20structures%20in%20the%20comm
unications%20sector.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
2	   The	   term	   “television”	   is	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   process	   of	   broadcasting	   audio-­‐visual	  
content,	   as	   opposed	   to	   any	   specific	   mode	   of	   transmission	   or	   distribution	   platform	   (unless	   stated	  
otherwise).	  
3	  Reasoning	  behind	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  consumer	  welfare	  standard	  is	  contained	  in	  Section	  1.3.1	  below.	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content	  in	  the	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV.	  Having	  regard	  to	  such	  characteristics,	  
the	  thesis	  assesses	  the	  impact	  of	  digitalisation	  and	  technological	  convergence	  
on	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   (especially	   new	   entry	   by	  
telecommunications	   service	   providers	   and	   online	   streaming	   services),	   and	  
hence	  the	  meaning	  of	  effective	  competition	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context.	  
This	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   broadening	   the	   definition	   of	   premium	  
content	   to	   include	   original,	   typically	   scripted,	   cinematic-­‐quality	   drama	  
(“premium	  drama”).	  It	  then	  analyses	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  respective	  roles	  
of	   sector-­‐specific	   regulation	   and	   general	   competition	   law	   in	   the	   UK	   and	  
Australia.	  
	  
The	   thesis	   identifies	   that,	   whilst	   there	   remains	   a	   case	   for	   concurrent	  
regulation	   under	   sector-­‐specific	   legislation	   and	   general	   competition	   law,	  
there	   is	  a	  decreasing	   role	   for	  sector-­‐specific	   regulation	   in	   the	  digital	  era.	   It	  
argues,	  by	  default,	  an	  increasing	  residual	  role	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  general	  
competition	  law.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  thesis	  reviews	  the	  theories	  of	  harm	  
for	  assessing	  market	  power	  relating	  to	  horizontal	  concentration	  of	  ownership,	  
exclusive	   licensing	   and	   refusal	   to	   supply	   under	   UK/EU	   and	   Australian	  
competition	   law.	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   changing	   broadcasting	  
environment	  upon	  the	  ability	  and	   incentive	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  (i.e.	  cable	  
and	  satellite)	  providers	  to	  exploit	  market	  power	  in	  the	  wholesale	  acquisition	  
and	   supply	   of	   premium	   content,	   in	   order	   to	   anti-­‐competitively	   foreclose	  
downstream	  competition	  in	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  premium	  content	  to	  viewers.	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  remains	  such	  ability	  and	  incentive,	  the	  thesis	  suggests	  
refinement	   of	   the	   standard	   principles	   of	   competition	   law,	  with	   the	   aim	  of	  
more	   effectively	   protecting/promoting	   the	   investment	   incentives	   of	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  their	  competitors.	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1.2	   Context	  of	  the	  Research	  
Pay-­‐TV	  has	  historically	  been	  dominated	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐
TV	  providers	  due	   to	   the	   specific	  economics	  of	  pay-­‐TV	   in	   the	  analogue	  era.	  
However,	  technological	  developments	  and	  structural	  changes	  in	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  
industry	   are	   altering	   the	   competitive	   landscape.	   Digitalisation	   and	   the	  
convergence	  of	  communications	  services	  facilitate	  new	  entry	  by	  established	  
telecommunications	   service	   providers	   and	   online	   streaming	   services.	   Such	  
new	  entry	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  established	  principles	  of	  
regulation	   remain	  appropriate.	  The	  network	   industry	  aspect	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  
the	  multi-­‐sided	   platform	   nature	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	  may	   produce	  market	  
outcomes	   that	   are	   typically	   indicative	   of	  market	   failure.4	   However,	   having	  
regard	  to	  such	  characteristics	  and	  the	  role	  of	  premium	  content	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV,	  such	  outcomes	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  definitive	  
of	   effective	   competition	   in	   the	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   context.	   Exploring	   the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  such	  characteristics,	  
and	   the	   consequent	   impact	   on	   the	   competitive	   dynamic	   for	   the	   supply	   of	  
premium	  pay-­‐TV,	  represents	  the	  foundational	  basis	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
1.2.1	   Changing	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  digital	  age	  of	  convergence	  	  
Pay-­‐TV	  refers	  to	  the	  transmission	  of	  television	  services	  via	  encrypted	  signals,	  
which	   viewers	   can	   access	   upon	   payment,	   using	   the	   necessary	   decoding	  
equipment.	   This	   has	   traditionally	   involved	   subscribers	   paying	   a	   monthly	  
subscription	   fee	   to	   access	   the	   one-­‐way,	   one-­‐to-­‐many	   delivery	   of	   cable	   or	  
satellite	  services	  to	  a	  television	  set,	  and	  using	  a	  set-­‐top	  box	  (“STB”)	  to	  decode	  
the	  encrypted	  signals.	  It	  is	  the	  subscription	  requirement	  that	  fundamentally	  
distinguishes	   pay-­‐TV	   from	   free-­‐to-­‐air	   (“FTA”)	   television.5	   FTA	   television	   is	  
transmitted	  via	  unencrypted	  signals	  that	  can	  be	  received	  by	  anyone	  with	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Market	  failure	  refers	  to	  “the	  failure	  of	  a	  more	  or	  less	  idealized	  system	  of	  price-­‐market	  institutions	  to	  
sustain	   ‘desirable’	  activities	  or	   to	  estop	   ‘undesirable’	  activities.”	   Francis	  M	  Bator,	   ‘The	  Anatomy	  of	  
Market	  Failure’	  (1958)	  72(3)	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  351.	  
5	   In	   this	   thesis,	   “FTA”	   television	   refers	   generally	   to	   public	   service	   broadcasting	   and	   commercial	  
terrestrial	  television	  (unless	  stated	  otherwise).	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antenna,	   at	   no	   additional	   direct	   cost	   to	   the	   viewer.	   This	   is	   subject	   to	   the	  
nuisance	  cost	  that	  advertising	  on	  commercial	  FTA	  television	  can	  impose	  on	  
viewers	  (as	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter).	  
	  
Premised	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   television	   to	   achieve	   various	   socio-­‐cultural	   and	  
political	  objectives	  on	  account	  of	  its	  pervasiveness,6	  FTA	  television	  (and	  more	  
specifically	   public	   service	   broadcasting	   (“PSB”))	   aims	   to	   satisfy	   the	   public	  
interest	   in	   television.	   This	   may	   take	   the	   form	   of	   seeking	   to	   “improve”	  
audiences	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  society	  by	  ensuring	  the	  supply	  of	  programmes	  
that	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  publicly	  desirable	  but	  likely	  to	  be	  under-­‐supplied	  in	  
a	  free	  market.7	  An	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  state,	  acting	  through	  the	  
government/legislator,	  is	  best	  placed	  to	  define	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  to	  fulfil	  
the	  programming	  needs	  of	  viewers	   in	   the	  name	  of	   the	  public	   interest.	  The	  
ability	   of	   PSB	   and	   FTA	   television	  more	   generally	   to	   fulfil	   this	   role,	   and	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   governments/legislators	   in	   determining	   what	   programmes	  
should	   be	  made	   available	   based	   on	   perceived	   notions	   as	   to	  what	   viewers	  
“need”,	  is	  inherently	  contentious.8	  	  
	  
It	  is	  particularly	  contentious	  where	  PSB	  is	  funded	  directly	  by	  viewers	  through	  
a	  licence	  fee	  (as	  in	  the	  UK),9	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  televised	  sport	  because	  of	  the	  
high	  prices	  which	  the	  live	  television	  rights	  to	  major	  sporting	  events	  typically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  generally,	  Michael	  Morgan,	  James	  Shanahan	  and	  Nancy	  Signorielli,	  Living	  with	  Television	  Now:	  
Advances	   in	   Cultivation	   Theory	   &	   Research	   (Peter	   Lang	   2012);	   John	   Tulloch,	  Watching	   Television	  
Audiences:	   Cultural	   Theories	   and	   Methods	   (Bloomsbury	   Academic	   2000);	   John	   Storey,	   Cultural	  
Consumption	  and	  Everyday	  Life	  (Bloomsbury	  Academic	  1999)	  114.	  
7	  David	  Sawers,	  ‘The	  Future	  of	  Public	  Service	  Broadcasting’	  in	  Michael	  E	  Beesley,	  Dan	  Goyder,	  Malcolm	  
J	  Matson,	  David	  Sawers,	  William	  B	  Shew	  and	  Irwin	  M	  Stelzer,	  Markets	  and	  the	  Media:	  Competition,	  
Regulation	  and	  the	  Interests	  of	  Consumers	  (Institute	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  1996)	  83-­‐84.	  
8	   See,	   for	   instance,	   Robert	   G	   Picard	   and	   Paolo	   Siciliani,	   ‘Is	   there	   Still	   a	   Place	   for	   Public	   Service	  
Television?	  Effects	  of	  the	  Changing	  Economics	  of	  Broadcasting’	  (Symposium	  organised	  by	  the	  Reuters	  
Institute	   for	   the	   Study	   of	   Journalism,	   University	   of	   Oxford,	   September	   2013)	  
<https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Is%20There%20Still%20a%20Place%20f
or%20Public%20Service%20Television_0.pdf>	  accessed	  11	  July	  2016.	  
9	  The	  licence	  fee	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  £147	  and	  is	  payable	  by	  all	  households	  that	  watch	  live	  television	  (subject	  
to	   limited	  exemptions).	  As	  of	  1	  September	  2016,	  this	  also	  applies	  to	  downloading	  or	  watching	  BBC	  
programmes	  on-­‐demand,	  including	  catch-­‐up	  television	  on	  BBC	  iPlayer,	  on	  any	  device.	  Communications	  
Act	  2003,	  pt	  4;	  Communications	  (Television	  Licensing)	  Regulations	  2004.	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command.10	  By	  contrast,	  pay-­‐TV	  primarily	  aims	  to	  entertain	  and	  to	  fulfil	  the	  
interests	  of	  niche	  audiences	  through	  special-­‐interest	  channels.	  This	  is	  based	  
on	  what	  viewers	  “want”,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  their	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  	  
	  
1.2.1.1	  Internet	  television	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  	  
Digitalisation	  and	  the	  convergence	  of	  communications	  services	  facilitate	  the	  
emergence	   of	   other	   pay-­‐TV	   distribution	   platforms	   and	   services,	  which	   are	  
based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  different	  revenue	  models.	  This	  includes	  the	  supply	  of	  
video-­‐on-­‐demand	   (“VOD”)	   services	   on	   “over-­‐the-­‐top”	   (“OTT”)	   television,	  
which	  may	  enable	  new	  entrants	  to	  bypass	  the	  networks	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  
providers.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  OTT	  television	  broadly	  encompasses	  
the	   supply	   of	   three	   types	   of	   VOD	   services:	   (i)	   subscription-­‐based	   VOD	  
(“SVOD”)	  services	  (such	  as	  California-­‐based	  Netflix	  and	  Hulu);	  (ii)	  transactional	  
VOD	  (“TVOD”)	  services,	  which	  allow	  users	  to	  pay	  for	  individual	  programmes	  
(such	  as	  Amazon	  Prime	  Instant	  Video	  and	  iTunes);	  and	  (iii)	  ad-­‐supported	  VOD	  
services,	  of	  which	   there	  may	  be	  “free”	  and/or	  “paid”	  versions	   (as	  with	   the	  
Hulu-­‐Plus	  monthly	   subscription	   and	   partially	   ad-­‐supported	   services).11	  OTT	  
services	  may	  be	  transmitted	  via	  the	  unmanaged	  public	  Internet	  or	  via	  private,	  
managed	  networks	  (Internet	  Protocol	  television	  (“IPTV”)).	  Independent	  OTT	  
service	  providers	  include	  the	  likes	  of	  Netflix,	  Amazon	  Prime,	  Apple	  TV,	  iTunes	  
and	  Google	  Play	  Movies	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  generally	  as	  SVOD	  platforms).	  	  
	  
1.2.1.2	  Viewing	  paradigm	  of	  “any	  time,	  anywhere,	  any	  device”	  
Television	  is	  now	  consumed	  within	  the	  paradigm	  of	  “any	  time,	  anywhere,	  any	  
device”.	  The	  availability	  of	  live	  streaming,	  near-­‐VOD,	  time-­‐shifting	  and	  catch-­‐
up	  services	  enables	  viewers	  to	  access	  most	  programmes	  “on	  the	  move”	  on	  a	  
laptop,	  tablet,	  smartphone	  or	  smartwatch.	  This	  represents	  a	  notable	  shift	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Harry	  A	  Solberg,	  ‘Sports	  Broadcasting:	  Is	  it	  a	  Job	  for	  Public	  Service	  Broadcasters?	  
A	  Welfare	  Economic	  Perspective’	  (2007)	  20(4)	  Journal	  of	  Media	  Economics	  289.	  
11	   This	   is	   a	   joint	   venture	   between	   Disney-­‐ABC	   Television	   Group	   (The	  Walt	   Disney	   Company),	   Fox	  
Broadcasting	  Company	  (Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox)	  and	  NBCUniversal	  Television	  Group.	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how	   viewers	   can	   consume	   content,	   from	   one-­‐to-­‐many	   to	   one-­‐to-­‐one,	   and	  
one-­‐way	   (linear)	   to	   two-­‐way	   (on-­‐demand)	   television.	   The	   increasing	  
opportunities	  to	  personalise	  television	  services	  (such	  as	  where	  viewers	  can	  
select	  how	  programmes	  end	   through	  branch	  narratives),12	   and	   the	  greater	  
choice	  that	  this	  theoretically	  affords	  viewers,13	  intensifies	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  
relative	  extent	  to	  which	  (if	  any)	  the	  supply	  of	  television	  programmes	  should	  
be	  regulated	  according	  to	  what	  viewers	  “want”	  or	  “need”.14	  There	  is	  also	  the	  
practical	  challenge	  of	  accurately	  determining	  what	  viewers	  “need”	  or	  “want”.	  	  
	  
1.2.1.3	  Emergence	  of	  social	  media	  as	  a	  broadcasting	  platform	  
Related	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  Internet	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  media	  as	  a	  
broadcasting	  platform.	  Television	  broadcasts	  can	  increasingly	  be	  accessed	  via	  
social	  media	  platforms	  like	  YouTube,	  Snapchat,	  Facebook,	  Instagram,	  Twitter	  
and	  Vine.	  By	   facilitating	   the	  exchange	  of	  dialogue	  between	  viewers	   in	   real	  
time,	   social	   media	   also	   offers	   the	   possibility	   of	   enhancing	   audience	  
engagement	  and	  increasing	  ratings.15	  Often	  viewers	  use	  social	  media	  whilst	  
watching	   live	   television,	   but	   social	   media	   may	   also	   increase	   consumption	  
ratings	  via	  online	  streaming,	  VOD	  and	  digital	  video	  recorders	  (“DVRs”).16	  As	  
will	  be	  suggested,	  the	  opportunity	  that	  this	  offers	  to	  commercial	  broadcasters	  
in	   terms	  of	   advertising	   revenue	   is	   also	  potentially	   significant	   from	  a	  multi-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	   Press	   Association,	   ‘Netflix	   launches	   “choose	   your	   own	   adventure”	   interactive	   TV	   shows’	   The	  
Telegraph	   (21	   June	   2017)	   <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/06/21/netflix-­‐launching-­‐
choose-­‐adventure-­‐interactive-­‐tv-­‐shows/>	  accessed	  11	  August	  2017.	  
13	  “Choice”	  may	  be	  assessed	  by	  reference	  to	   the	  number	  of	  channels,	   the	  number	  of	   independent	  
content	  providers	  or	  the	  content	  itself.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  channels	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  only	  theoretically	  
increases	  the	  choice	  for	  viewers	  because	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  channels	  or	  quantity	  of	  available	  
content	  does	  not	  guarantee	  greater	  diversity	  of	   content.	   It	  may,	   in	   fact,	   lead	   to	   the	  duplication	  of	  
content.	  Ben	  Calvert,	  Neil	  Casey,	  Bernadette	  Casey,	  Liam	  French	  and	  Justin	  Lewis,	  Television	  Studies:	  
The	  Key	  Concepts	  (Routledge	  2007)	  182.	  
14	  This	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  may	  favour	  content	  that	  reinforces	  their	  own	  existing	  
views.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Silvia	   Knobloch-­‐Westerwick	   and	   Jingbo	   Meng,	   ‘Looking	   the	   Other	   Way:	  
Selective	  Exposure	  to	  Attitude-­‐Consistent	  and	  Counterattitudinal	  Political	   Information’	  (2009)	  36(3)	  
Communication	  Research	  426.	  
15	  See,	  Hallvard	  Moe,	  Thomas	  Poell	  and	  José	  van	  Dijck,	  ‘Rearticulating	  Audience	  Engagement:	  Social	  
Media	  and	  Television’	  (2016)	  17(2)	  Television	  &	  New	  Media	  99.	  
16	   ‘First	   Impressions:	  When	  and	  Why	  Social	   Program	  Engagement	  Matters’	   (Nielsen,	   23	  November	  
2015)	  <http://www.nielsensocial.com/first-­‐impressions-­‐when-­‐and-­‐why-­‐social-­‐program-­‐engagement-­‐
matters/>	  accessed	  17	  June	  2016.	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sided	  market	  perspective.	  It	  will	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  7	  how	  the	  growth	  of	  
social	   media	   platforms	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   shift	   in	   the	   competitive	   access	  
problem	  away	   from	  Conditional	  Access	   System	   (“CAS”)	   technology	   such	  as	  
STBs,	  towards	  Applications	  Programming	  Interfaces	  (“APIs”)	  (i.e.	  the	  software	  
supporting	   social	   media	   platforms)	   and	   the	   broadcast	   rights	   to	   premium	  
content.	  
	  
1.2.1.4	  Meaning	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  
Such	   developments	   in	   the	   supply	   and	   consumption	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   raise	   the	  
question	  as	   to	  what	   constitutes	   “pay-­‐TV”	   in	   the	  digital	  era.	  This	   inherently	  
requires	   consideration	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   and	  
SVOD,	  and	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	   two	  may	  be	   regarded	  as	   substitutable.	  
However,	   it	   is	   overly	   simplistic	   to	  perceive	   the	   competitive	   landscape	   as	   a	  
battle	   between	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   SVOD	  
platforms	   (and	   possibly	   FTA	   broadcasters)	   on	   the	   other,	   because	   the	  
distinction	  between	  them	  is	  diminishing.	  This	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  bundling	  of	  
communications	   services.	   The	   ability	   to	   provide	   triple-­‐play	   services	  
(broadband	  Internet,	  television	  and	  fixed	  telephony)	  and	  quad-­‐play	  services	  
(broadband	  Internet,	  television,	  fixed	  telephony	  and	  mobile	  telephony)	  has	  
seen	  the	  entry	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  into	  telecommunications	  and	  
the	  entry	  of	  established	  telecommunications	  service	  providers	   into	  pay-­‐TV.	  
The	  distinction	  also	  becomes	  less	  clear	  as	  more	  collaborations	  arise	  between	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  SVOD	  platforms	   i.e.	   for	   the	  supply	  of	  OTT	  
television	  services	  on	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  networks.	  	  
	  
OTT	   television	   typically	   complements	   rather	   than	   replaces	   traditional	   pay-­‐
TV.17	  This	  is	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  supply	  and	  consumption	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  ‘Linear	  vs	  non-­‐linear	  viewing:	  A	  qualitative	  investigation	  exploring	  viewers’	  behaviour	  and	  attitudes	  
towards	  using	  different	  TV	  platforms	  and	  services	  providers’	  (Kantar	  Media,	  commissioned	  by	  Ofcom,	  
May	  2016)	  55	  (UK)	  <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/68816/km_report.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017;	  ‘TV	  today:	  free	  and	  paid,	  linear	  and	  on	  demand’	  (Roy	  Morgan	  press	  release,	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of	  OTT	   television	   services	  often	   remains	  dependent	  on	  a	   subscription	   to	   a	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  service.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  continued	  tendency	  for	  traditional	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  secure	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  
major	  sporting	  events.18	  An	  OTT	  television	  service	  is	  therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  
regarded	  by	  viewers	  as	  a	  close	  substitute	  for	  a	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  service	  for	  
the	  consumption	  of	  such	  content.	  However,	  as	  suggested	  in	  Chapter	  3	  of	  the	  
thesis,	  there	  are	  indications	  of	  change	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  definition	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
is	  important	  because	  it	  will	  have	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  relevant	  market	  is	  
defined	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  
pay-­‐TV	  is	  defined	  broadly	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Section	  1.2.1,	  without	  reference	  
to	   any	   particular	   distribution	   platform.	   The	   emphasis	   on	   technological	  
neutrality	  is	  a	  theme	  which	  recurs	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  with	  the	  focus	  being	  
on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  content	  supplied.	  
	  
1.2.2	   Re-­‐definition	  of	  premium	  content	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  
Premium	  content	  is	  generally	  defined	  as	  premium	  sport	  and	  movie	  content.19	  
Premium	   sport	   content	   refers	   to	   the	   live	   coverage	   of	   professional	   or	   elite	  
sporting	  events.	  Football	  (sometimes	  known	  in	  Australia	  as	  soccer)	  of	  various	  
codes	   attracts	   some	  of	   the	   largest	   audiences,	   so	   is	   especially	   appealing	   to	  
broadcasters	  and	  advertisers.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  escalating	  
wholeprice	   price	   of	   the	   broadcast	   rights	   to	   leading	   football/soccer	  
tournaments	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia.	   In	   the	   UK,	   this	   includes	   the	   English	  
Premier	   League	   (“Premier	   League”)	   and	   the	   UEFA	   Champions	   League	  
(organised	   by	   the	   Union	   of	   European	   Football	   Associations	   (“UEFA”)).	   The	  
“marquee”	  codes	  in	  Australia	  include	  the	  Australian	  Football	  League	  (“AFL”),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	   May	   2016)	   (AU)	   <http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6823-­‐watching-­‐television-­‐by-­‐free-­‐to-­‐air-­‐
broadcast-­‐foxtel-­‐or-­‐on-­‐demand-­‐australia-­‐april-­‐2016-­‐201605240526>	  accessed	  14	  July	  2016.	  
18	   This	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   restrictions	   that	   are	   imposed	  by	  anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   (as	  discussed	   in	  
Chapter	  6	  of	  the	  thesis).	  
19	  Office	  for	  Communications	  (n	  1)	  (UK);	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission	  (n	  1)	  10	  
(AU).	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the	   National	   Rugby	   League	   (“NRL”)	   and	   Super	   Rugby.20	   Premium	   movies	  
include	  first-­‐run	  Hollywood	  blockbusters.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  this	  
includes	  movies	  licensed	  in	  the	  first	  subscription	  pay-­‐TV	  window	  by	  the	  Major	  
Hollywood	   Studios	   (Fox	   Filmed	   Entertainment,	   NBC	   Universal,	   Sony,	   Time	  
Warner,	  The	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	  and	  Viacom	  (and	  their	  wholly-­‐owned	  or	  
controlled	  subsidiaries)).21	  	  
	  
1.2.2.1	  Boundary	  between	  premium	  sport	  content	  and	  sports	  news	  
In	  an	  era	  of	  content	  abundance,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  constitutes	  “premium	  
content”	   is	  an	   interesting	  one.	   It	   is	   complicated	  by	  changes	   to	   the	  ways	   in	  
which	   audio-­‐visual	   content	   is	   supplied	   and	   consumed.	   With	   respect	   to	  
developments	   in	   the	   coverage	   of	  major	   sporting	   events,	   for	   instance,	   the	  
increasing	  supply	  and	  consumption	  of	  real-­‐time	  or	  near-­‐real-­‐time	  coverage	  in	  
highlight	   format	   on	   mobile	   devices,	   blurs	   the	   distinction	   between	   sports	  
coverage	  and	  news.22	  The	  distinction	  is	  identified	  in	  the	  thesis	  as	  an	  area	  in	  
which	  the	  changing	  broadcasting	  landscape	  calls	  for	  reconsideration	  of	  some	  
of	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  the	  prevailing	  regulatory	  frameworks	  are	  based.	  
It	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  will	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  sports	  
rights	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  being	   like	  ordinary	  market	  goods	  for	  regulatory	  
purposes	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  scope	  of	  sector-­‐specific	  rules	  such	  as	  anti-­‐
siphoning	  and	  the	  right	  to	  short	  reporting.	  This	  will	  in	  turn	  have	  consequences	  
for	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   market,	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   rights	   owners	   and	  
broadcasters	  to	  monetise	  sports	  rights.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Deborah	  Healey,	  ‘Australia’	  in	  Ian	  Blackshaw,	  Steve	  Cornelius	  and	  Robert	  CR	  Siekmann,	  TV	  Rights	  
and	  Sport:	  Legal	  Aspects	  (TMC	  Asser	  Press	  2009)	  215.	  Precisely	  what	  constitutes	  a	  “marquee”	  code	  or	  
premium	  sport	  will	  vary	  to	  some	  extent	  between	  jurisdictions	  and	  possibly	  between	  states/nations	  
within	  a	  single	  jurisdiction.	  
21	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  definition	  used	  by	  Ofcom	  in	  the	  UK.	  Office	  for	  Communications	  (n	  1).	  
22	   It	   builds	   on	   the	   growing	   willingness	   of	   broadcasters	   in	   the	   1990s	   to	   carry	   sports	   stories	   as	  
mainstream	  news	  items	  and	  to	  apply	  increasing	  journalistic	  rigour	  to	  sports	  coverage.	  Raymond	  Boyle,	  
Sports	  Journalism:	  Context	  and	  Issues	  (SAGE	  2006)	  72.	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1.2.2.2	  Basis	  on	  which	  content	  is	  defined	  as	  premium	  
Re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   premium	   content	   raises	   fundamental	  
questions	   about	   what	   renders	   content	   “premium”	   and	   from	   whose	  
perspective	   the	   premium	   nature	   of	   content	   is	   assessed	   i.e.	   viewers,	  
broadcasters	  and/or	  advertisers.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  value	  
that	  is	  attributed	  to	  premium	  content	  by	  such	  parties,	  whether	  collectively	  or	  
individually,	   is	   measured	   and	   quantified.	   Whilst	   significant	   financial	  
investment	  does	  not	  guarantee	  high	  quality	  content	  (however	  “high	  quality”	  
may	  be	  determined),	  premium	  content	   is	   characteristically	  associated	  with	  
substantial	  production	  values	  (including	  the	  cost	  of	  hosting	  major	  events	  in	  
the	  sporting	  context).	  The	  value	  that	  is	  attributed	  to	  premium	  content	  may	  
be	   deduced	   from	   the	   willingness	   of	   broadcasters	   to	   pay	   high	   prices	   for	  
broadcast	   rights	   or	   high	   demand/consumption	   by	   viewers	   (with	   larger	  
audiences,	   in	   turn,	   theoretically	   attracting	  greater	  advertising	   revenue).	  As	  
will	   be	   discussed,	   however,	   the	   relationship	   between	   audience	   size	   and	  
advertising	  revenue	  is	  not	  necessarily	  directly	  proportionate	  (with	  advertisers	  
also	  being	  interested	  in	  the	  demographic	  of	  audiences	  and	  the	  attentiveness	  
of	  viewers,	  for	  instance).23	  	  
	  
The	   content	   which	   is	   valued	   most	   highly	   by	   viewers	   may	   be	   determined	  
according	  to	  how	  much	  viewers	  demonstrate	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  to	  access	  
it.	  However,	  willingness	  to	  pay	  does	  not	  necessarily	  equate	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  
pay	  (and	  vice	  versa).	  Also,	  popularity	  is	  not	  always	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	  
quality.	  These	  distinctions	  become	  of	  real	  significance	  only	  if	  the	  content	  in	  
question	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   content	   that	   viewers	   “need”	   as	   opposed	   to	  
“want”	   (which	   has	   already	   been	   identified	   as	   a	   contentious	   issue).	   The	  
question	  as	  to	  whether	  quality	  even	  matters,	  if	  it	  is	  content	  that	  viewers	  want	  
to	   consume,	   also	   only	   arises	   if	   premium	   content	   is	   distinguished	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Bruce	  M	  Owen	  and	  Steven	  S	  Wildman,	  Video	  Economics	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  1992)	  3.	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ordinary	  market	  goods	  (i.e.	  goods	  which	  are	  subject	  only	  to	  market	  forces	  and	  
general	  competition	  law	  enforcement).	  
	  
As	  will	  be	  seen,	  certain	  sporting	  events	  are	  distinguished	  in	  this	  respect	  for	  
regulatory	   purposes	   in	   both	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia.	   Sport	   is	   the	   genre	   of	  
premium	  content	  that	  has	  attracted	  the	  most	  regulatory	  attention,	  due	  to	  the	  
widely	   recognised	   socio-­‐cultural	   functions	   of	   sport	   on	   FTA	   television	   (as	  
discussed	   in	   the	   following	   chapter).	   Reference	   is	   made	   here	   to	   the	  
combination	   of	   social	   and	   cultural	   functions	   of	   televised	   sport	  which	   have	  
been	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  academic	  study	  and	  government	  policy.24	  It	  is	  well	  
established	   that	   there	   are	   social	   and	   cultural	   interests	   in	   the	   television	  
broadcasting	   of	   certain	   sporting	   events	  which	   the	  market	   alone	  would	   be	  
unlikely	   to	   protect.	   Hence	   the	   introduction	   of	   regulation	   such	   as	   anti-­‐
siphoning	  rules.	  
	  
By	  contrast,	  television	  drama	  has	  predominantly	  been	  regarded	  as	  being	  of	  
entertainment	  value.	  There	  is	  increasing	  interest	  in	  the	  potential	  social	  and	  
cultural	  value	  of	  drama.25	  The	  scope	  for	  considering	  this	  concept	  as	  a	  policy	  
driver	  in	  relation	  to	  premium	  drama	  content	  could	  certainly	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  
future	  research.	  Indeed,	  such	  research	  has	  arguably	  become	  more	  pertinent	  
with	   the	   rise	   of	   premium	   drama	   as	   identified	   in	   this	   thesis.	   However,	  
consistent	   with	   the	   focus	   elsewhere	   to	   date	   on	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	  
functions	   of	   televised	   sport,	   discussion	   on	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   value	   of	  
television	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  premium	  sport	  content.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For	  a	  review	  of	  such	  literature,	  see	  Tom	  Evens,	  Petros	  Iosifidis	  and	  Paul	  Smith,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  
of	  Television	  Sports	  Rights	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2013)	  52-­‐67.	  
25	  Robin	  Nelson,	  TV	  Drama	  in	  Transition	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  1997);	  John	  Caughie,	  Television	  Drama:	  
Realism,	  Modernism,	  and	  British	  Culture	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2000);	  Tony	  Bennett,	  ‘Distinction	  on	  
the	  Box:	  Cultural	  Capital	  and	  the	  Social	  Space	  of	  Broadcasting’	  (2006)	  15(2-­‐3)	  Cultural	  Trends	  193-­‐212;	  
Elke	  Weissmann,	  Transnational	  Television	  Drama:	  Special	  Relations	  and	  Mutual	  Influence	  between	  the	  
US	   and	   UK	   (Springer	   2012);	   ‘Measuring	   the	   Cultural	   Value	   of	   Australia’s	   Screen	   Sector’	   (A	   report	  
presented	  to	  Screen	  Australia	  by	  Olsberg	  SPI,	  11	  November	  2016).	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  thesis	  calls	  for	  greater	  consideration	  of	  premium	  drama	  
going	  forward	  and,	  to	  this	  end,	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  content	  
is	  defined	  as	  premium.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  movies	  are	  defined	  
as	   premium,	   the	   UK	   Office	   for	   Communications	   (“Ofcom”)	   notes	   three	  
characteristics	   of	   first-­‐run	   Hollywood	   movies	   that	   make	   them	   particularly	  
compelling	   to	   consumers.	   Such	   characteristics	   include:	   (i)	   high	   quality	   (as	  
defined	  by	  box	  office	  success);	  (ii)	  first	  airing	  on	  television	  (with	  consumers	  
typically	  valuing	  movies	  more	  highly	  the	  shorter	  the	  period	  of	  time	  between	  
box	   office	   release	   and	   first	   airing	   on	   television);	   and	   (iii)	   availability	   via	  
subscription	  (with	  subscription	  services	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  greater	  demand	  
than	  pay-­‐per-­‐view	  or	  TVOD,	  due	  to	  the	  perceived	  convenience	  of	  not	  having	  
to	   pay	   for	  movies	   on	   an	   individual	   basis).26	  Having	   regard	   to	   the	   changing	  
broadcasting	  environment,	  this	  thesis	  challenges	  reliance	  on	  such	  factors	  as	  
the	  basis	  for	  restricting	  the	  definition	  of	  premium	  content	  to	  premium	  movie	  
(and	  sport)	  content.	  For	  instance,	  the	  bundling	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  content	  and	  services	  
with	  other	  communications	  services	  renders	  the	  willingness	  of	  viewers	  to	  pay,	  
a	  less	  reliable	  factor	  in	  identifying	  premium	  content.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  
above	  characteristics	  can	  equally	  be	  applied	  to	  premium	  drama.	  
	  
1.2.2.3	  Re-­‐defining	  premium	  content	  to	  include	  original,	  high	  quality	  drama	  
Viewers	  are	  also	  increasingly	  enticed	  to	  subscribe	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  services	  by	  the	  
availability	  of	  exclusive,	  original	  drama.27	  This	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  
streaming	   services	  with	   business	  models	   based	   on	   the	   exclusive	   supply	   of	  
original	   drama	   series.	   Based	   on	   upward	   trends	   in	   advertising	   spend,	  
subscriber	  spend,	  and	  the	  levels	  of	  investment	  and	  airtime	  that	  are	  devoted	  
to	   premium	   drama,	   this	   thesis	   argues	   the	   case	   for	   redefining	   premium	  
content	   to	   include	  premium	  drama.	  This	   is	   significant	  because,	  as	  with	   the	  
definition	  of	  pay-­‐TV,	   it	  will	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Ofcom	  (n	  1)	  para	  1.6.	  
27	  See,	  Robin	  Nelson,	  State	  of	  Play:	  Contemporary	  High-­‐End	  TV	  Drama	  (Manchester	  University	  Press	  
2007).	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market	  and	  assessment	  of	  market	  power.	  The	  ways	   in	  which	  adopting	   this	  
broader	   definition	   of	   premium	   content	  may	   produce	   outcomes	   that	  more	  
accurately	   reflect	   economic	   reality	   in	   the	   digital	   era	   are	   considered	  
throughout	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
1.3	   Significance	  of	  Focusing	  on	  the	  Specific	  Economics	  of	  Premium	  Pay-­‐TV	  
The	   significance	   of	   this	   thesis	   lies	   in	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	  
changing	   broadcasting	   landscape	   is	   a	   product	   of	   the	   specific	   economic	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  industry	  and	  premium	  content.	  This	  is	  used	  to	  
ascertain	   the	   appropriate	   regulatory	   response	   to	   the	   reinforced	   tendency	  
towards	  the	  concentration	  of	  market	  power	  over	  the	  supply	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐
TV.	   The	   specific	   economic	   characteristics	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   give	   rise	   to	  
market	  conditions	  that	  neoclassical	  economic	  theory	  dictate	  as	  indicative	  of	  
market	  failure.	  However,	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
pay-­‐TV	  as	  a	  network	  industry	  and	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  
on	   the	   changing	   broadcasting	   environment	   (and	   vice	   versa),	   the	   thesis	  
demonstrates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  prevailing	  market	  conditions	  in	  the	  UK	  
and	  Australia	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  effective	  competition.	  
	  
This	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  understanding	  that	  competition	  within	  any	  given	  industry	  
is	  determined	  not	  simply	  by	  the	  competitive	  forces	  posed	  by	  existing	  firms,	  
but	  in	  the	  underlying	  economics	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  question.28	  This	  includes	  
the	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  of	  suppliers	  and	  consumers,	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  
new	  entry	  and	  substitute	  products.29	  The	  tendency	  elsewhere	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  
the	  use	  of	  competition	  law	  as	  a	  means	  of	  assisting	  new	  entry,	  particularly	  by	  
so-­‐called	  “new	  media”	  operators	  (i.e.	  distributors	  of	  audio-­‐visual	  content	  on	  
platforms	   other	   than	   traditional	   broadcast	   television,	   cable	   or	   satellite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Michael	  E	  Porter,	  ‘How	  Competitive	  Forces	  Shape	  Strategy’	  (1979)	  57(2)	  Harvard	  Business	  Review	  
137.	  
29	  ibid	  141.	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television).30	  Such	  an	  approach	  risks	  intervening	  in	  a	  market	  to	  change	  its	  very	  
structure,	  which	  it	  is	  argued	  is	  beyond	  the	  legitimate	  remit	  of	  competition	  law	  
and	  policy.	  This	   is	  especially	  worrisome	  in	  the	  case	  of	  emerging	  markets	   in	  
innovation-­‐driven	  industries	  like	  pay-­‐TV,	  in	  which	  rational,	  profit-­‐maximising	  
firms	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  better	  placed	  than	  regulators	  to	  identify	  and	  discipline	  
potentially	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct.	  
	  
In	  this	  respect,	  the	  thesis	  plays	  “devil’s	  advocate”	  by	  challenging	  the	  basis	  on	  
which	  UK/EU	  and	  Australian	  competition	  law	  is	  used	  to	  regulate	  the	  exercise	  
of	   market	   power	   by	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   in	   the	   premium	   content	  
context.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  proceeds	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  prevalence	  of	  market	  
power	   is	   largely	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   specific	   economic	   characteristics	   of	  
premium	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  the	  commercial	  arrangements	  which	  are	  entered	  into	  
by	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  in	  response	  to	  such	  characteristics.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  
these	  characteristics	  are	  more	  pronounced	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  Hence	  the	  thesis	  
reinforces	   the	   importance	   of	   regulating	  market	   power	   over	   the	   supply	   of	  
premium	   pay-­‐TV	   in	   the	   light	   of	   this	   context-­‐specific	   concept	   of	   effective	  
competition.	  
	  
1.3.1	   Effective	  competition	  and	  the	  goals	  of	  competition	  law	  and	  policy	  
The	  concept	  of	  “effective	  competition”	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  main	  provisions	  
of	  UK/EU	  and	  Australian	  competition	  law.	  According	  to	  the	  General	  Court	  (a	  
constituent	   court	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union),	   the	  
competition	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  prohibition	  on	  anti-­‐competitive	  agreements	  in	  
Article	  101	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (“TFEU”)	  
is	  taken	  to	  mean	  effective	  competition.31	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  prohibition	  
on	  the	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  in	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU,	  a	  dominant	  position	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Damien	  Geradin,	   ‘Access	  to	  Content	  by	  New	  Media	  Platforms:	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  Competition	  Law	  
Problems’	  (2005)	  30(1)	  European	  Law	  Review	  68.	  
31	   Case	   T-­‐168/01	   GlaxoSmithKline	   Services	   Unlimited	   v	   Commission	   [2006]	   ECR	   II-­‐2969	   [109];	  
Consolidated	   versions	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   European	  Union	   and	   the	   Treaty	   on	   the	   Functioning	   of	   the	  
European	  Union	  [2012]	  OJ	  C326/1	  (“TFEU”).	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defined	  as	  the	  power	  to	  “prevent	  effective	  competition	  being	  maintained	  on	  
the	  relevant	  market.”32	  The	  substantive	  test	  under	  the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  
is	   whether	   a	  merger	  would	   “significantly	   impede	   effective	   competition”.33	  
Similarly,	   in	   Australia,	   as	   the	   Trade	   Practices	   Tribunal	   (now	   the	   Australian	  
Competition	  Tribunal	  (“ACT”))	  noted	  in	  QCMA,34	  “[c]ompetition	  is	  a	  process	  
rather	  than	  a	  situation.	  […]	  whether	  firms	  compete	  is	  very	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  markets	  in	  which	  they	  operate.”35	  
	  
1.3.1.1	  Role	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  competition	  policy	  
Competition	  policy	  is	  not	  about	  the	  pursuit	  of	  competition	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  
but	   rather	   to	   realise	   the	   consumer	   benefits	   of	   competition.36	   In	   economic	  
terms,	  there	  is	  a	  choice	  of	  welfare	  standards	  in	  competition	  law	  between	  the	  
total	  welfare	  standard	  and	  the	  consumer	  welfare	  standard.	  As	  a	  measure	  of	  
how	  well	  an	  industry	  performs,	  total	  welfare	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  producer	  
surplus	   and	   consumer	   surplus	   (or	   consumer	  welfare).37	  Whether	   the	   total	  
welfare	  or	  consumer	  welfare	  standard	  applies	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  framing	  
of	  the	  objectives	  of	  competition	  law	  and	  policy.38	  This	  broadly	  concerns	  the	  
relative	   importance	   that	   is	   attached	   to	   economic	   and	   non-­‐economic	  
considerations.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	   Case	   27/76	   United	   Brands	   Company	   and	   United	   Brands	   Continentaal	   BV	   v	   Commission	   of	   the	  
European	  Communities	  [1978]	  ECR	  207;	  (1978)	  1	  CMLR	  429	  [65];	  Case	  85/76	  Hoffmann-­‐La	  Roche	  &	  Co	  
AG	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  461	  [38].	  
33	   Council	   Regulation	   No.139/2004	   of	   20	   January	   2004	   on	   the	   control	   of	   concentrations	   between	  
undertakings	  [2004]	  OJ	  L24/1,	  as	  amended	  by	  Commission	  Regulation	  No.1033/2008	  [2008]	  OJ	  L279/3	  
and	  Commission	  Implementing	  Regulation	  No.1269/2013	  [2013]	  OJ	  L336/1	  (“EU	  Merger	  Regulation”)	  
art	  2(3).	  
34	  Re	  Queensland	  Co-­‐Op	  Milling	  Association	  Limited	  and	  Defiance	  Holdings	  Limited	  (1976)	  8	  ALR	  481;	  
(1976)	  ATPR	  40-­‐012	  (QCMA).	  
35	  ibid	  [17,246].	  
36	  Prof	  Frederick	  C	  Hilmer,	  Mark	  Rayner	  and	  Geoffrey	  Taperell,	  ‘National	  Competition	  Policy	  Review’	  
(Australian	   Government	   Publishing	   Service,	   25	   August	   1993)	   (“Hilmer	   Report”)	   xvi	  
<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/National	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  report,	  The	  Hilmer	  Report,	  August	  
1993.pdf>	  accessed	  16	  August	  2017.	  
37	  Massimo	  Motta,	  Competition	  Policy:	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2004)	  18-­‐19.	  
38	  ibid.	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For	  instance,	  at	  the	  EU	  level,	  there	  are	  the	  competing	  goals	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Lisbon.39	  However,	  with	  growing	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  for	  economic	  analysis	  
as	  part	  of	  the	  modernisation	  of	  EU	  competition	  law,	  there	  has	  been	  increasing	  
emphasis	   on	   the	   maximisation	   of	   consumer	   welfare	   (especially	   by	   the	  
European	   Commission).40	   By	   contrast,	   preference	   for	   the	   total	   welfare	  
standard	  in	  Australia	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  “public	  
benefit”	   in	   relation	   to	   authorisation	   applications	   and	   notifications.41	  More	  
generally,	   however,	   when	   dealing	   with	   consumers	   who	   are	   individuals	   as	  
opposed	   to	   companies,	   there	   is	   said	   to	   be	   a	   preference	   for	   adopting	   the	  
consumer	  welfare	  standard.42	  
	  
1.3.1.2	  Relationship	  between	  the	  consumer	  interest	  and	  the	  citizen	  interest	  
Whilst	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  “citizen”	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  context	  and	  may	  
vary	  over	  time,43	  it	  can	  generally	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  individual’s	  interests	  
in	   relation	   to	   the	   state.	   This	   includes	   the	   role	   of	   the	   individual	   citizen	   in	  
participating	   in	   civil	   society	   by	   engaging	   in	   a	   range	   of	   social,	   cultural	   and	  
political	   activities.44	   In	   fulfilling	   this	   role,	   the	   citizen	   interest	   is	   about	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  amending	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  the	  European	  
Community	  [2007]	  OJ	  C306/1.	  
40	  ‘Rules	  Applicable	  to	  Merger	  Control’	  (European	  Commission,	  1	  December	  2014)	  para	  61;	  Guidance	  
on	  the	  Commission’s	  enforcement	  priorities	  in	  applying	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  
of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  abusive	  exclusionary	  conduct	  by	  dominant	  undertakings	  OJ	  C(2009)45/7,	  
para	  19.	  
41	  Re	  Qantas	  Airways	  Limited	  [2004]	  ACompT	  9,	  42-­‐875;	  Re	  Howard	  Smith	  Industries	  Pty	  Ltd	  (1977)	  28	  
FLR	  385,	  391.	  Generally	  speaking,	  authorisation	  and	  notification	  provide	  statutory	  protection	  against	  
legal	  action	  in	  respect	  of	  conduct	  that	  might	  otherwise	  breach	  Australian	  competition	  law,	  when	  the	  
public	   benefit	   from	   the	   conduct	   outweighs	   any	   public	   detriment.	   See,	   ‘Authorisations	   and	  
Notifications:	   A	   Summary’	   (Australian	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Commission,	   January	   2011)	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Authorisations%20and%20notifications%20a%20summary.p
df>	  accessed	  30	  August	  2017.	  
42	  Victoria	  Daskalova,	  ‘Consumer	  Welfare	  in	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  What	  Is	  It	  (Not)	  About?’	  (2015)	  11(1)	  
Competition	  Law	  Review	  133,	  141.	  
43	  See,	  Janet	  Newman	  and	  John	  Clarke,	  Publics,	  Politics	  &	  Power:	  Remaking	  the	  Public	  in	  Public	  Services	  
(Sage	  Publications	  2009).	  
44	  On	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  citizen	  interest	  in	  the	  media	  sector,	  see	  ‘‘Citizens’	  and	  the	  ACMA	  -­‐	  Exploring	  
the	  Concepts	  within	  Australian	  Media	  and	  Communications	  Regulation:	  Occasional	  Paper’	  (Australian	  
Communications	  and	  Media	  Authority,	  June	  2010);	  Sonia	  Livingstone,	  ‘What	  is	  the	  Citizen’s	  Interest	  in	  
Communication	  Regulation?	  Ofcom’s	  Agenda	  for	  ‘Citizens,	  Communications	  and	  Convergence’’	  (Paper	  
presented	  to	  the	  Media,	  Communication	  and	  Humanity	  Conference,	  London	  School	  of	  Economics,	  21-­‐
23	   September	   2008)	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than	  private	  interests.45	  In	  furthering	  the	  citizen	  interest,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  what	  
is	  good	  for	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  concept	  of	  “consumer”	  refers	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  an	  individual	  
in	   relation	   to	   a	   market.	   This	   includes	   participation	   in	   the	   marketplace	   by	  
purchasing	   or	   otherwise	   consuming	   goods	   and	   services.46	   The	   purchasing	  
decisions	  of	  consumers	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  public	  responsibility,	  
with	  the	  social	  practice	  of	  the	  ethical	  consumer	  “voting	  with	  their	  dollar”.47	  
Generally	  speaking,	  however,	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals	  as	  consumers	  are	  said	  
to	  be	  motivated	  by	  personal	  desire	  and	  self-­‐interest.	  The	  consumer	  interest	  
is	   commonly	   described	   in	   terms	   of	   lower	   prices,	   better	   quality	   and	   more	  
innovative	  products.	  	  
	  
The	   focus	   in	   promoting	   the	   consumer	   interest	   is	   on	  making	  markets	  work	  
better	  for	  consumers	  (i.e.	  the	  purpose	  of	  competition	  law	  and	  policy).	  In	  doing	  
this,	   the	   citizen	   interest	  may	   be	   protected	   because	   the	   state	   includes	   the	  
marketplace.48	   To	   some	   extent,	   the	  market	   will	   deliver	   on	   the	   interest	   of	  
citizens	   in	   being	   able	   to	   access	   the	   services,	   content	   and	   skills	   needed	   to	  
participate	  in	  civil	  society.49	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  state	  extends	  beyond	  the	  
marketplace,	  so	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  may	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  citizen	  
interest.	   Hence	   regulatory	   intervention	   in	   the	   market	   other	   than	   under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21561/1/whatisthecitizeninterestin%28LSEROversion%29.pdf>	  accessed	  27	  
March	  2018.	  
45	  Georgina	  Born	  and	  Tony	  Prosser,	  ‘Culture	  and	  Consumerism:	  Citizenship,	  Public	  Service	  Broadcasting	  
and	  the	  BBC’s	  Fair	  Trading	  Obligations’	  (2001)	  64(5)	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  657,	  671.	  
46	  On	  the	  ideological	  tension	  between	  the	  conception	  of	  individuals	  as	  consumers	  and	  citizens	  in	  the	  
media	  context,	  see	  Sonia	  Livingstone	  and	  Peter	  Lunt,	  Media	  Regulation:	  Governance	  and	  the	  Interests	  
of	   Citizens	   and	   Consumers	   (2011	   Sage	   Publications);	   Sonia	   Livingstone,	   Peter	   Lunt,	   Laura	   Miller,	  
‘Citizens,	   Consumers	   and	   the	   Citizen-­‐Consumer:	   Articulating	   the	   Citizen	   Interest	   in	   Media	   and	  
Communications	  Regulation’	  (2007)	  1(1)	  Discourse	  &	  Communication	  63-­‐89;	  Sonia	  Livingstone,	  Peter	  
Lunt	   and	   Laura	   Miller,	   ‘Citizens	   and	   Consumers:	   Discursive	   Debates	   During	   and	   After	   the	  
Communications	  Act	  2003’	  (2007)	  29(4)	  Media,	  Culture	  &	  Society	  613-­‐638.	  
47	  Josée	  Johnston,	  ‘The	  Citizen-­‐Consumer	  Hybrid:	  Ideological	  Tensions	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Whole	  Foods	  
Market’	  (2008)	  37(3)	  Theory	  and	  Society	  229-­‐270.	  
48	  ‘Citizens,	  Communications	  and	  Convergence:	  Discussion	  Paper’	  (Ofcom,	  11	  July	  2008)	  para	  2.20.	  
49	  ibid	  para	  2.27.	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general	  competition	  law,	  based	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  
outcomes	  required	  by	  society	  which	  would	  not	  be	  delivered	  by	  the	  market	  
alone.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  broader	  public	  interest.50	  
	  
1.3.1.3	  Focus	  in	  adopting	  the	  consumer	  welfare	  standard	  
The	   thesis	   adopts	   the	   consumer	   welfare	   standard	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
evaluating	   the	   prevailing	   regulatory	   and	   competitive	   landscapes.	   The	  
consumer	   welfare	   standard	   relates	   to	   citizen	   interests	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  
promoting	  the	  consumer	  interest	  may	  also	  serve	  the	  citizen	  interest.	  Beyond	  
this,	  there	  is	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  the	  broader	  public	  
interest.	  The	  thesis	  considers	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  consumer	  interest	  and	  the	  
citizen	   interest	   by	   exploring	   regulatory	   issues	   at	   the	   intersection	   between	  
general	  competition	  law	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  legislation.	  
	  
In	   adopting	   the	   consumer	   welfare	   standard,	   the	   focus	   should	   be	   on	   “the	  
outcomes	  for	  consumers	  that	  competition	   in	  a	  particular	  market	  delivers	  –	  
not	  the	  particular	  form	  that	  the	  competition	  process	  takes.”51	  Such	  outcomes	  
can	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  determine	  in	  some	  industries	  than	  others,	  particularly	  
where	   there	   is	   a	   rapid	   rate	  of	   technological	  development.	   The	   importance	  
that	   the	   thesis	   places	   on	   adopting	   a	   context-­‐specific	   concept	   of	   effective	  
competition	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  aims	  to	  minimise	  the	  enforcement	  errors	  
in	   using	   inappropriate	   theories	   of	   harm	   that	   may	   render	   the	   prevailing	  
regulatory	  frameworks	   ineffective	  and	  potentially	  counterproductive.	  More	  
broadly,	   it	   reinforces	   the	   importance	   of	   avoiding	   an	   overly-­‐interventionist	  
approach	  in	  regulating	  commercial	  arrangements	  that	  are	  ultimately	  entered	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  ibid	  para	  2.28;	  Shalini	  Venturelli,	  Liberalising	  the	  European	  Media:	  Politics,	  Regulation,	  and	  the	  Public	  
Sphere	  (Clarendon	  Press	  1998)	  72;	  Lesley	  Hitchens,	  ‘Citizen	  versus	  Consumer	  in	  the	  Digital	  World’	  in	  
Andrew	  Kenyon,	  TV	  Futures:	  Digital	  Television	  Policy	  in	  Australia	  (Melbourne	  University	  Press	  2007)	  9.	  
51	  Simon	  Bishop	  and	  Mike	  Walker,	  The	  Economics	  of	  EC	  Competition	  Law:	  Concepts,	  Application	  and	  
Measurement	  (3rd	  edn,	  Sweet	  &	  Maxwell	  2010)	  20-­‐21.	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into	  by	  rational	  profit-­‐maximising	  firms,52	  in	  naturally	  oligopolistic,	  vertically-­‐
related	  markets.	  	  
	  
1.3.2	   Network	  industry	  aspect	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
As	  a	  network	  industry,	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  typically	  comprised	  of	  a	  series	  of	  oligopolistic,	  
vertically-­‐related	   markets.	   High	   sunk	   costs	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   network	  
effects	  (reinforced	  by	  the	  multi-­‐sided	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers)	  mean	  that	  
there	   is	   a	   tendency	   towards	   high	   market	   concentration	   in	   the	   supply	   of	  
premium	  pay-­‐TV.	  The	  vertical	   structure	  of	  markets	   in	   the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  
context	  is	  underpinned	  by	  the	  main	  types	  of	  commercial	  arrangements	  which	  
rights	  owners	  and	   traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  enter	   into	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  
internalise	   such	   costs.	   This	   includes	   consolidation	   by	   merger	   and	   vertical	  
integration,	   exclusive	   licensing	   and	   joint	   selling.	   The	   cumulative	   effect	   of	  
these	  arrangements	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  in	  the	  ownership	  
of	  the	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  premium	  content	  and/or	  control	  over	  the	  means	  of	  
supplying	  premium	  content	  to	  viewers.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	   See	   generally,	   Thomas	   Hoehn,	   Carmen	   Matutes,	   Paul	   Seabright	   and	   Stefan	   Szymanski,	   ‘The	  
Americanization	  of	  European	  Football’	  (1999)	  14(28)	  Economic	  Policy	  203.	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To	  maximise	  the	  return	  on	  the	  significant	  investment	  that	  is	  typically	  involved	  
in	   the	   production	   of	   premium	   content,	   the	   rights	   to	   broadcast	   premium	  
content	  are	  often	  granted	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	  for	  a	  defined	  period	  of	  time.	  
Rights	   owners	   may	   integrate	   forwards	   into	   the	   retail	   supply	   of	   premium	  
content	   to	   viewers.	   Pay-­‐TV	   providers	   may	   integrate	   backwards	   into	   the	  
production	  of	  premium	  content,	  to	  internalise	  some	  of	  the	  transaction	  costs	  
otherwise	   involved	   in	   distributing	   or	   acquiring	   the	   rights	   to	   broadcast	  
premium	  content.	  Exclusivity	  can	  also	  form	  part	  of	  joint	  selling	  arrangements	  
by	  the	  clubs	  in	  a	  league,	  which	  further	  intensifies	  the	  level	  of	  concentration	  in	  
the	  wholesale	  supply	  and	  acquisition	  of	  sports	  rights.	  	  
	  
Together	  with	  multi-­‐media	  and	  conglomerate	  concentrations	   in	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  
industry,	  such	  commercial	  arrangements	  reinforce	  the	  tendency	  for	  the	  rights	  
to	  broadcast	  premium	  content	  to	  be	  concentrated	  amongst	  a	  relatively	  small	  
number	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   providers.	   Such	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   can	   enjoy	   significant	  
economies	   of	   scale	   in	   the	   retail	   distribution	   of	   premium	   content	   as	   a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  positive	  externalities	  attendant	  with	  having	  established	  a	  
large	  subscriber	  base.53	  This	  is	  significant	  because,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  Chapters	  
5	   to	   7,	   mergers	   and	   horizontal/vertical	   integration	   are	   becoming	   more	  
prevalent	   as	   firms	   seek	   to	   capitalise	   on	   the	   opportunities	   presented	   by	  
technological	  convergence.	  It	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  possible	  displacement	  effects	  
of	  the	  dynamic	  aspect	  of	  competition	  and	  the	  multi-­‐sided	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
providers.	   However,	   as	   identified	   in	   Chapter	   8,	   relatively	   little	   is	   currently	  
known	  about	  the	  precise	  market	  impact	  of	  such	  effects.	  
	  
1.3.3	   Multi-­‐sided	  platform	  characteristics	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  
Pay-­‐TV	  providers	  act	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  by	  operating	  as	  intermediaries	  
between	  content	  producers/rights	  owners	  (where	  content	  is	  not	  produced	  in-­‐
house),	  advertisers	  (where	  funded,	  at	   least	   in	  part,	  by	  advertising	  revenue)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Communications,	  The	  Ownership	  of	  the	  News	  (HL	  2007-­‐08,	  122-­‐II)	  243.	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and	  subscribers.	  The	  concept	  of	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  is	  an	  application	  of	  two-­‐
sided	  market	  theory.54	  Two-­‐sided	  markets	  are	  said	  to	  arise:	  
	  
where	  the	  participants	  on	  each	  side	  care	  directly	  about	   the	  
number	   of	   participants	   on	   the	   other	   (so	   there	   are	   bilateral	  
network	  externalities).	  The	  two	  sides	  are	  intermediated	  by	  a	  
platform,	  or	  platforms,	  which	  typically	  compete	  for	  business	  
from	   both	   sides	   […]	   so	   the	   platform	   problem	   involves	  
appropriate	  pricing	  for	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  market.55	  
	  
By	  supplying	  viewers	  with	  access	  to	  content,	  content	  producers/rights	  owners	  
with	  access	  to	  viewers	  and	  advertisers	  with	  exposure	  to	  potential	  customers,	  
pay-­‐TV	   providers	   compete	   for	   business	   on	   at	   least	   two	   different	   but	  
inextricably	  linked	  sides.56	  Network	  externalities	  exist	  between	  the	  different	  
sides	   which	   influence	   the	   pricing	   and	   other	   strategic	   decisions	   of	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers.	  It	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  take	  each	  side	  into	  consideration	  when	  
assessing	   the	   competitive	   effects	   of	   such	   decisions.	   In	   assessing	   the	  
competitive	  effects	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms,	  
the	   standard	   conceptual	   framework	   remains	   fundamentally	   appropriate.	  
However,	  in	  applying	  the	  principles	  which	  underpin	  the	  framework,	  the	  need	  
for	  multi-­‐sided	   platforms	   to	   “get	   all	   sides	   on	   board”	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  
account.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Since	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  on	  the	  multi-­‐sided	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  pay-­‐
TV	  industry	  more	  broadly,	  it	  uses	  the	  expression	  “multi-­‐sided	  platform”	  (instead	  of	  two-­‐sided	  or	  multi-­‐
sided	  market),	   in	  common	  with	  Evans	  and	  Schmalensee.	  David	  S	  Evans	  and	  Richard	  L	  Schmalensee,	  
Matchmakers:	  The	  New	  Economics	  of	  Multisided	  Platforms	  (Harvard	  Business	  Review	  Press	  2016).	  
55	  Simon	  P	  Anderson	  and	  Stephen	  Coate,	  ‘Market	  Provision	  of	  Broadcasting:	  A	  Welfare	  Analysis’	  (2005)	  
72(4)	  The	  Review	  of	  Economic	  Studies	  947,	  950.	  
56	  See,	  Jean-­‐Charles	  Rochet	  and	  Jean	  Tirole,	  ‘Platform	  Competition	  in	  Two-­‐Sided	  Markets’	  (2003)	  1(4)	  
Journal	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Association	  990;	  David	  S	  Evans,	  ‘The	  Antitrust	  Economics	  of	  Multi-­‐
Sided	   Platform	  Markets’	   (2003)	   20(2)	   Yale	   Journal	   on	   Regulation	   325;	   David	   S	   Evans	   and	   Richard	  
Schmalensee,	   ‘The	   Industrial	   Organization	   of	   Markets	   with	   Two-­‐Sided	   Platforms’	   (2007)	   3(1)	  
Competition	  Policy	  Insights	  151.	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The	   importance	   of	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   specific	   economic	  
characteristics	  of	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  was	  recently	  affirmed	  by	  the	  ECJ,	  in	  
its	   application	   of	   Article	   101	   of	   the	   TFEU	   to	   card	   payment	   systems	   in	   the	  
Cartes	   Bancaires	   and	   MasterCard	   cases.57	   The	   interactions	   between	   the	  
various	  sides	  of	  a	  multi-­‐sided	  platform	  do	  not	  in	  themselves	  raise	  competition	  
issues.	   As	   the	   European	   Commission	   noted	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   recent	  
Facebook/WhatsApp	  merger,	  “[t]he	  existence	  of	  network	  effects	  as	  such	  does	  
not	   a	   priori	   indicate	   a	   competition	   problem	   in	   the	   market	   affected	   by	   a	  
merger.”58	   There	  needs	   to	  be	  a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  analysis	  of	  network	  effects.59	  
Proceeding	  on	  this	  basis,	  the	  thesis	  builds	  on	  these	  rulings	  and	  the	  two-­‐sided	  
market	   theory	   literature,60	   by	   assessing	   the	   multi-­‐sided	   nature	   of	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  in	  the	  premium	  content	  context.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  seeks	  to	  provide	  a	  
perspective	   on	   how	   to	   incorporate	   multi-­‐sided	   considerations	   into	  
competition	  law	  analysis	  in	  this	  context.	  
	  
1.4	   Timeliness	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
The	   significance	   of	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   on	   the	   specific	   economic	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  market	  is	  reinforced	  by	  its	  timeliness.	  It	  is	  timely	  from	  a	  
technological	   perspective	   in	   view	  of	   the	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	   Internet	   as	   a	  
broadcasting	  platform	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  online	  streaming.	  Linked	  to	  this	  is	  the	  
increasing	  notoriety	  of	  premium	  drama	  within	  the	  business	  models	  of	  online	  
streaming	   services	  and,	   in	   response,	   traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	   It	   is	   also	  
timely	  due	  to	  ongoing	  investigations	  into	  the	  supply	  of	  premium	  content	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Case	  C‑67/13	  P	  Groupement	  des	  Cartes	  Bancaires	  (CB)	  v	  European	  Commission	  [2014]	  5	  CMLR	  22;	  
Case	  C-­‐382/12	  P	  MasterCard	  Inc	  and	  Others	  v	  European	  Commission	  [2014]	  5	  CMLR	  23.	  These	  cases	  
are	  referred	  to	  further	  in	  Chapter	  6	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
58	  Facebook/WhatsApp	  (Case	  No	  COMP/M.7217)	  OJ	  C(2014)7239	  [130].	  This	  merger	  is	  considered	  in	  
Chapter	  5	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
59	  ibid	  [135].	  
60	  Bernard	  Caillaud	  and	  Bruno	  Jullien,	  ‘Competing	  Cybermediaries’	  (2001)	  45(4-­‐6)	  European	  Economic	  
Review	  797;	  Bernard	  Caillaud	  and	  Bruno	  Jullien,	  ‘Chicken	  &	  Egg:	  Competition	  Among	  Intermediation	  
Service	  Providers’	  (2003)	  34(2)	  RAND	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  309;	  Jean-­‐Charles	  Rochet	  and	  Jean	  Tirole,	  
‘Two-­‐Sided	   Markets:	   An	   Overview’	   (2006)	   37	   Rand	   Journal	   of	   Economics	   645;	   Mark	   Armstrong,	  
‘Competition	  in	  Two-­‐Sided	  Markets’	  (2006)	  37	  The	  Rand	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  668.	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pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  at	  the	  EU	  level,	  and	  the	  proposed	  reform	  of	  competition	  
law	   and	   media	   ownership	   rules	   in	   Australia	   (as	   discussed	   below).	   The	  
comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  prevailing	  competitive	  conditions	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
Australia	  is	  therefore	  potentially	  invaluable	  for	  informing	  the	  debates	  in	  both	  
countries	   on	   the	   appropriate	   approach	   to	  media	  market	   regulation	   in	   the	  
digital	  era.	  
	  
1.4.1	   Growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  premium	  drama	  
Major	  technological	  developments	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis	  include	  the	  growth	  
of	  the	  Internet	  as	  a	  broadcasting	  platform	  (which	  is	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  roll-­‐
out	   of	   increasingly	   fast	   broadband),	   the	   rise	   of	   online	   streaming	   and	   the	  
mobile	  app	  revolution.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  3	  on	  the	  
competitive	   landscapes	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia,	   the	   entry	   of	   established	  
telecommunications	   service	   providers	   and	   online	   streaming	   services	   are	  
transforming	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  premium	  content	  is	  supplied	  and	  consumed.	  
The	   bundling	   of	   communications	   services	   and	   content	   is	   increasingly	  
common,	  as	  is	  “multi-­‐homing”	  by	  viewers	  and	  advertisers,	  where	  more	  than	  
one	  service/platform	  is	  used	  to	  consume	  content	  or	  place	  advertisements.	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  some	  key	  distinctions	  between	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  other	  
pay-­‐TV	   services	   remain.	   Most	   notable	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   online	   streaming	  
services	  have	  not	  yet	  entered	  the	  market	  for	  live	  sports	  broadcasting	  (though	  
they	   may	   do	   at	   some	   point	   in	   the	   future).	   With	   the	   ongoing	   trend	   of	  
traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   and	   new	   entrants	   investing	   more	   in	   original	  
drama,	  this	  is	  a	  critical	  time	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  developments	  on	  
the	  competitive	  landscapes	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  	  
	  
The	  commissioning	  of	  premium	  drama	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  not	  new.61	  However,	  it	  is	  
on	  the	  rise	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  dedicated	  premium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  For	  example,	  HBO’s	  The	  Sopranos	  aired	  from	  1999	  to	  2007	  and	  remained	  its	  most	  watched	  drama	  
series	   until	   it	   was	   overtaken	   by	  Game	   of	   Thrones	   in	   2014.	   Daisy	  Wyatt,	   ‘Game	   of	   Thrones	   beats	  
Sopranos	   to	   become	   HBO’s	   most-­‐watched	   show’	   The	   Independent	   (6	   June	   2014)	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drama	  channels,	  increasing	  advertising	  spend	  on	  slots	  in	  premium	  dramas,62	  
and	   rising	   viewership	   figures	   and	   subscriber	   spend	   on	   premium	   drama.	  
Premium	  drama	  also	   represents	  an	  area	  of	  potential	  growth	   for	   the	  Major	  
Hollywood	   Studios,	   at	   a	   time	  when	   the	   economics	   of	   the	   cinema	   industry	  
become	  relatively	  less	  attractive.63	  These	  trends	  may	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	  
the	  growth	  in	  online	  streaming	  services	  whose	  business	  models	  are	  based	  on	  
attracting	  subscribers	  with	   the	  on-­‐demand	  availability	  of	  exclusive,	  original	  
drama	  (often	  for	  unlimited	  viewing	  on	  a	  number	  of	  devices	  for	  a	  fixed	  fee).	  
The	  most	  prolific	  in	  this	  respect,	  to	  date,	  is	  arguably	  Netflix.	  Since	  releasing	  its	  
first	  original	  show	  Lilyhammer	   in	  February	  2012,	  Netflix	  has	  reported	  more	  
than	  a	  tenfold	  increase	  in	  the	  net	  worth	  of	  its	  content	  library.64	  It	  is	  said	  to	  
have	   some	   104million	   subscribers	   worldwide	   and	   creating	   new	   content	   is	  
claimed	  to	  be	  critical	  to	  its	  success.65	  
	  
1.4.1.1	  Global	  phenomenon	  around	  premium	  drama	  
Despite	  being	  typically	  original	  and	  exclusive	  in	  nature,	  scarcity	  is	  less	  of	  an	  
issue	   with	   premium	   drama	   than	   live	   sporting	   events	   or	   Hollywood	  
blockbusters	   (as	   will	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   following	   chapter).	   Competing	   in	   the	  
supply	   of	   premium	   drama	   is	   therefore	   generally	   more	   accessible	   to	   new	  
entrants.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  for	  SVOD	  platforms	  which,	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  
typically	  have	  lower	  price	  points	  than	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  The	  impact	  
of	  this	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  on	  the	  level	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-­‐entertainment/tv/news/game-­‐of-­‐thrones-­‐beats-­‐the-­‐sopranos-­‐
ratings-­‐to-­‐become-­‐hbo-­‐s-­‐most-­‐watched-­‐show-­‐9500777.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
62	  Brian	  Steinberg,	  ‘TV	  Ad	  Prices:	  Football,	  Empire,	  Walking	  Dead,	  Big	  Bang	  Theory	  Top	  the	  List’	  Variety	  
(29	   September	   2015)	   <http://variety.com/2015/tv/news/tv-­‐advertising-­‐prices-­‐football-­‐empire-­‐
walking-­‐dead-­‐big-­‐bang-­‐theory-­‐1201603800/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
63	   See,	   ‘Split	   Screens:	   A	   tale	   of	   two	   Tinseltowns’	   The	   Economist	   (23	   February	   2013)	  
<https://www.economist.com/news/business/21572218-­‐tale-­‐two-­‐tinseltowns-­‐split-­‐screens>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
64	  The	  net	  value	  of	  Netflix’s	   total	  content	   library	  reportedly	   increased	  from	  US$361,979	   in	  2010	  to	  
US$4,899,028	   in	   2014.	   Netflix	   Inc	   Annual	   Report	   for	   the	   period	   ending	   31	   December	   2014,	   15	  
<https://ir.netflix.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1065280-­‐15-­‐6&>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
65	   ‘Netflix	   now	   has	   104	   million	   subscribers	   worldwide’	   BBC	   News	   (18	   July	   2017)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-­‐40638924>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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new	   entry	   by	   SVOD	   platforms	   in	   the	  UK	   and	   Australia.	   Online	   distribution	  
means	   that	   SVOD	   platforms	   can	   also	   more	   easily	   develop	   international	  
operations	  and	  scale	  niche	  productions	  so	  that	  they	  are	  still	  profitable.	  The	  
growing	  global	  market	  for	  premium	  drama	  is	  therefore	  significant	  as	  regards	  
the	  possibilities	   for	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	   (and	  broadcasters	  more	  generally)	   to	  
monetise	  their	  content.	  This	  supports	  the	  argument	  made	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  
the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  in	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  must	  be	  assessed	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  the	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  presented	  by	  the	  international	  television	  
drama	  market.	  
	  
1.4.1.2	  Media	  globalisation	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  localness	  of	  content	  
Concomitant	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  global	  communications	  sector	  is	  the	  issue	  
of	   the	   protection	   and	   promotion	   of	   the	   production	   of	   local	   content.	   As	  
viewers	   increasingly	  consume	  audio-­‐visual	  content	  from	  around	  the	  World,	  
the	  question	  arises	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  protection/promotion	  of	  local	  
content	   remains	   a	   regulatory	   concern.	   It	   is	   suggested	   here	   that	   media	  
globalisation	  may,	  in	  fact,	  increase	  the	  perceived	  importance	  of	  localness	  of	  
content,	   as	   individuals	   seek	   to	   reconcile	   their	   local	   interests	   with	   their	  
responsibilities	   as	   global	   citizens.	   The	   question	   is	   then	   how	   local	   content	  
should	  be	  regulated	  i.e.	  through	  sector-­‐specific	  media	  ownership	  rules	  or	  by	  
other	   policy	  means	   (such	   as	   the	   public	   service	  mandates	   of	   public	   service	  
broadcasters	  and/or	  local	  content	  conditions	  in	  broadcasters’	  licences).	  	  
	  
Integral	  to	  ascertaining	  the	  most	  effective	  approach	  towards	  the	  regulation	  
of	  local	  content	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  “local	  content”	  is	  defined.	  The	  definition	  
of	   local	   content	   may	   vary	   between	   countries	   and	   between	   the	   different	  
regions	  of	  individual	  countries	  (i.e.	  the	  devolved	  nations	  of	  the	  UK,	  and	  the	  
federal	  states	  and	  territories	  of	  Australia).	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  how	  local	  
content	  is	  defined	  will,	  for	  instance,	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  media	  
ownership	  rules,	  and	  consequently	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and	  residual	  
	  	  26	  
role	   for	   general	   competition	   law	   enforcement.	   It	   may	   also	   influence	   how	  
broadcasters	  seek	  to	  differentiate	  their	  services	   in	  an	   increasingly	  crowded	  
market.	  It	  will	  be	  suggested	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  content	  is	  reinforced	  
in	  the	  digital	  era	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  broadcasters	  will	  seek	  to	  make	  their	  
propositions	   even	   more	   local,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   further	   differentiate	   their	  
services	  in	  the	  global	  marketplace.	  	  
	  
1.4.2	   Investigations	  into	  sport	  and	  movies	  on	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  EU	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  relation	  to	  premium	  drama,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
premium	   sport	   (and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   premium	  movies),	   the	   regulatory	  
focus	   firmly	   remains	   on	   the	   control	   over	   supply	   by	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers.	  In	  the	  UK,	  this	  includes	  Ofcom’s	  investigation	  in	  2014	  into	  the	  joint	  
selling	   arrangements	   of	   the	   Football	   Association	   Premier	   League	   Limited	  
(“FAPL”)	   for	   the	   live	   UK	   television	   rights	   to	   Premier	   League	   matches.66	   It	  
questioned	   whether	   the	   object	   or	   effect	   of	   such	   arrangements	   was	   the	  
restriction	  or	  distortion	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  UK	  and/or	  EU,	  in	  contravention	  
of	   the	   prohibition	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   agreements	   in	   Chapter	   I	   of	   the	  
Competition	  Act	  1998	  (“CA1998”)	  and/or	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  TFEU	  (set	  out	  
in	  Section	  1.5.1.2(ii)	  below).	  The	  investigation	  was	  closed	  in	  August	  2016.67	  
However,	  as	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  decision	  to	  close	  this	  investigation	  is	  not	  beyond	  
criticism.	  
	  
As	   regards	   the	   distribution	   of	   premium	   movie	   rights	   in	   the	   UK,	   the	  
Competition	  Commission	  (“CC”)	  (now	  the	  Competition	  and	  Markets	  Authority	  
(“CMA”)),	   carried	   out	   an	   investigation	   between	   2010	   and	   2012,68	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  ‘Competition	  Act	  investigation	  into	  the	  sale	  of	  live	  UK	  audio-­‐visual	  media	  rights	  to	  Premier	  League	  
matches’	  (Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Bulletin	  CW/01138/09/14).	  	  
67	   ‘Ofcom	  closes	   investigation	   into	  Premier	  League	   football	   rights’	   (Ofcom	  media	   release,	  8	  August	  
2016)	   <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-­‐ofcom/latest/media/media-­‐releases/2016/premier-­‐
league-­‐football-­‐rights>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
68	  ‘Movies	  on	  Pay	  TV	  Market	  Investigation:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Supply	  and	  Acquisition	  of	  Subscription	  Pay-­‐
TV	   Movie	   Rights	   and	   Services’	   (Competition	   Commission,	   2	   August	   2012)	  
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5519492940f0b614040001ca/main_report.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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investigations	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   are	   ongoing.	   In	   January	   2014,	   the	   European	  
Commission	  launched	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  distribution	  of	  movie	  rights	  in	  
the	  UK	  by	  the	  Major	  Hollywood	  Studios	  to	  Sky.69	  A	  Statement	  of	  Objections	  
from	   the	   European	   Commission	   asserts	   that	   contractual	   restrictions	   have	  
been	   put	   in	   place	   to	   prevent	   Sky	   from	   allowing	   EU	   consumers	   located	  
elsewhere	  to	  access	  satellite	  or	  online	  pay-­‐TV	  services	  available	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
Ireland.70	  By	  granting	  absolute	  territorial	  exclusivity	  to	  Sky,	  such	  restrictions	  
were	   considered	   to	   eliminate	   cross-­‐border	   competition	   between	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  and	  to	  partition	  the	  Internal	  market	  contrary	  to	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  
TFEU.71	   The	   European	   Commission	   has	   since	   accepted	   commitments	   from	  
Paramount	  Pictures	  (a	  subsidiary	  of	  Viacom),72	  but	  investigations	  continue	  in	  
respect	  of	  the	  other	  Major	  Hollywood	  Studios.	  
	  
Sky	  is	  also	  under	  the	  regulatory	  spotlight	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  proposed	  
acquisition	  by	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  of	  the	  61	  per	  cent	  shareholding	  in	  Sky	  
that	  it	  does	  not	  already	  own.73	  The	  proposed	  acquisition	  raises	  fundamental	  
questions	   about	   the	   tension	   that	   can	   arise	   between	   compliance	   with	   EU	  
competition	  law	  and	  protecting	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  ownership	  in	  the	  
UK.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  the	  European	  Commission	  has	  
unconditionally	   approved	   the	   proposed	   acquisition	   on	   competition	  
grounds.74	  However,	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  transaction	  looks	  set	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  ‘Commission	  investigates	  restrictions	  affecting	  cross	  border	  provision	  of	  pay	  TV	  services’	  (European	  
Commission	   press	   release,	   13	   January	   2014)	   <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐14-­‐
15_en.htm>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
70	  ‘Commission	  sends	  Statement	  of	  Objections	  on	  cross-­‐border	  provision	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  services	  available	  
in	  UK	  and	  Ireland’	  (European	  Commission	  press	  release,	  23	  July	  2015)	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_IP-­‐15-­‐5432_en.htm>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
71	  ibid.	  
72	   ‘Commission	   accepts	   commitments	   by	   Paramount	   on	   cross-­‐border	   pay-­‐TV	   services’	   (European	  
Commission	  press	  release,	  26	  July	  2016)	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐16-­‐2645_en.htm>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
73	  David	  Bond,	  Matthew	  Garrahan	  and	  Arash	  Massoudi,	  ‘21st	  Century	  Fox	  makes	  £11.7bn	  formal	  bid	  
for	   Sky’	   Financial	   Times	   (15	   December	   2016)	   <https://www.ft.com/content/1ca0eb1a-­‐c2c4-­‐11e6-­‐
9bca-­‐2b93a6856354>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
74	   ‘Commission	   clears	   21st	   Century	   Fox’s	   proposed	   acquisition	   of	   Sky	   under	   EU	   merger	   rules’	  
(European	   Commission	   press	   release	   IP/17/902,	   7	   April	   2017)	   <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_IP-­‐17-­‐902_en.htm>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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CMA	  for	  a	  Phase	  2	  investigation	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  media	  plurality	  and	  genuine	  
commitment	   to	   broadcasting	   standards.75	   There	   have	   been	   significant	  
industry	  developments	   since	   the	  previously	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  Sky	  by	  
News	  Corporation	  in	  2010	  (which	  was	  abandoned	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2011	  at	  
the	   height	   of	   the	   phone	   hacking	   scandal	   surrounding	   the	   News	   of	   the	  
World).76	   Despite	   such	   developments,	   the	   thesis	   argues	   the	   case	   for	   the	  
referral	   and	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   ensuring	   that	   the	   proposed	  
acquisition	  is	  assessed	  from	  a	  multi-­‐media,	  multi-­‐platform	  perspective.	  
	  
1.4.3	   Proposed	  reform	  of	  media	  ownership	  rules	  in	  Australia	  
Further	   to	   the	   final	   report	   in	   2012	   of	   the	   Convergence	   Review,77	   the	  
Broadcasting	   Legislation	   Amendment	   (Broadcasting	   Reform)	   Bill	   2017	  
(previously	   the	   Media	   Reform	   Bill	   2016)	   proposes	   the	   repeal	   of	   two	   key	  
Australian	  media	   ownership	   rules	   (as	   discussed	   in	   detail	   Chapter	   5	   of	   the	  
thesis).	  The	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  Bill	  reinforces	  the	  timeliness	  of	  this	  thesis	  
because	   the	   proposed	   reform	  would	   pave	   the	  way	   for	   firms	   to	   enter	   into	  
previously	   restricted	   transactions	   (including	   transactions	   of	   a	   cross-­‐media	  
nature,	  and	  consolidations	  between	  metropolitan	  and	  regional	  broadcasters).	  
This	   would	   enhance	   the	   ability	   of	   Australian	   media	   firms	   to	   realise	   the	  
economies	   of	   scale	   that	   are	   required	   to	   compete	   in	   an	   increasingly	   global	  
communications	  industry.78	  The	  thesis	  welcomes	  the	  proposed	  repeal	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Letter	  from	  the	  Department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  &	  Sport	  to	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox,	  Inc	  and	  Sky	  plc	  
(29	   June	   2017)	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623306/DCMS_L
etter_to_Sky_Fox_29_June_2017_Redacted.pdf>	  accessed	  21	  July	  2017;	  ‘Statement	  from	  the	  Culture	  
Secretary	   on	   the	   proposed	   Sky	   plc	   /	   21st	   Century	   Fox	   Inc.	   merger’	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-­‐from-­‐the-­‐culture-­‐secretary-­‐on-­‐the-­‐proposed-­‐
sky-­‐plc-­‐21st-­‐century-­‐fox-­‐inc-­‐merger>	   accessed	   14	   September	   2017.	   Consideration	   of	   the	   proposed	  
acquisition	  in	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  media	  plurality	  issue.	  
76	   James	   Robinson,	   ‘News	   Corp	   pulls	   out	   of	   BSkyB	   bid’	   The	   Guardian	   (13	   July	   2011)	  
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/jul/13/news-­‐corp-­‐pulls-­‐out-­‐of-­‐bskyb-­‐bid>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  
77	   ‘Convergence	  Review:	  Final	  Report’	   (Department	  of	  Broadband,	  Communications	  and	  the	  Digital	  
Economy,	   March	   2012)	   <http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/1339_convergence.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
78	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  Broadcasting	  Legislation	  Amendment	  (Media	  Reform)	  Bill	  2016,	  
para	  8.	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rules.	   It	   suggests	   how	   enduring	   concerns	   about	   local	   content	   could	   be	  
addressed	   through	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   modified	   version	   of	   the	   media-­‐
specific	  public	  interest	  test	  that	  is	  found	  in	  the	  UK	  merger	  control	  rules	  in	  the	  
Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  (“EA2002”)	  (referred	  to	  in	  Section	  1.5.1.2(i)	  below).	  
	  
As	   regards	   the	   broader	   communications	   landscape,	   on	   6	   September	   2016	  
Australia’s	  competition	  regulator,	  the	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  
Commission	  (“ACCC”),	  commenced	  a	  market	  study	  into	  the	  communications	  
sector.79	   It	   released	  an	   Issues	  Paper	  outlining	  the	  areas	   that	   it	  proposes	   to	  
explore	   as	   part	   of	   the	   study.80	   The	   growing	   availability	   of	   OTT	   television	  
services	  over	  the	  Internet	  and	  increasing	  use	  of	  mobile	  devices	  to	  access	  the	  
Internet	   are	   amongst	   key	   trends	   that	   the	   ACCC	   identifies	   as	   making	   the	  
market	   study	   timely.81	   The	   final	   report	   for	   this	   study	   is	   expected	   to	   be	  
released	  in	  November	  2017.	  
	  
1.4.4	   Recent	  and	  proposed	  reform	  of	  Australian	  competition	  law	  
The	  thesis	   is	  also	  opportune	  from	  a	  competition	  law	  perspective	  in	  view	  of	  
the	  recent	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  (“Harper	  Review”),82	  which	  undertook	  
a	  “root	  and	  branch”	  review	  of	  Australian	  competition	  law.	  The	  Harper	  Review	  
was	  timely	  because	  the	  most	  recent	  major	  review	  of	  Australian	  competition	  
law	  prior	  to	  this	  was	  undertaken	  by	  the	  National	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  
(“Hilmer	   Review”)	   in	   1992-­‐1993.83	   Since	   the	   Hilmer	   Review	   preceded	   the	  
launch	  of	  public	  Internet	  access	  in	  Australia	  in	  1996,	  it	  did	  not	  anticipate	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	   ‘ACCC	  to	  undertake	  market	  study	  of	   the	  communications	  sector’	   (ACCC	  media	  release	  144/16,	  4	  
August	   2016)	   <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-­‐release/accc-­‐to-­‐undertake-­‐market-­‐study-­‐of-­‐the-­‐
communications-­‐sector>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
80	   ‘Competition	   in	   Evolving	   Communications	   Markets:	   Issues	   Paper’	   (ACCC,	   September	   2016)	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Comms%20Market%20Study%20-­‐%20Issues%20Paper%20-­‐
%20September%202016.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
81	  ibid	  para	  2.7.	  
82	  Former	  Prime	  Minister	  the	  Hon	  Tony	  Abbott	  MP	  and	  former	  Minister	  for	  Small	  Business	  the	  Hon	  
Bruce	  Billson	  MP,	   ‘Review	  of	  Competition	  Policy’	   (Treasury	  of	  the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia	  
media	   release,	   4	   December	   2013)	   <http://bfb.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-­‐release/014-­‐2013/>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
83	  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36).	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myriad	   of	   competition	   issues	   relating	   to	   digitalisation	   or	   convergence.	   By	  
contrast,	  competition	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  specific	  area	  of	  focus	  
for	  the	  Harper	  Review,	  which	  published	  its	  final	  report	  in	  March	  2015.84	  	  
	  
A	   key	   recommendation	   of	   the	   Harper	   Review	   was	   the	   repeal	   of	   the	  
prohibition	  on	  the	  misuse	  of	  market	  power	  in	  the	  now	  former	  Section	  46	  of	  
the	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Act	   2010	   (“CCA”)	   (formerly	   the	   Trade	  
Practices	   Act	   1974	   (“TPA”)).85	   In	   place	   of	   this,	   it	   recommended	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  new	  Section	  46	  incorporating	  a	  “purpose	  and	  effects”	  test.86	  
This	  proposal	  was	  not	  new.87	  The	  former	  Section	  46	  prohibited	  a	  corporation	  
with	   a	   substantial	   degree	   of	   power	   in	   a	   market	   in	   Australia	   from	   taking	  
advantage	  of	  such	  power	  in	  that	  or	  any	  other	  market	  for	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  
proscribed	  purposes.88	  There	  has	  long	  been	  particular	  concern	  regarding	  the	  
difficulties	   of	   satisfying	   the	   “taking	   advantage”	   and	   “proscribed	   purpose”	  
requirements.89	   The	   Competition	   and	   Consumer	   Amendment	   (Misuse	   of	  
Market	  Power)	  Act	  2017,	  which	   received	  Royal	  Assent	  on	  23	  August	  2017,	  
duly	  amends	  the	  CCA.	  The	  new	  Section	  46	  is	  reproduced	  in	  Appendix	  1	  of	  the	  
thesis.	  The	  likely	  implications	  of	  the	  new	  Section	  46	  for	  the	  role	  of	  Australian	  
competition	  law	  in	  regulating	  access	  to	  premium	  content	  are	  considered	  in	  
Chapter	  7	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Professor	  Ian	  Harper,	  Peter	  Anderson,	  Su	  McCluskey	  and	  Michael	  O’Bryan	  QC,	  ‘Competition	  Policy	  
Review:	   Final	   Report’	   (Australian	   Government	   Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	  March	   2015)	   (“Harper	  
Report”)	   <http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2015/03/Competition-­‐policy-­‐review-­‐
report_online.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
85	  The	  CCA	  replaced	  the	  TPA	  as	  of	  1	  January	  2011.	  
86	  Harper	  Report	  (n	  84)	  62.	  
87	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Senator	  the	  Hon	  Gareth	  Evans	  QC	  Attorney-­‐General,	  Hon	  Barry	  Cohen	  MP	  Minister	  
for	  Home	  Affairs	  and	  Environment,	  and	  Hon	  Ralph	  Willis	  MP	  Minister	  for	  Employment	  and	  Industrial	  
Relations,	  ‘The	  Trade	  Practices	  Act:	  Proposals	  for	  Change’	  (Canberra,	  February	  1984)	  para	  30.	  
88	   The	   proscribed	   purposes	   were:	   (a)	   eliminating	   or	   substantially	   damaging	   a	   competitor	   of	   the	  
corporation	  or	  a	  body	  corporate	  related	  to	  the	  corporation	  in	  that	  or	  any	  other	  market;	  (b)	  preventing	  
the	  entry	  of	  a	  person	  into	  that	  or	  any	  other	  market;	  and	  (c)	  deterring	  or	  preventing	  a	  person	  from	  
engaging	  in	  competitive	  conduct	  in	  that	  or	  any	  other	  market.	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  
46.	  
89	  Re	  Eastern	  Express	  Pty	  Limited	  v	  General	  Newspapers	  Pty	  Limited	  [1991]	  FCA	  321	  [70].	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There	  is	  also	  the	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Amendment	  (Competition	  Policy	  
Review)	  Bill	  2017,	  which	  was	  introduced	  into	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  on	  
28	  March	  2017	  (two	  days	  after	   it	  passed	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Market	  Power	  Bill).	  
The	   Competition	   Policy	   Review	   Bill	   proposes	   (amongst	   other	   things)	  
amendments	  to	  the	  national	  access	  regime	  in	  Part	  IIIA	  of	  the	  CCA	  (which	  is	  
referred	   to	   in	   Section	   1.5.1.2(iii)	   below).	   The	   proposed	   amendments	   are	  
considered	   in	   Chapter	   7	   of	   the	   thesis.	   It	   will	   be	   suggested	   that	   such	  
amendments	  support	  the	  general	  tenet	  of	  this	  thesis,	  namely	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
increasing	   residual	   role	   for	   the	  enforcement	  of	   general	   competition	   law	   in	  
regulating	  the	  supply	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  Australia.	  
	  
Access	  to	  premium	  content	  and	  the	  specific	  economic	  characteristics	  of	  two-­‐
sided	  markets	   are	   also	   identified	   as	   key	   issues	   in	   the	   ACCC’s	   draft	  Media	  
Merger	   Guidelines.90	   The	   draft	   Guidelines	   were	   released	   for	   public	  
consultation	  on	  26	  August	  2016,	   in	   the	   light	  of	   the	   then	  proposed	  reforms	  
under	   the	   Broadcasting	   Reform	   Bill.	   Consultation	   on	   the	   draft	   Guidelines	  
closed	  on	  14	  October	  2016.	  A	  review	  of	  the	  ACCC’s	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  
is	   timely	   given	   that	   it	   has	   been	   more	   than	   a	   decade	   since	   the	   existing	  
Guidelines	  were	  published	  in	  2006.91	  However,	  as	  suggested	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  
the	  thesis,	  the	  draft	  Guidelines	  still	  represent	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  ACCC	  to	  
provide	   further	   clarification	   regarding	   the	   appropriate	   framework	   for	  
assessing	  media	  mergers	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  
	  
1.5	   Research	  Methodology	  
The	  thesis	  is	  a	  comparative	  study	  on	  the	  regulation	  of	  market	  power	  over	  the	  
supply	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  content	  and	  services	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  The	  
broadcasting	  and	  regulatory	   landscapes	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  bear	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  ‘Draft	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines’	  (ACCC,	  August	  2016)	  <https://consultation.accc.gov.au/mergers-­‐
and-­‐adjudication/draft-­‐media-­‐merger-­‐guidelines/supporting_documents/Draft	   Media	   Mergers	  
Guidelines.pdf>	  accessed	  18	  August	  2017.	  
91	   ‘Media	   Merger	   Guidelines’	   (ACCC,	   August	   2006)	   <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Media	  
Mergers	  -­‐	  2011.pdf>	  accessed	  18	  August	  2017.	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similarities.	  Both	  have	  a	  mixed	  system	  of	  public	  and	  commercial	   television	  
(with	  a	  strong	  PSB	   tradition),	  pay-­‐TV	   industries	  historically	  dominated	  by	  a	  
single	  pay-­‐TV	  provider,	   and	   concurrent	   regulation	  of	  media	  markets	  under	  
sector-­‐specific	  legislation	  and	  general	  competition	  law.	  There	  are	  also	  some	  
important	  differences,	  including	  the	  more	  comprehensive	  system	  of	  sector-­‐
specific	   regulation	   that	   prevails	   in	   Australia,	  where	   broadcast	  markets	   are	  
smaller	  and	  more	  concentrated	  than	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  approach	  to	  regulating	  
the	   supply	   of	   premium	   content	   in	   the	  UK	   is	   influenced	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   by	  
(amongst	  other	  things)	  the	  policy	  objective	  of	  promoting	  a	  single	  market	  for	  
audio-­‐visual	   media	   services,	   as	   implemented	   by	   the	   Audio	   Visual	   Media	  
Services	  Directive	  (“AVMSD”).92	  Whilst	  complicating	  the	  comparative	  aspect	  
of	  the	  thesis,	  such	  differences	  equally	  serve	  to	  further	  it.	  
	  
1.5.1	   Comparative	  analysis	  of	  regulatory	  frameworks	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  
The	   primary	   comparators	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   thesis	   are	   the	   UK	   and	  
Australia.	   Discussion	   on	   the	   changing	   broadcasting	   environments	   and	  
regulatory	   frameworks	   therefore	   focuses	   on	   these	   two	   jurisdictions.	  
However,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  UK’s	  accession	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  1973,93	  UK	  law	  
must	  be	  assessed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  direct	  effect	  and	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  
EU	  Member	   States.94	   UK	   law	  must	   follow	   EU	   law.	   In	   the	   competition	   law	  
context,	   this	   includes	   the	   system	   of	   parallel	   competence	   under	  which	   the	  
courts	  and	  national	  competition	  authorities	  (“NCAs”)	  of	  Member	  States	  must	  
apply	   EU	   competition	   law	   when	   assessing	   impugned	   conduct	   which	   may	  
affect	   trade	   between	   Member	   States.95	   NCAs	   must	   also	   act	   in	   “close	  
cooperation”	  with	   the	   European	   Commission	   to	   ensure	   consistency	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	   Directive	   2010/13/EU	  of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	  of	   the	   Council	   of	   10	  March	   2010	  on	   the	  
coordination	  of	  certain	  provisions	  laid	  down	  by	  law,	  regulation	  or	  administrative	  action	  in	  Member	  
States	  concerning	  the	  provision	  of	  audiovisual	  media	  services	  [2010]	  OJ	  L95/1	  (“AVMSD”).	  	  
93	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972.	  
94	  ibid	  s	  2.	  
95	   Council	   Regulation	   No.1/2003	   of	   16	   December	   2002	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   rules	   on	  
competition	  laid	  down	  in	  Articles	  101	  and	  102	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
[2003]	  OJ	  L001/1,	  arts	  3	  and	  11.	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application	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  across	  the	  EU.96	  Also,	  under	  Section	  60	  of	  
the	  CA1998,	  UK	  courts	  must	  apply	  UK	  competition	  law	  consistently	  with	  EU	  
competition	   law,	   and	   have	   regard	   to	   relevant	   decisions/statements	   of	   the	  
European	  Commission.	  
	  
1.5.1.1	  Relevance	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  policy	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Brexit	  	  
On	  23	  June	  2016,	  the	  UK	  Government	  held	  a	  referendum	  on	  whether	  the	  UK	  
should	  leave	  or	  remain	  in	  the	  EU.	  By	  a	  slim	  majority,	  voters	  elected	  to	  leave	  
the	  EU.	  The	  UK	  Government	  consequently	  voted	  to	  activate	  the	  UK’s	  right	  to	  
withdraw	  its	  membership	  of	  the	  EU.97	  On	  29	  March	  2017,	  UK	  Prime	  Minister	  
Theresa	  May	  notified	  the	  European	  Council	  of	  the	  UK’s	  intention	  to	  leave	  the	  
EU	  (“Brexit”).98	  This	  triggered	  a	  2-­‐year	  period	  for	  negotiating	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
withdrawal,	  and	  future	  relations	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EU.99	  The	  
precise	   impact	  of	  Brexit	  on	  the	  future	  influence	  of	  EU	  competition	  law	  and	  
policy	   in	   the	  UK	  remains	  unclear.	  Possible	   implications	  of	  Brexit	  within	   the	  
premium	   pay-­‐TV	   context	   are	   considered	   in	   the	   thesis.	   However,	   for	   the	  
duration	  of	  the	  negotiating	  period,	  UK	  law	  remains	  subject	  to	  EU	  law.100	  The	  
thesis	   therefore	   proceeds	   on	   this	   basis	   and	   refers,	   where	   appropriate,	   to	  
“UK/EU”	  competition	  law.	  	  
	  
1.5.1.2	  Legal	  frameworks	  that	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  comparative	  analysis	  	  
The	   thesis	  normatively	  analyses	   the	   regulation	  of	  market	  power	  under	   the	  
UK/EU	   and	   Australian	   legal	   frameworks	   governing:	   (i)	   horizontal	  
concentration	  in	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  premium	  content	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  ibid	  preamble	  recital	  15	  and	  art	  11(1).	  
97	  TFEU	  (n	  31)	  art	  50(1).	  The	  European	  Union	  (Notification	  of	  Withdrawal)	  Act	  2017	  received	  Royal	  
Assent	  on	  16	  March	  2017.	  
98	  Letter	  from	  UK	  Prime	  Minister	  Theresa	  May	  to	  European	  Council	  President	  Donald	  Tusk	  (29	  March	  
2017)	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_
Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf>	  accessed	  21	  April	  2017.	  
99	  The	  European	  Council	  may	  unanimously	  decide,	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  UK,	  to	  extend	  this	  period.	  
TFEU	  (n	  31)	  arts	  50(2)	  and	  50(3).	  
100	  ibid	  art	  50(3).	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and	  the	  means	  of	  supplying	  such	  content	  to	  viewers;	  (ii)	  exclusive	  licensing	  of	  
the	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  premium	  content;	  and	  (iii)	  unilateral	  refusal	  to	  supply	  
the	   rights	   to	   broadcast	   premium	   content	   or	   allow	   access	   to	   the	  
physical/technical	  means	  of	  supplying	  content	  to	  viewers:	  
	  
(i)   Horizontal	  concentration	  in	  the	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  premium	  
content	   in	  the	  UK	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  review	  as	  a	  “relevant	  
merger	  situation”	  under	  the	  EA2002,101	  where	   it	  results	  or	  
may	   be	   expected	   to	   result	   in	   a	   substantial	   lessening	   of	  
competition	  in	  the	  UK.	  Where	  there	  is	  a	  concentration	  with	  
a	  Community	  dimension,102	   the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  will	  
apply.103	   Similarly,	   a	   merger	   that	   has	   the	   effect	   or	   likely	  
effect	  of	  substantially	  lessening	  competition	  in	  a	  market	  for	  
goods	  or	   services	   in	  Australia	   is	   prohibited	   (subject	   to	   the	  
parties	  obtaining	  clearance	  or	  authorisation)	  under	  Section	  
50	  of	  the	  CCA.	  In	  media	  merger	  cases	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  may	  intervene	  on	  
the	   public	   interest	   grounds	   of	   plurality	   and	   other	  
considerations	  relating	  to	  the	  media.104	  
	  
In	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia,	  merger	  control	  rules	  operate	  
alongside	   sector-­‐specific	   rules	   on	   media	   ownership	   and	  
control.	   Such	   rules	   are	   contained	   in	   the	   UK	   in	   the	  
Broadcasting	   Act	   1996	   (“BA1996”)	   (as	   amended	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  In	  determining	  whether	  a	  “relevant	  merger	  situation”	  has	  or	  will	  be	  created,	  Sections	  23-­‐30	  and	  34	  
of	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  apply.	  
102	  A	  concentration	  will	  have	  a	  “Community	  dimension”	  if	  the	  turnover	  thresholds	  in	  Articles	  1(2)	  or	  
1(3)	  of	  the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  are	  satisfied.	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  (n	  33).	  
103	  The	  substantive	  test	  for	  the	  appraisal	  of	  concentrations	  with	  a	  Community	  dimension	  is	  whether	  
the	   concentration	  would	   significantly	   impede	   effective	   competition	   in	   the	   Internal	  market	   or	   in	   a	  
substantial	  part	  of	  the	  Internal	  market.	  ibid	  art	  2(3).	  
104	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  s	  42(1).	  The	  public	  interest	  considerations	  in	  broadcasting	  mergers	  are	  defined	  
in	  Section	  58(2C)	  of	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  as	  amended	  by	  Section	  375	  of	  the	  Communications	  Act	  
2003.	  
	  	  35	  
Communications	  Act	  2003	  (“CA2003”)),105	  and	  in	  Australia	  in	  
the	   Broadcasting	   Services	   Act	   1992	   (“BSA”).106	   The	   thesis	  
identifies	   an	   increasing	   tendency	   for	   horizontal	  
concentration	   of	   ownership	   in	   the	   digital	   era.	   The	  
implications	   of	   this	   for	   the	   intersection	   between	   sector-­‐
specific	  media	  ownership	  regulation	  and	  the	  enforcement	  of	  
merger	  control	  rules	  is	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
(ii)   Exclusive	  rights	  arrangements	  in	  the	  UK	  may	  contravene	  the	  
prohibition	  under	  Chapter	   I	  of	   the	  CA1998	  on	  agreements	  
that	  have	  as	  their	  object	  or	  effect	  the	  prevention,	  restriction	  
or	  distortion	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  which	  may	  affect	  
trade	   within	   the	   UK.107	   The	   Chapter	   I	   prohibition	   largely	  
reflects	  the	  corresponding	  prohibition	  in	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  
TFEU.108	   This	   prohibits	   agreements	   which	   have	   as	   their	  
object	  or	  effect	   the	  prevention,	   restriction	  or	  distortion	  of	  
competition	   in	   the	   Internal	  market,	   and	  which	  may	   affect	  
trade	   between	   Member	   States.	   Prohibition	   under	   Article	  
101(1)	   may	   be	   declared	   inapplicable	   pursuant	   to	   Article	  
101(3)	  where	  there	  are	  efficiency	  gains	  which	  contribute	  to	  
improving	   the	   production	   or	   distribution	   of	   goods,	   or	   to	  
promoting	  technical	  or	  economic	  progress.	  This	  is	  provided	  
that	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  such	  gains	  are	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers,	  
the	   restrictions	   on	   competition	   are	   indispensable	   for	  
attaining	  such	  objectives	  and	  competition	  is	  not	  eliminated	  
in	  respect	  of	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  goods	  in	  question.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  sch	  14.	  
106	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  ss	  53	  and	  54.	  	  
107	  Competition	  Act	  1998,	  s	  2(1).	  
108	  TFEU	  (n	  31).	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Contracts,	  arrangements	  or	  understandings	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  
substantially	  lessen	  competition	  in	  a	  market	  in	  Australia	  are	  
subject	  to	  prohibition	  under	  Section	  45	  of	  the	  CCA.	  There	  is	  
also	  a	  specific	  provision	  on	  exclusive	  dealing	  in	  Australia	  in	  
Section	  47	  of	  the	  CCA.	  This	  provides	  that	  corporations	  may	  
engage	   in	   exclusive	   dealing	   conduct	   (except	   “third-­‐line	  
forcing”	  which	  is	  strictly	  prohibited),109	  provided	  that	  it	  does	  
not	  substantially	  lessen	  competition	  in	  a	  market	  in	  Australia.	  
The	  licensing	  of	  rights	  to	  various	  sporting	  events	  is	  subject	  to	  
restrictions	  imposed	  under	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation,	  which	  
aims	   to	   prevent	   the	   migration	   of	   the	   coverage	   of	   listed	  
events	   exclusively	   to	   pay-­‐TV.	   This	   includes	   the	   Australian	  
“anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules	  in	  the	  BSA	  and	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules	  in	  
the	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1996.110	  The	  respective	  impact	  of	  these	  
rules	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   market	   and	   regulatory	  
implications	  are	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  6	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
(iii)   There	  is	  no	  general	  duty	  to	  deal	  under	  UK/EU	  or	  Australian	  
competition	  law.	  However,	  in	  the	  UK,	  a	  refusal	  to	  supply	  may	  
infringe	  the	  prohibition	  in	  Chapter	   II	  of	  the	  CA1998	  on	  the	  
abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  a	  market	  which	  may	  affect	  
trade	  in	  the	  UK.111	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU	  similarly	  prohibits	  
the	  abuse	  of	  a	  dominant	  position	  within	  the	  Internal	  market	  
in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   may	   affect	   trade	   between	  Member	   States.	  
Under	   EU	   competition	   law,	   a	   “special	   responsibility”	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	   “Third-­‐line	   forcing”	   occurs	   where	   a	   supplier	   offers	   goods/services	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   the	  
purchaser	   also	   buys	   goods/services	   from	   another	   specific	   supplier,	   or	  where	   a	   supplier	   refuses	   to	  
supply	  because	  the	  purchaser	  will	  not	  buy	  from	  another	  specific	  supplier.	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  
Act	  2010,	   ss	  47(6)	  and	  47(7).	  The	  prohibition	  of	   third-­‐line	   forcing	   is	   subject	   to	  authorisation	  under	  
Section	  88(8),	  where	  it	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  public	  benefit	  grounds.	  
110	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  115(1);	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Events)	  Notice	  (No.1)	  2010,	  sch	  
(AU).	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1996,	  pt	  IV;	  Code	  on	  Sports	  and	  Other	  Listed	  and	  Designated	  Events	  (Ofcom,	  4	  
July	  2014)	  (UK).	  
111	  Competition	  Act	  1998,	  s	  18(1).	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imposed	  on	  an	  undertaking	  in	  a	  dominant	  position	  “not	  to	  
allow	  its	  conduct	  to	  impair	  genuine	  undistorted	  competition	  
on	  the	  [internal]	  market.”112	  Dominant	   firms	  may	  claim	  an	  
objective	   justification	   to	   legitimise	   conduct	   that	   is	   prima	  
facie	  abusive,	  where	  the	  conduct	  pursues	  the	  legitimate	  end	  
of	  making	  a	  profit	  through	  proportionate	  means.113	  
	  
A	  refusal	  to	  supply	  in	  Australia	  will	  be	  unlawful	  if	  it	  involves	  
the	  misuse	  of	  market	  power	  contrary	   to	  Section	  46	  of	   the	  
CCA.	   The	   new	   Section	   46	   prohibits	   corporations	   with	   a	  
substantial	   degree	   of	   market	   power	   from	   engaging	   in	  
conduct	   that	   has	   the	   purpose,	   effect	   or	   likely	   effect	   of	  
substantially	  lessening	  competition	  in	  that	  market	  (or	  in	  any	  
other	   market	   in	   which	   the	   corporation	   or	   related	  
corporation	  supplies,	  acquires	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  supply	  or	  acquire	  
goods	  or	  services).	  The	  ability	  of	  rights	  owners	  and	  dominant	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  refuse	  third	  parties	  access	  to	  premium	  
content	   rights	   or	   communication	   infrastructure	   is	   also	  
subject	  to	  sector-­‐specific	  access	  regulation	  in	  both	  Australia	  
and	   the	  UK.	   Such	   regulation	   is	   contained	   in	   the	  UK	   in	   the	  
CA2003,	  and	  in	  Australia	  in	  Parts	  IIIA,	  XIB	  and	  XIC	  of	  the	  CCA.	  
The	   respective	   roles	   for	   access	   regulation	   and	   general	  
competition	   law	   on	   refusal	   to	   supply	  within	   the	   premium	  
pay-­‐TV	  context	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7	  
of	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	   Case	   322/81	   NV	   Nederlandsche	   Banden	   Industrie	   Michelin	   v	   Commission	   of	   the	   European	  
Communities	  [1983]	  ECR	  3461,	  3511	  [57].	  
113	  Opinion	  of	  A-­‐G	  Kirschner	   in	   Case	   T-­‐51/89	  Tetra	   Pak	  Rausing	   SA	   v	   Commission	  of	   the	   European	  
Communities	  [1990]	  ECR	  II	  309	  [67].	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The	   thesis	   comparatively	   analyses	   the	   public	   enforcement	   of	   the	   above	  
frameworks.	   It	   studies	   the	   interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   statutory	  
provisions,	  and	  associated	  decisions	  of	  the	  UK/EU	  and	  Australian	  courts	  and	  
competition	   authorities.	   This	   includes	   the	   regulatory	   practice	   of	   the	   CMA	  
(which	  replaced	  the	  CC	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  (“OFT”)	  as	  the	  NCA	  for	  
the	  UK	  as	  of	  1	  April	  2014),114	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  ACCC.	  It	  also	  
includes	  decisions	  of	  Ofcom	  which	  has	  concurrent	  powers	  with	  the	  CMA	  to	  
enforce	   the	   Chapter	   I	   and	   II	   prohibitions	   (and	   Articles	   101	   and	   102),115	   in	  
relation	  to	  communications	  matters	  in	  the	  UK.116	  The	  regulatory	  practice	  of	  
the	   Australian	   Communications	   and	   Media	   Authority	   (“ACMA”),	   which	   is	  
responsible	  for	  the	  public	  enforcement	  of	  the	  media	  ownership	  and	  control	  
provisions	  in	  the	  BSA,	  is	  also	  considered.	  
	  
1.5.2	   Rationale	  for	  the	  choice	  of	  comparators	  
The	  UK	  and	  Australia	  serve	  as	  useful	  comparators	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	   legal	  
research	   due	   to	   similarities	   between	   their	   legal	   systems	   and	   political	  
structures.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  English	  colonisation,	  Australian	  jurisprudence	  
is	  derived	  from	  the	  traditions	  of	  English	  common	  law.	  Sharing	  a	  common	  law	  
heritage,	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  bear	  a	  system	  of	  jurisprudence	  that	  is	  based	  on	  
judicial	  precedent	  and	  practice.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  reception	  of	  English	  law,117	  
Australia	   inherited	   the	  Westminster	   system	   of	   parliamentary	   government.	  
However,	   since	   legislative	   and	   judicial	   independence,118	   Australian	  
jurisprudence	  has	  developed	  its	  own	  distinctive	  characteristics	  which	  reflect	  
the	   country’s	   specific	   socio-­‐cultural,	   geographic,	   economic	   and	   political	  
conditions.	  A	  key	  point	  of	  divergence	   is	  Australia’s	   federal	  structure	  where	  
powers	   are	   shared	   by	   national	   and	   state	   governments	   according	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Reform	  Act	  2013,	  pt	  3.	  
115	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  s	  371.	  
116	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  (Concurrency)	  Regulations	  2004;	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  cooperation	  within	  
the	  network	  of	  competition	  authorities	  [2004]	  OJ	  C101/43.	  
117	  Australian	  Courts	  Act	  1828,	  s	  24	  (New	  South	  Wales,	  Queensland	  and	  Victoria);	  Acts	  Interpretation	  
Act	  1915,	  s	  48	  (South	  Australia);	  Interpretation	  Act	  1918,	  s	  43	  (Western	  Australia).	  
118	  Australia	  Act	  1986.	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Australian	  constitution.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  powers	  in	  the	  UK	  
to	  the	  devolved	  nations.119	  The	  regulatory	  implications	  of	  such	  characteristics	  
are	  considered,	  where	  appropriate,	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
1.5.2.1	  Similarities	  between	  broadcasting	  and	  regulatory	  regimes	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   similarities	   between	   broadcasting	   environments,	   the	   UK	   and	  
Australia	   share	   a	   strong	   history	   of	   FTA	   television	   founded	   on	   the	   Reithian	  
tradition	   to	   “inform,	   educate	   and	   entertain”.120	   This	   indicates	   a	   common	  
understanding	   that	   the	   function	  of	   traditional	  broadcast	   television	  extends	  
beyond	  pure	  entertainment	  and	  not	  all	  television	  broadcasts	  are	  necessarily	  
to	   be	   treated	   as	   being	   simply	   like	   any	   other	   tradable	   commodity.	   Both	  
jurisdictions	  also	  adopt	  a	  mixed	  system	  of	  public	  and	  commercial	  television,	  
and	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   founded	   by	   the	   Australian-­‐born	   American	   media	  
proprietor,	  Rupert	  Murdoch.	  This	  includes	  Sky	  UK	  Ltd	  (“Sky”)	  (formerly	  British	  
Sky	   Broadcasting	   (“BSkyB”),	   a	   wholly-­‐owned	   subsidiary	   of	   pan-­‐European	  
satellite	   broadcaster,	   Sky	   plc)	   in	   the	   UK,121	   and	   Foxtel	   Management	   Pty	  
Limited	  (“Foxtel”)	  in	  Australia.	  
	  
As	  already	  noted,	   the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  both	  operate	  systems	  of	  regulation	  
based	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   general	   competition	   law	   and	   sector-­‐specific	  
legislation.	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation	  in	  Australia	  is	  generally	  
more	  comprehensive	  than	  in	  the	  UK.	  To	  some	  extent,	  this	  can	  be	  related	  back	  
to	  Australia’s	  smaller	  and	  more	  concentrated	  markets.	  However,	  the	  thesis	  
does	  identify	  scope	  for	  deregulation	  in	  support	  of	  the	  central	  argument	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	   However,	   the	   subject	  matter	   of	   the	   Broadcasting	   Act	   1990	   and	   the	   Broadcasting	   Act	   1996	   are	  
reserved	  to	  Westminster.	  
120	  John	  CW	  Reith,	  Broadcast	  over	  Britain	  (Hodder	  &	  Stoughton	  1924)	  34.	  
121	   Following	   BSkyB’s	   acquisition	   of	   Sky	   Italia	   and	   a	   90	   per	   cent	   interest	   in	   Sky	   Deutschland	   in	  
November	  2014,	  its	  holding	  company,	  British	  Sky	  Broadcasting	  Group	  plc,	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  Sky	  plc.	  
BSkyB	  also	  changed	   its	  name	  to	  Sky	  UK	  Limited,	  which	  trades	  as	  Sky.	   ‘Sky	  creates	  Europe’s	   leading	  
entertainment	   company’	   (Sky	   news	   release,	   13	   November	   2014)	  
<http://www.iii.co.uk/research/LSE:BSY/news/item/1282195>	  accessed	  4	  August	  2016.	  
	  	  40	  
thesis	  that	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  residual	  role	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  general	  
competition	  law.	  
	  
1.5.2.2	  Geographic	  and	  economic	  differences	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  
There	   are	   important	   differences	   between	   the	   geographic	   landscapes	   and	  
economic	  conditions	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  which	  have	  ramifications	  for	  the	  
respective	  broadcasting	  environments	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks.122	  Despite	  
being	   the	   sixth	   largest	   country	   in	   the	  World	  by	   land	  mass,123	  Australia	   is	   a	  
geographically-­‐diverse,	   small	   market	   economy.	   It	   has	   a	   low	   population	  
density,	   with	   the	   majority	   of	   inhabitants	   concentrated	   in	   and	   around	   the	  
coastal	   cities	   of	   Sydney	   and	  Melbourne.	   Significant	   distances	   between	   the	  
most	  densely	  populated	  East	  coast	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Australia	  render	  universal	  
service	  provision	  a	  particular	  priority.	  It	  simultaneously	  presents	  physical	  and	  
technical	  challenges	   for	   the	  development	  of	  network	   infrastructure.	  This	   is	  
important	  because	  small	  market	  economies	  typically	  have	  more	  concentrated	  
markets	  with	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  	  
	  
In	   small	   market	   economies,	   the	   large	   size	   of	   the	   minimum	   efficient	   scale	  
relative	   to	  demand	   tends	   to	   create	  high	   levels	  of	  market	   concentration.124	  
This	   is	   especially	   likely	   in	   industries,	   such	   as	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV,	   where	  
significant	   economies	   of	   scale	  mean	   that	   only	   a	   few	   firms	  may	   be	   able	   to	  
compete	   effectively.125	   As	   Gal	   notes,	   such	   economies	   generally	   cannot	  
support	  the	  same	  level	  of	  competition	  as	  larger	  economies.126	  The	  thesis	  has	  
regard,	   where	   appropriate,	   to	   such	   differences	   between	   the	   jurisdictions,	  
which	  arguably	  enrich	  its	  comparative	  element.	  Since	  the	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  For	  key	  indicators	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia,	  see	  Appendix	  2	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
123	  Australia	  is	  the	  sixth	  largest	  country	  after	  Russia,	  Canada,	  China,	  the	  US	  and	  Brazil.	  ‘Australia’s	  Size	  
Compared’	   (Australian	   Government	   Geoscience	   Australia)	   <http://www.ga.gov.au/scientific-­‐
topics/national-­‐location-­‐information/dimensions/australias-­‐size-­‐compared>	  accessed	  4	  August	  2016.	  
124	   Minimum	   efficient	   scale	   refers	   to	   the	   scale	   of	   operation	   at	   which	   the	   average	   unit	   cost	   of	  
production	  is	  first	  minimised.	  Michal	  S	  Gal,	  Competition	  Policy	  for	  Small	  Market	  Economies	  (Harvard	  
University	  Press	  2003)	  15,	  18.	  
125	  ibid	  20.	  
126	  ibid	  4.	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the	   specific	   economic	   characteristics	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV,	   the	   broader	  
economic	   climate	   in	   which	   the	   UK	   and	   Australian	   markets	   operate	   are	  
inherently	  pertinent.	  
	  
1.5.2.3	  Different	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  communications	  regulation	  
Fundamental	   questions	   regarding	   the	   regulation	   of	   television	   are	   the	  
appropriate	   role	   for	   the	   state	   and	   on	   what	   grounds,	   if	   any,	   television	  
broadcasts	   (and,	   more	   specifically,	   premium	   content)	   are	   distinguishable	  
from	  ordinary	  market	   goods.	   This	   thesis	   identifies	   the	  potential	   regulatory	  
implications	   of	   the	   increasing	   personalisation	   of	   television	   services,	   for	  
example.	   However,	   it	   stops	   short	   of	   suggesting	   that	   all	   premium	   content	  
should	  be	  treated	  like	  any	  other	  tradable	  commodity,	  by	  accepting	  that	  the	  
normative	   basis	   for	   anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   remains	   sound,	   for	   instance.	  
The	   trend	   identified	   in	   this	   thesis	   of	   a	   reinforced	   tendency	   towards	   the	  
concentration	   of	   market	   power	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   raises	  
complex	   socio-­‐cultural,	   as	   well	   as	   economic,	   issues.	   Linked	   to	   this	   is	   the	  
question	   of	   how	   the	   public	   enforcement	   responsibilities	   for	   regulating	   the	  
effects	  of	  market	  concentration	  should	  be	  allocated.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  that	  the	  UK	  
has	   separate	   regulators	   in	   the	   CMA	   and	   Ofcom,	   whilst	   Australia	   has	   a	  
combined	   regulator	   in	   the	   ACCC.	   As	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   the	  
amalgamation	   of	   competition	   law	   and	   regulatory	   responsibilities	   with	   the	  
formation	   of	   the	   ACCC	   in	   1995	   followed	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Hilmer	  
Review.127	   Industry-­‐specific	  and	  economy-­‐wide	  approaches	  each	  have	  their	  
own	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses.	   The	   relative	   desirability	   of	   the	   two	  
approaches	   is	   considered	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   proposals	   (also	   made	   in	  
Chapter	  5)	   for	   the	   creation	  of	  a	   separate	   regulator	   to	  administer	  a	  media-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36).	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specific	  public	  interest	  test	  in	  Australia.	  These	  proposals	  are	  especially	  timely	  
given	  the	  recent	  review	  of	  ACMA	  by	  the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia.128	  
	  
1.5.2.4	  Relevance	  of	  the	  US	  as	  a	  point	  of	  reference	  in	  the	  comparative	  analysis	  
Reference	  will	  also	  be	  made,	  where	  appropriate,	  to	  the	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  
frameworks	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (“US”).	  US	  antitrust	  law	  offers	  a	  useful	  point	  
of	  reference	  due	  to	  its	  longevity,	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  in	  1890	  
and	  the	  Clayton	  Act	  in	  1914.	  Also,	  much	  premium	  movie	  and	  drama	  content	  
is	   sourced	   from	   the	   US.	   The	   strength	   of	   the	   US	   audio-­‐visual	   market	   is	  
increasingly	  pertinent	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  global	  communications	  sector.	  
As	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  it	  is	  relevant	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  global	  scale	  
of	  US-­‐based	  media	  firms	  like	  Netflix	  and	  Amazon,	  and	  competition	  between	  
such	  firms	  and	  UK/Australian	  rivals	  at	  the	  national	  and	  international	  level.	  
	  
However,	  there	  are	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  the	  economic	  climates	  
and	  broadcasting	  landscapes	  in	  the	  US	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
Australia	  on	  the	  other.	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  markets,	  with	  
the	  US	  market	  being	  significantly	  larger	  than	  the	  UK	  market	  (and	  especially	  
the	   Australian	   market).	   As	   will	   be	   seen,	   this	   has	   potentially	   significant	  
implications	   for	   the	   ability	   of	   rights	   owners	   and	   broadcasters	   to	  monetise	  
their	  rights.	  Whilst	  broadcasting	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  has	  been	  dominated	  
by	  FTA	  television	  and	  the	  public	  service	  role	  of	  traditional	  broadcast	  television	  
(as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3),	  broadcasting	  in	  the	  US	  is	  predominantly	  market-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	   ‘Review	   of	   the	   Australian	   Communications	   and	  Media	   Authority:	   Final	   Report’	   (Department	   of	  
Communications	   and	   the	   Arts,	   October	   2016)	  
<https://www.communications.gov.au/documents/review-­‐australian-­‐communications-­‐and-­‐media-­‐
authority-­‐final-­‐report>	  accessed	  10	  August	  2017.	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driven.	  Amidst	  accounts	  of	  “cord-­‐cutting”,129	  it	  is	  reported	  that	  83	  per	  cent	  of	  
US	  households	  still	  subscribe	  to	  some	  form	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  service.130	  	  
	  
Meanwhile,	  FTA	  television	  accounts	  for	  37	  per	  cent	  of	  viewership	  time	  in	  the	  
US,	  compared	  to	  77-­‐95	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  EU.131	  The	  relatively	  high	  popularity	  of	  
FTA	  television	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  may	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	  the	  absence	  
of	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  in	  the	  US.132	  However,	  the	  migration	  of	  content	  
to	  pay-­‐TV	  has	  not	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  issue	  in	  the	  US,	  which	  indicates	  
that	  anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   is	  not	   the	  only	   factor	  at	  play	   in	   the	  possible	  
migration	  of	   premium	  content	   to	  pay-­‐TV.133	   Such	  differences	  between	   the	  
jurisdictions	  are	  considered	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
1.5.3	   Purpose	  of	  the	  comparative	  analysis	  
The	   comparative	   analysis	   in	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   identify	   and	   evaluate	  
similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  regulatory	  approaches	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
Australia	   as	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end,	   rather	   than	   an	   end	   in	   itself.	   It	   adopts	   an	  
“applied”	  version	  of	  comparative	  law,134	  under	  which	  the	  evaluation	  is	  used	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  “Cord-­‐cutting”	  refers	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  subscribers	  cancelling	  their	  pay-­‐TV	  subscriptions.	  Scott	  Moritz	  and	  
Gerry	  Smith,	  ‘Pay-­‐TV	  Losing	  300,000	  Users	  Is	  Good	  News	  Amid	  Cord-­‐Cutting’	  Bloomberg	  Business	  (19	  
October	   2015)	   <https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2015-­‐10-­‐19/pay-­‐tv-­‐losing-­‐300-­‐
000-­‐customers-­‐is-­‐good-­‐news-­‐in-­‐cord-­‐cutting-­‐era>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
130	  ‘83%	  of	  U.S.	  households	  subscribe	  to	  a	  pay-­‐TV	  service’	  (Leichtman	  Research	  Group	  Inc	  press	  release,	  
3	   September	   2015)	   <http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/090315release.html>	   accessed	   11	  
February	  2016.	  The	  relatively	  high	  cable	  viewer	  figures	  in	  the	  US	  must	  be	  seen	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  US	  “must-­‐carry”	  rules	  in	  the	  Cable	  Television	  Consumer	  Protection	  and	  Competition	  Act	  of	  1992	  
which,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  require	  cable	  systems	  to	  carry	  local	  broadcast	  television	  channels.	  
131	  Jason	  B	  Bazinet,	  Mark	  May,	  Catherine	  T	  O’Neill,	  Michael	  Rollins	  and	  Thomas	  A	  Singlehurst,	   ‘The	  
Curtain	   Falls:	   How	   Silicon	   Valley	   is	   Challenging	   Hollywood’	   (Citi	   Global	   Perspectives	   &	   Solutions,	  
October	   2015)	   63	  
<https://ir.citi.com/vYIHfw6T8570v%2FHslp4ehC5Bh7rTeNIOB7Z%2FIIOpNygp8gdTXn%2BxhZDUi9b
ZS0kUDJie4hNVu7M%3D>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
132	  Anti-­‐siphoning	  rules	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  US	  Federal	  Communications	  Commission	  in	  1970,	  but	  
struck	  down	  in	  1977	  for	  infringing	  the	  First	  Amendment	  to	  the	  US	  Constitution.	  Memorandum	  Opinion	  
and	  Order	  23	  FCC	  2d	  825	  (1970),	  codified	  in	  47	  CFR	  §76.225	  (1976);	  Home	  Box	  Office	  v	  FCC	  567	  F	  2d	  9	  
(1977).	  	  
133	  See,	  Stefan	  Szymanski,	  ‘Why	  Have	  Premium	  Sports	  Rights	  Migrated	  to	  Pay-­‐TV	  in	  Europe	  but	  not	  in	  
the	  US’	  in	  Stefan	  Szymanski,	  The	  Comparative	  Economics	  of	  Sport	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2010).	  
134	  Reference	  is	  made	  here	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  comparative	  law	  in	  its	  “theoretical-­‐descriptive	  
form”	  (where	  the	  principal	  aim	  is	  to	  say	  how	  and	  why	  certain	  legal	  systems	  are	  different	  or	  alike)	  and	  
comparative	  law	  in	  its	  “applied	  version”	  (where	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  provide	  advice	  on	  legal	  policy).	  Hein	  Kӧtz	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to	  contribute	  to	  the	  ongoing	  debates	  in	  both	  jurisdictions	  on	  media	  market	  
regulation	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  legal	  rules	  cannot	  be	  fully	  
understood	   without	   considering	   the	   non-­‐legal	   contexts	   in	   which	   they	   are	  
formulated	  and	  applied	  in	  practice.135	  As	  noted	  above,	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  in	  the	  
UK	   and	   Australia	   inherently	   face	   different	   competitive	   conditions.	   The	  
limitations	  which	  such	  considerations	   impose	  on	  drawing	  conclusions	   from	  
the	  findings	  of	  the	  comparison	  are	  discussed,	  where	  relevant,	  throughout	  the	  
thesis.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  simply	  transplant	  legal	  rules	  
from	   one	   jurisdiction	   into	   another	   without	   modification.136	   The	   thesis	  
therefore	   adopts	   the	   “social	   science	   theory”	  use	  of	   comparative	   law,137	   to	  
compare	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  relevant	  legal	  systems	  in	  their	  specific	  socio-­‐cultural	  
and	  historical	  contexts.	  By	  identifying	  what	  lessons	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  may	  
learn	  from	  one	  another,	  the	  thesis	  proposes	  what	  Zweigert	  and	  Kӧtz	  describe	  
as	  a	  “better	  solution”138	  approach.	  This	  may	  be	  modified,	  where	  necessary,	  to	  
reflect	   the	  distinct	   socio-­‐cultural,	   geographical	   and	  economic	   conditions	   in	  
the	  respective	  jurisdictions.	  The	  importance	  of	  adopting	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  
reinforced	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  by	  the	  rapid	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  
changing,	   and	   the	   relative	   extent	   to	   which	   such	   change	   is	   affecting	  
established	   perceptions	   of	   the	   competitive	   dynamic	   for	   the	   supply	   of	  
premium	  content	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  Konrad	  Zweigert,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Comparative	  Law,	  vol	  1	  (2nd	  edn,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  
1987)	  11-­‐12.	  	  
135	   Mark	   Van	   Hoecke,	   ‘Deep	   Level	   Comparative	   Law’	   in	   Mark	   Van	   Hoecke,	   Epistemology	   and	  
Methodology	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  (Hart	  Publishing	  2004)	  167.	  
136	   Pierre	   Legrand,	   ‘The	   Impossibility	   of	   “Legal	   Transplants”’	   (1997)	   4(2)	   Maastricht	   Journal	   of	  
European	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  111.	  “A	  living	  body	  of	  law	  is	  not	  a	  collection	  of	  doctrines,	  rules,	  terms	  
and	  phrases	  […]	  but	  a	  culture;	  and	  it	  has	  to	  be	  approached	  as	  such.”	  Lawrence	  M	  Friedman,	  ‘Some	  
Thoughts	  on	  Comparative	   Legal	  Culture’	   in	  David	   S	  Clark	   and	   John	  H	  Merryman,	  Comparative	  and	  
Private	   International	   Law:	   Essays	   in	   Honor	   of	   John	   Henry	   Merryman	   on	   his	   Seventieth	   Birthday	  
(Duncker	  and	  Humblot	  1990)	  49-­‐50.	  
137	   Reza	   Banakar,	   ‘Review	   Essay:	   Power,	   Culture	   and	   Method	   in	   Comparative	   Law’	   (2009)	   5(1)	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  in	  Context	  69.	  
138	  Kӧtz	  and	  Zweigert	  (n	  134)	  15.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
	  
ECONOMIC	  CHARACTERISTICS	  OF	  PREMIUM	  CONTENT	  AS	  A	  DRIVER	  OF	  PAY-­‐TV	  	  
	  
2.1	   Introduction	  
Premium	   content	   is	   widely	   recognised	   as	   being	   a	   key	   driver	   in	   the	  
development	   of	   pay-­‐TV.139	   The	   ability	   to	   attract	   large	   audiences	   who	   are	  
willing	   to	   pay	   renders	   premium	   content	   especially	   desirable	   to	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  with	   revenue	  models	  based	  on	   subscription	   fees	  and	  advertising	  
revenue.	  However,	  premium	  content	  is	  scarce.	  To	  maximise	  the	  return	  on	  the	  
substantial	  investment	  that	  is	  typically	  required	  to	  produce	  premium	  content,	  
rights	  owners	  often	  grant	  broadcast	  rights	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	  for	  a	  defined	  
period	  of	   time.	  The	   cumulative	  effect	  of	   such	   scarcity	  and	  exclusivity	   is	   an	  
upward	   pressure	   on	   the	  wholesale	   cost	   to	   broadcasters	   of	   acquiring	   such	  
rights.	   In	   the	   analogue	   era,	   access	   to	   premium	   content	   was	   consequently	  
restricted	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  Over	  time,	  this	  
reinforced	  their	  ability	  to	  acquire	  further	  rights	  and	  entrenched	  their	  position	  
in	  the	  downstream	  market	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  premium	  content	  to	  viewers.	  	  
	  
Access	   to	   premium	   content	   consequently	   presents	   both	  opportunities	   and	  
challenges	   for	   new	  entrants.	   The	   network	   externalities	   that	   exist	   between	  
rights	  owners	  and	  viewers,	  and	  between	  viewers	  and	  advertisers,	  give	  rise	  to	  
the	  so-­‐called	  “chicken	  and	  egg”	  problem	  for	  new	  entrants	   in	  accessing	   the	  
rights	  to	  broadcast	  premium	  content.	  The	  socio-­‐cultural	  functions	  of	  televised	  
sport	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  live	  coverage	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  to	  command	  
the	  largest	  captive	  audiences	  reinforce	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  within	  the	  premium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	   ‘Pay	  TV	  Statement’	   (Ofcom,	  31	  March	  2010)	  44	   (UK)	  <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-­‐
and-­‐statements/category-­‐1/third_paytv/statement>	   accessed	   13	   August	   2017.	   The	   European	  
Commission	   describes	   recent	   movies	   and	   regular	   football	   events	   involving	   national	   teams	   as	   the	  
essential	   factor	   or	   “drivers”	   that	   lead	   consumers	   to	   subscribe	   to	   a	   particular	   pay-­‐TV	   service.	  
Newscorp/Telepiù	   (Case	   COMP/M.2876)	   OJ	   C(2003)1082	   [54]	   (EU).	   The	   ACCC	   similarly	   describes	  
premium	  content	  as	  being	  critical	  to	  the	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  Australia.	  ACCC	  (n	  1)	  xiv	  (AU).	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sport	  context.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  focuses	  on	  premium	  sport	  content.	   It	  
concludes	  by	  noting	  how	  the	  specific	  economic	  characteristics	  of	  such	  content	  
continue	   to	   limit	   the	   scope	   for	   new	   entry	   into	   live	   sports	   broadcasting.	  
However,	   the	   different	   economic	   characteristics	   of	   premium	   non-­‐sport	  
content	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  suggest	  greater	  scope	  for	  new	  entry,	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  supply	  of	  premium	  drama	  in	  particular.	  	  
	  
2.2	   Economic	  Value	  of	  the	  Rights	  to	  Broadcast	  Premium	  Content	  
In	   an	   era	   of	   content	   abundance,	   the	   rights	   to	   broadcast	   premium	   content	  
remain	  scarce	  relative	  to	  demand.	  Together	  with	  the	  tendency	  for	  such	  rights	  
to	  be	  granted	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis	  for	  a	  specific	  period	  of	  time,	  this	  increases	  
the	  wholesale	  cost	  to	  broadcasters	  of	  acquiring	  such	  rights.	  This	  is	  particularly	  
the	  case	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  major	  sporting	  events	  because	  
of	  the	  ability	  of	  such	  events	  to	  attract	  the	  largest	  audiences,	  which	  are	  also	  
less	  likely	  than	  premium	  movie	  or	  drama	  audiences	  to	  be	  fragmented	  by	  time-­‐
shifting.	   The	   commercialisation	   of	   televised	   sport	   reinforces	   the	   economic	  
value	  of	  live	  sports	  rights	  and	  the	  enduring	  ability	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  
of	  larger	  broadcasters	  to	  compete	  effectively	  for	  such	  rights.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  
to	   the	   increasing	   opportunities	   for	   rights	   owners	   and	   broadcasters	   to	  
monetise	  premium	  drama	  in	  the	  international	  television	  drama	  market.	  
	  
2.2.1	   Scarcity	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  and	  Hollywood	  blockbusters	  
Premium	  sport	  and	  movie	  content	  is	  scarce.	  A	  fixed	  number	  of	  major	  sporting	  
events	  are	  staged	  each	  year.	  The	  governing	  bodies	  of	  elite	  sports	  determine	  
the	  number	  of	  teams	  in	  a	  league,	  the	  number	  of	  events	  to	  be	  staged	  and	  the	  
maximum	  number	  of	  television	  rights	  to	  such	  events.	  By	  intensifying	  demand	  
from	   broadcasters,	   this	   increases	   the	   wholesale	   cost	   to	   broadcasters	   of	  
acquiring	  such	  rights	  which	  may	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers	   in	  the	  form	  of	  
higher	  subscription	  fees,	  reduced	  quality	  and/or	  less	  innovative	  services.	  For	  
example,	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  Premier	  League	  had	  a	  policy	  of	  making	  168	  of	  its	  380	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matches	   available	   to	   live	   television.140	   Limited	   supply	   saw	   demand	   reach	  
unprecedented	   levels	   in	   2015,	  when	   the	   Premier	   League	   agreed	   a	   record-­‐
breaking	  £5.1billion	  rights	  deal	  with	  Sky	  and	  British	  Telecommunications	  plc	  
(“BT”)	  for	  the	  three	  seasons	  from	  2016/2017.141	  This	  represents	  a	  70	  per	  cent	  
increase	  on	  Sky	  and	  BT’s	  previous	   rights	  deal	  worth	  £3billion.142	  As	  will	  be	  
discussed	   in	   the	   following	   chapter,	   all	   Sky	   and	   BT	   subscribers	   have	   since	  
experienced	  slight	  price	  increases	  (not	  just	  sports	  channel	  subscribers).	  
	  
Policies	  of	   restricting	  the	  number	  of	   live	  television	  rights	   to	  major	  sporting	  
events	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   regulatory	   scrutiny.	   This	   issue	   arose	   in	   Virgin	  
Media’s	  complaint	  relating	  to	  the	  FAPL	  in	  2014.143	  Virgin	  Media	  claimed	  that	  
the	  41	  per	  cent	  of	  Premier	  League	  matches	  that	  were	  made	  available	  for	  live	  
television	  was	   lower	   than	   some	   other	   leading	   European	   leagues.144	   It	  was	  
argued	   that	   this	   contributes	   to	   higher	   prices	   for	   consumers	   of	   pay-­‐TV	  
packages	   including	  premium	  sport	  channels	  and	   for	   the	  pay-­‐TV	  retailers	  of	  
such	  channels.145	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  Ofcom	  closed	  the	  case	  after	  the	  
Premier	  League	  made	  commitments	  to	  (amongst	  other	  things)	  increase	  the	  
number	  of	  matches	  available	  for	  live	  television	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  a	  minimum	  of	  190	  
per	  season	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  2019/2020	  season.146	  
	  
Central	  to	  concerns	  about	  restrictions	  on	  the	  number	  of	  live	  television	  rights	  
is	   that	  major	  sporting	  events	   (and,	  to	  a	   lesser	  extent	  premium	  movies)	  are	  
regarded	  as	  unique.	  The	  competitive	  nature	  of	  sporting	  events	  means	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Dan	  Roan,	  ‘Premier	  League:	  Football	  broadcasting	  battle	  hots	  up’	  BBC	  Sport	  (15	  December	  2015)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/35099081>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
141	  ibid.	  
142	   ‘Premier	  League	  TV	  rights:	  Sky	  and	  BT	  pay	  £5.1bn	  for	   live	  games’	  BBC	  Sport	   (10	  February	  2015)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/31357409>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
143	   ‘Ofcom	   Investigation	   into	   Premier	   League	   Football	   Rights’	   (Ofcom	   news	   release,	   18	  November	  
2014)	   <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-­‐ofcom/latest/media/media-­‐releases/2014/premier-­‐
league>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
144	  ‘Competition	  Act	  investigation	  into	  the	  sale	  of	  live	  UK	  audio-­‐visual	  media	  rights	  to	  Premier	  League	  
matches’	  (Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Bulletin,	  CW/01138/09/14,	  8	  August	  2016).	  
145	  ibid.	  
146	  ibid.	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they	   can	   never	   be	   precisely	   reproduced.147	   Similarly,	   a	   limited	   number	   of	  
Hollywood	  blockbusters	  are	  released	  each	  year	   (partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	   that	  
despite	   technological	   advancements,	   the	   cost	   of	   production	   remains	  
relatively	  high).148	  The	  unique	  quality	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  and	  Hollywood	  
blockbusters	  means	  that	  there	  are	  typically	  considered	  to	  be	  few,	  if	  any,	  close	  
substitutes	  (i.e.	  products	  or	  services	  to	  which	  viewers	  may	  switch	  in	  response	  
to	   a	   relative	   increase	   in	   price,	   variation	   in	   quality	   or	   other	   change	   to	   the	  
conditions	   of	   supply).	   For	   instance,	   as	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4	   within	   the	  
context	  of	  market	  definition,	  there	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  limited	  (if	  
any)	  substitution	  possibilities	  for	  viewers	  between	  different	  sports,	  and	  even	  
between	  different	  codes	  of	  the	  same	  sport.149	  	  
	  
The	  absence	  of	  close	  substitutes	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  live	  coverage	  
of	  major	   sporting	   events	   because	  most	   viewers	   still	   prefer	   to	   watch	   such	  
events	   in	   real	   time.150	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   possible	   reasons	   for	   this,	  
including	  a	  desire	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  shared	  experience	  or	  to	  enjoy	  the	  thrill	  
associated	  with	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   outcome.151	   Time-­‐shifting	   technology	   is	  
therefore	  likely	  to	  have	  relatively	  less	  impact	  in	  fragmenting	  the	  audiences	  of	  
such	   events.	   This	   is	   supported	   by	   Ofcom’s	   findings	   in	   the	   UK	   that	   as	   a	  
percentage	   of	   total	   viewing	   time-­‐shifted	   viewing	   for	   sport	   is	   8	   per	   cent,	  
compared	   to	   32	   per	   cent	   for	   drama.152	   Similarly,	   in	   the	   US,	   live	   viewing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Alexander	  Scheuer	  and	  Peter	  Strothmann,	  ‘Sport	  as	  Reflected	  in	  European	  Media	  Law’	  (2004)	  14(1)	  
Media	  Law	  &	  Policy	  6,	  9.	  
148	  There	  are	  also	  reports	  that	  the	  number	  of	  releases	  by	  the	  Major	  Hollywood	  Studios	  is	  in	  decline.	  
Cynthia	   Littleton,	   ‘Major	   Film	   Studios	   Prosper	   on	   the	   Margins’	   Variety	   (18	   April	   2013)	  
<http://variety.com/2013/biz/news/major-­‐film-­‐studios-­‐prosper-­‐on-­‐the-­‐margins-­‐1200376494/>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
149	  Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith	  (n	  24)	  96.	  
150	   Robin	   Foster,	   ‘Future	   Broadcasting	   Regulation’	   (Commissioned	   by	   the	   Department	   for	   Culture,	  
Media	   and	   Sport,	   January	   2007)	   para	   7.3.20	  
<http://www.refoster.co.uk/FutureBroadcastingRegulation.pdf>	  accessed	  25	  July	  2016.	  
151	  Lawrence	  A	  Wenner,	  Media,	  Sports	  and	  Society	  (SAGE	  1989)	  15.	  
152	   ‘Communications	   Market	   Report	   2015’	   (Ofcom,	   6	   August	   2015)	   159	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/20668/cmr_uk_2015.pdf>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  Across	  all	  types	  of	  content,	  live	  viewing	  remains	  the	  standard.	  In	  Australia,	  for	  instance,	  
89.6	  per	  cent	  of	  FTA	  television	  and	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  watched	  live-­‐to-­‐air	  each	  month.	  ‘Australian	  Multi-­‐Screen	  
Report:	   Q4	   2016’	   (Oztam,	   Nielsen	   and	   Regional	   Television	   Audience	   Measurement,	   2017)	   13	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remains	  the	  standard	  for	  sport,	  with	  95	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  viewing	  being	  live.153	  
This	   also	   makes	   live	   sports	   events	   especially	   attractive	   to	   television	  
advertisers	  as,	  for	  example,	  ad-­‐skipping	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  prevalent	  than	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  premium	  movies	  and	  drama.	  
	  
2.2.2	   Symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  sport	  and	  television	  	  
Sport	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   “the	   programme	   for	   which	   television	   was	  
invented.”154	   The	   economic	   value	   of	   sports	   rights	   to	   broadcasters	   and	   the	  
value	   of	   television	   rights	   to	   sport	   is	   significant.	   Concomitant	   with	   the	  
commercialisation	  of	  sport	  for	  television	  is	  the	  commodification	  of	  televised	  
sport.	   This	   refers	   to	   the	   increasing	   role	   of	   free	   market	   philosophy	   and	  
principles	  in	  sport.155	  Manifestations	  of	  this	  include	  the	  rescheduling	  of	  sports	  
events	  to	  maximise	  the	  value	  of	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  such	  events,	  such	  as	  
the	  scheduling	  in	  Australia	  of	  night	  games	  by	  the	  AFL	  and	  the	  NRL	  to	  capture	  
prime-­‐time	   audiences.	   There	   is	   also	   the	   repackaging	   of	   sports	   events	   for	  
television,	   as	   with	   the	   development	   of	   international	   one-­‐day	   cricket	   into	  
World	  Series	  Cricket	  for	  the	  Nine	  Network	  by	  the	  late	  Kerry	  Packer.156	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.oztam.com.au/documents/Other/Australian%20Multi%20Screen%20Report%20Q4%2
02016%20FINAL.pdf>	  accessed	  11	  August	  2017.	  
153	   ‘The	   Year	   in	   Sports	   Media	   Report:	   2015’	   (Nielsen,	   3	   February	   2016)	  
<http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2016/the-­‐year-­‐in-­‐sports-­‐media-­‐report-­‐2015.html>	  
accessed	  10	  May	  2016.	  
154	  Leonie	  Sandercock	  and	  Ian	  Turner,	  Up	  Where,	  Cazaly?	  The	  Great	  Australian	  Game	  (Granada,	  1982)	  
149,	   as	   cited	   in	   Bob	   Stewart,	   ‘Seeing	   is	   Believing:	   Television	   and	   the	   Transformation	   of	   Australian	  
Cricket	  1956-­‐1975’	  (2005)	  22(1)	  Sporting	  Traditions	  39,	  44-­‐45.	  
155	  This	   is	  based	  on	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  commodification	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  goods	  actually	  
being	  traded,	  but	  rather	  on	  goods	  being	  regarded	  as	  having	  a	  monetary	  value	  and	  regulated	  according	  
to	  market	  norms.	  Elizabeth	  Anderson,	  Value	  in	  Ethics	  and	  Economics	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  1995)	  
190.	  
156	  See,	  Richard	  Giulianotti	  and	  Adrian	  Walsh,	  ‘This	  Sporting	  Mammon:	  A	  Normative	  Critique	  of	  the	  
Commodification	  of	  Sport’	  (2001)	  28(1)	  Journal	  of	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Sport	  53,	  55-­‐60.	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2.2.2.1	  Broadcasting	  rights	  as	  a	  revenue	  source	  for	  sports	  bodies	  	  
Television	  rights	  represent	  a	  substantial	  revenue	  stream	  for	  elite	  sport.	  It	  has	  
accounted	  for	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  income	  of	  the	  UEFA	  Champions	  League,157	  
and	   93	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   Premier	   League’s	   turnover.158	   The	   corresponding	  
figures	  in	  Australia	  are	  somewhat	  lower	  at	  60	  per	  cent	  for	  the	  NRL,159	  and	  46	  
per	  cent	  for	  the	  AFL.160	  Lower	  figures	  are	  not	  altogether	  surprising	  given	  that	  
the	  Australian	  market	  is	  smaller	  and	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  in	  Australia	  is	  
more	  comprehensive	  than	  in	  the	  UK	  (as	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  That	  
said,	   the	   cost	   of	   acquiring	   the	   broadcast	   rights	   to	  major	   sporting	   codes	   in	  
Australia	  is	  increasing.	  For	  instance,	  the	  rights	  deal	  announced	  by	  the	  NRL	  in	  
November	  2015	  was	  said	  to	  be	  worth	  AU$1.8billion.161	  This	  was	  reported	  to	  
represent	  a	  70	  per	  cent	  increase	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  previous	  deal.162	  The	  AFL	  
remains	  in	  the	  lead,	  however,	  having	  agreed	  a	  6-­‐year	  rights	  deal	  from	  2017	  
with	  the	  Seven	  Network	  and	  Foxtel,	  which	  is	  said	  to	  be	  worth	  AU$2.508billion	  
(purportedly	  the	  largest	  sports	  broadcasting	  deal	  in	  Australia’s	  history).163	  	  
	  
Television	   revenue	   represents	   a	   potentially	   important	   source	   of	   funds	   for	  
reinvesting	  in	  sport.	  It	  may	  be	  used	  to	  develop	  sport	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	   ‘UEFA	   Financial	   Report	   2014/15’	   (UEFA,	   25	   February	   2016)	   6	  
<http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/Finance/02/33/53/52
/2335352_DOWNLOAD.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
158	   Ben	   Rumsby,	   ‘Why	   TV	   cash	   is	   vital	   for	   Premier	   League	   clubs’	   The	   Telegraph	   (13	   May	   2015)	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-­‐league/11604019/Why-­‐TV-­‐cash-­‐
is-­‐vital-­‐for-­‐Premier-­‐League-­‐clubs.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
159	  Broadcast	  revenue	  for	  the	  NRL	  for	  the	  year	  ended	  October	  2015	  was	  AU$224.991million,	  out	  of	  a	  
total	   revenue	   of	   AU$374.142million.	   ‘Annual	   Report	   2015’	   (Australian	   Rugby	   League	   Commission	  
Limited,	   5	   February	   2016)	   102	  
<https://www.nrl.com/portals/nrl/RadEditor/Documents/2016/NRL%20Annual%20Report_2015.pdf
>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
160	   ‘Australian	   Football	   League	   Annual	   Report	   2015’	   (AFL,	   15	   February	   2016)	   147	  
<http://s.afl.com.au/staticfile/AFL%20Tenant/AFL/Files/Annual%20Report/AFLAnnualReport2015.pd
f>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
161	   ‘NRL	   broadcast	   rights	   deal	   announced’	   (NRL,	   27	   November	   2015)	   <http://www.nrl.com/nrl-­‐
broadcast-­‐rights-­‐deal-­‐announced/tabid/10874/newsid/91023/default.aspx>	  accessed	  6	  June	  2016.	  
162	  ibid.	  
163	  Australian	  Associated	  Press,	  ‘AFL	  secures	  record	  $2.5bn	  television	  deal	  with	  Seven	  and	  Foxtel’	  The	  
Guardian	   (18	   August	   2015)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/aug/18/afl-­‐secure-­‐record-­‐
25-­‐billion-­‐television-­‐deal-­‐with-­‐seven-­‐and-­‐foxtel>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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and	  invest	  in	  local	  communities,	  for	  example.	  The	  Premier	  League	  is	  said	  to	  
invest	   at	   least	   £1billion	   of	   its	   £5.1billion	   from	   television	   revenue	   for	  
2016/2017	   to	   2018/2019	   in	   grassroots	   facilities,	   youth	   coaching,	   ticketing,	  
improving	  disabled	  access	  and	  solidarity	  payments	  to	  lower	  leagues.164	  The	  
potential	   benefit	   to	   be	   gained	   from	   reinvesting	   in	   sport	   is	   a	   standard	  
argument	  raised	  by	  rights	  owners	  and	  broadcasters	   in	  support	  of	  exclusive	  
broadcast	   rights.	  However,	   relatively	   little	   is	  known	  about	   the	   true	  nature,	  
degree	   and	   longevity	   of	   the	  non-­‐economic	   benefits	  which	  may	  be	  derived	  
from	  reinvesting	  television	  revenue	  in	  sport.165	  
	  
Contention	   regarding	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   non-­‐economic	   benefits	   of	  
television	   revenue	   to	   sport	   is	   reinforced	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  not	  all	   sports	  are	  
considered	  equal.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  EU,	  football	  attracts	  the	  largest	  share	  
of	   expenditure	   on	   sports	   rights.	   Broadcast	   revenue	   across	   the	   “Big	   Five”	  
European	  football	  leagues	  (i.e.	  the	  Premier	  League,	  Bundesliga	  in	  Germany,	  
La	  Liga	  in	  Spain,	  Ligue	  1	  in	  France	  and	  the	  Italian	  Serie	  A)	  increased	  by	  8	  per	  
cent	   in	  2014/2015	   to	  EU€5.8billion.166	   This	   represents	  48	  per	   cent	  of	   total	  
revenue.167	   However,	   the	   Premier	   League	   leads	   by	   generating	   more	   than	  
twice	  the	  broadcast	  revenue	  of	  the	  Italian	  top	  tier	  and	  three	  times	  that	  of	  the	  
Bundesliga	  1	  clubs.168	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  Henry	  Winter,	  ‘Premier	  League	  will	  invest	  “at	  least	  £1	  billion”	  of	  bumper	  TV	  revenue	  in	  lower	  league	  
and	   grass-­‐roots	   football’	   The	   Telegraph	   (26	   March	   2015)	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-­‐league/11497651/Premier-­‐
League-­‐will-­‐invest-­‐at-­‐least-­‐1-­‐billion-­‐of-­‐bumper-­‐TV-­‐revenue-­‐in-­‐lower-­‐league-­‐and-­‐grass-­‐roots-­‐
football.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
165	  Koen	  Breedveld	  and	  Paul	  Hover,	  ‘Elite	  sports:	  what	  is	  it	  good	  for?’	  in	  Richard	  Bailey	  and	  Margaret	  
Talbot,	  Elite	  Sport	  and	  Sport-­‐for-­‐All:	  Bridging	  the	  Two	  Cultures?	  (Routledge	  2015)	  15.	  See	  also,	  Fred	  
Coalter,	  A	  Wider	  Social	  Role	  for	  Sport:	  Who’s	  Keeping	  the	  Score	  (Routledge	  2007).	  
166	   ‘Annual	   Review	   of	   Football	   Finance	   2016’	   (Deloitte	   Sports	   Business	   Group,	   June	   2016)	   8	  
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/sports-­‐business-­‐group/deloitte-­‐
uk-­‐annual-­‐review-­‐of-­‐football-­‐finance-­‐2016.pdf>	  accessed	  6	  June	  2016.	  
167	  ibid.	  
168	  ibid.	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Televising	  sports	  events	  is	  ultimately	  an	  economic	  activity.169	  Rational,	  profit-­‐
maximising	  broadcasters	  and	  advertisers	  will	  therefore	  typically	  invest	  most	  
heavily	   in	   events	   that	   attract	   the	   largest	   audiences	   (assuming	   that	   such	  
audiences	   are	   also	   of	   the	   appropriate	   demographic).	   As	   a	   result,	  minority	  
sports	   are	   likely	   to	   attract	   relatively	   little	   television	   revenue.	   For	   example,	  
when	   the	   funding	   of	   the	   Australian	   Broadcasting	   Corporation	   (“ABC”)	  was	  
reduced	   as	   part	   of	   the	   2014	   budget	   cuts	   by	   the	   Federal	   Government	   of	  
Australia,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  broadcasting	  deals	  to	  be	  affected	  was	  that	  with	  the	  
Australian	   national	   women’s	   professional	   football	   league,	   W-­‐League.170	   In	  
addition	   to	   qualifying	   the	   general	   principle	   that	   television	   represents	   an	  
important	   source	   of	   funding	   for	   sport,	   this	   example	   suggests	   how	   the	  
commodification	   of	   televised	   sport	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   reinforce	   archaic	  
gender	  norms	  and	  hierarchies.171	  Notably,	  the	  return	  of	  W-­‐League	  to	  the	  ABC	  
in	   2016	  was	   financially	   supported	  by	  pay-­‐TV	  under	   a	   partnership	  with	   Fox	  
Sports.172	  	  
	  
Even	   at	   the	   level	   of	   individual	  major	   sporting	   codes,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   top	  
teams	  in	  a	  league	  are	  likely	  to	  attract	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  television	  revenue	  
engenders	  a	  degree	  of	  inequality	  between	  such	  teams	  and	  lower	  teams.173	  By	  
affecting	  how	  evenly	  teams	  are	  matched,	  this	  can	  undermine	  the	  principle	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  Case	  36/74	  BNO	  Walrave	  and	  LJN	  Koch	  v	  Association	  Union	  Cycliste	  Internationale	  [1974]	  ECR	  1405.	  
170	  Richard	  Parkin,	  ‘ABC	  cuts:	  “It’s	  a	  really	  sad,	  sad	  day	  for	  women’s	  sport”’	  The	  Guardian	  (25	  November	  
2014)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2014/nov/25/abc-­‐cuts-­‐really-­‐sad-­‐sad-­‐day-­‐
womens-­‐sport>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
171	  See,	  for	  example,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Level	  Playing	  Field:	  Sport	  and	  Gender	  in	  Australian	  Media’	  (University	  
of	  New	  South	  Wales	  Journalism	  and	  Media	  Research	  Centre	  and	  Media	  Monitors	  (Joint	  research	  for	  
the	   Australian	   Sports	   Commission),	   January	   2008	   -­‐	   July	   2009)	  
<https://www.clearinghouseforsport.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/595567/Towards_a_level
_playing_field_-­‐_Updated_Version.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
172	   ‘W-­‐League	  returns	  to	  ABC	  TV	  in	  partnership	  with	  FFA	  and	  Fox	  Sports’	  ABC	  News	   (15	  September	  
2015)	  <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-­‐09-­‐15/w-­‐league-­‐returns-­‐to-­‐abc-­‐tv/6777302>	  accessed	  13	  
August	  2017.	  	  
173	  Such	  inequality	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  top	  clubs,	  like	  Manchester	  United	  and	  Manchester	  
City,	  get	  as	  much	  from	  foreign	  ownership	  and	  other	  commercial	  income	  as	  television	  revenue.	  See,	  
‘Annual	   Review	   of	   Football	   Finance	   2017’	   (Deloitte	   Sports	   Business	   Group,	   July	   2017)	  
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/sports-­‐business-­‐group/deloitte-­‐
uk-­‐annual-­‐review-­‐of-­‐football-­‐finance-­‐2017.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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“competitive	   balance”	   on	   which	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   outcome	   of	   sporting	  
events	  relies.	  According	  to	  the	  “uncertainty	  of	  outcome”	  hypothesis,174	  higher	  
levels	   of	   competitive	   balance	   (as	   reflected	   in	   more	   uncertain	   outcomes),	  
increase	   match	   attendances,	   television	   audiences	   and	   overall	   interest.175	  
Revenue	  sharing	  is	  one	  means	  of	  addressing	  the	  competitive	  imbalance	  that	  
would	  otherwise	  be	  likely	  to	  prevail	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  television	  revenue	  
in	  a	  free	  market.	  However,	  this	  still	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  television	  
revenue	  is	  distributed	  equally	  between	  all	  of	  the	  clubs	  in	  a	  league.	  	  
	  
The	  Premier	  League	  claims	  that	  its	  centralised	  model	  of	  revenue	  sharing	  is	  the	  
most	   equitable	   of	   Europe’s	   major	   football	   leagues.176	   As	   regards	   UK	  
broadcasting	  revenue,	  50	  per	  cent	  is	  split	  equally	  between	  all	  20	  clubs,	  25	  per	  
cent	   is	  paid	   in	  merit	  payments,	  and	  25	  per	  cent	   is	  paid	   in	  facility	  fees	  each	  
time	   a	   club’s	  matches	   are	   broadcast	   in	   the	   UK.177	   International	   broadcast	  
revenue	  is	  divided	  equally	  between	  all	  20	  clubs.178	  In	  2014/2015,	  this	  revenue	  
sharing	  model	  resulted	  in	  a	  ratio	  of	  1.53:1	  between	  Chelsea	  which	  finished	  at	  
the	  top	  with	  almost	  £99million	  and	  Queens	  Park	  Rangers	  which	  finished	  at	  
the	   bottom	   with	   £64.9million.179	   Inequity	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   television	  
revenue	  between	  La	  Liga	  clubs	  (with	  Barcelona	  and	  Real	  Madrid	  taking	  the	  
lion’s	  share),	  led	  the	  Spanish	  Government	  in	  2015	  to	  approve	  a	  new	  law	  that	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  Simon	  Rottenberg,	  ‘The	  Baseball	  Players’	  Labor	  Market’	  (1956)	  64	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Economy	  242.	  
175	  David	  Forrest	  and	  Robert	  Simmons,	  ‘Outcome	  Uncertainty	  and	  Attendance	  Demand	  in	  Sport:	  The	  
Case	  of	  English	  Soccer’	  (2002)	  51	  Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Statistical	  Society	  229;	  Stefan	  Szymanski,	  ‘The	  
Economic	  Design	  of	  Sporting	  Contests’	  (2003)	  41	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Literature	  1137;	  Jeffery	  Borland	  
and	  Robert	  Macdonald,	  ‘Demand	  for	  Sport’	  (2003)	  19	  Oxford	  Review	  of	  Economic	  Policy	  478;	  Stephen	  
Dobson	  and	  John	  Goddard,	  ‘Competitive	  Balance,	  Uncertainty	  of	  Outcome	  and	  Home-­‐Field	  Advantage’	  
in	  Stephen	  Dobson	  and	  John	  Goddard,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Football	  (2nd	  edn,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  
2011)	  42-­‐78.	  
176	  ‘Premier	  League	  announces	  payments	  to	  clubs	  in	  season	  2014/15’	  (Premier	  League,	  2	  June	  2015)	  
<http://www.premierleague.com/en-­‐gb/news/news/2015-­‐16/jun/020615-­‐premier-­‐league-­‐
payments-­‐to-­‐clubs-­‐in-­‐season-­‐2014-­‐15.html>	  accessed	  28	  June	  2016.	  
177	  ‘Premier	  League	  Handbook	  2017/18’	  (The	  Football	  Association	  Premier	  League	  Limited,	  11	  August	  
2017)	  Rule	  D.16	  <https://www.premierleague.com/publications#!>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
178	  ibid	  Rules	  D.18.	  
179	  Premier	  League	  (n	  176).	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marks	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  an	  individual	  to	  a	  more	  centralised	  model	  of	  revenue	  
sharing.180	  	  
	  
2.2.2.2	  Significance	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  to	  television	  broadcasters	  	  
Major	   sporting	   events	   represent	   a	   significant	   source	   of	   revenue	   for	   the	  
television	  sector.	   In	  1996,	  Rupert	  Murdoch	  observed	  that	  sport	  “absolutely	  
overpowers	  film	  and	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  entertainment	  in	  drawing	  viewers	  to	  
television.”181	   Premium	   sport	   was	   described	   as	   a	   “battering	   ram”	   for	   the	  
expansion	  of	  his	  pay-­‐TV	  empire,182	  and	   this	   is	  evident	   from	  Foxtel’s	   role	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  Super	  League	  saga	  (discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter).	  Ofcom	  
reports	   that	   sport	   remains	   the	   genre	   that	   generates	   the	   most	   television	  
revenue	   for	   the	  UK	  multi-­‐channel	   sector.183	   Fundamental	   to	   the	   economic	  
value	   of	   sport	   to	   broadcasters	   is	   the	  mass	   appeal	   of	   live	   sports	   events	   in	  
particular,	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   such	   events	   to	   attract	   large	   audiences.184	   In	  
addition	  to	  the	  limited	  impact	  of	  technological	  developments	  such	  as	  time-­‐
shifting,	  the	  commercial	  potential	  of	  sports	  events	  is	  generally	  not	  impeded	  
by	  cultural	  or	  language	  barriers.185	  	  
	  
Television	  broadcasters	  are	  consequently	  willing	  to	  bid	  aggressively	   for	  the	  
live	   broadcasting	   rights	   to	  major	   sporting	   events.	   This	   is	   demonstrated	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  Revenue	  will	  be	  distributed	  as	  follows:	  (i)	  90	  per	  cent	  to	  all	  of	  the	  clubs	  in	  La	  Liga,	  of	  which	  half	  will	  
be	  shared	  equally	  between	  the	  20	  clubs,	  and	  the	  other	  half	  will	  be	  divided	  according	  to	  criteria	  such	  
as	  performance	  and	  size;	  and	  (ii)	  the	  remaining	  10	  per	  cent	  to	  the	  second	  division	  clubs,	  of	  which	  70	  
per	  cent	  will	  be	  divided	  equally	  between	  such	  clubs.	  Royal	  Decree-­‐Law	  5/2015	  of	  30	  April	  on	  urgent	  
measures	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   commercialisation	   of	   audiovisual	   rights	   of	   professional	   football	  
competitions.	  
181	  Rupert	  Murdoch	  at	  the	  Annual	  General	  Meeting	  of	  News	  Corp	  in	  1996,	  as	  cited	  in	  Ellis	  Cashmore	  
and	  Ernest	  Cashmore,	  Making	  Sense	  of	  Sports	  (Taylor	  &	  Francis	  2010)	  400.	  
182	  Robert	  Milliken,	   ‘Sport	   is	  Murdoch’s	   “Battering	  Ram”	   for	  Pay	  TV’	  The	   Independent	   (16	  October	  
1996)	   <http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/sport-­‐is-­‐murdochs-­‐battering-­‐ram-­‐for-­‐pay-­‐tv-­‐
1358686.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
183	  Ofcom	  (n	  152)	  170.	  
184	  An	  early	  study	  by	  Steiner	  of	  the	  programming	  decisions	  of	  broadcasters	  showed	  how	  the	  demand	  
for	   radio	   broadcast	   rights	   depends	   on	   the	   total	   size	   of	   the	   potential	   audience.	   Peter	   O	   Steiner,	  
‘Program	  Patterns	  and	  Preferences	  and	  the	  Workability	  of	  Competition	  in	  Radio	  Broadcasting’	  (1952)	  
66(2)	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  194.	  
185	  Ian	  Henry	  and	  Ling-­‐Mei	  Ko,	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  Sport	  Policy	  (Routledge	  2013)	  168.	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increasing	   expenditure	   on	   such	   rights.	   In	   2014,	   expenditure	   on	   sports	  
programming	   across	   the	   UK	  multi-­‐channel	   sector	   was	   £2.12billion.186	   This	  
represents	  a	  21	  per	  cent	  increase	  on	  2013.187	  Sky	  fulfils	  a	  notable	  role	  in	  this	  
trend	  when	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  Sky’s	  content	  expenditure	  
that	  is	  dedicated	  to	  sport.	  In	  2015,	  Sky	  invested	  £4.89billion	  in	  content.188	  This	  
is	   not	   far	   off	   the	   £5.14billion	   UK	   television	   rights	   deal	   which	   the	   Premier	  
League	  secured	  in	  2015,	  of	  which	  Sky	  will	  pay	  £4.18billion	  over	  three	  years.189	  	  
	   	  
The	   ability	   to	   attract	   large	   audiences,	   particularly	   of	   the	   young	   male	  
demographic	  (who	  typically	  watch	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  television),	  also	  makes	  
live	   sporting	   events	   especially	   valuable	   from	   an	   advertising	   revenue	  
perspective.	  The	  US	  Super	  Bowl	  attracts	  the	  largest	  mass	  audience	  which	  an	  
advertiser	  may	  reach	  at	  any	  one	  time	  on	  television.190	  The	  2015	  Super	  Bowl	  
was	  the	  most	  watched	  US	  television	  programme	  in	  history	  with	  an	  average	  
audience	  of	  114.4million	  viewers	  (i.e.	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  US	  population).191	  
Advertisers	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  large	  sums	  for	  such	  exposure,	  with	  30-­‐second	  
advertising	  slots	  costing	  US$5million	  each.192	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186	  Ofcom	  (n	  152)	  182-­‐183.	  
187	  Ofcom	  suggests	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  2014	  was	  the	  first	  full	  year	  
to	  reflect	  the	  higher	  Premier	  League	  rights	  payments	  following	  the	  2012	  television	  rights	  auction.	  ibid	  
182.	  
188	   ‘Annual	   Report	   2015’	   (Sky	   plc,	   2015)	   15	   <http://s3-­‐eu-­‐west-­‐1.amazonaws.com/skygroup-­‐sky-­‐
static/documents/annual-­‐report-­‐2015/annual-­‐report-­‐spreads-­‐2015.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
189	  Owen	  Gibson,	  ‘Sky	  and	  BT	  retain	  Premier	  League	  TV	  rights	  for	  record	  £5.14bn’	  The	  Guardian	  (10	  
February	   2015)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/feb/10/premier-­‐league-­‐tv-­‐rights-­‐sky-­‐
bt>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
190	  Dennis	  Deninger,	  Sports	  on	  Television:	  The	  How	  and	  Why	  Behind	  What	  You	  See	  (Routledge	  2012)	  
164.	  
191	  Hazel	  Sheffield,	   ‘How	  much	  do	  Super	  Bowl	  adverts	  actually	   cost?’	  The	   Independent	   (5	  February	  
2016)	   <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/how-­‐much-­‐do-­‐super-­‐bowl-­‐adverts-­‐
actually-­‐cost-­‐a6855426.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
192	  David	  Millward,	   ‘Super	  Bowl:	   the	  biggest	  advertising	  show	  on	  earth’	  The	  Telegraph	   (6	  February	  
2016)	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/leisure/12139111/Superbo
wl-­‐the-­‐biggest-­‐advertising-­‐show-­‐on-­‐earth.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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By	  contrast,	  30-­‐second	  advertising	  slots	  in	  the	  AFL	  and	  the	  NRL	  grand	  finals	  
each	  cost	  around	  AU$135,000	  and	  AU$100,000,	  respectively.193	  Such	  figures	  
also	  appear	  low	  by	  UK	  standards.	  For	  example,	  a	  30-­‐second	  advertising	  slot	  
during	  coverage	  of	  England	  matches	  on	  Independent	  Television	  (“ITV”)	  during	  
the	  2014	  World	  Cup	  cost	  between	  £275,000	  and	  £300,000	  (AU$496,000	  and	  
AU$541,000).194	  However,	  the	  figures	   in	  Australia	  compare	  reasonably	  well	  
having	   regard	   to	   the	   relative	   size	   of	   the	   UK	   and	   Australian	   markets,	  
populations	   and	   audience	   ratings.	   For	   instance,	   ITV’s	   coverage	   of	   England	  
versus	  Uruguay	   in	   the	  2014	  World	  Cup	  attracted	  an	  average	  of	  18.2million	  
(and	   a	   peak	   of	   more	   than	   20million)	   viewers.195	   This	   compares	   to	   peak	  
audience	   ratings	   of	   around	   2.64million	   for	   the	   2015	   AFL	   grand	   final	   and	  
4.42million	  for	  the	  first	  NRL	  State	  of	  Origin	  match	  of	  2016.196	  	  
	  
2.2.3	   Monetising	  premium	  drama	  in	  the	  international	  television	  drama	  market	  
With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  channels	  aided	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming,	  
there	  is	  increasing	  demand	  for	  content	  and	  particularly	  premium	  drama.	  This	  
is	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  business	  models	  of	  SVOD	  platforms	  
are	   based	   on	   the	   exclusive	   supply	   of	   original	   drama	   series.	   From	   the	  
perspective	  of	  viewers	  living	  in	  a	  society	  in	  which	  the	  immediacy	  of	  news	  (and	  
the	  issue	  of	  “fake”	  news)	  gives	  the	  impression	  at	  least	  of	  increasingly	  troubled	  
times,	  drama	  offers	  a	  means	  of	  escapism	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  Compared	  to	  movies,	  dramas	  offer	  a	  
relatively	   cost	   effective	   way	   of	   meeting	   such	   demand.	   Also,	   as	   already	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	   Darren	  Davidson,	   ‘State	   of	  Origin’s	   ad	   haul	   stirs	   rights	   split	   talk’	  The	  Australian	   (28	  May	   2015)	  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/state-­‐of-­‐origins-­‐ad-­‐haul-­‐stirs-­‐rights-­‐split-­‐
talk/news-­‐story/0b5961ca67bcc5a5a340dcdcea42d18d>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
194	   ‘Winners	  of	  the	  World	  Cup:	  UK	  industries	  hopeful	  for	  a	  big	  home	  win’	  (Ibis	  World,	  June	  2014)	  3	  
<http://us7.siteground.us/~media243/media.ibisworld.co.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/07/UK-­‐
Special-­‐Report_June-­‐2014.pdf>	  accessed	  7	  August	  2016.	  
195	   Mark	   Sweney,	   ‘The	   real	   World	   Cup	   winners:	   BBC	   or	   ITV?’	   The	   Guardian	   (11	   July	   2014)	  
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/11/world-­‐cup-­‐2014-­‐bbc-­‐v-­‐itv>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	  
196	   Michael	   Bodey,	   ‘State	   of	   Origin	   scores	   ratings	   record’	   The	   Australian	   (2	   June	   2016)	  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/state-­‐of-­‐origin-­‐scores-­‐ratings-­‐record/news-­‐
story/c1f34e1c1f523f4e63a9026e7d9aa935>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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indicated,	  dramas	  are	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  scarcity	  issue	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
major	   sporting	   events	   or	   Hollywood	   blockbusters.	   Dramas	   can	   also	   quite	  
easily	   be	   adapted	   via	   subtitles	   and	   language	   selection	   settings	   to	  
accommodate	  the	  needs	  of	  a	  multicultural	  audience.	  
	  
The	   increasing	  appetite	  around	  the	  world	   for	  premium	  drama	  expands	  the	  
opportunities	   for	   rights	   owners	   and	   broadcasters	   to	   monetise	   premium	  
drama.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  a	  likely	  consequence	  of	  the	  increasing	  amount	  of	  
drama	  aimed	  at	  a	  multicultural	  audience,	  local	  broadcasters	  may	  respond	  by	  
becoming	  even	  more	   local	   in	   their	  propositions.	  As	  already	  suggested,	   this	  
offers	  a	  means	  by	  which	  broadcasters	  may	  differentiate	  their	  services	  from	  
that	  of	  leading	  US-­‐based	  networks	  and	  SVOD	  platforms	  in	  particular.	  In	  order	  
to	   compete	   effectively,	   however,	   the	   challenge	   lies	   in	   broadcasters	  
“premiumising”	   local	   content,	   such	   as	   by	   enabling	   the	   personalisation	   of	  
services	  in	  a	  similar	  vein	  to	  that	  made	  possible	  by	  SVOD	  platforms.	  Evidence	  
of	  these	  trends	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  on	  
the	  changing	  broadcasting	  landscapes	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  
	  
2.3	   Specific	  Issues	  Raised	  by	  the	  Possible	  Migration	  of	  Sport	  to	  Pay-­‐TV	  
Concerns	   about	   the	   commercialisation	   and	   commodification	   of	   sport	   for	  
television	   only	   arise	   if	   televised	   sport	   is	   regarded	   as	   distinguishable	   from	  
ordinary	   market	   goods.	   For	   this	   purpose,	   a	   distinction	   may	   be	   drawn	   by	  
reference	   to	   differences	   in	   the	   relationships	   between	   sporting	   events	   and	  
viewers	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  between	  consumers	  and	  ordinary	  market	  goods	  
on	  the	  other.	  Televised	  sport	  may	  be	  regarded	  in	  economic	  terms	  as	  a	  “public	  
good”	  and/or	  a	   “merit	   good”	  which	  economic	   theory	  dictates	  are	   typically	  
under-­‐consumed	   in	  a	   free	  market.	  The	  migration	  of	   the	  coverage	  of	  sports	  
events	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  may	  therefore	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  form	  of	  market	  failure.	  This	  
is	  subject,	  however,	  to	  the	  argument	  made	  below	  that	  televised	  sport	  may	  be	  
more	  appropriately	  defined	  as	  a	  “club	  good”,	  which	  has	  policy	   implications	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for	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  televised	  sport	  may	  (or	  may	  not)	  be	  distinguished	  from	  
ordinary	   market	   goods.	   There	   are	   also	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   functions	   of	  
broadcasting	  sport	  on	  FTA	  television.	  
	  
2.3.1	   Product	  distinctions	  between	  televised	  sport	  and	  ordinary	  market	  goods	  
The	   interrelationships	  between	   spectators,	   sports	   institutions	   and	   sporting	  
events	  can	  be	  distinguished	   from	  the	  relationship	  between	  consumers	  and	  
the	   suppliers	   of	   ordinary	   market	   goods.197	   Unlike	   ordinary	   market	   goods,	  
sporting	  events	  require	  the	  cooperation	  of	  two	  or	  more	  teams/competitors	  
and	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  product	  to	  viewers	  depends	  on	  the	  perceived	  
quality	  of	  the	  game.198	  As	  already	  noted,	  the	  success	  of	  sporting	  events	  relies	  
on	  “competitive	  balance”	  which	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  ensured	  in	  a	  free	  market.	  The	  
principle	  of	  the	  “survival	  of	  the	  fittest”	  means	  that	  a	  free	  market	  would	  be	  
likely	  to	  lead	  to	  outcomes	  that	  are	  predictable	  and	  therefore	  uncompelling	  to	  
viewers.199	  Hence	  measures	  such	  as	  revenue	  sharing	  to	  achieve	  greater	  parity	  
between	  teams	  by	  “levelling	  the	  playing	  field”.	  The	  unpredictability	  this	  may	  
generate	  was	  exemplified	  in	  the	  2015-­‐2016	  Premier	  League,	  which	  was	  won	  
by	  underdogs	  Leicester	  City	  against	  odds	  of	  up	  to	  5000/1.200	  
	  
The	  quality	  of	  a	  sporting	  event	  depends	  upon	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  scores,	  the	  
number	   of	   “star”	   players	   involved,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   match	   and	   its	  
perceived	   entertainment	   value.201	   Its	   external	   value	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	  
passion,	   loyalty	   and	   identification	   that	   spectators	   demonstrate	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  RK	  Stewart,	  ‘The	  Economic	  Development	  of	  the	  Victorian	  Football	  League	  1960-­‐1984’	  (1985)	  1(2)	  
Sporting	  Traditions	  2,	  6.	  
198	  ibid.	  
199	  ibid.	  
200	  Jack	  de	  Menezes,	  ‘Leicester	  win	  the	  Premier	  League:	  Bookmakers’	  set	  to	  lose	  over	  £25m	  as	  lucky	  
punters	   bag	   £100,000	   winnings’	   The	   Independent	   (3	   May	   2016)	  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-­‐league/leicester-­‐win-­‐the-­‐premier-­‐league-­‐
odds-­‐bookmakers-­‐to-­‐lose-­‐over-­‐25m-­‐lucky-­‐punters-­‐bag-­‐100000-­‐pay-­‐out-­‐a7010726.html>	  accessed	  13	  
August	  2017.	  
201	  Stewart	  (n	  197).	  
	  	  59	  
event.202	   So	   in	   addition	   to	   consuming	   them,	   spectators	   are	   important	  
contributors	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  sporting	  events.203	  The	  importance	  of	  having	  a	  
strong	   stadium	   presence	   was	   exemplified	   by	   the	   decision	   of	   Liverpool	   to	  
revise	  its	  plan	  to	  increase	  ticket	  prices,	  after	  an	  estimated	  10,000	  Liverpool	  
fans	  walked	  out	  in	  protest	  in	  the	  77th	  minute	  of	  the	  match	  against	  Sunderland	  
on	  6	  February	  2016.204	  The	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  competitors	   in	  sport	   is	   to	  
win,	  not	   simply	   to	  maximise	  profit.205	  However,	   the	   latter	   is	   significant	   for	  
enabling	  reinvestment	  in	  the	  means	  to	  winning.	  
	  
2.3.1.1	  Re-­‐characterising	  televised	  sport	  from	  a	  public	  good	  into	  a	  club	  good	  
Televised	  sporting	  events	  can	  bear	   the	  public	  good	  characteristics	  of	  being	  
non-­‐rivalrous	   in	  consumption	  and	  non-­‐excludable.206	  The	  consumption	  of	  a	  
public	  good	  by	  one	  individual	  does	  not	  prevent	  others	  from	  consuming	  it	  and	  
it	   is	   not	  possible	   to	  exclude	  anyone	   from	  doing	   so	  once	   it	   has	  been	  made	  
available	  for	  consumption.	  With	  terrestrial	  broadcasting	  in	  the	  analogue	  era,	  
televised	   sports	   events	   were	   both	   non-­‐rivalrous	   in	   consumption	   and	   non-­‐
excludable.	  Once	  an	  event	  was	  transmitted,	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  anyone	  with	  a	  
television	  set	  to	  receive	  the	  transmission	  without	  paying	  for	   it.	  One	  viewer	  
watching	  an	  event	  does	  not	  prevent	  others	  from	  doing	  so.	  Whilst	  television	  
broadcasting	   remains	   non-­‐rivalrous	   in	   consumption,	   the	   encryption	   of	  
transmission	   signals	   via	   pay-­‐TV	   means	   that	   events	   which	   were	   previously	  
available	   on	   FTA	   television	   may	   become	   available	   exclusively	   to	   pay-­‐TV	  
subscribers.	  In	  this	  sense,	  such	  television	  coverage	  becomes	  a	  “club	  good”.207	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202	  ibid	  7.	  
203	  ibid.	  
204	  Andy	  Hunter,	  ‘Liverpool	  owner	  backs	  down	  on	  ticket	  prices	  and	  apologises	  to	  fans’	  The	  Guardian	  
(10	   February	   2016)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/10/liverpool-­‐back-­‐down-­‐
ticket-­‐prices-­‐77>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
205	  Stewart	  (n	  197)	  7.	  
206	  Paul	  A	  Samuelson,	  ‘The	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Expenditure’	  (1954)	  36(4)	  Review	  of	  Economics	  and	  
Statistics	  387;	  Paul	  A	  Samuelson,	  ‘Diagrammatic	  Exposition	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Expenditure’	  (1955)	  
37(4)	  Review	  of	  Economics	  and	  Statistics	  350.	  
207	  A	  “public	  good”	  becomes	  a	  “club	  good”	  where	   it	   is	  non-­‐rivalrous	   in	  consumption	  but	  there	   is	  a	  
means	  of	  excluding	  non-­‐payers.	   James	  M	  Buchanan,	   ‘An	  Economic	  Theory	  of	  Clubs’	   (1965)	  32(125)	  
Economica	  1.	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There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  implications	  in	  characterising	  televised	  sport	  as	  
a	   club	   good	   rather	   than	   a	   public	   good.	   A	   welfare	   loss	   arises	   where	   some	  
viewers	  are	  prevented	  from	  watching	  events	  who	  could	  otherwise	  have	  done	  
so	  without	  affecting	  the	  ability	  of	  other	  viewers	  to	  watch	  them.208	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  however,	  competing	  suppliers	  increases	  the	  possibility	  for	  competition	  
and	   innovation,	   and	   improved	   quality	   and	   variety	   of	   content.	   Also,	   the	  
problem	  of	   “lowest	   common	  denominator”	   broadcasting,209	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
advertising-­‐funded	   broadcasting,	   may	   be	   avoided.	   It	   is	   therefore	   arguable	  
that	   where	   sports	   coverage	   migrates	   to	   pay-­‐TV,	   the	   “public	   good”	  
characterisation	  of	  televised	  sport	  ceases	  to	  represent	  a	  legitimate	  basis	  on	  
which	  to	  distinguish	  televised	  sport	  from	  ordinary	  market	  goods.	  The	  supply	  
of	   club	   goods	   is	   arguably	   a	  matter	   for	   property	   rights	   rather	   than	   sector-­‐
specific	  regulation.	  
	  
2.3.1.2	  Characterisation	  of	  televised	  sporting	  events	  as	  merit	  goods	  
Merit	  goods	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  intrinsically	  desirable	  but	  undervalued	  by	  
individuals,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  individuals	  are	  considered	  to	  need	  such	  goods	  
irrespective	  of	  their	  ability	  or	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  them.210	  In	  a	  free	  market,	  
the	   supply	   and	   consumption	   of	   merit	   goods	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   at	   socially	  
optimal	   levels.	  Where	   the	  coverage	  of	  a	   sporting	  event	  migrates	   from	  FTA	  
television	   to	   pay-­‐TV,	   a	   direct	   pecuniary	   cost	   is	   imposed	   on	   viewers	   (in	  
acquiring	  a	  STB	  and	  subscription	  fees)	  that	  was	  not	  previously	  imposed.	  Since	  
some	  viewers	  will	  be	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  incur	  this	  cost,	  fewer	  viewers	  will	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  Dobson	  and	  Goddard	  (n	  175)	  176.	  
209	  See,	  Beebe	   JH,	   ‘Institutional	  Structure	  and	  Program	  Choices	   in	  Television	  Markets’	   (1977)	  91(1)	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  15.	  
210	  Richard	  A	  Musgrave,	  ‘A	  Multiple	  Theory	  of	  Budget	  Determination’	  (1957)	  17(3)	  FinanzArchiv	  New	  
Series	  333;	  Richard	  A	  Musgrave,	  The	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance:	  A	  Study	  in	  Public	  Economy	  (McGraw-­‐Hill	  
1959)	  13-­‐15.	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have	  access	  to	  the	  event	  than	  if	  it	  was	  made	  available	  on	  FTA	  television.	  This	  
may	  be	  perceived	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  failure.211	  
	  
As	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   positive	   externalities	   that	   may	   be	   generated	   by	  
making	   televised	  sporting	  events	  available	  on	  FTA	  television	   (reinforced	  by	  
the	  socio-­‐cultural	  functions	  of	  televised	  sport	  (discussed	  below)),	  restricting	  
the	  ability	  of	  some	  viewers	  to	  watch	  such	  events	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  welfare	  
loss.212	  Sporting	  events	  may	  be	  characterised	  as	  merit	  goods	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  
community	   demand	   is	   high	   due	   to	   the	   social	   benefits,213	   but	   the	   normal	  
market	  cost	  of	  paying	  to	  watch	  such	  events	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  intolerable	  for	  some	  
viewers.214	  However,	   the	  merit	   good	   characterisation	   of	   televised	   sporting	  
events	   assumes	   a	   paternalistic	   view	   of	   the	   state	   in	   which	   the	  
government/legislator	  is	  regarded	  as	  better	  placed	  than	  viewers	  to	  assess	  the	  
value	  of	  such	  events.	  It	  is	  also	  based	  on	  the	  non-­‐economic	  value	  of	  televised	  
sport	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  functions	  of	  sport	  on	  traditional	  
broadcast	  television.	  
	  
2.3.2	   Socio-­‐cultural	  functions	  of	  broadcasting	  sport	  on	  free-­‐to-­‐air	  television	  
The	  value	  of	  televised	  sport	  is	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  defined	  solely	  in	  economic	  terms.	  
Sport	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  capable	  of	  fulfilling	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  uniting	  
people,	  and	  in	  developing	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  national	  and	  cultural	  identity.	  In	  
the	   words	   of	   Baron	   Pierre	   de	   Coubertin,	   founder	   of	   the	  modern	   Olympic	  
Games,	  “[sport]	  is	  not	  a	  luxury	  activity,	  or	  an	  activity	  for	  the	  idle	  […]	  Sport	  is	  
part	   of	   every	   man	   and	   woman’s	   heritage	   and	   its	   absence	   can	   never	   be	  
compensated	   for.”215	   Sport	   is	   said	   to	   be	   based	   on	   “fundamental	   social,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	   Anthony	  Kerr,	  Matthew	  Nicholson	   and	  Merryn	   Sherwood,	  Sport	   and	   the	  Media:	  Managing	   the	  
Nexus	  (Routledge	  2015)	  100.	  
212	  Dobson	  and	  Goddard	  (n	  175).	  
213	  Kerr,	  Nicholson	  and	  Sherwood	  (n	  211).	  
214	  Ewen	  J	  Michael,	  Public	  Policy:	  The	  Competitive	  Framework	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2006)	  63.	  
215	  Conrado	  D	  Corral,	  Pierre	  de	  Coubertin:	  The	  Olympic	  Humanist	  (International	  Olympic	  Committee	  
and	   International	   Pierre	   de	   Coubertin	   Committee,	   1994)	   27,	   as	   cited	   in	   Jeroen	   Heijmans	   and	   Bill	  
Mallon,	  Historical	  Dictionary	  of	  the	  Olympic	  Movement	  (Scarecrow	  Press	  2011)	  8.	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educational	  and	  cultural	  values	  [making]	  for	  integration,	  involvement	  in	  the	  
life	   of	   society,	   tolerance,	   acceptance	   of	   differences	   and	   compliance	   with	  
rules.”216	  
	  
Integration	  and	  social	  cohesion	  are	  especially	  pertinent	  in	  the	  EU	  given	  the	  
role	   that	   is	   attributed	   to	   sport	   in	   developing	   a	   shared	   cultural	   identity	  
between	  Member	  States.217	  The	  unifying	  capability	  of	  sport	  is	  also	  important	  
in	  Australia.	  Hailed	  as	  a	  “nation	  of	  good	  sports”,	   it	   is	  said	  to	  have	  a	  special	  
affinity	  with	  sport.218	  For	  example,	  the	  day	  of	  the	  Melbourne	  Cup,	  described	  
as	   “the	   race	   that	   stops	   the	   nation”,	   has	   been	   an	   annual	   public	   holiday	   in	  
Victoria	   since	   1877.219	   With	   respect	   to	   Australia’s	   demographically	   and	  
culturally	   diverse	   population,	   reinvesting	   television	   revenue	   in	   local	  
communities	  may	  also	  contribute	   to	   the	   role	  of	   sport	   in	  uniting	  Australia’s	  
indigenous	  communities.220	  	  
	  
Given	   the	   separate	   roles	   of	   sport	   and	   television	   in	   popular	   culture,	   it	   is	  
unsurprising	   that	   the	   television	   broadcasting	   of	   sport	   has	   come	   to	   be	   so	  
closely	  associated	  with	  concepts	  of	  national	  and	  cultural	   identity.221	   It	  was	  
noted	   in	   the	   1977	   report	   of	   the	   Annan	   Committee	   on	   the	   future	   of	   UK	  
broadcasting	  how	  television	  “links	  people,	  gives	  the	  mass	  audience	  common	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Declaration	  on	  incorporating	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  sport	  and	  its	  social	  functions	  into	  the	  
implementation	  of	  common	  policies	  (European	  Council,	  Nice,	  2000).	  
217	  Recommendation	  No.R	  (92)	  13	  Rev	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  to	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  Revised	  
European	   Sports	   Charter,	   adopted	   on	   24	   September	   1992	   at	   the	   480th	   meeting	   of	   the	  Ministers’	  
Deputies	  and	  revised	  at	  the	  752nd	  meeting	  on	  16	  May	  2001,	  para	  6.	  
218	  ‘Australia	  in	  Brief’	  (Australian	  Government	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  15	  October	  
2014)	  58;	  ‘Australian	  Citizenship:	  Our	  Common	  Bond’	  (Commonwealth	  of	  Australia,	  2014)	  43.	  
219	  Vivienne	  McCredie,	  The	  Race	  That	  Stops	  the	  Nation:	  And	  Other	  Verses	  (Hydro	  Ideas	  2005).	  
220	  ‘Submission	  to	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  –	  Inquiry	  into	  Broadcasting’	  (AFL,	  December	  1999)	  11	  
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/broadcasting/submissions/subdr240/subdr240.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
221	  For	  instance,	  such	  is	  the	  association	  between	  rugby	  and	  Welsh	  identity,	  that	  access	  to	  the	  Rugby	  
Union	   Six	  Nations	   on	   FTA	   television	   in	  Wales	   has	   been	  described	   as	   a	   “national	   birthright”.	  David	  
Williamson,	  ‘The	  Six	  Nations	  is	  part	  of	  our	  “national	  birthright”	  and	  must	  stay	  free-­‐to-­‐air,	  says	  Shadow	  
Welsh	   Secretary	   Owen	   Smith’	   Wales	   Online	   (26	   June	   2015)	  
<http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-­‐news/six-­‐nations-­‐part-­‐national-­‐birthright-­‐9535821>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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topics	   of	   conversation,	   makes	   them	   realise	   that,	   in	   experiencing	   similar	  
emotions,	  they	  all	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  nation.”222	  The	  Council	  of	  Europe	  has	  
similarly	   identified	  how	  television	   is	  an	   important	  medium	  for	  encouraging	  
the	  provision	  of	  appropriate	  opportunities	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  sport	  at	  all	  levels	  
of	   experience	   and	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   all	   citizens.223	   In	   Australia,	   it	   is	   an	  
objective	   of	   the	   BSA	   “to	   promote	   the	   role	   of	   broadcasting	   services	   in	  
developing	  and	  reflecting	  a	  sense	  of	  Australian	  identity,	  character	  and	  cultural	  
diversity”.224	  As	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  (“HCA”)	  noted	  in	  
Project	   Blue	   Sky,225	  within	   the	   context	   of	   defining	   “Australianness”	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  programme	  quotas	   in	   the	  Australian	  Content	   Standard,226	   “[a]	  
program	  will	  contain	  Australian	  content	  if	  it	  shows	  aspects	  of	  the	  […]	  sporting	  
activities	  of	  Australians”.227	  
	  
The	   pervasiveness	   of	   traditional	   broadcast	   television	   renders	   it	   an	   ideal	  
platform	  for	  achieving	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  functions	  of	  sport,	  by	  exposing	  
sporting	   events	   to	   as	   large	   and	   wide	   an	   audience	   as	   possible.228	   In	   the	  
analogue	  era,	  the	  perceived	  importance	  of	  sport	  on	  television	  can	  be	  related	  
to	   the	  mass	   audience	   and	   immediacy	   of	   FTA	   television.	   The	   availability	   of	  
fewer	  channels	  and	  one-­‐way	  delivery	  of	   content	  meant	   that	  more	  viewers	  
were	   likely	   to	   simultaneously	   watch	   the	   same	   programmes.	   However,	  
audience	   fragmentation	   in	   the	   digital	   era	   (particularly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
increasing	  consumption	  of	  live	  or	  near-­‐live	  sports	  coverage	  in	  highlight	  format	  
on	  mobile	  devices)	  undermines	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  intervening	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  ‘Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Broadcasting’	  (HMSO	  Cmnd	  6753,	  March	  1977)	  para	  
3.2.	  
223	  Recommendation	  No.R	  (80)	  1	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  to	  Member	  States,	  adopted	  by	  the	  
Committee	  of	  Ministers	  on	  24	  January	  1980	  at	  the	  313th	  meeting	  of	  the	  Ministers’	  Deputies.	  
224	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  3(e).	  
225	  Project	  Blue	  Sky	  v	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Authority	  [1998]	  HCA	  28.	  
226	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Australian	  Content)	  Standard	  2005,	  as	  amended	  by	  Broadcasting	  Services	  
(Australian	  Content)	  Standard	  Variation	  2009	  (No.1)	  and	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Australian	  Content)	  
Standard	  Variation	  2010	  (No.1).	  
227	  Project	  Blue	  Sky	  (n	  225)	  [88].	  
228	   ‘Parliamentary	   Debates’	   (Commonwealth	   of	   Australia,	   House	   of	   Representatives	   no.14,	   5	   April	  
1978)	  996.	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in	  the	  market	  to	  retain	  sports	  coverage	  on	  FTA	  television	  serves	  the	  public	  
interest.229	  	  
	  
2.4	   Role	  of	  Premium	  Content	  in	  the	  Development	  of	  Pay-­‐TV	  
Due	   to	   its	  mass	   appeal	   and	   the	  willingness	   of	   viewers	   to	   pay	   to	  watch	   it,	  
premium	  content	  fulfils	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV.	  However,	  
the	  multi-­‐sided	  nature	  of	   pay-­‐TV	  providers	  means	   that	   access	   to	  premium	  
content	   presents	   challenges	   as	   well	   as	   opportunities	   for	   new	   entrants.	  
Acquiring	   the	   rights	   to	   broadcast	   premium	   content	   or	   producing	   premium	  
content	  typically	  requires	  significant	  investment,	  whether	  from	  subscription	  
fees	  and/or	  advertising	  revenue	  (or	  licence	  fees	  or	  state	  subsidies	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   PSB).	   Externalities	   between	   rights	   owners	   and	   viewers,	   and	   between	  
viewers	  and	  advertisers,	  can	  confer	  first-­‐mover	  advantages	  and	  entrench	  the	  
market	  positions	  of	  incumbent	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  This	  reinforces	  the	  challenge	  
for	   new	  entrants	   in	   competing	   in	   the	   retail	   supply	   of	   premium	   content	   to	  
viewers.	  
	  
2.4.1	   Network	  externalities	  in	  pay-­‐TV	  
In	   bearing	   the	   characteristics	   of	   a	  multi-­‐sided	   platform,	   a	   pay-­‐TV	   provider	  
enables	   interactions	  between	  rights	  owners,	  viewers	  and	  advertisers	  which	  
are	   indirectly	   connected	   by	   externalities	   that	   may	   not	   otherwise	   be	  
sufficiently	  internalised.	  As	  with	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  generally,	  positive	  and	  
negative	  externalities	  between	  these	  different	  sides	  indirectly	  affect	  the	  value	  
of	  each	  of	  the	  sides.	  The	  aim	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  is	  to	  “get	  all	  sides	  on	  board”.	  
The	   task	   of	   assessing	   externalities	   between	   the	   various	   sides	   in	   order	   to	  
achieve	  this,	  however,	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  rights	  owners	  
to	   supply	   viewers	   directly	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   viewers	   to	   skip/avoid	  
advertisements.	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  The	  challenge	  of	  defining	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  is	  considered	  later	  in	  the	  thesis.	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2.4.1.1	  Complementary	  interactions	  between	  rights	  owners	  and	  viewers	  
An	  increase	  in	  audience	  exposure	  generates	  positive	  externalities	  for	  rights	  
owners	   by	   increasing	   the	   value	   of	   their	   rights.	   The	   Internet	   and	   mobile	  
technology	  provide	  rights	  owners	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  connecting	  directly	  
with	   viewers	   and	   thereby	   bypassing	   the	   networks	   of	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers.230	  The	  direct-­‐to-­‐viewer	  model	  of	  distribution	  is	  well-­‐established	  in	  
the	   context	   of	   premium	   sport	   content.	   In	   the	  UK,	  Manchester	  United	   and	  
Chelsea	  were	  amongst	  the	  first	  football	  clubs	  to	  launch	  their	  own	  dedicated	  
channels,	  MUTV	  in	  1998	  and	  Chelsea	  TV	  in	  2001.	  Direct	  subscription	  services	  
have,	  more	   recently,	  also	  been	   launched	  by	   some	  of	   the	  Major	  Hollywood	  
Studios.	  Examples	  include	  Disney’s	  launch	  of	  DisneyLife	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2015,231	  
and	  NBCUniversal’s	  launch	  of	  the	  reality	  show	  SVOD	  service	  Hayu	  in	  the	  UK,	  
Ireland	  and	  Australia	  in	  2016.232	  	  
	  
Traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  networks	  may	  still	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐media,	  multi-­‐
platform	   distribution	   strategy.	   However,	   where	   rights	   owners	   are	   able	   to	  
capture	  value	  from	  dealing	  directly	  with	  viewers,	  a	  positive	  externality	  may	  
flow	   from	   rights	   owners	   to	   viewers.233	   This	   represents	   a	   complementary	  
interaction	   between	   rights	   owners	   and	   viewers.	   The	   benefits	   of	   increased	  
competition	  in	  retail	  distribution	  may	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  viewers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
lower	   prices,	   better	   quality	   and/or	   more	   innovative	   services.	   However,	  
dealing	  directly	  with	  viewers	  entails	  greater	  risk	  for	  rights	  owners,	  including	  
fewer	  financial	  guarantees	  and	  higher	  transaction	  costs.234	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  
a	  negative	  externality	  may	  flow	  from	  rights	  owners	  to	  viewers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230	   The	   regulatory	   implications	   of	   the	   growth	   in	   the	   direct-­‐to-­‐viewer	   model	   of	   distribution	   are	  
considered	  in	  Chapter	  6	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
231	  Mark	  Sweney,	  ‘Disney	  to	  launch	  UK	  film	  and	  TV	  streaming	  service	  for	  £9.99	  a	  month’	  The	  Guardian	  
(22	  October	  2015)	  <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/oct/22/disney-­‐uk-­‐film-­‐tv-­‐streaming-­‐
disneylife-­‐frozen-­‐toy-­‐story>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
232	  Leo	  Barraclough,	  ‘NBCUniversal	  Launches	  Reality	  Streaming	  Service	  Hayu	  in	  U.K.,	  Ireland,	  Australia’	  
Variety	   (11	   February	   2016)	   <http://variety.com/2016/digital/global/nbcuniversal-­‐reality-­‐streaming-­‐
service-­‐hayu-­‐uk-­‐ireland-­‐australia-­‐1201703166/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
233	  Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith	  (n	  24)	  46.	  
234	  ibid.	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2.4.1.2	  Non-­‐complementary	  interactions	  between	  viewers	  and	  advertisers	  
A	   positive	   externality	   flows	   from	   viewers	   to	   advertisers.235	   The	   size	   and	  
composition	   of	   television	   audiences	   have	   a	   positive	   effect	   on	   advertisers’	  
payoffs.236	  Subject	  to	  the	  appropriate	  demographic	  and	  attention	  value	  of	  the	  
audience,	  advertisers	  prefer	  larger	  audiences.	  Positive	  externalities	  may	  also	  
flow	  from	  advertisers	  to	  viewers.	  Viewers	  may	  indirectly	  value	  the	  quality	  of	  
the	  content	  which	  may	  be	  produced	  or	  acquired	  through	  the	  reinvestment	  of	  
advertising	  revenue.	  Also,	  viewers	  may	  directly	  value	  advertisements	  that	  are	  
informative	  or	  entertaining.	  	  
	  
Generally	   speaking,	   however,	   viewers	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   averse	   to	  
advertisements	   on	   television.237	   This	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   non-­‐complementary	  
interaction	  between	  advertisers	  and	  viewers.	  Television	  advertising	  is	  said	  to	  
impose	   a	   nuisance	   cost	   for	   viewers.	   If	   this	   nuisance	   cost	   outweighs	   the	  
positive	  benefits	  to	  viewers,	  a	  negative	  externality	  will	  flow	  from	  advertisers	  
to	  viewers.238	  Hence,	  the	  imposition	  in	  jurisdictions	  (including	  the	  UK/EU	  and	  
Australia)	  of	  restrictions	  on	  the	  volume	  and	  scheduling	  of	  advertisements,239	  
to	  protect	  viewers	  from	  excessive	  amounts	  of	  advertising	  and	  maintain	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235	   Kyle	   Bagwell,	   ‘The	   Economic	   Analysis	   of	   Advertising’	   in	  Mark	   Armstrong	   and	   Robert	   H	   Porter,	  
Handbook	  of	  Industrial	  Organization,	  vol	  3	  (North-­‐Holland	  Elsevier	  2007)	  1822.	  
236	  Robert	  G	  Picard	  and	  Steven	  S	  Wildman,	  Handbook	  on	  the	  Economics	  of	  the	  Media	  (Edward	  Elgar	  
Publishing	   2015)	   7.	   See,	   Germà	   Bel	   and	   Laia	   Domènech,	   ‘What	   Influences	   Advertising	   Price	   in	  
Television	   Channels?	   An	   Empirical	   Analysis	   on	   the	   Spanish	   Market’	   (2009)	   22	   Journal	   of	   Media	  
Economics	  164.	  
237	  See,	  Simon	  P	  Anderson	  and	  Jean	  J	  Gabszewicz,	  ‘The	  Media	  and	  Advertising:	  A	  Tale	  of	  Two-­‐Sided	  
Markets’	  in	  Victor	  A	  Ginsburgh	  and	  David	  Throsby,	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Economics	  of	  Art	  and	  Culture,	  vol	  
1	  (Elsevier	  2006)	  567-­‐614;	  Anthony	  Dukes	  and	  Esther	  Gal-­‐Or,	  ‘Minimum	  Differentiation	  in	  Commercial	  
Media	  Markets’	   (2003)	  12(3)	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  and	  Management	  Strategy	  291.	  However,	  some	  
studies	   differentiate	   between	   ad-­‐loving,	   ad-­‐averse	   and	   neutral	   viewers.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Jorge	  
Ferrando,	  Jean	  J	  Gabszewicz,	  Didier	  Laussel	  and	  Nathelie	  Sonnac,	  ‘Intermarket	  Network	  Externalities	  
and	  Competition:	  An	  Application	  to	  the	  Media	   Industry’	   (2008)	  4	   International	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  
Theory	   357;	   Hans	   J	   Kind	   and	   Frank	   Stähler,	   ‘Market	   Shares	   in	   Two-­‐sided	  Media	   Industries’	   (2010)	  
166(2)	  Journal	  of	  Institutional	  and	  Theoretical	  Economics	  205.	  
238	  Bagwell	  (n	  235).	  
239	   The	   volume	   of	   advertising	   on	  UK	   television	   is	   subject	   to	  Ofcom’s	   Code	   on	   the	   Scheduling	   and	  
Amount	   of	   Advertising	   and	   regulation	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   under	   the	   AVMSD.	   AVMSD	   (n	   92)	   art	   23.	  
Television	  advertising	  in	  Australia	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  number	  of	  codes	  of	  practice,	  including	  the	  Commercial	  
Television	  Industry	  Code	  of	  Practice	  for	  FTA	  television	  and	  the	  Australian	  Subscription	  Television	  and	  
Radio	  Association’s	  Code	  of	  Practice	  for	  pay-­‐TV.	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quality	  of	  the	  viewing	  experience.	  However,	  recent	  studies	  call	  into	  question	  
the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   advertising	   and	   viewers	   by	   finding	   that	   advertising	  
restrictions	  may	  benefit	  privately-­‐owned	  rivals	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  restrictions	  
because	  the	  profits	  of	  media	  outlets	  can	  increase	  even	  where	  the	  nuisance	  
cost	  to	  viewers	  increases.240	  This	   is	  based	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  advertising	  
revenue	   as	   a	   source	   for	   funding	   high	   quality	   content	   and	   the	   overriding	  
interest	  of	  viewers	  in	  such	  content.	  
	  
The	  risk	  of	  negative	  externalities	  flowing	  from	  advertisers	  to	  viewers	  is	  likely	  
to	  be	  reduced	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  viewers	  to	  use	  DVRs	  and	  ad-­‐
skipping	   technology	   to	   avoid	   watching	   advertisements.	   Also,	   the	   Netflix	  
model	   of	   advertising-­‐free	   streaming	   offers	   viewers	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
consume	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  premium	  content	  without	  the	  need	  to	  use	  
such	   technology.	   Streaming	   content	   via	   Netflix	   reportedly	   saves	   viewers	  
around	  160	  hours	  of	  advertising	  time	  per	  year.241	  Some	  broadcasters	  have	  cut	  
back	  on	  advertising	  time	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  lure	  back	  the	  Netflix	  generation	  to	  
traditional	   broadcast	   television.242	   All	   of	   this,	   however,	   is	   likely	   to	   have	  
ramifications	  for	  the	  ability	  of	  most	  broadcasters	  to	  monetise	  their	  audiences.	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  suggested	   that	   live	   sports	  events	   remain	   the	   form	  of	  premium	  
content	   for	  which	  ad-­‐skipping	  would	  appear	  to	  pose	  the	   least	   risk	  because	  
most	  viewers	  prefer	  to	  watch	  such	  events	  in	  real	  time.	  Also,	  advertisement-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  Markus	  Reisinger,	  ‘Platform	  Competition	  for	  Advertisers	  and	  Users	  in	  Media	  Markets’	  (2012)	  30(2)	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  Organization	  243;	  Tanja	  Greiner	  and	  Marco	  Sahm,	  ‘How	  Effective	  
Are	  Advertising	  Bans?	  On	  the	  Demand	  for	  Quality	   in	  Two-­‐Sided	  Media	  Markets’,	  29	  February	  2016	  
<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/145724/1/VfS_2016_pid_6733.pdf>	   accessed	   26	   June	  
2017.	  
241	   Nathan	   McAlone,	   ‘Netflix	   Saves	   Its	   Subscribers	   from	   160	   Hours	   of	   Commercials	   Per	   Year’	  UK	  
Business	  Insider	  (10	  May	  2016)	  <http://uk.businessinsider.com/netflix-­‐subscribers-­‐save-­‐160-­‐hours-­‐of-­‐
commercials-­‐compared-­‐to-­‐cable-­‐2016-­‐5>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2017.	  
242	   The	   possible	   effects	   of	   this	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   most	   pronounced	   in	   countries	   where	   television	  
advertising	  is	  more	  prolific,	  such	  as	  the	  US	  where	  a	  typical	  hour	  of	  cable	  television	  includes	  15	  minutes	  
and	  38	  seconds	  of	  advertising	   time.	   ‘Advertising	  and	  Audiences:	  State	  of	   the	  Media’	   (Nielsen,	  May	  
2014)	   14	  
<https://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/jp/docs/report/2014/Nielsen_Advertising_a
nd_%20Audiences%20Report-­‐FINAL.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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free	   SVOD	   platforms	   like	  Netflix	   do	   not	   currently	   provide	   live	   coverage	   of	  
sports	   events.	   According	   to	   its	   Chief	   Content	   Officer,	   Netflix	   does	   not	  
currently	  have	  any	  plans	  to	  enter	  the	  sports	  rights	  market.243	  Though	  there	  
does	  not	   appear	   to	  be	  any	   technological	   reason	  why	  Netflix	  would	  not,	   at	  
some	  point,	  go	  live.244	  	  
	  
In	   an	   attempt	   to	   reduce	   their	   exposure	   to	   advertising,	   viewers	   may	   even	  
consider	  switching	  supplier.	  However,	  the	  scope	  for	  switching	  may	  be	  limited	  
in	  practice	  by	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  individual	  viewer	  of	  acquiring	  another	  STB	  and	  
any	  penalties/charges	  which	  may	  be	   incurred	   for	   terminating	  their	  existing	  
subscription.	   Also,	   there	   may	   not	   be	   any	   alternative	   suppliers	   of	   certain	  
content,	  such	  as	  live	  coverage	  of	  sports	  events	  where	  broadcast	  rights	  been	  
licensed	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  opportunities	  for	  switching	  
are	  likely	  to	  be	  greater	  in	  relation	  to	  premium	  non-­‐sport	  content	  (particularly	  
in	   view	   of	   the	   growth	   of	   online	   streaming	   and	   increasing	   investment	   in	  
original	  drama).	  	  
	  
Pay-­‐TV	  providers	  must	  have	  regard	  to	  these	  possibilities	  and	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	   market	   for	   advertisers	   is	   also	   changing.	   The	   opportunity	   to	   advertise	  
across	  a	  range	  of	  media	  and	  devices	  means	  that	  advertising	  budgets	  are	  being	  
spread	  more	  broadly.	  Zentner	  finds	  that	  increases	  in	  Internet	  penetration	  are	  
negatively	   correlated	   with	   changes	   in	   advertising	   expenditure	   on	  
television.245	  In	  2009,	  the	  UK	  reportedly	  became	  the	  first	  major	  economy	  in	  
which	   advertisers	   spent	   more	   on	   Internet	   advertising	   than	   on	   television	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243	   ‘Edited	  Transcript:	  NFLX	  -­‐	  Q1	  2016	  Netflix	   Inc	  Earnings	  Call’	   (Thomson	  Reuters,	  18	  April	  2016)	  5	  
<http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/1550531779x0x888591/598D09BB-­‐3F29-­‐451C-­‐
8C78-­‐A22ECD827E7E/NFLX-­‐Transcript-­‐2016-­‐04-­‐18T21_00.pdf>	  accessed	  18	  August	  2017.	  
244	  Netflix	  has	  already	  started	  to	  supply	  near-­‐live	  content	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  talk	  show	  Chelsea	  Handler,	  
which	  is	  streamed	  a	  couple	  of	  hours	  after	  being	  recorded	  live.	  ibid.	  
245	   Alejandro	   Zentner,	   ‘Internet	   Adoption	   and	   Advertising	   Expenditures	   on	   Traditional	   Media:	   An	  
Empirical	  Analysis	  Using	  a	  Panel	  of	  Countries’	   (2012)	  21(4)	   Journal	  of	  Economics	  and	  Management	  
Strategy	  913.	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advertising.246	   However,	   traditional	   broadcast	   television	   remains	   a	   crucial	  
advertising	  medium	  in	  the	  UK,	  with	  adspend	  growing	  by	  7.3	  per	  cent	  to	  reach	  
a	   record	   £5.3billion	   in	   2015,	   followed	  by	   forecasts	   of	   continued	   growth	   in	  
total	  television	  adspend.247	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  in	  Australia	  where	  television	  
is	  reported	  to	  remain	  the	  most	  powerful	  paid	  advertising	  platform.248	  	  
	  
2.4.2	   “Chicken	  and	  egg”	  problem	  in	  securing	  the	  rights	  to	  premium	  content	  
As	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms,	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  need	  to	  adopt	  adequate	  pricing	  
structures	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  market	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  minimum	  efficient	  
scale.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  attract	  a	  sufficient	  number	  or	  critical	  mass	  of	  viewers	  
in	   order	   to	   receive	   the	   revenue	   from	   subscription	   fees	   and	   advertising	  
revenue,	  where	   relevant,	   to	   invest	   in	   content	   that	  will	   attract	   viewers.	   To	  
achieve	  critical	  mass,	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  need	  to	  supply	  a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  
content	   that	   viewers	   find	   appealing.	   Supplying	   such	   content	   requires	   the	  
necessary	  investment	  to	  produce	  or	  acquire	  the	  rights	  to	  such	  content.	  
	  
The	  more	  viewers	  that	  a	  channel	  attracts,	  the	  more	  appealing	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
to	   advertisers	   because	   the	   more	   attention	   an	   advert	   receives,	   the	   more	  
persuasion	  may	  occur.249	  This	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  demographic	  of	  the	  audience,	  
and	  the	  effects	  of	  ad-­‐skipping	  and/or	  multi-­‐homing	  by	  viewers.	  By	  reducing	  
audience	  size	  and/or	  the	  quality	  of	  viewer	  attention,	  ad-­‐skipping	  and	  multi-­‐
homing	   can	   impose	   a	   downward	   pressure	   on	   advertising	   rates	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246	  Mark	  Sweney,	  ‘Internet	  overtakes	  television	  to	  become	  biggest	  advertising	  sector	  in	  the	  UK’	  The	  
Guardian	   (30	   September	   2009)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/sep/30/internet-­‐
biggest-­‐uk-­‐advertising-­‐sector>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
247	  ‘UK	  advertising	  spend	  passes	  £20bn	  as	  growth	  hits	  five-­‐year	  high’	  (Advertising	  Association/Warc	  
Expenditure	   Report	   2015,	   26	   April	   2016)	   3	  
<http://expenditurereport.warc.com/FreeContent/Q4_2015.pdf>	  accessed	  23	  April	  2017.	  
248	   ‘Ads	   on	   TV	  Drive	  More	  Action	   than	   any	  Other	   Paid	  Media	  Online’	   (Nielsen,	   16	   February	   2016)	  
<http://www.nielsen.com/au/en/insights/news/2016/ads-­‐on-­‐tv-­‐drive-­‐more-­‐action-­‐than-­‐any-­‐other-­‐
paid-­‐media.html>	  accessed	  23	  April	  2017.	  
249	  Thales	  S	  Teixeira,	  ‘The	  Rising	  Cost	  of	  Consumer	  Attention:	  Why	  You	  Should	  Care,	  and	  What	  You	  Can	  
Do	   About	   It’	   (Harvard	   Business	   School	   working	   paper	   14-­‐055,	   17	   January	   2014)	   4	  
<http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-­‐055_2ef21e7e-­‐7529-­‐4864-­‐b0f0-­‐
c64e4169e17f.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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broadcasters.	  Multi-­‐homing	   by	   advertisers	  may	   also	   eliminate	   competition	  
between	   broadcasters	   for	   such	   advertisers.250	  Meanwhile,	   some	   empirical	  
studies	   suggest	   that	   competition	   remains	   strong	  between	  broadcasters	   on	  
the	   advertising-­‐side,	   with	   larger	   broadcasters	   still	   able	   to	   command	   a	  
premium	  as	  regards	  advertising	  revenue	  per	  viewer.251	  
	  
Increasing	   the	   size	   of	   an	   audience	   involves	   providing	   additional	   appealing	  
content	  and	  this,	   in	  turn,	  requires	  further	  investment	  for	  the	  production	  or	  
acquisition	  of	  such	  content,	  and	  so	  on.	  A	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
achieve	   critical	   mass	   if	   it	   does	   not	   attract	   adequate	   revenue	   from	   viewer	  
subscriptions	  (and	  advertising	  if	  applicable),	  and	  vice	  versa.	  This	  gives	  rise	  to	  
the	  so-­‐called	  “chicken	  and	  egg”	  problem.252	   It	  will	  be	  seen	   in	  the	  following	  
chapter	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  in	  the	  analogue	  era	  was	  to	  entrench	  the	  market	  
positions	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  
Australia.	  However,	  it	  will	  be	  suggested	  that	  the	  “chicken	  and	  egg”	  problem	  
is	  alleviated	  in	  the	  digital	  era,	  particularly	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  
and	  the	  rise	  of	  premium	  drama.	  
	  
2.5	   Conclusions	  
By	   its	   very	   nature,	   premium	   content	   presents	   both	   opportunities	   and	  
challenges	   for	   pay-­‐TV	   providers.	   The	   tendency	   for	   broadcast	   rights	   to	   be	  
granted	   on	   an	   exclusive	   basis	   for	   a	   specific	   period	   of	   time	   reinforces	   the	  
scarcity	  of	  premium	  content	  (and	  premium	  sport	  content	  in	  particular).	  The	  
possible	  absence	  of	  close	  substitutes	  for	  major	  sporting	  events	  is	  reinforced	  
by	   the	   fact	   that	   most	   viewers	   still	   prefer	   to	   watch	   such	   events	   live.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  Anderson	  and	  Coate	  (n	  55);	  Mark	  Armstrong	  and	  Julian	  Wright,	  ‘Two-­‐Sided	  Markets,	  Competitive	  
Bottlenecks	  and	  Exclusive	  Contracts’	  (2007)	  32(2)	  Economic	  Theory	  353.	  
251	  Keith	  Brown	  and	  George	  Williams,	   ‘Consolidation	  and	  Advertising	  Prices	   in	  Local	  Radio	  Markets’	  
(Federal	   Communications	   Commission,	   September	   2002)	  
<https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-­‐226838A9.pdf>	   accessed	   13	   August	   2017;	  
Keith	  Brown	  and	  Peter	  J	  Alexander,	  ‘Market	  Structure,	  Viewer	  Welfare	  and	  Advertising	  Rates	  in	  Local	  
Television	  Markets’	  (2005)	  86	  Economic	  Letters	  331.	  
252	  See,	  Caillaud	  and	  Jullien	  (2003)	  (n	  60).	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Nevertheless,	  the	  increasing	  consumption	  of	  sports	  coverage	  in	  real	  time	  “on	  
the	  move”	  via	  mobile	  devices	  and	  social	  media	  begs	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  
constitutes	  watching	   content	   “live”.	   This	  will	   have	   implications	   for	  market	  
definition	   and	   the	   assessment	   of	   market	   power	   by	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  holding	  exclusive	  live	  sports	  rights	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  The	  
resulting	  upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  wholesale	  cost	  of	  acquiring	  such	  rights	  will	  
be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  escalating	  cost	  of	  sports	  
rights	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  	  
	  
Scarcity	  does	  not	  arise	  as	  such	  an	  issue	  within	  the	  context	  of	  premium	  drama.	  
The	   effects	   of	   this	   on	   the	   relatively	  wide	   availability	   of	   premium	  drama	   is	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  by	  the	  higher	  degree	  of	  new	  entry	  into	  
the	  supply	  of	  premium	  drama	   in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  The	   increasing	  
opportunities	   to	   monetise	   premium	   drama	   in	   the	   international	   television	  
drama	  market	  fulfils	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this	  trend.	  Even	  within	  the	  context	  
of	  premium	  drama,	  exclusivity	  arguably	  remains	  a	  definitive	  characteristic	  of	  
effective	  competition.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  ensuring	  that	  
this	  and	  the	  resulting	  tendency	  towards	  market	  concentration	  are	  given	  due	  
consideration	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	  market	   power	   in	   the	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	  
context.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
	  
PREMIUM	  CONTENT	  AND	  PAY-­‐TV	  DEVELOPMENTS	  IN	  THE	  UK	  AND	  AUSTRALIA	  
	  
	  
3.1	   Introduction	  
Subject	  to	  the	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation,	  the	  coverage	  
of	  major	  sporting	  events	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  
a	  small	  number	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  (specifically	  Sky	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  
Foxtel	   in	   Australia).	   New	   entry	   by	   established	   telecommunications	   service	  
providers,	   with	   their	   ability	   to	   bundle	   pay-­‐TV	   with	   other	   communications	  
services,	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   undermine	   the	  market	   positions	   of	   Sky	   and	  
Foxtel	  in	  relation	  to	  live	  sports	  broadcasting.	  However,	  the	  greatest	  change	  in	  
the	  competitive	  dynamic	  for	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  premium	  content	  to	  viewers	  
arguably	  arises	   in	  relation	  to	  premium	  drama.	  This	   is	  due	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  
online	  streaming	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  premium	  drama	  within	   the	  business	  
models	  of	  SVOD	  platforms.	  
	  
The	  entry	  of	  BT	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Optus	  in	  Australia	  into	  the	  sports	  rights	  market	  
markedly	   alters	   the	   competitive	   dynamic	   for	   the	   retail	   supply	   of	   premium	  
sport	  content	  in	  the	  UK	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  in	  Australia.	  This	  may	  be	  partly	  
due	  to	  the	  greater	  opportunities	  for	  competition	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  larger	  UK	  
market.	   It	   is	   also	   likely	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	   the	  more	   comprehensive	   anti-­‐
siphoning	  regulation	  of	  premium	  sport	  content	  that	  persists	  in	  Australia	  (as	  
will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  However,	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  in	  
the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  suggests	  more	  comparable	  effects	  on	  the	  competitive	  
landscapes	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  as	  regards	  the	  supply	  of	  premium	  movies	  and	  
drama.	   This	   demonstrates	   how	   suppliers	   are	   competing	  more	   strongly	   on	  
innovation	   (than	   on	   price)	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   differentiate	   their	   services,	   as	  
firms	  do	  in	  dynamic	  markets.	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3.2	   Impact	  of	  Pay-­‐TV	  on	  the	  Broadcasting	  Landscapes	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  
Television	  broadcasting	  emerged	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  primarily	  as	  a	  
public	  service.	  The	  introduction	  of	  satellite	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  cable	   in	  Australia	  
saw	  the	  gradual	  growth	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV.	  Despite	  the	  relatively	  stronger	  
tradition	   of	   PSB	   in	   the	   UK,	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   penetration	   exceeds	   that	   in	  
Australia.	   This	   can	   be	   partly	   explained	   by	   the	   technical	   and	   physical	  
constraints	   that	   the	   large	   geographic	   size	   and	   dispersed	   population	   of	  
Australia	   impose	  on	  the	   laying	  of	  network	   infrastructure.	  Despite	  this,	  new	  
entry	   by	   established	   telecommunications	   service	   providers	   and	   SVOD	  
platforms	   suggests	   a	   degree	   of	   convergence	   between	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
competitive	   landscapes	   in	   the	   two	   countries.	   This	   includes	   the	   enduring	  
resilience	   of	   FTA	   television	   in	   both	   the	  UK	   and	  Australia,	   as	   public	   service	  
broadcasters	  and	  commercial	  FTA	  broadcasters	  seek	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  growth	  
of	  online	  streaming.	  
	  
3.2.1	   Role	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  on	  the	  development	  of	  broadcasting	  in	  the	  UK	  
Broadcasting	   in	   the	  UK	  was	   founded	   as	   a	   FTA	  public	   service	   based	  on	   the	  
Reithian	  tradition	  to	  “inform,	  educate	  and	  entertain”.253	  These	  values	  were	  
conferred	  on	  the	  the	  UK’s	   first	  and	  primary	  public	  service	  broadcaster,	   the	  
British	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  (“BBC”),254	  by	  its	  first	  Director-­‐General,	  John	  
Reith.	   The	   BBC	  was	   established	   in	   1927,	   as	   a	   vertically-­‐integrated	   content	  
producer,	  channel	  provider	  and	  broadcaster,	  to	  provide	  broadcasting	  services	  
as	  a	  public	  utility.255	  Its	  Charter	  specifies	  that	  the	  BBC’s	  main	  activities	  include	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  Reith	  (n	  120).	  	  
254	  The	  other	  PSB	  channel	  providers	  in	  the	  UK	  include	  the	  Channel	  4	  Corporation,	  ITV	  plc,	  STV	  Group	  
plc,	  UTV	  Media	  plc,	  S4C	  and	  Channel	  5.	  The	  PSB	  channels	  in	  the	  UK	  include	  BBC	  One,	  BBC	  Two,	  BBC	  
Three,	  BBC	  Four,	  BBC	  News,	  CBBC,	  CBeebies,	  BBC	  Parliament,	  BBC	  HD	  services,	  ITV,	  STV,	  UTV,	  Channel	  
4,	  Five,	  S4C	  and	  BBC	  Alba.	  ‘Public	  Service	  Content	  in	  a	  Connected	  Society:	  Ofcom’s	  Third	  Review	  of	  
Public	   Service	   Broadcasting’	   (Ofcom,	   15	   December	   2014)	   1	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/42580/psbr-­‐3.pdf>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	  
255	   BBC	   Royal	   Charter	   1927,	   cl	   3(a)	  
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement/a
rchive/1927.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  The	  BBC’s	  1937	  Royal	  Charter	  extended	  the	  public	  utility	  
service	   of	   the	   BBC	   from	   radio	   to	   include	   television.	   BBC	   Royal	   Charter	   1937,	   cl	   3(a)	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to	  promote	   its	   “public	  purposes”.256	  Notably,	   sport	   is	   considered	   to	   fulfil	   a	  
vital	  role	  in	  the	  BBC’s	  public	  purposes,257	  by	  bringing	  audiences	  together	  to	  
share	   the	   experience	   of	   watching	   events	   of	   national	   importance	   and	  
promoting	  minority	  sports.258	  	  
	  
The	  BBC	  enjoyed	  what	  Reith	  describes	  as	  the	  “brute	  force	  of	  monopoly”,259	  
until	  the	  introduction	  of	  commercial	  FTA	  television	  in	  1955,260	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
ITV.261	   As	   a	   FTA	  broadcaster,	   ITV	  delivers	   content	   on	   traditional	   broadcast	  
television	  and	  on-­‐demand	  via	  the	  ITV	  Hub.	  Whilst	  funded	  by	  advertising	  and	  
sponsorship,	   ITV	  still	  has	  a	  public	  service	  remit	   to	  provide	  “a	  range	  of	  high	  
quality	  and	  diverse	  programming.”262	  The	  ITV’s	  duopoly	  with	  the	  BBC	  existed	  
until	   the	   launch	   of	   Channel	   4	   in	   1982.	   Publicly-­‐owned	   but	   commercially-­‐
funded,	  Channel	  4	  has	  the	  same	  general	  public	  service	  remit	  as	  ITV.	  It	  is	  also	  
required	   to	  provide	   innovative	  programming	  of	   a	  distinctive	   character	   and	  
educative	  value	  that	  appeals	  to	  a	  culturally	  diverse	  society.263	  The	  UK’s	  fourth	  
FTA	  network,	  Channel	  5	  (“Five”),	  which	  is	  owned	  by	  Viacom,	  was	  launched	  in	  
1997.	  Five	  has	  the	  same	  public	  service	  remit	  as	  ITV.264	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement/a
rchive/1937.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
256	  The	  BBC’s	  “public	  purposes”	  include	  sustaining	  citizenship	  and	  civil	  society;	  promoting	  education;	  
stimulating	  creativity	  and	  cultural	  excellence;	  representing	  the	  UK	  and	  its	  communities;	  bringing	  the	  
UK	   to	   the	   World	   and	   vice	   versa;	   and	   helping	   to	   deliver	   to	   the	   public	   the	   benefit	   of	   emerging	  
communications	  technologies	  and	  services.	  ‘Copy	  of	  Royal	  Charter	  for	  the	  continuance	  of	  the	  British	  
Broadcasting	   Corporation’	   (Department	   for	   Culture,	   Media	   and	   Sport,	   2006)	   arts	   4	   and	   5(1)	  
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
257	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  BBC	  Charter	  Review,	  Further	  Issues	  for	  BBC	  Charter	  Review	  (HL	  2005-­‐06,	  
128-­‐II)	  para	  108.	  
258	  ibid	  para	  109.	  
259	  John	  CW	  Reith,	  Into	  the	  Wind	  (Hodder	  &	  Stoughton	  1949)	  99.	  
260	  On	  the	  introduction	  of	  competition	  in	  UK	  broadcasting,	  see	  Asa	  Briggs,	  The	  History	  of	  Broadcasting	  
in	  the	  United	  Kingdom:	  Competition,	  vol	  5	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  1995)	  18-­‐19.	  
261	  Television	  Act	  1954.	  
262	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  s	  265(2).	  
263	  ibid	  s	  265(3).	  	  
264	  ibid	  s	  265(2).	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3.2.1.1	  Introduction	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  Sky	  
Despite	   the	  UK’s	   strong	   tradition	  of	  PSB,	   traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  has	  achieved	  a	  
reasonably	  high	  degree	  of	  penetration	  within	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  
Europe’s	   first	   satellite	   service,	   British	   Satellite	   Broadcasting	   (“BSB”)	   was	  
launched	  in	  1982.	  BSB	  merged	  in	  1990	  with	  a	  second	  non-­‐domestic	  satellite	  
service,265	   Sky	   Television	   plc,266	   to	   form	   Sky,	   in	   whose	   parent	   company	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  holds	  a	  39	  per	  cent	  share.267	  In	  2006,	  the	  UK’s	  two	  
then	   largest	   cable	   operators,	   National	   Transcommunications	   Limited	   and	  
Telewest,	  merged	  to	  form	  Virgin	  Media	  Inc	  (“Virgin	  Media”).	  Virgin	  Media	  is	  
now	  the	  UK’s	  main	  cable	  operator	  with	  5.7million	  cable	  customers.268	  As	  the	  
UK’s	   main	   pay-­‐TV	   providers,	   Sky	   and	   Virgin	   Media,	   together	   with	  
telecommunications	   service	   providers	   BT	   and	   TalkTalk	   Telecom	   Group	   plc	  
(“TalkTalk”),	  have	  a	  total	  of	  around	  16.5million	  subscribers.269	  Over	  half	  of	  UK	  
households	  pay	  for	  a	  television	  service,270	  with	  36	  per	  cent	  taking	  pay-­‐TV	  as	  a	  
standalone	  service	  and	  64	  per	  cent	  having	  pay-­‐TV	  as	  a	  bundled	  service.271	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	   Stefaan	  Verhulst,	   ‘The	  United	   Kingdom’	   in	  David	  Goldberg,	   Tony	   Prosser	   and	   Stefaan	  Verhulst,	  
Regulating	  the	  Changing	  Media:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  (Clarendon	  Press	  1998)	  106.	  
266	  On	  events	   leading	  up	   to	   the	  merger,	   see	  Mark	  Williams,	   ‘Sky	  Wars:	  The	  OFT	  Review	  of	  Pay-­‐TV’	  
(1997)	  18(4)	  European	  Competition	  Law	  Review	  214.	  
267	   ‘TR1	  Notification	  of	  Major	   Interest	   in	   Shares’	   (British	   Sky	  Broadcasting	  Group	  PLC,	   1	   July	  2013)	  
<https://markets.ft.com/data/announce/full?dockey=1323-­‐11632121-­‐
101T5VTRVSMISK2IMINF5RC9P0>	  accessed	  18	  August	  2017.	  
268	   ‘Virgin	   Media	   Q3	   2016	   Results’	   (Virgin	   Media	   press	   release,	   4	   November	   2016)	  
<http://www.virginmedia.com/corporate/media-­‐centre/press-­‐releases/virgin-­‐media-­‐q3-­‐2016-­‐
results.html>	  accessed	  25	  April	  2017.	  
269	   ‘Review	   of	   the	   Pay	   TV	   Wholesale	   Must-­‐Offer	   Obligation:	   Consultation	   Document’	   (Ofcom,	   19	  
December	  2014)	  13	  <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/54185/Review-­‐of-­‐the-­‐
pay-­‐TV-­‐wholesale-­‐must-­‐offer-­‐obligation.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
270	  ibid.	  
271	   ‘Pricing	   Trends	   for	   Communications	   Services	   in	   the	   UK’	   (Ofcom,	   15	   March	   2017)	   28	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/98605/Pricing-­‐report-­‐2017.pdf>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	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3.2.1.2	  Delayed	  entry	  of	  BT	  into	  the	  UK	  cable	  television	  market	  
BT	  was	  prohibited	  from	  entering	  cable	  television	  until	  2001,272	  to	  assist	  new	  
entry	  by	  rival	  cable	  providers.273	  Since	  its	  entry	  into	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  2006	  with	  the	  
launch	  of	  the	  subscription	   IPTV	  service,	  BT	  TV	  (originally	  BT	  Vision),	  BT	  has	  
expanded	  rapidly.	  It	  has	  utilised	  its	  incumbency	  in	  the	  UK	  telecommunications	  
sector	  to	  attract	  1.5million	  BT	  TV	  subscribers.274	  This	  represents	  9	  per	  cent	  of	  
the	   total	   UK	   pay-­‐TV	  market.275	   BT	   Sports	   channels	   are	   now	   in	  more	   than	  
5.2million	  homes.276	  BT	  requires	  BT	  TV	  customers	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  its	  broadband	  
Internet	   and	   landline	   telephone	   services.	   This	   is	   significant	   given	   the	  
continuing	   growth	   of	   Internet	   broadcasting	   and	   the	   popularity	   of	   online	  
streaming.	   As	   part	   of	   BT	   Group	   plc,277	   BT	   is	   the	   UK’s	   largest	  
telecommunications	  service	  provider,	  with	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  the	  fixed	  UK	  
broadband	  market	  at	  32	  per	  cent.278	  	  
	  
BT’s	  bundling	  capabilities	  were	  reinforced	  in	  August	  2016	  by	  its	  acquisition	  of	  
the	   UK’s	   largest	   mobile	   operator,	   EE	   Limited	   (“EE”).279	   The	   acquisition	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  Competition	  and	  Choice:	  Telecommunications	  Policy	  for	  
the	  1990s	  (White	  Paper,	  Cm	  1461,	  1991).	  	  
273	  Mark	  Armstrong,	   ‘Competition	   in	  Telecommunications’	   (1997)	  13(1)	  Oxford	  Review	  of	  Economic	  
Policy	  64,	  69.	  
274	   BT	   Group	   plc’s	   Annual	   Report	   2016,	   9	  
<http://www.btplc.com/Sharesandperformance/Annualreportandreview/pdf/2016-­‐Annual-­‐
Report.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
275	  ibid	  72.	  
276	  ‘Financial	  Results	  for	  the	  Fourth	  Quarter	  and	  Year	  to	  31	  March	  2015’	  (BT	  Group	  plc,	  7	  May	  2015)	  1	  
<https://www.rns-­‐pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/4229M_-­‐2015-­‐5-­‐6.pdf>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	  
277	  BT	  Group	  plc	  descends	  from	  the	  UK’s	  first	  telecommunications	  undertaking,	  the	  Electric	  Telegraph	  
Company,	  which	  was	  incorporated	  in	  1846.	  Electric	  Telegraph	  Company’s	  Act	  1946.	  
278	  The	  remaining	  shares	  of	  the	  market	  are	  held	  by	  Virgin	  Media	  (19	  per	  cent),	  TalkTalk	  (13	  per	  cent),	  
Sky	   (23	  per	   cent),	   EE	   (4	  per	   cent)	   and	  Others	   (8	  per	   cent).	   ‘Communications	  Market	  Report	   2016’	  
(Ofcom,	   4	   August	   2016)	   149	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/26826/cmr_uk_2016.pdf>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  
279	  ‘BT	  Group	  plc	  and	  EE	  Limited:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Anticipated	  Acquisition	  by	  BT	  Group	  plc	  of	  EE	  Limited’	  
(CMA,	   15	   January	   2016)	  
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/56992242ed915d4747000026/BT_EE_final_report.
pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017;	  ‘BT	  to	  retain	  EE	  brand	  as	  acquisition	  confirmed’	  (BT	  news	  release,	  10	  
August	   2016)	   <http://home.bt.com/news/bt-­‐life/bt-­‐to-­‐retain-­‐ee-­‐brand-­‐as-­‐acquisition-­‐confirmed-­‐
11364037422234>	  accessed	  11	  September	  2016.	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significant	   because	   EE	   services	  more	   than	   31million	   connections	   across	   its	  
mobile,	   fixed	  and	  wholesale	  networks.280	  This	  enables	  BT	  to	  deliver	  a	   fully-­‐
functional,	  quad-­‐play	  service.	  Quad-­‐play	  services	  are	  also	  offered	  by	  Talk	  Talk,	  
which	   was	   launched	   in	   September	   2012,	   via	   the	   BT	   network.281	   A	   further	  
potential	   new	   entrant	   from	   the	   telecommunications	   sector	   was	   Vodafone	  
Group	  plc	  (“Vodafone”),	  which	  has	  around	  19million	  mobile	  customers	  in	  the	  
UK.282	  Vodafone	  was	  expected	  to	  launch	  Internet-­‐based	  Vodafone	  TV	  (which	  
already	  exists	  in	  Ireland,	  Portugal	  and	  Spain)	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2016.283	  However,	  it	  
is	   reported	   that	   Vodafone	   no	   longer	   intends	   to	   do	   so	   in	   the	   foreseeable	  
future,284	  possibly	  due	  to	  its	  small	  share	  of	  the	  UK	  broadband	  market	  which	  it	  
only	  entered	  in	  June	  2015.285	  	  
	  
3.2.1.3	  Impact	  of	  new	  entry	  by	  online	  streaming	  services	  in	  the	  UK	  	  
New	  entry	  by	  SVOD	  platforms,	  Amazon	  Prime	  and	  Netflix	  in	  particular,	  means	  
that	  online	  streaming	  in	  the	  UK	  has	  also	  grown	  significantly	  in	  recent	  years.	  
Launched	  in	  2007,	  Amazon	  Prime	  offers	  users	  unlimited	  access	  to	  a	  store	  of	  
movies	  (and	  music	  and	  e-­‐books)	  for	  an	  annual	  subscription	  fee	  of	  £79.286	  Since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280	  ‘About	  EE’	  <http://ee.co.uk/our-­‐company/about-­‐ee>	  accessed	  11	  September	  2016.	  
281	   TalkTalk	   is	   operated	   by	   TalkTalk	   Telecom	  Group	  plc.	  Originally	   launched	   in	   September	   2000	   as	  
Homechoice	  by	  Video	  Networks	  Limited,	  in	  August	  2006	  Homechoice	  was	  purchased	  by	  Tiscali	  UK	  and	  
became	  known	  as	  Tiscali	  TV.	  Following	  the	  acquisition	  by	  Carphone	  Warehouse	  in	  2009	  of	  Tiscali	  UK,	  
Tiscali	  TV	  was	  rebranded	  as	  TalkTalk	  TV.	  
282	  ‘Vodafone	  through	  the	  years’	  <http://www.vodafone.co.uk/about-­‐us/company-­‐history/>	  accessed	  
10	  April	  2015.	  
283	   Kate	   Palmer,	   ‘Vodafone	   puts	   an	   extra	   £2bn	   into	   UK	  mobile	   after	   upgrade	   project	   falls	   behind	  
schedule’	   The	   Telegraph	   (17	   May	   2016)	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/05/17/vodafone-­‐signals-­‐modest-­‐recovery-­‐as-­‐sales-­‐
rise-­‐2pc/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
284	  This	   is	  based	  on	  reports	  that	  Vodafone	  is	  seeking	  early	  exit	  from	  contracts	  with	  various	  channel	  
providers.	   Christopher	   Williams,	   ‘Vodafone	   wastes	   millions	   on	   thwarted	   pay-­‐TV	   ambitions’	   The	  
Telegraph	   (24	   April	   2017)	   <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/04/24/vodafone-­‐wastes-­‐
millions-­‐thwarted-­‐pay-­‐tv-­‐ambitions/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
285	  Daniel	  Thomas,	  ‘Vodafone	  launches	  broadband	  service	  into	  competitive	  UK	  market’	  Financial	  Times	  
(10	   June	   2015)	   <https://www.ft.com/content/b7cf6960-­‐0f4f-­‐11e5-­‐897e-­‐00144feabdc0>	   accessed	   2	  
September	  2017.	  
286	  The	  annual	  cost	  of	  subscribing	  to	  Amazon	  was	  increased	  from	  £49	  in	  2014.	  Jeff	  Parsons,	  ‘Amazon	  
Prime:	   What	   is	   it	   and	   is	   it	   worth	   paying	   £79	   a	   year	   for?’	   The	   Mirror	   (15	   July	   2015)	  
<http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/technology-­‐science/technology/amazon-­‐prime-­‐what-­‐worth-­‐paying-­‐
6070295>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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launching	   in	   the	   UK	   in	   2012,	   Netflix	   has	   attracted	   more	   than	   5million	  
customers,287	   at	   a	   cost	   of	   £5.99	   per	   month.	   This	   is	   notably	   less	   than	   the	  
monthly	  cost	  of	  subscribing	  to	  Sky	  or	  Virgin	  Media,	  with	  basic	  packages	  for	  
Sky	   (the	   Sky	   Original	   Bundle)	   and	   Virgin	   Media	   costing	   £20	   and	   £18,	  
respectively.	   BT	   offers	   a	   starter	   package	   of	   BT	   TV	   to	   its	   BT	   Broadband	  
customers	   at	   no	   additional	   cost,	   and	  entertainment	  packages	   for	  between	  
£10	  and	  £16	  per	  month.288	  	  
	  
The	   price	   differentials	   between	   these	   services	  may	   be	   partly	   explained	   by	  
differences	  between	   their	   content	  offerings.	   For	  example,	  Netflix	  does	  not	  
stream	  live	  sport	  (although	  Amazon	  does).	  Meanwhile,	  Sky’s	  24-­‐hour	  sports	  
news	  television	  channel,	  Sky	  Sports	  News	  HQ,	  is	  included	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Sky	  
Original	  Bundle.	  This	  is	  pertinent	  because	  despite	  the	  increasing	  consumption	  
of	  sports	  coverage	  “on	  the	  move”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  highlights/updates,	  it	  will	  be	  
seen	  how	  Ofcom	  remains	  reluctant	  to	  include	  sports	  news	  within	  the	  category	  
of	  news	  and	  current	  affairs.	  Also,	  price	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  deciding	  factor	  
for	   viewers	   (particularly	   sports	   fans)	   in	   choosing	   between	  pay-­‐TV	   services.	  
Additionally,	  as	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  adopting	  a	  multi-­‐media	  
distribution	   strategy	   and	   integrating	   backwards	   into	   the	   production	   of	  
content,	  the	  task	  of	  comparing	  the	  different	  price	  points	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  and	  new	  entrants	  becomes	  increasingly	  complex.	  
	  
Despite	  such	  new	  entry,	  Sky	  remains	  the	  UK’s	   largest	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	  with	  
12.35million	  retail	  customers.289	  Access	  to	  premium	  content	  has	  played	  a	  vital	  
role	  in	  enabling	  Sky	  to	  establish	  its	  strong	  market	  position	  in	  the	  analogue	  era.	  
It	  retains	  the	  ability	  to	  bid	  aggressively	  for	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  premium	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287	  Jasper	  Jackson,	  ‘Netflix	  races	  ahead	  of	  Amazon	  and	  Sky	  with	  5m	  UK	  households’	  The	  Guardian	  (22	  
March	   2016)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/mar/22/netflix-­‐amazon-­‐sky-­‐uk-­‐
subscribers-­‐streaming>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
288	  ‘BT	  TV	  &	  Broadband	  Packages’	  <https://www.productsandservices.bt.com/products/tv-­‐packages/>	  
accessed	  22	  July	  2016.	  
289	   Sky	   plc’s	   Group	   KPI	   Summary	   <http://s3-­‐eu-­‐west-­‐1.amazonaws.com/skygroup-­‐sky-­‐
static/documents/investors/results/2016/q4-­‐kpi-­‐summary.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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sport	  content.	  However,	   the	  consideration	  below	  of	  Sky’s	  response	  to	  new	  
entry,	   especially	   by	   BT,	   demonstrates	   increasingly	   strong	   dynamic	  
competition.	  	  
	  
3.2.2	   Australian	  broadcasting	  with	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
It	  is	  said	  to	  be	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  television	  in	  Australia	  
coincided	  with	  the	  staging	  of	  the	  1956	  Olympic	  Games	  in	  Melbourne.290	  The	  
initial	   broadcast	   was	   made	   by	   the	   ABC,	   Australia’s	   first	   public	   service	  
broadcaster,	   on	   5	   November	   1956.291	   The	   Reithian	   tradition	   to	   “inform,	  
educate	  and	  entertain”	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  ABC’s	  public	  service	  mandate,292	  to	  
provide	  programmes	  that:	  
	  
contribute	   to	  a	   sense	  of	  national	   identity	   and	   inform	  and	  
entertain,	  and	  reflect	  the	  cultural	  diversity	  of,	  the	  Australian	  
community;	  and	  […]	  programs	  of	  an	  educational	  nature.293	  
	  
Similarly,	  the	  Special	  Broadcasting	  Service	  (“SBS”)	  was	  established	  in	  1975	  as	  
a	   national	   multicultural	   and	   multilingual	   broadcaster,	   to	   provide	   media	  
services	  that	  inform,	  educate	  and	  entertain	  all	  Australians,	  and	  hence	  reflect	  
Australia’s	  multicultural	  society.294	  	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  BBC,	  the	  ABC	  lacked	  the	  benefits	  of	  monopoly	  or	  the	  licence	  
fee	   funding	   model.	   It	   instead	   faced	   strong	   political	   opposition	   from	   the	  
commercial	   FTA	   broadcasters	   with	   their	   associated	   press	   ownership.295	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290	  Stewart	  (n	  154)	  41.	  
291	  It	  is	  reported	  that	  the	  ABC	  Chairman	  at	  the	  time	  stated	  that	  television	  would	  be	  introduced	  largely	  
because	  of	  the	  Olympic	  Games.	  Richard	  Boyer,	  ‘This	  Television’	  The	  ABC	  Weekly	  (1	  September	  1956)	  
1.	  
292	   The	   Australian	   Broadcasting	   Commission	   was	   established	   under	   the	   Australian	   Broadcasting	  
Commission	   Act	   1932	   and	   replaced	   by	   the	   Australian	   Broadcasting	   Corporation	   on	   1	   July	   1983.	  
Australian	  Broadcasting	  Corporation	  Act	  1983,	  s	  5(1).	  
293	  ibid	  s	  6(1).	  
294	  Special	  Broadcasting	  Service	  Act	  1991,	  s	  6(1).	  
295	  Reith	  (n	  120)	  222.	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Commercial	  FTA	  television	   in	  Australia	  commenced	  on	  16	  September	  1956	  
with	   the	   launch	   of	   Channel	   Nine	   (or	   the	   Nine	   Network	   (“Nine”)).	   Nine	   is	  
owned	   by	   Nine	   Entertainment	   Co	   Holdings	   Ltd	   (“Nine	   Entertainment”)	  
(formerly	   Publishing	   and	   Broadcasting	   Limited	   (“PBL”)).	   Later	   that	   year,	  
Channel	   Seven	   (or	   the	   Seven	   Network	   (“Seven”))	   was	   launched.	   Seven	   is	  
owned	   by	   Seven	   West	   Media	   Limited	   (“Seven	   West	   Media”).	   The	   third	  
commercial	   FTA	   channel,	   Channel	   Ten	   (or	   Network	   Ten	   (“Ten”)),	   which	   is	  
owned	  by	  Ten	  Network	  Holdings	  Ltd,	  was	  launched	  on	  1	  August	  1964.	  Unlike	  
their	  UK	  counterparts,	  Seven,	  Nine	  and	  Ten	  do	  not	  have	  public	  service	  remits,	  
but	   they	   are	   subject	   to	   programme	   quotas	   in	   the	   Australian	   Content	  
Standard,296	  and	  a	  system	  of	  co-­‐regulation.297	  	  
	  
3.2.2.1	  Moratorium	  on	  the	  introduction	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  Australia	  
Seven,	  Nine	  and	  Ten	  were	   instrumental	   in	   the	  delay	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	  
pay-­‐TV	   in	   Australia.	   Intense	   lobbying	   contributed	   to	   the	   imposition	   by	   the	  
Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia,	  in	  1986,	  of	  a	  4-­‐year	  moratorium	  (extended	  
by	   an	   additional	   year	   in	   1990),298	   on	   the	   supply	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   to	   domestic	  
receivers.299	  The	  aims	  of	  the	  moratorium	  included	  to	  protect	  commercial	  FTA	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296	  For	  instance,	  the	  Australian	  Content	  Standard	  requires	  all	  commercial	  FTA	  television	  licensees	  to	  
broadcast	  an	  annual	  minimum	  transmission	  quota	  of	  55	  per	  cent	  of	  Australian	  programming	  between	  
6am	  and	  midnight.	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  122(1);	  Australian	  Content	  Standard	  (n	  226).	  
297	  This	  is	  based	  on	  codes	  of	  practice	  developed	  by	  industry	  representative	  groups	  (Free	  TV	  Australia	  
and	   the	   Australian	   Subscription	   Television	   and	   Radio	   Association)	   in	   consultation	  with	   ACMA	   and	  
subject	  to	  periodical	  review	  by	  ACMA.	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  123A.	  
298	   Other	   contributing	   factors	   concerned	   licence	   allocations	   (including	   a	   bidding	   process	   with	   low	  
deposits	  which	  attracted	  many	  tenderers	  that	  failed	  to	  honour	  their	  bids	  on	  time),	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  
Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia	  to	  obtain	  a	  successful	  outcome	  for	  the	  privatisation	  of	  Australia’s	  
national	  satellite	  service,	  and	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  consumer	  demand.	  ‘Pay	  Television’	  (Parliament	  of	  
the	   Commonwealth	   of	   Australia	   background	   paper	   no.22,	   28	   November	   1994)	   2	  
<https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1994-­‐95/95bp22.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
299	   See,	   ‘Future	  Directions	   for	  Pay	  TV	   in	  Australia’	   (Department	  of	  Transport	  and	  Communications,	  
1989);	  ‘To	  Pay	  or	  Not	  to	  Pay?	  Pay	  Television	  and	  Other	  New	  Broadcasting-­‐Related	  Services’	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Transport,	  Communications	  and	  Infrastructure,	  1989).	  The	  
introduction	   in	   1986	   of	   Video	   and	   Audio	   Entertainment	   and	   Information	   Services	   meant	   pay-­‐TV	  
services	   could	  be	  delivered	   to	  non-­‐domestic	   receivers	   such	   as	   hotels	   and	   clubs.	   Parliament	  of	   the	  
Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  (n	  298)	  1.	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television	  against	  competition	  from	  pay-­‐TV.300	  The	  perceived	  need	  for	  such	  
protection	   was	   influenced	   by	   investments	   made	   by	   Seven,	   Nine	   and	   Ten	  
under	  the	  policy	  of	  equalisation,	  which	  sought	  to	  provide	  residents	  of	  regional	  
Australia	  with	  the	  same	  television	  services	  as	  residents	  of	  the	  capital	  cities.301	  
Seven,	  Nine	  and	  Ten	  operate	  commercial	  television	  services	  in	  predominantly	  
metropolitan	  markets.	  Some	  of	  their	  services	  are	  made	  available	  in	  regional	  
areas	   under	   affiliation	   agreements	   with	   regional	   television	   licensees	  
(including	  Prime	  Media	  Group	  Limited,	  Southern	  Cross	  Media	  Group	  Limited,	  
WIN	  Corporation	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Imparja	  Television	  Pty	  Ltd).302	  
	  
3.2.2.2	  Introduction	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  Australia	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Foxtel	  
In	  1992,	  the	  Parliament	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  enacted	  Part	  7	  of	  
the	  BSA,303	  which	  provides	  the	  legislative	  basis	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
in	  Australia.304	  Key	  provisos	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  included	  an	  initial	  
ban	   on	   advertising	   on	   pay-­‐TV	   (which	   lasted	   until	   1	   July	   1997),305	   and	   a	  
requirement	   that	   subscription	   fees	   remained	   the	   predominant	   source	   of	  
funding	   for	   pay-­‐TV	   providers.306	   This	   was	   followed	   by	   restrictions	   on	   the	  
content	   and	   scheduling	   of	   advertising	   on	   pay-­‐TV	   which	   remain	   in	   the	  
advertising	   code	   for	   subscription	   television	   in	   Australia.307	   Under	   the	   BSA,	  
Australis	   Media	   Limited	   (“Australis”)	   acquired	   a	   monopoly	   on	   satellite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Transport,	  Communications	  and	  Infrastructure	  
(n	  299)	  20.	  
301	  ibid	  3.	  
302	   ‘ACMA	   Communications	   Report	   2010-­‐11’,	   56	  
<http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Research%20and%20Analysis/Publication/Comms%20Report%2
02010%2011/PDF/communications_report_201011%20pdf.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
303	  As	  amended	  by	  the	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Subscription	  Television	  Broadcasting)	  Amendment	  Act	  
1992.	  
304	  This	  followed	  a	  recommendation	  in	  1989	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  
Transport,	   Communications	   and	   Infrastructure	   that	   the	   Federal	   Government	   of	   Australia	   should	  
announce	  an	  in-­‐principle	  decision	  to	  introduce	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  Australia.	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Standing	  
Committee	  on	  Transport,	  Communications	  and	  Infrastructure	  (n	  299)	  23.	  
305	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  101(1).	  
306	  ibid	  sch	  2,	  pt	  6,	  s	  2(b).	  	  
307	  ‘Codes	  of	  Practice	  2013:	  Subscription	  Broadcast	  Television’	  (Australian	  Subscription	  Television	  and	  
Radio	   Association,	   2013)	   12-­‐13	  
<https://www.astra.org.au/images/pages/ASTRA_Subscription_Broadcast_Television_Codes_of_Pra
ctice_2013.pdf.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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broadcasting.	   In	   1995,	   under	   a	   joint	   venture	   with	   Continental	   Century,	   it	  
launched	  Australia’s	  first	  pay-­‐TV	  service,	  Galaxy.	  In	  1998,	  Australis	  went	  into	  
liquidation	  and	  the	  Galaxy	  service	  was	  taken	  over	  by	  Foxtel.	  
	  
Foxtel	  was	  established	  in	  1995	  as	  a	  joint	  venture	  between	  the	  former	  Federal	  
Government	  of	  Australia’s	  telephony	  monopoly,	  Telstra	  Corporation	  Limited	  
(“Telstra”),	  and	  News	  Corp	   (which	  was	   founded	  by	  Rupert	  Murdoch	  and	   is	  
owned	   by	   the	  Murdoch	   Family	   Trust).308	   News	   Corp	   was	   formed	   in	   2013,	  
alongside	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox,	   as	   spin-­‐offs	   of	   the	   former	   News	  
Corporation	   (which	  was	   founded	  by	  Rupert	  Murdoch	   in	  1979,	  as	  a	  holding	  
company	  for	  his	  Australian	  newspaper	  business,	  News	  Ltd).	  Under	  the	  joint	  
venture,	  Telstra	  is	  obliged	  to	  own	  and	  maintain	  the	  cable	  network	  over	  which	  
Foxtel	   supplies	   its	   content	   to	   subscribers.	   The	   relationship	  between	   Foxtel	  
and	  Telstra	  is	  unique	  and,	  as	  will	  be	  suggested,	  potentially	  significant	  for	  its	  
enduring	  impact	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Australian	  pay-­‐TV	  industry.	  	  
	  
Foxtel	  has	  access	  to	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  Australia’s	  two	  leading	  sporting	  codes,	  
the	  AFL	  and	  the	  NRL.	  Under	  a	  6-­‐year	  broadcast	  rights	  agreement	  that	  will	  run	  
from	   2017	   to	   2022,	   together	   with	   Seven	   and	   Telstra,	   Foxtel	   retains	   the	  
broadcast	  rights	  to	  the	  AFL.309	  At	  AU$2.508billion,	  such	  rights	  have	  doubled	  in	  
value	  on	  the	  previous	  rights	  arrangement	  which	  expired	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2016.310	  
Fox	   Sports	   Australia	   also	   holds	   NRL	   rights	   under	   a	   contract	   with	   Nine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308	  News	  Corp	  focuses	  on	  newspapers	  and	  publishing,	  whilst	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  is	  comprised	  of	  
the	  former	  News	  Corporation’s	  broadcasting	  and	  media	  properties	  (including	  the	  Fox	  Entertainment	  
Group).	  
309	  Travis	  King	  and	  Ben	  Guthrie,	   ‘AFL	  signs	  new	  six-­‐year,	  $2.5	  billion	  broadcast	  rights	  deal’	   (AFL,	  18	  
August	   2015)	   <http://www.afl.com.au/news/2015-­‐08-­‐18/afl-­‐on-­‐the-­‐verge-­‐of-­‐signing-­‐new-­‐tv-­‐deal>	  
accessed	  2	  September	  2017.	  
310	  Jared	  Lynch,	  ‘Bidding	  for	  AFL	  television	  rights	  could	  reach	  $2b’	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  (3	  March	  
2015)	   <http://www.smh.com.au/business/media-­‐and-­‐marketing/bidding-­‐for-­‐afl-­‐television-­‐rights-­‐
could-­‐reach-­‐2b-­‐20150303-­‐13tgjn.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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Entertainment	  and	  Telstra,	  which	   is	   said	   to	  be	  worth	  around	  AU$1.2billion	  
over	  five	  years	  and	  expires	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2017.311	  
	  
3.2.2.3	  Cable	  television	  in	  Australia	  and	  the	  National	  Broadband	  Network	  
The	   liberalisation	   of	   the	   Australian	   telecommunications	   sector	   under	   the	  
Telecommunications	   Act	   1991	   saw	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   duopoly	   involving	  
Telstra	   and	   SingTel	   Optus	   Pty	   Limited	   (then	   Optus	   Communications	   Pty	  
Limited)	  (“Optus”).	  In	  1991,	  Optus	  acquired	  the	  publicly-­‐owned	  operator	  of	  
Australia’s	   national	   satellite	   service,	   Aussat	   Pty	   Limited,	   which	   was	  
established	  in	  1985	  when	  the	  first	  communications	  satellite	  was	  launched	  in	  
Australia.	   Originally	   the	   Australian	   Overseas	   Telecommunications	  
Corporation	  Limited,	  Telstra	  was	  formed	  by	  the	  merger	  of	  Telecom	  Australia	  
and	  the	  Overseas	  Telecommunications	  Commission.312	  The	  duopoly	  provided	  
Optus	   and	   Telstra	   (now	   Australia’s	   largest	   mobile	   operators),313	   with	   the	  
exclusive	   right	   to	   construct	   and	   operate	   broadband	   cable	   networks	   in	  
Australia.	  	  
	  
Optus	  owns	  and	  operates	  its	  own	  network	  infrastructure,	  in	  addition	  to	  using	  
the	   services	   of	   other	   network	   service	   providers,	   most	   notably	   Telstra	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311	  Jared	  Lynch	  and	  John	  Stensholt,	  ‘Seven	  to	  try	  for	  knockout	  bid	  for	  NRL	  and	  AFL	  rights’	  Australian	  
Financial	   Review	   (3	   May	   2015)	   <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:S-­‐
96o9x84RwJ:www.afr.com/business/sport/seven-­‐to-­‐try-­‐for-­‐knockout-­‐bid-­‐for-­‐nrl-­‐and-­‐afl-­‐rights-­‐
20150430-­‐1mx2dt+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
312	  The	  Overseas	  Telecommunications	  Commission	  was	  established	  in	  1946	  with	  responsibility	  for	  all	  
international	  telecommunications	  services	  into,	  through	  and	  out	  of	  Australia.	  
313	  Telstra	  is	  Australia’s	  largest	  mobile	  operator	  with	  around	  16million	  customers.	  ‘Telstra	  Half	  Year	  
Results’	   (Telstra,	   12	   February	   2015)	   <https://www.telstra.com.au/aboutus/investors/financial-­‐
information/financial-­‐results>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  Optus	   is	  Australia’s	   second	   largest	  mobile	  
operator	  with	  a	  30	  per	  cent	  share	  of	  the	  market	  and	  a	  mobile	  network	  which	  covers	  98.5	  per	  cent	  of	  
the	   Australian	   population.	   ‘SingTel	   Annual	   Report	   2014’,	   8	   and	   17	  
<http://info.singtel.com/annualreport/2014/downloads/Singtel_AR2014.pdf>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	  Vodafone	  Hutchison	  Australia,	  which	  is	  50	  per	  cent	  owned	  by	  Hutchison	  Telecommunications	  
Australia	  and	  50	  per	  cent	  owned	  by	  Vodafone	  Group	  plc,	  follows	  with	  around	  5.3million	  customers.	  
‘Vodafone	  financial	  results	  mark	  final	  year	  of	  turnaround:	  customer	  numbers	  grow	  in	  second	  half	  of	  
year’	   (Vodafone	   media	   release,	   18	   February	   2015)	  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:traz5o-­‐
0x6cJ:www.vodafone.com.au/media/financial-­‐results-­‐final-­‐
year/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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Wholesale	   (a	  Telstra	  business	   that	   sells	  access	   to	  Telstra’s	  networks	   in	   the	  
wholesale	   market).	   Telstra	   enjoys	   a	   further	   competitive	   advantage	   as	  
Australia’s	  incumbent	  telecommunications	  service	  provider	  from	  owning	  the	  
fixed-­‐line	  telephone	  network	  and	  as	  sole	  provider	  of	  46	  per	  cent	  of	  fixed-­‐line	  
services	  in	  regional	  Australia.314	  Telstra’s	  market	  position	  was	  strengthened	  
by	   the	   fact	   that	   its	   privatisation	   coincided	  with	   the	   rise	   of	   public	   Internet	  
access	   in	   Australia.	   This	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   leveraging	   its	   dominance	   as	   a	  
telephone	  call	  carrier	  into	  the	  supply	  of	  Internet	  content	  through	  its	  50	  per	  
cent	  share	  in	  Foxtel.	  
	  
In	   an	   attempt	   to	   introduce	   facilities-­‐based	   competition,	   Telstra	   and	  Optus	  
were	  encouraged	  to	  build/overbuild	  cable	  networks	  in	  the	  same	  area.315	  The	  
roll-­‐out	  of	  parallel	  networks	  of	  hybrid	  fibre	  coaxial	  cable	  led	  to	  the	  duplication	  
of	  coverage	  across	  half	  of	  Australia,	  with	  the	  remaining	  half	  not	  receiving	  any	  
coverage.	   In	  April	  2009,	  NBN	  Co	  Limited	  was	  established	  as	  a	  government-­‐
owned	  entity	  to	  design,	  build	  and	  operate	  the	  National	  Broadband	  Network	  
(“NBN”)	  i.e.	  Australia’s	  first	  national	  wholesale-­‐only,	  open-­‐access	  broadband	  
network.316	  Once	  the	  migration	  of	  Telstra’s	  fixed-­‐line	  services	  to	  the	  NBN	  is	  
complete,	   Telstra	   will	   cease	   to	   control	   the	   network	   (which	   is	   expected	   to	  
provide	  minimum	  broadband	  download	  speeds	  to	  all	  premises	  and	  super-­‐fast	  
broadband	  to	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  premises).317	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314	   ‘Australia’s	  Telecommunications	  Market	  Structure:	  The	  Price	  Premium	  Paid	  by	  Consumers’	   (The	  
Centre	   for	   International	   Economics,	   prepared	   for	   Vodafone	   Hutchison	   Australia,	   June	   2015)	   1	  
<https://www.communications.gov.au/sites/g/files/net301/f/Vodafone%20-­‐
%20Attachment%20E.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
315	  Lesley	  Hitchens,	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   Co	   Limited	   ACN	   136	   533	   741,	   Companies	   Register,	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   and	   Investment	  
Commission.	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  (NBN	  Co	  Ltd,	  24	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  2016)	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  2017.	  
	  	  85	  
3.2.2.4	  Competitive	  responses	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  in	  Australia	  
Foxtel	   is	   now	   Australia’s	   largest	   pay-­‐TV	   provider	   with	   2.88million	  
subscribers.318	  Under	  the	  Telstra	  joint	  venture,	  Foxtel	  has	  access	  to	  Telstra’s	  
cable	  network	  for	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  services.	  This	  places	  Foxtel	  in	  an	  
advantageous	  position	  as	  regards	  the	  possibilities	  for	  bundling	  its	  content	  and	  
services.	  Through	  its	  digital	  STB	  (T-­‐Box),	  Telstra	  supplies	  Foxtel	  (“Foxtel	  from	  
Telstra”)	  and	  BigPond	  Movies	  (which	  offers	  new	  movie	  releases	  from	  AU$6	  
each	  and	  television	  episodes	  from	  AU$2	  each).	  Subscription	  costs	  for	  Foxtel	  
start	  from	  AU$26	  per	  month	  for	  its	  basic	  entertainment	  package.319	  In	  2014,	  
the	  cost	  of	  Foxtel	  was	  almost	  halved	  from	  AU$49	  to	  AU$25	  per	  month,	  in	  an	  
attempt	   to	   increase	   Foxtel’s	   penetration	   beyond	   30	   per	   cent.320	   This	  
endeavour	  was	  made	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  intensified	  competition	  from	  SVOD.	  
	  
Australia’s	   first	   online	   streaming	   service,	   Quickflix	   Limited	   (“Quickflix”),	   in	  
which	  Nine	   Entertainment	  was	   a	  major	   investor,321	  was	   launched	   in	   2003.	  
Stan,	   a	   joint	   venture	   between	  Nine	   Entertainment	   and	   Fairfax	  Media,	  was	  
launched	   in	   January	  2015.	  Stan	  offers	  a	  monthly	  subscription	  of	  AU$10	  for	  
unlimited	   viewing	   of	   selected	  movies	   and	   television	   shows.	   In	   April	   2016,	  
Quickflix	   announced	   its	   appointment	   of	   voluntary	   administrators.322	   Its	  
founder	   and	   chief	   executive,	   Stephen	   Langsford,	   cites	   Quickflix’s	   limited	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  world’	  Business	  Insider	  Australia	  (18	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   2016)	   <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/foxtel-­‐subscribers-­‐are-­‐up-­‐8-­‐despite-­‐
streaming-­‐service-­‐onslaught-­‐2016-­‐2>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
319	   ‘Foxtel	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   Pack’	   <https://www.foxtel.com.au/get/tv-­‐combos/entertainment.html>	  
accessed	  3	  August	  2016.	  
320	   Claire	   Reilly,	   ‘Foxtel	   cuts	   prices,	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   IQ3’	   CNet	   (4	   September	   2014)	  
<https://www.cnet.com/au/news/foxtel-­‐cuts-­‐prices-­‐adds-­‐channels-­‐announces-­‐iq3/>	   accessed	   28	  
July	  2017.	  
321	  Australian	  Associated	  Press,	  ‘Nine	  snaps	  up	  HBO’s	  stake	  in	  Quickflix’	  The	  Australian	  (21	  July	  2014)	  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies/nine-­‐snaps-­‐up-­‐hbos-­‐stake-­‐in-­‐
quickflix/news-­‐story/9956ab52e68c73d676afacf3d0df25ef>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
322	   ‘Quickflix	   Appoints	   Voluntary	   Administrator’	   (Quickflix	   ASX	   release,	   26	   April	   2016)	  
<https://images.quickflix.com.au/Site/Investor/ASX%20Announcements/QuickflixAppointsVoluntary
Administrator.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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ability	  to	  raise	  capital	  due	  to	  redeemable	  preference	  shares	  as	  contributing	  
to	  its	  inability	  to	  raise	  sufficient	  capital	  to	  continue	  investing	  in	  content.323	  
	  
Foxtel’s	  response	  to	  such	  new	  entry	  has	  included	  offering	  triple-­‐play	  services.	  
It	  sells	  fixed-­‐line	  broadband	  and	  telephony	  services	  in	  competition	  with	  its	  50	  
per	  cent	  owner	  Telstra.	   It	  has	  also	   launched	  online	  services,	  such	  as	  Foxtel	  
Play	  and	  Presto	  (a	  50:50	  joint	  venture	  between	  Foxtel	  and	  Seven	  West	  Media,	  
which	  starts	  at	  AU$10	  per	  month	  for	  television	  or	  movies).	  Under	  proposed	  
acquisitions	  between	  Foxtel	  and	  Ten,	  which	  the	  ACCC	  confirmed	  in	  October	  
2015	  it	  will	  not	  oppose,324	  Ten	  will	  also	  have	  an	  option	  to	  acquire	  10	  per	  cent	  
of	  Presto.	  The	  proposed	  acquisitions,	  which	  include	  for	  Foxtel	  to	  acquire	  up	  
to	  15	  per	  cent	  of	  Ten	  and	  for	  Ten	  to	  acquire	  a	  24.99	  per	  cent	  stake	  in	  Foxtel’s	  
advertising	  agency	  Multi-­‐Channel	  Network,325	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  
the	  thesis.	  In	  2014,	  the	  cost	  of	  Presto	  was	  (similar	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  Foxtel)	  halved	  
to	  AU$10	  per	  month,	  bringing	  it	  on	  par	  with	  the	  price	  points	  of	  most	  online	  
streaming	  services.326	  	  
	  
As	   will	   be	   seen,	   Foxtel	   has	   also	   responded	   by	   investing	   more	   heavily	   in	  
premium	   drama,	   particularly	   since	   the	   launch	   of	   Netflix	   Australia	   Pty	   Ltd	  
(“Netflix	  Australia”)	   in	  March	  2015.	  Starting	  at	  AU$8.99	  per	  month,	  Netflix	  
Australia	  had	  attracted	  2.78million	  subscribers	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015.327	  This	  is	  
significantly	   more	   than	   the	   450,000	   subscribers	   to	   Stan,328	   which	   was	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2015)	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accessed	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  2017.	  
325	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   Harry	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   news.com.au	   (23	   March	   2015)	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  accessed	  28	  July	  2017.	  
327	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   (Roy	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  Research,	   19	   January	   2016)	  
<http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6633-­‐netflix-­‐growth-­‐slows-­‐by-­‐end-­‐of-­‐year-­‐december-­‐2015-­‐
201601182300>	  accessed	  14	  March	  2016.	  
328	  Chris	  Pash,	   ‘These	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  show	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  how	  far	   local	   rival	  Stan	   is	  behind	  Netflix’	  Business	   Insider	  
Australia	   (5	  November	  2015)	  <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/these-­‐numbers-­‐show-­‐just-­‐how-­‐
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  accessed	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  August	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launched	  two	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  Netflix	  Australia.	  The	  difference	  
in	  subscriber	  figures	  here	  will	  be	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  Netflix’s	  established	  
brand	  recognition	  (with	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Australians	  using	  virtual	  private	  
networks	   to	  access	   the	  US	  version	  of	  Netflix,	  prior	   to	   the	   launch	  of	  Netflix	  
Australia),329	  and	  public	  hype	  surrounding	  the	  launch	  of	  Netflix	  Australia.	  Also,	  
its	   global	   scale	   provides	   Netflix	   with	   deeper	   pockets	   for	   investing	   in	   the	  
production	  and	  supply	  of	  content	  to	  attract	  subscribers.	  According	  to	  its	  first	  
quarterly	   results	   for	   2017,	   Netflix	   has	   94.363million	   paid	   streaming	  
memberships.330	   Increasing	   annual	   investment	   in	   original	   shows	   exceeds	  
AU$1billion.331	   It	   is	   reported	   that	   Netflix	   Australia	   has	   some	   5million	  
subscriptions,	  with	  92	  per	  cent	  of	  such	  subscriptions	  being	  paid	  (compared	  to	  
258,960	   paid	   subscriptions	   for	   Stan	   and	   90,880	   paid	   subscriptions	   for	  
Presto).332	  
	  
3.3	   Market	  for	  Premium	  Sports	  Rights	  with	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Traditional	  Pay-­‐TV	  
The	  advent	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  saw	  the	  possible	  migration	  of	  
the	  coverage	  of	  certain	  sporting	  events	  away	  from	  FTA	  television	  exclusively	  
to	   pay-­‐TV.	   Hence	   the	   introduction	   of	   anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation.	   The	   focus	  
here	  is	  on	  the	  market	  entry	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers,	  namely	  Sky	  in	  the	  
UK	  and	  Foxtel	   in	  Australia.	  A	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  able	   to	  outbid	  
commercial	   FTA	   broadcasters	   for	   the	   rights	   to	   premium	   content	   because	  
advertisers	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  as	  much	  per	  viewer	  as	  viewers	  
might	  themselves	  pay	  to	  watch	  the	  same	  programme	  on	  pay-­‐TV.333	  Over	  time,	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  Netflix	  Inc	  Q1	  Quarterly	  Earnings	  2017	  <https://ir.netflix.com/results.cfm>	  accessed	  19	  April	  2017.	  
331	   Mark	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   The	  
Guardian	  (15	  April	  2017)	  <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/apr/15/netflix-­‐nudges-­‐100m-­‐
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  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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  now	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  Netflix;	  Stan	  and	  Presto	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  well	  behind,	  but	  growing’	  (Roy	  
Morgan	   finding	  press	   release	  no.6839,	  15	   June	  2016)	  <http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6839-­‐
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  July	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this	  reinforced	  the	  ability	  of	  Sky	  and	  Foxtel	  to	  acquire	  further	  rights,	  thereby	  
entrenching	  their	  market	  positions	  in	  televised	  sport	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  
in	  the	  analogue	  era.	  
	  
3.3.1	   Impact	  of	  Sky	  on	  televised	  sport	  in	  the	  UK	  
The	  televised	  transmission	  of	  sport	  in	  the	  UK	  commenced	  on	  9	  April	  1938	  with	  
a	  football	  match	  between	  England	  and	  Scotland.334	  Regular	  football	  coverage	  
began	  in	  1968	  with	  BBC’s	  Match	  of	  the	  Day.335	  Coverage	  of	  top-­‐flight	  football	  
was	  therefore	  available	  to	  viewers	  at	  no	  additional	  direct	  cost	  on	  the	  BBC.	  
When	  Sky	  emerged	  in	  1990,	  live	  sports	  coverage	  was	  integral	  to	  its	  business	  
strategy.336	  It	  set	  out	  to	  acquire	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  for	  the	  live	  coverage	  of	  a	  
range	  of	  sporting	  events.	   Its	  most	  notable	  acquisition	  arguably	  remains	  the	  
live	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  the	  then	  newly	  formed	  Premier	  League	  for	  its	  first	  five	  
seasons	   from	   1993-­‐1997.	   Recorded	   highlights	   were	   shown	   on	   the	   BBC	   in	  
connection	   with	   the	   revival	   of	   Match	   of	   the	   Day.	   Sky	   agreed	   to	   pay	  
£304million	  for	  the	  rights.337	  As	  will	  be	  seen,	  this	  is	  low	  by	  today’s	  standards,	  
but	  was	  significant	  for	  the	  time.	  	  
	  
At	  that	  time,	  matches	  within	  the	  Football	  League	  (now	  the	  English	  Football	  
League	   (“EFL”))	   generally	   involved	  only	   the	   top	   five	   teams	  of	  Division	  One	  
(Arsenal,	   Liverpool,	   Everton,	  Manchester	   United	   and	   Tottenham	  Hotspur).	  
The	  television	  revenue	  from	  these	  matches	  was	  distributed	  between	  all	  92	  
league	  member	  clubs.338	  It	  was	  the	  dissatisfaction	  of	  the	  top	  clubs	  with	  this	  
and	  voting	  arrangements	  more	  generally	  which	  provided	  the	  impetus	  for	  the	  
top	   clubs	   to	   form	  a	  breakway	   league,	   in	   1992,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   the	  Premier	  
League.339	  The	  Premier	  League	  made	  an	  unprecedented	  decision	   to	   sell	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334	  Dobson	  and	  Goddard	  (n	  175)	  171.	  
335	  ibid.	  
336	  Szymanski	  (n	  133)	  269.	  
337	  Sky	  ultimately	  paid	  around	  £190million.	  Dobson	  and	  Goddard	  (n	  175)	  173.	  
338	  Ofcom	  (n	  1)	  74.	  
339	  Decisions	  were	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  vote	  per	  club.	  With	  92	  clubs	  in	  total	  and	  22	  clubs	  in	  Division	  
One,	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  clubs	  in	  Division	  One	  were	  often	  outvoted.	  Other	  influential	  factors	  included	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broadcast	  rights	  to	  a	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	  (i.e.	  Sky),	  for	  a	  sum	  in	  the	  region	  of	  four	  
times	  the	  price	  previously	  paid	  by	  the	  BBC.340	  This	  was	  something	  of	  a	  gamble	  
given	   that	   Sky	  was	  operating	  at	   a	   loss,	  but	   it	   paid	  off	   for	   Sky.341	  Whilst	   its	  
acquisition	  of	  the	  Premier	  League	  rights	  was	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  at	  play	  (given	  
its	  focus	  also	  on	  premium	  movies,	  as	  discussed	  later),	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  by	  
1995	   the	   number	   of	   Sky	   subscribers	   increased	   from	   around	   1million	   to	  
3million.342	  	  
	  
Sky	  Sports	  was	  launched	  in	  1991	  and	  was	  rebranded	  as	  Sky	  Sports	  1	  when	  its	  
second	  sports-­‐dedicated	  channel	  Sky	  Sports	  2	  was	  launched	  in	  1994.	  Sky	  has	  
since	  used	   its	  ability	   to	   secure	   the	  exclusive	  broadcast	   rights	   to	   live	   sports	  
events	  to	  dominate	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  premium	  sport	  content	  on	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  
the	  UK.	  Its	  business	  model	  has	  undeniably	  been	  based	  on	  appealing	  to	  sports	  
fans,	   particularly	   fans	   of	   football	   (“the	   people’s	   game”).343	   In	   1996,	   Sky	  
launched	  Sky	  Sports	  3	  and,	   in	  1999,	   it	   introduced	  Sky	  Sports	  Extra,	  offering	  
interactive	  sports	  coverage	  via	  its	  digital	  services.344	  
	  
There	   is	   the	  suggestion	  that	  Sky	  may	  subsidise	   the	  cost	  of	  acquiring	  sports	  
rights	   with	   revenue	   from	   its	   entertainment	   services.	   For	   example,	   in	  
2008/2009,	   sports	   programming	   represented	   54	   per	   cent	   of	   Sky’s	   total	  
programming	  costs	  and	  21	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  entire	  operating	  expenditure.345	  This	  
was	  significantly	  more	  than	  the	  16	  per	  cent	  that	  Sky	  spent	  on	  movies,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that,	  at	  the	  time,	  English	  football	  clubs	  were	  over-­‐trading	  to	  get	  the	  “best”	  players	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  it	  
would	  pay-­‐off	   in	  terms	  of	  revenue.	  The	  television	  deal	  in	  1991	  also	  came	  at	  a	  low	  point	  for	  English	  
football	   following	   significant	   events	   in	   the	   1980s,	   such	   as	   the	   Heysel	   stadium	   wall	   disaster,	   the	  
Bradford	  City	  stadium	  fire	  and	  the	  Hillsborough	  disaster.	  
340	  This	  was	  preceded	  by	  negotiations	  between	  the	  top	  five	  teams	  of	  Division	  One	  of	  the	  EFL	  and	  then	  
head	  of	  ITV	  Sport,	  Greg	  Dyke,	  regarding	  television	  rights	  to	  a	  then	  theoretical	  breakway	  league.	  
341	   Competition	   issues	   arising	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   joint	   selling	   of	   broadcast	   rights	   are	   considered	   in	  
Chapter	  6.	  
342	  Szymanski	  (n	  133)	  270.	  	  
343	  Stephen	  Morrow,	  The	  People’s	  Game?	  Football,	  Finance	  and	  Society	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2003)	  1.	  
344	  See,	  ‘Sport	  on	  Television’	  (Independent	  Television	  Commission,	  June	  2003).	  	  
345	  Ofcom	  (n	  1)	  74.	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represented	  6	  per	  cent	  of	  its	  entire	  operating	  expenditure.346	  This	  is	  despite	  
the	   fact	   that	   its	   entertainment	   audience	   was	   larger	   than	   its	   sports	  
audience.347	  Multi-­‐sided	  platform	  considerations	  may	  apply	  here	  as,	  whilst	  
Sky’s	   sports	   audience	   may	   be	   smaller,	   the	   demographic	   of	   this	   audience	  
(typically	   comprised	   predominantly	   of	   young	   male	   viewers)	   means	   that	   it	  
could	   attract	  more	   than	   its	   entertainment	   audience	   by	  way	   of	   advertising	  
revenue.	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  advertising	  represents	  the	  second	  highest	  
revenue	  stream	  for	  Sky,	  after	  viewer	  subscription	  fees.348	  
	  
In	  the	  analogue	  era,	  Sky	  faced	  relatively	  little	  competition	  for	  sports	  rights.	  In	  
1998,	   two	   franchises	   of	   the	   ITV	   network,	   Carlton	   Communications	   and	  
Granada	  plc	  (now	  ITV	  Digital	  Channels	  Ltd,	  a	  wholly-­‐owned	  subsidiary	  of	  ITV	  
plc),	  launched	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  service	  ONdigital	  plc,	  which	  was	  rebranded	  as	  ITV	  
Digital	   in	   2001.349	   ITV	   Digital	   offered	   premium	   sport	   content	   (including	  
coverage	  of	  the	  EFL)	  on	  its	  ITV	  Sport	  channel.	  In	  1998,	  ITV	  Digital	  predicted	  
that	  it	  would	  cost	  £350million	  to	  break	  even.350	  However,	  by	  July	  2001	  it	  had	  
already	  cost	  £800million	  and	  ITV	  Digital	  confirmed	  that	  it	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  
turn	   a	   profit	   before	   2003.351	   Low	   audience	   ratings	   and	   an	   ultimately	  
unaffordable	  multi-­‐million-­‐pound	  deal	  with	  the	  EFL	   led	   ITV	  Digital	   to	  suffer	  
massive	  losses	  and,	  in	  March	  2002,	  it	  was	  forced	  to	  enter	  into	  administration.	  
Setanta	  is	  another	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	  that	  has	  unsuccessfully	  
sought	  to	  challenge	  Sky’s	  position	  in	  televising	  live	  football	  in	  the	  UK.352	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  ibid.	  
347	  ibid.	  
348	  Advertising	  provided	  6.5	  per	  cent	  of	  Sky’s	  revenue	  for	  2016,	  representing	  £778million	  out	  of	  a	  total	  
revenue	  of	  £11,965million.	  Jeremy	  Darroch,	  ‘Full	  Year	  Results	  2016’	  (Sky	  plc,	  2016)	  14	  <http://s3-­‐eu-­‐
west-­‐1.amazonaws.com/skygroup-­‐sky-­‐static/documents/investors/results/q4_presentation.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
349	   ‘Ondigital	   relaunches	   as	   ITV	   Digital’	   BBC	   News	   (11	   July	   2001)	  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/1433671.stm>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
350	  ibid.	  
351	  ibid.	  
352	  See,	  James	  Robinson,	  ‘Setanta	  thought	  it	  had	  a	  sporting	  chance.	  It	  lost’	  The	  Guardian	  (28	  June	  2009)	  
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/28/sentant-­‐bskyb-­‐football>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	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More	  recently,	  regulatory	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  improve	  the	  prospects	  
for	  competition	  in	  the	  live	  coverage	  of	  the	  Premier	  League	  by	  increasing	  the	  
availability	   of	   its	   broadcast	   rights.	   Scrutiny	   of	   the	   Premier	   League’s	   selling	  
arrangements	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  brought	  an	  end	  in	  2006	  to	  Sky’s	  monopoly	  in	  the	  
live	  coverage	  of	  its	  matches.353	  This	  followed	  a	  Statement	  of	  Objections	  issued	  
by	   the	   European	   Commission	   in	   2002	   concerning	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	  
horizontal	   joint	   selling	   arrangements	   of	   the	   Premier	   League	   with	   Article	  
101(1)	  of	  TFEU	  (which	   it	  concluded	  did	  not	   fulfil	   the	  criteria	   for	  exemption	  
under	  Article	  101(3)).354	  The	  negotiation	  of	  commitments	  ultimately	  required	  
that	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  for	  the	  fifth	  auction,	  relating	  to	  seasons	  2008-­‐2010,	  
were	  split	  into	  six	  packages.355	  Also,	  no	  single	  broadcaster	  was	  permitted	  to	  
acquire	  all	  six	  packages.356	  
	  
The	   UK	   arm	   of	   the	   Irish	   pay-­‐TV	   provider,	   Setanta,	   acquired	   two	   of	   the	  
packages,	   with	   Sky	   acquiring	   the	   other	   four.	   However,	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
inadequate	   viewer	   subscriptions,	   Setanta	   defaulted	   on	   its	   payment	   to	   the	  
Premier	   League.357	   In	   June	   2009,	   it	   entered	   into	   administration	   and	   its	  
Premier	  League	  rights	  were	  acquired	  by	  the	  Disney-­‐owned	  US	  cable	  provider,	  
ESPN.358	   It	   followed	  that,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  Sky	  remaining	  the	  dominant	  
bidder	  for	  the	  live	  rights	  to	  the	  Premier	  League,	  for	  the	  first	  twenty	  years	  of	  
the	  Premier	  League	  none	  of	  its	  matches	  were	  broadcast	  live	  on	  FTA	  television	  
in	  the	  UK.359	  This	  was	  also	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Premier	  League	  
is	  not	  subject	  to	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  Joint	  selling	  of	  the	  media	  rights	  to	  the	  FA	  Premier	  League	  (Case	  COMP/C-­‐2/38.173)	  OJ	  C(2006)868.	  
354	   ‘Commission	  opens	  proceedings	   into	  joint	  selling	  of	  media	  rights	  to	  the	  English	  Premier	  League’	  
(European	  Commission	  press	  release	  IP/02/1951,	  20	  December	  2002)	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_IP-­‐02-­‐1951_en.htm?locale=en>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
355	  FA	  Premier	  League	  (n	  353)	  [33,	  37,	  41].	  
356	  ibid	  annex,	  para	  3.2.	  
357	  Dobson	  and	  Goddard	  (n	  175)	  173.	  
358	  ibid.	  
359	  A	   similar	   fate	  became	  of	   the	   EFL	  with	   Sky	  dominating	   the	   live	   television	   rights	   to	   EFL	  matches	  
between	  1996	  and	  2010,	  at	  which	  point	  Sky	  entered	  into	  a	  partnership	  with	  the	  BBC.	  This	  partnership	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3.3.2	   Influence	  of	  Foxtel	  on	  the	  television	  coverage	  of	  sport	  in	  Australia	  
Australia	  has	  similarly	  seen	  the	  migration	  of	  some	  sports	  coverage	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  
and	   to	   a	   single	   pay-­‐TV	   provider	   in	   particular.	   Like	   Sky	   in	   the	  UK,	   Foxtel	   in	  
Australia	  has	  focused	  on	  using	  premium	  sport	  to	  develop	  its	  pay-­‐TV	  service.	  
Akin	   to	   Sky’s	   involvement	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Premier	   League,	   the	  
creation	  of	  Super	   League	   in	  1995	  was	  an	  attempt	  by	  News	  Corp	   to	   secure	  
access	  to	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  top-­‐level	  professional	  rugby	  league	  football	  
(which	   was	   then	   represented	   by	   the	   Australian	   Rugby	   League	   (“ARL”)).	  
Broadcast	   rights	   to	   the	   ARL	   were	   vested	   in	   Nine	   and	   Optus.	   News	   Corp	  
contracted	   ARL	   players	   and	   clubs	   to	   compete	   in	   its	   Super	   League.	   After	  
prolonged	   litigation	   regarding	   the	   arrangements	   under	   which	   the	  
players/clubs	  defected	  to	  Super	  League,360	  and	  one	  season	  of	  Super	  League,	  
the	  ARL	  and	  Super	  League	  merged	  to	  form	  the	  NRL.	  	  
	  
The	  migration	  of	  sports	  coverage	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  
strategy	  of	  Foxtel	  and	  News	  Corp	  to	  use	  sport	  to	  attract	  subscribers.	  It	  is	  also	  
influenced	  by	  the	  commercial	  climate	  in	  which	  Australian	  FTA	  broadcasters	  
operate.	  This	   includes	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  airtime	  that	  remains	  after	  the	  
dedication	  of	  airtime	  to	  the	  mainstream	  sports	  of	  rugby	  league,	  cricket	  and	  
Australian	  Rules	  Football.361	   It	   is	  reported	  that	  neither	  Seven,	  Nine	  nor	  Ten	  
were	  sufficiently	  interested	  to	  compete	  for	  soccer.362	  These	  circumstances	  led	  
to	  soccer	  at	  all	  levels,	  excluding	  the	  World	  Cup	  finals	  (which	  are	  covered	  by	  
the	  Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules),363	   becoming	   available	   exclusively	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
meant	  that,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1996,	  the	  EFL	  was	  broadcast	  live	  on	  FTA	  television	  in	  the	  UK.	  ibid	  
174-­‐175.	  
360	  News	  Ltd	  v	  Australian	  Rugby	  Football	  League	  Ltd	  and	  Others	  No.1	  (1996)	  135	  ALR	  33;	  No.2	  (1996)	  
139	  ALR	  193;	  (1996)	  58	  FCR	  447;	  (1996)	  64	  FCR	  410.	  
361	  Callum	  Gilmour	  and	  David	  Rowe,	  ‘Getting	  a	  Ticket	  to	  the	  World	  Party:	  Televising	  Soccer	  in	  Australia’	  
in	  Christopher	  J	  Hallinan	  and	  John	  E	  Hughson,	  The	  Containment	  of	  Soccer	  in	  Australia:	  Fencing	  Off	  the	  
World	  Game	  (Routledge	  2013)	  20.	  
362	   Les	   Murray,	   ‘Football’s	   new	   TV	   realities’	   SBS	   (15	   April	   2007)	  
<http://theworldgame.sbs.com.au/blog/2007/04/15/football-­‐s-­‐new-­‐tv-­‐realities>	   accessed	   30	   June	  
2016.	  
363	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Events)	  Notice	  (No.1)	  2010,	  sch	  para	  8.	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pay-­‐TV.	   It	   is	   arguable	   that	   Foxtel’s	   sports	   strategy	   may	   ultimately	   have	  
benefitted	  fans	  by	  providing	  them	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  access	  television	  
coverage	  which	  might	  not	  otherwise	  have	  been	  available	  at	  all.	  
	  
Like	   Sky,	   Foxtel	   faced	   relatively	   little	   competition	   for	   sports	   rights	   in	   the	  
analogue	  era.	  With	  the	  demise	  of	  Australis	  in	  1998,	  Foxtel	  acquired	  Australis’	  
network	  of	  50,000	  satellite	  dishes	  and	  decoders	  in	  former	  Galaxy	  subscribers’	  
homes.364	  It	  also	  secured	  access	  to	  part	  of	  the	  Galaxy	  package	  which	  included	  
a	   range	  of	   sport	  and	  movie	  content.	  Australis	  had	  output	  deals	  with	  Sony,	  
Paramount	  and	  Universal,365	  and	  Optus	  had	  output	  deals	  with	  Disney,	  Warner	  
Bros	   and	   Metro-­‐Goldwyn-­‐Mayer.366	   However,	   the	   competition	   between	  
Australis	  and	  Optus	   for	   the	  exclusive	  rights	   to	  premium	  movies	   led	  to	  high	  
minimum	   subscriber	   guarantees,	   high	   costs	   and	   financial	   difficulties	  which	  
contributed	  to	  the	  eventual	  demise	  of	  Australis.367	  
	  
3.4	   Competition	  for	  Sports	  Rights	  from	  Telecommunications	  Service	  Providers	  	  
For	   telecommunications	   service	   providers,	   the	   acquisition	   of	   sports	   rights	  
represents	  a	  potentially	  vital	  part	  of	  bundling	  services	  and	  becoming	  a	  multi-­‐
media	  firm.368	  The	  likes	  of	  BT	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Optus	  in	  Australia	  have	  sought	  in	  
this	   way	   to	   capitalise	   on	   their	   established	   customer	   base	   in	   the	  
telecommunications	   sector	   to	   develop	   their	   own	   pay-­‐TV	   services.	   Pay-­‐TV	  
subscribers	   may	   not	   have,	   as	   yet,	   seen	   a	   significant	   (if	   any)	   reduction	   in	  
subscription	   fees	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   this.	   However,	   when	   the	   dynamic	  
aspect	  of	  competition	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  the	  net	  effect	  on	  consumer	  
welfare	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  positive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364	  Anne	  Davies,	  ‘Foxtel	  pulls	  off	  coup	  in	  battle	  for	  pay	  TV’	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  (6	  March	  1998)	  
<http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac?docID=news980603_0686_6609>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
365	  Cento	  Veljanovski,	  Pay	  TV	  in	  Australia:	  Markets	  and	  Mergers	  (Institute	  of	  Public	  Affairs	  1999)	  22.	  
366	  ibid.	  	  
367	  ibid.	  	  
368	  Tom	  Evens,	  Petros	  Iosifidis	  and	  Paul	  Smith,	  ‘The	  Next	  Big	  Match:	  Convergence,	  Competition	  and	  
Sports	  Media	  Rights’	  (2016)	  31(5)	  European	  Journal	  of	  Communication	  536.	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3.4.1	   Impact	  of	  BT’s	  entry	  on	  live	  sports	  broadcasting	  in	  the	  UK	  
The	   launch	  of	  BT	  Sport	   in	  2010	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	  an	  unprecedented	  
shift	  in	  the	  competitive	  dynamic	  for	  the	  wholesale	  acquisition	  of	  sports	  rights	  
in	  the	  UK.	  It	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  acquisition	  by	  BT	  in	  2013	  of	  all	  UK	  television	  
rights	   to	   exclusively	   broadcast	   live	   UEFA	   Champions	   League	   and	   Europa	  
League	  matches	  for	  2015-­‐2018.	  BT	  paid	  £897million	  for	  the	  rights.369	  This	  is	  
more	  than	  double	  the	  total	  price	  that	  was	  previously	  paid	  by	  Sky	  and	  ITV.370	  
BT	  has	  since	  retained	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  show	  European	  football	  in	  the	  UK	  
until	  the	  summer	  of	  2021,	  after	  seeing	  off	  competition	  from	  Sky	  with	  a	  deal	  
worth	   £1.18billion	   (nearly	   £300million	   more	   than	   it	   paid	   for	   the	   rights	   in	  
2013).371	   In	   acquiring	   the	   rights	   to	   UEFA	   Champions	   League	   and	   Europa	  
League	  matches,	  BT	  became	  the	   first	  UK	  broadcaster	   to	  hold	  exclusive	   live	  
television	  rights	  to	  all	  matches	  from	  both	  major	  leagues.372	  In	  February	  2015,	  
it	  also	  won	  two	  of	  the	  seven	  packages	  of	  matches	  for	  the	  live	  television	  rights	  
to	   the	   Premier	   League	   for	   2016-­‐2019	   (with	   Sky	   Sports	   winning	   the	   other	  
five).373	  	  
	  
As	  the	  UK’s	  largest	  telecommunications	  service	  provider	  (particularly	  since	  its	  
recent	   acquisition	   of	   EE),	   BT’s	   business	   model	   is	   based	   on	   using	   its	  
telecommunications	  customer	  base	  to	  bundle	  content	  and	  services.	  Despite	  
the	  policy	  of	   local	   loop	  unbundling	   (which	  requires	  BT	  to	  allow	   its	   rivals	   to	  
provide	  high-­‐speed	  services	  over	  the	  last	  mile	  of	  the	  local	  copper	  loop),374	  BT	  
benefits	  from	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  the	  lead	  that	  it	  maintains	  over	  cable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369	   ‘Champions	   League:	   BT	   Sport	   wins	   £897m	   football	   rights	   deal’	   BBC	   Sport	   (9	   November	   2013)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/24879138>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
370	  ibid.	  
371	   Sam	   Dean,	   ‘BT	   Sport	   sees	   off	   Sky	   with	   £1.2bn	   deal	   for	   Champions	   League	   football	   rights’	   The	  
Telegraph	   (6	   March	   2017)	   <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/03/06/bt-­‐sees-­‐sky-­‐12bn-­‐
deal-­‐champions-­‐league-­‐football-­‐rights/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
372	  BT	  Group	  (n	  274)	  6.	  
373	   See,	   ‘Commission	   makes	   commitments	   from	   FA	   Premier	   League	   legally	   binding’	   (European	  
Commission	  press	  release	  IP/06/356,	  22	  March	  2006)	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐06-­‐
356_en.htm?locale=en>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  This	  decision	  is	  considered	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  
374	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  ss	  45,	  87	  and	  88	  (UK);	  Regulation	  2887/2000	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  
and	  the	  Council	  of	  18	  December	  2000	  on	  unbundled	  access	  to	  the	  local	  loop	  [2000]	  OJ	  L336/4	  (EU).	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operators	  in	  the	  local	  loop.	  BT	  Sport	  channels	  are	  free	  to	  BT	  TV	  customers.375	  
BT	   Broadband	   customers	   get	   BT	   Sport	   for	   free,	   together	  with	   £5	   off	   their	  
mobile	  bundle	  and	  access	   to	   the	  BT	  Sport	  App.376	  Similar	  offers	  have	  been	  
extended	   to	   EE	   pay-­‐monthly	   customers	   who	   benefit	   from	   6-­‐months’	   free	  
access	  to	  the	  BT	  Sport	  Pack	  via	  the	  BT	  Sport	  App.377	  
	  
The	  apparent	  impact	  of	  BT’s	  acquisition	  of	  key	  sports	  rights	  on	  its	  economic	  
performance	  supports	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  on	  the	  economic	  
value	  of	  premium	  sport	  content	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  Following	  its	  acquisition	  
of	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  the	  Premier	  League,	  BT’s	  share	  price	  rose	  by	  2.8	  per	  
cent	   to	   456.2p,	   which	   represented	   a	   14-­‐year	   high.378	   According	   to	   BT’s	  
financial	  results	  for	  the	  year	  to	  31	  March	  2015,379	  BT	  Sport	  channels	  are	   in	  
more	  than	  5.2million	  homes	  and,	  in	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  of	  2014,	  it	  attracted	  
52,000	   new	   customers.380	   BT	   reports	   that	   it	   now	   has	   1.7million	   television	  
customers	  across	  BT	  TV,	  YouView	  TV	  on	  Plusnet	  and	  EE	  TV.381	  This	  represents	  
a	  9	  per	  cent	  market	  share	  of	  the	  UK	  pay-­‐TV	  retail	  market.382	  
	  
The	  corresponding	  share	  price	  and	  subscriber	  figures	  for	  Sky	  suggest	  that	  it	  
has	  not	  been	  significantly	  adversely	  affected	  by	  BT’s	  entry	  into	  the	  UK	  sports	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  ‘BT	  Sport’	  <https://www.productsandservices.bt.com/products/bt-­‐sport>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2016.	  
376	   ‘BT	   Broadband	   households	   can	   now	   get	   fantastic	   deals	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   mobile	   phone	   plans’	  
<http://home.bt.com/tech-­‐gadgets/phones-­‐tablets/bt-­‐launches-­‐pay-­‐monthly-­‐mobile-­‐phone-­‐deals-­‐
11364067826611>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2016.	  
377	   ‘BT	  Sport	  App	  now	   free	   for	  EE	  customers’	  <http://sport.bt.com/football/bt-­‐sport-­‐app-­‐now-­‐free-­‐
for-­‐ee-­‐customers-­‐S11364075032059>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2016.	  
378	   Nick	   Goodway,	   ‘Premier	   League	   TV	   rights:	   BT	   shares	   rise	   following	   deal,	   while	   Sky’s	   fall’	   The	  
Independent	   (11	   February	   2015)	   <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/premier-­‐
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  7	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2015)	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  13	  August	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rights	  market.	  In	  its	  results	  for	  the	  six	  months	  ended	  31	  December	  2014,383	  
Sky	  reports	  “significant	  outperformance”	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Ireland,	  with	  204,000	  
new	  customers	  representing	  its	  highest	  growth	  in	  nine	  years.384	  Sky	  does	  not	  
appear	   to	  distinguish	  between	  pay-­‐TV	  customers	  and	  users	  of	   its	   Internet-­‐
based	  NowTV	  service,	  which	  was	  launched	  in	  2012	  to	  rival	  the	  likes	  of	  Netflix.	  
The	   cost	   to	   viewers	  of	   subscribing	   to	  NowTV	   is	   relatively	   low	  at	  £9.99	  per	  
month	   for	   the	  Sky	  Movies	  Pass	   (although	   the	  Sky	  Sports	  Month	  Pass	  costs	  
significantly	  more	  at	  £33.99	  per	  month).	  	  
	  
Cord-­‐cutting	  is	  generally	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  industry-­‐wide	  concern	  in	  the	  
UK.385	  However,	  Sky	  could	  begin	  to	  experience	  difficulty	  if	  pay-­‐TV	  subscribers	  
“cut	  the	  cord”	  and	  switch	  to	  online	  streaming.	  Sky’s	  chief	  financial	  officer	  has	  
reportedly	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  NowTV	  is	  “slightly	  dilutive”	  to	  
Sky’s	  average	  revenue	  per	  user	  (“ARPU”).386	  Although	  Sky	  has	  experienced	  a	  
steady	  increase	  in	  its	  ARPU	  from	  £45	  in	  2012	  to	  £47	  in	  2016.387	  This	  suggests	  
that	  the	  market	  is	  for	  now	  capable	  of	  sustaining	  at	  least	  two	  major	  players.	  
	  
The	   increase	   in	   competition	   for	   sports	   rights	   has	   not	   reduced	   the	   cost	   to	  
viewers	  of	  subscribing	  to	  Sky	  or	  BT.	  There	  has,	  in	  fact,	  been	  a	  slight	  increase	  
in	  subscription	  fees,	  influenced	  by	  the	  increase	  in	  competition	  for	  acquiring	  
such	   rights.	   The	   £5.1billion	   which	   Sky	   and	   BT	   agreed	   to	   pay	   in	   the	   2015	  
auction	   for	   the	   live	   television	   rights	   to	   the	   Premier	   League	   was	   up	   from	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£3billion	  in	  2012.388	  Sky	  has	  since	  increased	  the	  subscription	  fees	  for	  its	  sports	  
and	  family	  bundles	  to	  £47	  and	  £36	  per	  month,	  respectively.389	  This	  represents	  
an	  increase	  in	  cost	  to	  the	  individual	  subscriber	  of	  £1	  a	  month	  for	  Sky’s	  sports	  
bundle	  and	  £3	  a	  month	  for	  its	  family	  bundle.390	  Whilst	  this	  price	  increase	  to	  
the	  individual	  subscriber	  may	  seem	  nominal,	  with	  Sky	  supplying	  8.8million	  UK	  
households,391	  it	  represents	  a	  significant	  additional	  source	  of	  revenue	  for	  Sky	  
to	  continue	  to	  bid	  aggressively	  for	  premium	  sport	  content.	  	  
	  
In	  2014,	  BT	  imposed	  a	  6.49	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  home	  phone	  and	  
broadband	  packages	  for	  all	  of	  its	  customers,	  in	  what	  has	  been	  described	  by	  
some	  industry	  observers	  as	  a	  “football	  tax”.392	  The	  potentially	  adverse	  price	  
effects	  for	  viewers	  are	  arguably	  more	  considerable	  if	  the	  sports	  (or	  even	  just	  
football)	   broadcasting	   market	   is	   considered	   as	   a	   whole.	   For	   instance,	  
following	  BT’s	  acquisition	  of	  rights	  to	  the	  Premier	  League,	  in	  order	  to	  watch	  
all	   live	   Premier	   League	   matches,	   viewers	   may	   need	   to	   bear	   the	   cost	   of	  
subscribing	  to	  both	  BT	  and	  Sky.	  
	  
The	   non-­‐price	   effects	   of	   the	   increased	   competition	   between	   Sky	   and	   BT	  
appear	  to	  be	  stronger	  with	  more	  intense	  dynamic	  competition.	  This	  includes	  
the	   launch	   of	   new	   services,	   such	   as	   BT	   Sport	   Ultra	   HD	   and	   BT	   Sport’s	  
connected	   red	   button	   service,	   which	   enables	   BT	   TV	   viewers	   to	   switch	  
between	  matches	  and	  to	  use	  a	  new	  “goal	  alert”	  function	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  the	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May	   2017)	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  September	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action	  across	  a	  range	  of	  matches.	  Also,	  the	  BT	  Sport	  App	  provides	  customers	  
with	  additional	  functionality	  like	  goal	  replays	  and	  alternative	  camera	  angles,	  
with	  the	  aim	  of	  enhancing	  the	  viewer	  experience.	  From	  a	  consumer	  welfare	  
perspective,	  increasingly	  strong	  dynamic	  competition	  between	  Sky	  and	  BT	  has	  
the	   potential	   to	   offset	   concerns	   regarding	   the	   upward	   price	   effects	   of	   the	  
increase	  in	  competition	  for	  live	  sports	  rights.	  
	  
Sky	  has	  also	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  its	  market	  position	  by	  merger.	  In	  November	  
2014,	  Sky	  Europe	  was	  created	  by	  the	  merger	  of	  British	  Sky	  Broadcasting	  Group	  
Plc,	  Sky	  Deutschland	  AG	  and	  Sky	   Italia.	  As	  Europe’s	   largest	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	  
with	   20million	   customers	   across	   the	   UK,	   Ireland,	   Germany,	   Italy	   and	  
Austria,393	   the	  merger	   could	   have	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   competitive	  
dynamic	   in	   the	  UK	   sports	   rights	  market.394	   The	   reported	   objectives	   of	   the	  
merger	  for	  Sky	  expressly	  include	  to	  compete	  more	  aggressively	  against	  BT	  and	  
US-­‐based	  SVOD	  platforms	  like	  Netflix.395	  	  
	  
3.4.2	   Entry	  of	  Optus	  into	  live	  sports	  broadcasting	  in	  Australia	  
Similar	  to	  the	  experience	  with	  BT	  in	  the	  UK	  (but	  distinguished	  by	  Optus’	  some	  
15-­‐year	   lead	   on	   BT	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   services),	   telecommunications	  
services	  provider	  Optus	  has	  recently	  made	  its	  foray	  into	  sports	  broadcasting	  
in	  Australia.	  In	  October	  2015,	  Optus	  announced	  a	  sponsorship	  deal	  as	  Cricket	  
Australia’s	  streaming	  partner.396	  The	  Cricket	  Australia	  Live	  Pass	  gives	  Optus	  
users	   the	   ability	   to	   watch	   matches	   for	   AU$29.99	   per	   season.	   As	   a	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consequence	  of	  Optus	  being	  able	  to	  bundle	  its	  services,	  data	  used	  on	  mobile	  
devices	   in	   watching	   matches	   does	   not	   count	   against	   users’	   download	  
allowances.	  In	  May	  2016,	  Optus	  displaced	  Foxtel	  as	  holder	  of	  the	  Australian	  
television	   rights	   to	   the	   Premier	   League,	   for	   which	   Optus	   will	   pay	  
AU$200million	   over	   three	   years.397	   This	   exceeds	   the	   amount	   paid	   for	   the	  
rights	   to	   both	   Super	   Rugby	   and	   the	   A-­‐League,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
Premier	   League	   attracts	   relatively	   fewer	   viewers	   in	   Australia.398	   Whilst	  
attracting	   fewer	   viewers,	   the	   Premier	   League	   is	   valuable	   because	   it	   takes	  
place	  during	  the	  Australian	  summer	  when	  the	  NRL	  and	  AFL	  are	  not	  in	  play,	  
and	  it	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  in	  Australia.	  
	  
The	  willingness	  of	  Optus	  to	  pay	  such	  a	  high	  price	  for	  these	  rights	  suggests	  that,	  
as	   with	   BT	   in	   the	   UK,	   it	   intends	   to	   capitalise	   on	   its	   telecommunications	  
customer	  base.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  Optus’	  pricing	  strategy	  which	  is	  aimed	  at	  
increasing	  the	  ARPU	  for	  each	  of	  its	  customers	  across	  all	  of	  its	  communications	  
businesses.399	  For	  instance,	  Optus	  is	  releasing	  a	  mini-­‐STB	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  AU$5	  per	  
month	  for	  its	  mobile	  customers	  who	  want	  to	  watch	  matches	  on	  television.400	  
Optus	   reports	  a	  mobile	  ARPU	  of	  AU$41	  per	  month.401	  Although	   this	   is	   less	  
than	  half	  of	  Foxtel’s	  ARPU	  of	  AU$89	  per	  month.402	  
	  
In	  2016,	  Optus	  offered	  live	  coverage	  of	  the	  2016/2017	  season	  of	  the	  Premier	  
League	  to	  customers	  who	  subscribed	  to	  mobile	  plans	  from	  AU$30	  per	  month	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397	  Harry	  Tucker,	  ‘How	  Optus	  stole	  the	  English	  Premier	  League	  from	  Foxtel’	  Business	  Insider	  Australia	  
(5	   May	   2016)	   <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/how-­‐optus-­‐stole-­‐the-­‐english-­‐premier-­‐league-­‐
from-­‐foxtel-­‐2016-­‐5>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  	  
398	   It	   is	   reported	   that,	   in	   2015,	   1.7million	   Australians	   watched	   the	   Premier	   League	   and	   around	  
2.1million	  Australians	  watched	  the	  A-­‐League.	  ibid.	  
399	  ibid.	  
400	  ibid.	  
401	  Historical	  financial	  summaries	  of	  the	  Singtel	  Group’s	  results	  for	  the	  last	  quarter	  ended	  March	  2016	  
<http://info.singtel.com/about-­‐us/investor-­‐relations/financial-­‐results?dispatcher=302>	   accessed	   28	  
July	  2016.	  
402	   News	   Corp’s	   Annual	   Report	   for	   the	   year	   ended	   30	   June	   2016,	   13	  
<http://investors.newscorp.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-­‐16-­‐679975&CIK=1564708>	  accessed	  
17	  August	  2017.	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(with	   such	   coverage	   costing	   subscribers	   AU$15	   per	   month	   from	   31	   July	  
2017).403	   Premier	   League	   coverage	   is	   also	   offered	   at	   no	   additional	   cost	   to	  
subscribers	   of	   plans	   valued	   at	   AU$85	   per	   month	   or	   more.404	   This	   may	  
incentivise	   customers	   looking	   at	   mobile	   and	   broadband	   plans	   around	   the	  
AU$70	  per	  month	  price	  bracket	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  more	  expensive	  contract.	  It	  may	  
also	   encourage	   customers	   to	   sign	   up	   for	   Optus’	   Yes	   TV	   by	   Fetch	   service,	  
included	  in	  broadband	  plans	  above	  AU$90	  per	  month.405	  	  
	  
Rather	  than	  respond	  by	  reducing	  its	  subscription	  fees,	  Foxtel	  has	   increased	  
the	  price	  of	  its	  basic	  package	  from	  AU$25	  to	  AU$26	  per	  month.406	  As	  with	  the	  
increase	  in	  subscription	  fees	  for	  Sky’s	  sport	  and	  movie	  packages,	  for	  individual	  
Foxtel	   subscribers	   this	  may	   not	   represent	   a	   significant	   increase.	   However,	  
with	  2.88million	  subscribers,	  it	  will	  provide	  Foxtel	  with	  invaluable	  additional	  
revenue	  for	  reinvesting	   in	  content.	   Indications	  of	   this	  are	  already	  apparent	  
from	  Foxtel’s	  expansion	  of	  its	  sports	  offering	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  new	  sport	  
channels	   through	   beIN	   Sports,	   which	   includes	   coverage	   of	   major	   football	  
events	  such	  as	  the	  UEFA	  Champions	  League	  and	  matches	  by	  the	  “Big	  Five”	  
European	   football	   leagues.407	   Since	   July	   2016,	   the	   official	   club	   television	  
channels	  for	  Chelsea,	  Liverpool	  and	  Manchester	  United	  have	  also	  formed	  part	  
of	  the	  Foxtel	  sports	  package.408	  Whilst	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  draw	  firm	  conclusions,	  
the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  (like	  Sky	  in	  the	  UK)	  Foxtel	  is	  responding	  to	  new	  entry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403	  ‘The	  new	  Premier	  League	  season	  is	  yours	  for	  free’	  <https://www.optus.com.au/epl>	  accessed	  28	  
July	  2016.	  
404	   ‘Optus	  customers	   to	  get	  English	  Premier	  League	  from	  $15	  per	  month	  on	  selected	  plans’	   (Optus	  
media	  release,	  4	  May	  2016)	  <https://media.optus.com.au/media-­‐releases/2016/optus-­‐customers-­‐to-­‐
get-­‐english-­‐premier-­‐league-­‐from-­‐15-­‐per-­‐month-­‐on-­‐selected-­‐plans/>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2016.	  
405	  ibid.	  
406	  Dominic	  White,	  ‘Foxtel	  price	  rise	  sparks	  backlash	  but	  boosts	  profit’	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  (15	  
March	   2016)	   <http://www.smh.com.au/business/media-­‐and-­‐marketing/foxtel-­‐price-­‐rise-­‐sparks-­‐
backlash-­‐but-­‐boosts-­‐profit-­‐20160314-­‐gnihjk.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
407	  beIN	  Sports	  is	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  beIN	  Media	  Group,	  which	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  Al	  Jazeera	  network.	  In	  2014,	  
it	  acquired	  pay-­‐TV	  sports	  channel	  Setanta	  Sports	  Australia	   (subsequently	  rebranded	  as	  beIN	  Sports	  
Australia).	   ‘beIN	   SPORTS	   Asia	   Pacific’	   <https://beinmediagroup.com/subsidiary/bein-­‐sports-­‐asia-­‐
pacific/>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2016.	  
408	   Paul	   Farrell,	   ‘Football	   Heaven:	   Foxtel	   adds	   SIX	   new	   sport	   channels’	   (Foxtel,	   6	   May	   2016)	  
<https://www.foxtel.com.au/got/whats-­‐on/foxtel-­‐insider/foxtel/sport/football.html>	   accessed	   16	  
May	  2016.	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into	  the	  sports	  rights	  market	  by	  focusing	  on	  differentiating	  its	  content	  through	  
the	  launch	  of	  new	  and	  innovative	  content	  and	  services.	  	  
	  
3.5	   Rise	  of	  Premium	  Drama	  with	  the	  Growth	  of	  Online	  Streaming	  
The	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  is	  changing	  the	  competitive	  dynamic	  for	  the	  
retail	  supply	  of	  premium	  non-­‐sport	  content,	  particularly	  premium	  drama,	  in	  
both	   the	  UK	   and	  Australia.	   Traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   are	   responding	   to	  
new	  entry	  by	  SVOD	  platforms	  by	  investing	  more	  heavily	  in	  the	  production	  and	  
exclusive	   supply	   of	   original	   drama.	  On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   the	  UK	   has	   arguably	  
experienced	  greater	  change	  in	  this	  respect,	  with	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  new	  entry,	  
compared	  to	   the	  smaller	  Australian	  market.	  However,	  consideration	  of	   the	  
relative	  impact	  of	  new	  entry	  from	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  perspective,409	  based	  on	  
the	  inherent	  link	  between	  the	  market	  and	  society,410	  suggests	  that	  the	  effects	  
on	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  are	  comparable.	  
	  
3.5.1	   Impact	  of	  online	  streaming	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  premium	  drama	  in	  the	  UK	  
In	  addition	  to	  acquiring	  key	  sports	  rights,	  Sky’s	  business	  model	  has	  been	  based	  
on	   securing	   exclusive	   deals	   under	   output	   agreements	   with	   the	   Major	  
Hollywood	  Studios.	  These	  deals	  come	  up	  for	  renewal	  in	  2017	  and	  2018.	  It	  is	  
possible	  that	  BT	  will	  compete	  against	  Sky	  for	  these	  deals,	  as	  it	  did	  with	  the	  
rights	  to	  the	  Premier	  League	  and	  the	  UEFA	  Champions	  League.	  In	  its	  response	  
to	   Ofcom’s	   proposal	   in	   2010	   to	   make	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   CMA	   regarding	  
premium	  movies	  on	  UK	  pay-­‐TV,411	  BT	  identifies	  premium	  movies	  and	  drama	  
(in	  addition	  to	  sport)	  as	  the	  most	  effective	  drivers	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  subscriptions.412	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409	  The	  expression	  “socio-­‐economic”	  is	  used	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  study	  of	  economic	  activity	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  social	  processes.	  For	  discussion	  on	  the	  various	  meanings	  of	  socio-­‐economic,	  see	  Simon	  Hellmich,	  
‘What	  is	  Socioeconomics?	  An	  Overview	  of	  Theories,	  Methods,	  and	  Themes	  in	  the	  Field’	  (2017)	  46(1)	  
Forum	  for	  Social	  Economics	  3-­‐25.	  
410	  See,	  Paul	  Stern,	  ‘The	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Perspective	  and	  its	  Institutional	  Prospects’	  (1993)	  22(1)	  The	  
Journal	  of	  Socio-­‐Economics	  1,	  2-­‐3.	  
411	   ‘BT’s	   Response	   to	   Ofcom’s	   Proposed	   Reference	   to	   the	   Competition	   Commission	   in	   respect	   of	  
Premium	   Pay	   TV	   Movies’	   (BT,	   14	   May	   2010)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/42427/bt.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
412	  ibid	  5.	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Without	  access	  to	  such	  content,	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  pay-­‐TV	  provider	  to	  compete	  
is	  said	  to	  be	  severely	  limited.413	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen,	  however,	  what	  impact	  
the	  recent	  launch	  of	  direct	  subscription	  services	  by	  Disney	  and	  NBCUniversal	  
may	  have	  on	  any	  output	  deal	  renewals.	  
	  
The	  pricing	  structure	  of	  most	  SVOD	  platforms	  means	  that	  they	  are	  effectively	  
priced	  out	  of	  competing	  for	  the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  premium	  sports	  events	  
and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  premium	  movies.	  Based	  on	  an	  estimated	  total	  number	  
of	  SVOD	  subscribers	  of	  6.3million,414	  with	  an	  average	  subscription	  cost	  of	  £10	  
per	  month,	  the	  annual	  revenue	  generated	  from	  SVOD	  in	  the	  UK	  will	  be	  around	  
£756million.	  This	  is	  less	  than	  what	  BT	  paid	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  auction	  for	  live	  
television	  rights	  to	  the	  UEFA	  Champions	  League	  alone.415	  However,	  as	  already	  
noted,	  the	  economics	  of	  online	  streaming	  is	  more	  compatible	  with	  the	  supply	  
of	  premium	  drama.	   The	  potential	   impact	  of	  new	  entry	  on	   the	   competitive	  
dynamic	  for	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  premium	  drama	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  already	  evident	  
from	   trends	   in	   subscriber	   figures	   and	   investment	   in	   the	   production	   of	  
premium	  drama.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Broadcasters’	  Audience	  Research	  Board,	  the	  number	  of	  UK	  
households	   that	   subscribe	   to	   any	   SVOD	   service	   increased	   from	   around	  
4million	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2014	  to	  around	  6.5million	  at	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  
of	  2015.416	  8.89million	  UK	  households	  now	  subscribe	  for	  VOD.417	  Sky	  and	  BT	  
are	  also	  investing	  more	  than	  ever	  in	  drama	  and	  in-­‐house	  drama	  production.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413	  ibid.	  
414	  This	  is	  based	  on	  reports	  by	  Ofcom	  that,	  as	  of	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2015,	  over	  4.3million	  UK	  households	  
pay	  for	  a	  Netflix	  subscription,	   less	  than	  1.5million	  UK	  households	  subscribe	  to	  Amazon	  and	  around	  
500,000	  UK	  households	  subscribe	  to	  NowTV.	  Ofcom	  (n	  152)	  54.	  
415	   ‘Champions	   League:	   BT	   Sport	   wins	   £897m	   football	   rights	   deal’	   BBC	   Sport	   (9	   November	   2013)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/24879138>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
416	   ‘The	  UK	  Television	   Landscape	  Report:	   Is	  Netflix	   taking	  over?’	   (Broadcasters’	  Audience	  Research	  
Board,	  21	  March	  2016)	  <http://www.barb.co.uk/tv-­‐landscape-­‐reports/netflix-­‐taking-­‐over/>	  accessed	  
16	  May	  2016.	  
417	  ‘The	  UK	  Television	  Landscape	  Report:	  SVOD	  Households’	  (Broadcasters’	  Audience	  Research	  Board,	  
25	   May	   2017)	   <http://www.barb.co.uk/tv-­‐landscape-­‐reports/svod-­‐households-­‐interactive-­‐chart/>	  
accessed	  2	  September	  2017.	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Sky	  has	  over	  150	  hours	  of	  original	  drama	  in	  production.418	  In	  April	  2017,	  Sky	  
announced	  a	  partnership	  with	  HBO	  for	  the	  US$250million	  co-­‐production	  of	  
high-­‐end	  drama.419	  It	  was	  also	  recently	  reported	  that	  Sky	  will	  boost	  its	  drama	  
budget	  by	  a	  quarter	  in	  2017	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  spending	  by	  Netflix	  
and	  Amazon,	  and	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  strong	  international	  appetite	  for	  drama	  
box	  sets.420	  
	  
3.5.2	   Supply	  of	  premium	  drama	  and	  online	  streaming	  services	  in	  Australia	  
The	   trend	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   using	   premium	   non-­‐sport	   content	   to	  
differentiate	   their	   services	   is	   also	   evident	   in	   Australia	   from	   increasing	  
investment	  in	  the	  production	  and	  supply	  of	  original	  drama.	  Premium	  drama	  
is	  an	  especially	  promising	  area	  of	  growth	  for	  Foxtel	  since	  its	  ability	  to	  secure	  
the	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  premium	  movies	  is	  limited	  by	  output	  deals	  between	  
the	  commercial	  FTA	  broadcasters	  and	  some	  of	  the	  Major	  Hollywood	  Studios.	  
Seven	  has	  output	  deals	  with	  Sony	  Pictures	  and	  NBCUniversal,	  although	  these	  
deals	  were	  scaled	  down	  in	  2013.421	  Nine	  has	  an	  output	  deal	  with	  Warner	  Bros	  
but	  is	  reportedly	  considering	  scaling	  down	  the	  deal.422	  Ten	  had	  an	  output	  deal	  
with	  US	  commercial	  broadcast	  television	  network	  CBS,	  but	  this	  ended	  in	  2014	  
amidst	  poor	  ratings.423	  In	  addition,	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  the	  ACCC’s	  approval	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  ‘Unaudited	  results	  for	  the	  three	  months	  ended	  30	  September	  2015’	  (Sky	  plc,	  30	  September	  2015)	  
4	   <http://s3-­‐eu-­‐west-­‐1.amazonaws.com/skygroup-­‐sky-­‐static/documents/media-­‐center/news-­‐
releases/2015/unaudited-­‐results-­‐for-­‐the-­‐three-­‐months-­‐ended-­‐30-­‐september-­‐2015.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  
August	  2017.	  
419	  ‘HBO	  and	  Sky	  join	  forces	  to	  launch	  a	  new	  global	  drama	  powerhouse’	  (Sky	  plc	  news	  release,	  20	  April	  
2017)	   <https://www.skymedia.co.uk/news/hbo-­‐sky-­‐join-­‐forces-­‐launch-­‐new-­‐global-­‐drama-­‐
powerhouse/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
420	  Christopher	  Williams,	   ‘Sky	   ramps	  up	  drama	  spending	  as	  profits	   take	  a	  hit	   from	  Premier	   League	  
rights’	  The	  Telegraph	   (27	  July	  2017)	  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/27/sky-­‐ramps-­‐
drama-­‐spending-­‐profits-­‐take-­‐hit-­‐premier-­‐league-­‐rights/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
421	   ‘Ten	   Network	   cuts	   major	   content	   supply	   deal	   with	   CBS’	   The	   Australian	   Financial	   Review	   (23	  
September	   2014)	   <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-­‐
Nvl2b6_Bn4J:www.afr.com/business/media-­‐and-­‐marketing/tv/ten-­‐network-­‐cuts-­‐major-­‐content-­‐
supply-­‐deal-­‐with-­‐cbs-­‐20140922-­‐jftom+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  	  
422	  ibid.	  	  
423	  ibid.	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Foxtel’s	  merger	  with	  Austar	   in	   2012	   (which	   is	   considered	   in	   Chapter	   6),424	  
Foxtel	  undertook	  for	  a	  period	  of	  8	  years	  to	  not	  exclusively	  own	  VOD	  or	  IPTV	  
rights	  to	  movies	  and	  television	  shows	  for	  a	  range	  of	  channels.425	  	  
	  
Movie	  output	  deals	  do	  not,	   however,	   typically	   include	  SVOD	   rights,	   so	   the	  
SVOD	  market	  in	  Australia	  is	  said	  to	  still	  be	  “up	  for	  grabs”.426	  SVOD	  is	  growing	  
rapidly	   in	   Australia.	   Between	   January	   and	   March	   2015,	   Australia	   saw	   the	  
launch	   of	   Stan,	   Presto	   and	   Netflix	   (each	   of	   which	   notably	   provide	   local	  
content).427	  The	  take-­‐up	  of	  SVOD	  has	  since	  increased	  rapidly.	  A	  survey	  carried	  
out	   by	   ACMA	   in	   2015	   reported	   that	   around	   17	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   Australian	  
population	  consumed	  content	  via	  SVOD	  in	  the	  six	  months	  to	  June	  2015	  (three	  
months	  of	  which	  preceded	  the	   launch	  of	  Netflix	  Australia).428	  One	  year	  on,	  
there	   followed	   reports	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time	  more	  Australians	  have	   SVOD	  
than	   linear	   pay-­‐TV.429	   This	   is	   potentially	   significant	   from	   an	   advertising	  
revenue	  perspective	  amidst	  reports	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  advertising	  revenue	  
remaining	  for	  local	  traditional	  media	  companies	  is	  diminishing	  and,	  by	  2020,	  
global	  online	  players	  will	  dominate	  advertising	  revenue	  in	  Australia.430	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424	  ‘ACCC	  not	  to	  oppose	  AUSTAR	  acquisition	  after	  undertaking	  resolves	  concerns’	  (ACCC	  media	  release,	  
10	   April	   2012)	   <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-­‐release/accc-­‐not-­‐to-­‐oppose-­‐austar-­‐acquisition-­‐
after-­‐undertaking-­‐resolves-­‐concerns>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
425	  Undertaking	  to	  the	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission,	  given	  under	  Section	  87B	  of	  
the	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010	  by	  FOXTEL	  Management	  Pty	  Limited	  for	  and	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
FOXTEL	  Partnership,	  dated	  9	  April	  2012,	  cls	  3,	  4.1	  and	  5-­‐7.	  
426	   ‘Equity	  Research	  on	  Nine	  Entertainment’	  (Credit	  Suisse,	  4	  April	  2014)	  4-­‐5	  <https://doc.research-­‐
and-­‐
analytics.csfb.com/docView?language=ENG&source=ulg&format=PDF&document_id=1031543581&
serialid=QQK9vapE9HTHvEymaeV45K6HNrzD9MR%2BBxj4PcZBEBA%3D>	  accessed	  13	  May	  2015.	  
427	  Paul	  Kalina,	  ‘Netflix,	  Stan	  and	  Presto	  support	  local	  content,	  to	  a	  point’	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  
(4	   June	   2015)	   <https://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-­‐and-­‐radio/netflix-­‐stan-­‐and-­‐presto-­‐
support-­‐local-­‐content-­‐to-­‐a-­‐point-­‐20150602-­‐ghdvfj.html>	  accessed	  16	  November	  2015.	  
428	   ‘Subscription	   video	   on	   demand	   in	   Australia	   2015’	   (ACMA,	   16	   November	   2015)	  
<http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/engage-­‐blogs/engage-­‐blogs/Research-­‐snapshots/Subscription-­‐
video-­‐on-­‐demand?utm_source=s0cial&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=svod>	   accessed	   1	   July	  
2016.	  
429	  ‘More	  Australians	  now	  have	  SVOD	  than	  Foxtel’	  (Roy	  Morgan	  Research	  press	  release,	  8	  September	  
2016)	   <http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6957-­‐svod-­‐overtakes-­‐foxtel-­‐pay-­‐tv-­‐in-­‐australia-­‐august-­‐
2016-­‐201609081005>	  accessed	  17	  March	  2017.	  
430	   Stephen	   Letts,	   ‘Global	   internet	   giants	   crushing	   Australian	  media’	  ABC	   News	   (29	   January	   2016)	  
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-­‐01-­‐29/global-­‐internet-­‐giants-­‐crushing-­‐australian-­‐
media/7125458>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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In	  addition	  to	  supplying	  exclusive	  US	  content	  from	  HBO,	  Foxtel	  is	  focusing	  on	  
enhancing	   its	   own	   investment	   in	   original	   drama.	   This	   includes	   a	   pledge	   to	  
invest	   more	   heavily	   in	   the	   commissioning	   and	   production	   of	   Australian	  
content.431	  As	  suggested	   in	  Chapter	  2,	   local	  content	   is	  resonating	  well	  with	  
home	  audiences,	  despite	  the	  increasing	  availability	  of	  content	  from	  around	  
the	  World.	  For	  example,	  seven	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  shows	  that	  were	  aired	  on	  Foxtel	  
in	  2016	  were	  homegrown	  productions.432	  
	  
Similarly,	   Australia’s	   three	   largest	   mobile	   operators	   (Telstra,	   Optus	   and	  
Vodafone)	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  competing	  more	  aggressively	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  
more	  innovative	  content	  and	  services,	  and	  bundling	  the	  same	  to	  encourage	  
mobile	  customers	  to	  subscribe	  also	  for	  pay-­‐TV.	  For	  example,	  since	  May	  2015,	  
customers	  who	  have	  signed	  up	  for	  Telstra’s	  mobile	  plans	  have	  received	  the	  
option	   of	   a	   12-­‐month	   NRL	   Digital	   Pass,	   an	   AFL	   Live	   Pass	   or	   six	  months	   of	  
Presto.433	  In	  2015,	  Optus	  offered	  new	  subscribers	  a	  free	  6-­‐month	  subscription	  
to	  Netflix.434	  Meanwhile,	  Vodafone	  Australia	  offers	  a	  range	  of	  content	  options	  
from	  Stan	  and	  Spotify.435	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
431	  Shannon	  Molloy,	  ‘Foxtel	  pledges	  to	  double	  its	  investment	  in	  original	  Australian	  TV	  content	  in	  three	  
years’	  news.com.au	   (17	   June	  2015)	  <http://www.news.com.au/entertainment/tv/foxtel-­‐pledges-­‐to-­‐
double-­‐its-­‐investment-­‐in-­‐original-­‐australian-­‐tv-­‐content-­‐in-­‐three-­‐years/news-­‐
story/5ab6cbc77888bdb1c840e7f48b28d20b>	  accessed	  29	  July	  2017.	  
432	  Darren	  Davidson,	   ‘Local	  drama	  a	  major	  driver	  of	  Foxtel’s	  ratings	  growth	   in	  2016’	  The	  Australian	  
Business	   Review	   (12	   December	   2016)	  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ewF5exKL5u4J:www.theaustralian.com.
au/business/media/local-­‐drama-­‐a-­‐major-­‐driver-­‐of-­‐foxtels-­‐ratings-­‐growth-­‐in-­‐2016/news-­‐
story/89a0ea7006fc197353dda226d28aa51f+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	  
433	  David	  Ramli,	   ‘Telstra	  offering	   free	   live	  NRL	  and	  AFL	   streaming	   to	  entice	  mobile	   customers’	  The	  
Sydney	   Morning	   Herald	   (11	   May	   2015)	   <http://www.smh.com.au/business/media-­‐and-­‐
marketing/telstra-­‐offering-­‐free-­‐live-­‐nrl-­‐and-­‐afl-­‐streaming-­‐to-­‐entice-­‐mobile-­‐customers-­‐20150509-­‐
ggy2vu.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
434	   This	   offer	   ended	   on	   31	   January	   2016.	   ‘Netflix	   Bonus	   Subscription	   Offer’	  
<http://www.optus.com.au/shop/support/answer/netflix-­‐bonus-­‐subscription-­‐
offer?requestType=NormalRequest&id=5241&typeId=5>	  accessed	  28	  July	  2016.	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  Ramli	  (n	  433).	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In	  the	  light	  of	  new	  entry	  by	  SVOD	  platforms	  with	  business	  models	  based	  on	  
the	  exclusive	  release	  of	  original	  dramas,	  the	  question	  arises	  (equally	  within	  
the	  UK	  context)	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  “premium	  content”.	  The	  likes	  of	  Netflix	  
could	  be	  perceived	  as	  providing	  a	   largely	  new	  service	  which	  means	  that,	   in	  
addition	  to	  expanding	  their	  own	  market	  shares,	  they	  are	  also	  expanding	  the	  
overall	  size	  of	  the	  industry.	  The	  increasing	  number	  of	  homes	  that	  subscribe	  to	  
some	   form	  of	  pay-­‐TV	   suggests	   so,	   as	  does	   the	   continued	   success	  of	   Foxtel	  
following	  the	  launch	  of	  Netflix	  Australia,	  for	  example.	  It	   is	  reported	  that,	   in	  
the	  first	  half	  of	  2016,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  Foxtel	  subscribers	  rose	  8.1	  per	  cent	  
from	  2.6million	  to	  approaching	  2.9million.	  Subscribers	  through	  Telstra	  were	  
up	  17.9	  per	  cent,	  with	  Telstra	  alone	  signing	  up	  100,000	  more	  customers.436	  
This	   is	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   increasing	   investment	   in	   quality	  
content.437	  
	  
3.6	   Conclusions	  
The	   competitive	   dynamic	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   in	   the	   UK	   and	  
Australia	   is	   changing	   with	   new	   entry	   by	   established	   telecommunications	  
service	  providers	  and	  online	  streaming	  services.	   Increasing	  competition	   for	  
sports	  rights	  from	  established	  telecommunications	  service	  providers	  has	  been	  
met	   with	   price	   increases	   for	   pay-­‐TV	   customers.	   Albeit	   nominal	   for	   the	  
individual	   customer,	   such	   price	   increases	   have	   not	   been	   limited	   to	   sports	  
channel	  subscribers.	  This	  reinforces	  questions	  about	  who	  should	  bear	  the	  cost	  
of	  the	  escalating	  wholeprice	  price	  of	  sports	  rights.	  
	  
The	   scope	   for	   competition	   on	   price	   is	   greater	   in	   the	   context	   of	   premium	  
movies	   and	   particularly	   drama.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   the	   different	   economics	   of	  
producing	  such	  content	  and	  the	  lower	  price	  points	  of	  SVOD	  platforms	  (whose	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436	  Harry	  Tucker,	  ‘Foxtel	  is	  putting	  up	  a	  huge	  fight	  in	  the	  Netflix	  world’	  Business	  Insider	  Australia	  (18	  
February	   2016)	   <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/foxtel-­‐subscribers-­‐are-­‐up-­‐8-­‐despite-­‐
streaming-­‐service-­‐onslaught-­‐2016-­‐2>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
437	  ibid.	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business	  models	  are	  focused	  on	  the	  exclusive	  supply	  of	  original	  drama).	  The	  
potential	  impact	  of	  this	  is	  particularly	  significant	  given	  that	  a	  high	  percentage	  
of	   the	   UK	   and	   Australian	   populations	   (91.6	   per	   cent	   and	   84.6	   per	   cent,	  
respectively)	  now	  use	  the	  Internet.438	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  relatively	  
slow	  Internet	  connection	  speeds	  are	  considered	  to	  remain	  a	  countervailing	  
factor	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  in	  Australia.439	  	  
	  
The	  increasing	  economic	  value	  of	  original	  drama	  series	  as	  a	  form	  of	  premium	  
content	  is	  evident	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  Established	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  
in	   both	   countries	   have	   responded	   to	   new	   entry	   by	   the	   likes	   of	   Netflix	   by	  
investing	  more	  heavily	  in	  the	  production	  and	  supply	  of	  premium	  drama.	  The	  
incentives	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  invest	  in	  premium	  drama	  (including	  local	  
drama)	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  increasing	  opportunities	  to	  monetise	  such	  drama	  
in	   the	   global	  market.	   This	   includes	   the	   use	   of	   local	   or	   national	   content	   by	  
domestic	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  differentiate	  their	  services	  from	  the	  services	  of	  
SVOD	  platforms	  marketing	  to	  an	  international	  audience.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  
by	   the	  enduring	  high	  global	  demand	   for	  British	  drama,	  which	   continues	   to	  
experience	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  growth	  (despite	  economic	  and	  political	  uncertainty,	  
particularly	   in	   Europe).440	   Australian	   dramas	   are	   also	   proving	   to	   be	  
increasingly	  popular	  with	  international	  audiences.441	  
	  
Despite	   these	   trends,	   the	   specific	   economic	   characteristics	   of	   the	   UK	   and	  
Australian	  pay-­‐TV	  industries	  continue	  to	  limit,	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  scope	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438	   World	   Bank	   Data,	   ‘Internet	   users	   (per	   100	   people)’	  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2>	  accessed	  16	  July	  2016.	  
439	  Samantha	  Donovan,	  ‘Internet	  speeds:	  Australia	  ranks	  44th,	  study	  cites	  direction	  of	  NBN	  as	  part	  of	  
problem’	   ABC	   News	   (12	   January	   2015)	   <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-­‐01-­‐12/australian-­‐
internet-­‐speeds-­‐rank-­‐44th-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world/6012570>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
440	  Leo	  Barraclough,	   ‘British	  Television	  Exports	  Rise	  10%	  to	  $1.66	  Billion’	  Variety	   (2	  February	  2017)	  
<http://variety.com/2017/tv/global/british-­‐television-­‐exports-­‐rise-­‐ten-­‐per-­‐cent-­‐1201976483/>	  
accessed	  10	  August	  2017.	  
441	  Steve	  Clark,	  ‘U.S.,	  U.K.	  Are	  World’s	  Top	  TV	  Exporters,	  Australia	  Shows	  Improvement’	  Variety	  (24	  
February	   2016)	   <http://variety.com/2016/tv/global/u-­‐s-­‐u-­‐k-­‐tv-­‐exporters-­‐australia-­‐1201713741/>	  
accessed	  10	  August	  2017.	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consumers	  to	  benefit	   from	  new	  entry,	  particularly	   in	  relation	  to	   live	  sports	  
broadcasting.	  The	  ability	  of	  online	  streaming	  services	  to	  bid	  for	  sports	  rights	  
is	   inherently	   restricted	  by	   their	   lower	   retail	  price	  points.	  By	   contrast,	   even	  
nominal	   increases	   in	   subscription	   fees	   can	   provide	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  (and	  established	  telecommunications	  service	  providers,	  on	  account	  
of	   their	  established	  customer	  base),	  with	  significant	  additional	   revenue	   for	  
reinvesting	  in	  content.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  hinder	  any	  further	  shift	  in	  
the	   competitive	   dynamic	   in	   the	   sports	   rights	  market.	   Nevertheless,	   as	   the	  
remainder	   of	   the	   thesis	   explores,	   the	   trends	   identified	   in	   this	   chapter	  
(particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  premium	  drama)	  have	  regulatory	  implications	  for	  
the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power	  in	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  This	  
begins	  with	  how	  the	  relevant	  market	  is	  defined.	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CHAPTER	  4	  
	  
ASSESSMENT	  OF	  THE	  MARKET	  AND	  MARKET	  POWER	  IN	  PREMIUM	  PAY-­‐TV	  
	  
4.1	   Introduction	   	   	  
Market	  definition	  fulfils	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  assessing	  market	  power	  under	  
UK/EU	   and	   Australian	   competition	   law.	   There	   are	   fundamental	   similarities	  
between	  the	  approaches	  to	  market	  definition	  in	  these	  jurisdictions	  (as	  set	  out	  
in	   the	   CMA’s	  Market	   Definition	   Guidelines,442	   the	   European	   Commission’s	  
Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition,443	  and	  the	  ACCC’s	  Merger	  Guidelines	  and	  Media	  
Merger	  Guidelines).444	  Defining	  the	  relevant	  market	  assists	  in	  identifying	  in	  a	  
systematic	  way	  the	  competitive	  constraints	   that	   firms	   face.445	  The	  relevant	  
market	   is	   determined	   according	   to	   the	   possibilities	   for	   demand-­‐side	   and	  
supply-­‐side	  substitution	  between	  products	  in	  a	  particular	  geographic	  area.	  It	  
may	  also	  be	  defined	  by	   reference	   to	  a	  particular	   stage	   in	   the	   supply	   chain	  
and/or	  a	  specific	  period	  of	  time.	  
	  
The	  general	  conceptual	  approach	  to	  market	  definition	  applies	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  like	  
any	   other	   sector.	   However,	   the	   rapid	   rate	   of	   technological	   change	   in	   the	  
digital	   era	   complicates	   the	   assessment	   of	   substitution	   possibilities.	  
Methodological	   issues	   specifically	   arise	   in	   relation	   to	   determining	  whether	  
prevailing	  prices	  are	  above	  the	  competitive	  level,	  asymmetric	  pricing	  by	  pay-­‐
TV	  providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms,	  and	  the	  bundling	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  with	  other	  
communications	  services.	  These	   issues	  can	  also	  obscure	  the	  functional	  and	  
temporal	   dimensions	   of	   the	   relevant	   market	   which,	   in	   such	   a	   dynamic,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	   ‘Market	   Definition:	   Understanding	   Competition	   Law’	   (CMA,	   December	   2004)	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284423/oft403.p
df>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
443	   Commission	   Notice	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   relevant	   market	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   Community	  
competition	  law	  [1997]	  OJ	  C372/5.	  
444	   ‘Merger	   Guidelines’	   (ACCC,	   November	   2008)	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Merger%20guidelines.pdf>	   accessed	  13	  August	   2017;	  ACCC	  
Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  91).	  
445	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  2.	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vertically-­‐integrated	  industry	  as	  pay-­‐TV,	  are	  arguably	  more	  pertinent	  than	  is	  
generally	  otherwise	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  
	  
Such	  issues	  do	  not	  arise	  exclusively	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context.	  Whilst	  the	  
standard	   conceptual	   approach	   to	  market	  definition	   remains	   fundamentally	  
appropriate,	  this	  chapter	  identifies	  a	  number	  of	  respects	  in	  which	  it	  is	  likely	  
to	  lead	  to	  markets	  being	  unduly	  narrowly	  defined.	  This	  will	  increase	  the	  risk	  
of	  over-­‐estimating	  market	  power,	  and	  unnecessary	  and	  potentially	  counter-­‐
productive	   regulatory	   interventions	   in	   the	  market.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   this,	   the	  
chapter	  proposes	  an	  approach	  that	  places	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  increasingly	  
global	  nature	  of	  the	  multi-­‐media	  landscape.	  	  
	  
4.2	   Concept	  of	  Relevant	  Market	  under	  UK/EU	  and	  Australian	  Competition	  Law	  
Defining	   the	   relevant	  market	   is	   integral	   in	   applying	   the	  main	  provisions	  of	  
UK/EU	  and	  Australian	  competition	  law.	  In	  assessing	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  
an	   abuse	   of	   dominance	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   Chapter	   II	   prohibition	   or	  
Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dominant	  
position	   in	   a	   given	  market.	   This	   presupposes	   that	   such	  a	  market	  has	  been	  
defined.446	   Similarly,	   in	   applying	   the	   prohibition	   on	   the	   misuse	   of	   market	  
power	   in	   Section	   46	   of	   the	   CCA,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   delineate	   the	   relevant	  
market	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  power	  in	  that	  market.447	  For	  
the	  purpose	  of	  applying	   the	  prohibition	  on	  anti-­‐competitive	  agreements	   in	  
Article	  101	  of	   the	  TFEU,	  defining	   the	  relevant	  market	   is	  used	  to	  determine	  
whether	  an	  agreement	  has	  the	  object	  or	  effect	  of	  preventing,	  restricting	  or	  
distorting	   competition	   in	   the	   Internal	  market,	   and	   is	   liable	   to	   affect	   trade	  
between	  Member	  States.448	  Objection	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446	  Case	  T-­‐61/99	  Adriatica	  di	  Navigazione	  SpA	  v	  Commission	  [2003]	  ECR	  II-­‐5349	  [27].	  
447	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission	  v	  Boral	  Besser	  Masonry	  Ltd	  [2001]	  FCA	  30	  [300];	  
ACCC	  v	  Baxter	  Healthcare	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2005]	  FCA	  581	  [549].	  
448	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐259/02	  to	  T-­‐264/02	  and	  T-­‐271/02	  Raiffeisen	  Zentralbank	  Österreich	  AG	  and	  Others	  
v	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [2006]	  ECR	  II-­‐5169	  [172];	  Case	  T-­‐111/08	  MasterCard	  and	  
Others	  v	  Commission,	  24	  May	  2012	  [171].	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is	  of	  no	  consequence	  provided	  the	  European	  Commission	  correctly	  concludes	  
that	  the	  agreement	  satisfies	  such	  criteria.449	  	  
	  
Market	  concentration	  is	  similarly	  assessed	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  specific	  market	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  merger	  analysis.450	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  substantive	  test	  is	  whether	  
a	   relevant	  merger	  situation	  has	   resulted	  or	  may	  be	  expected	   to	   result	   in	  a	  
substantial	  lessening	  of	  competition	  within	  any	  market(s)	  for	  goods/services	  
in	  the	  UK.451	  This	   includes	  any	  market	  that	  operates	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  another	  
country,	  or	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  UK.452	  As	  already	  noted,	  a	  concentration	  with	  a	  
Community	   dimension	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   substantive	   test	   in	   the	   EU	  Merger	  
Regulation	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   concentration	   would	   significantly	   impede	  
effective	   competition	   in	   the	   Internal	   market	   (or	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	  
Internal	  market).453	  	  
	  
In	  Australia,	  the	  test	  is	  whether	  an	  acquisition	  has	  the	  effect	  or	  likely	  effect	  of	  
substantially	  lessening	  competition	  in	  any	  market.454	  In	  the	  merger	  context,	  
“market”	   is	   defined	   as	   a	  market	   for	   goods/services	   in	  Australia	   or	   a	   state,	  
territory	  or	  region	  of	  Australia.455	  The	  term	  “market”	  is	  defined	  in	  Section	  4E	  
of	  the	  CCA	  as	  “a	  market	  in	  Australia	  and,	  when	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  goods	  
or	  services,	  includes	  a	  market	  for	  those	  goods	  or	  services	  and	  other	  goods	  or	  
services	  that	  are	  substitutable	  for,	  or	  otherwise	  competitive	  with,	  the	  first-­‐
mentioned	  goods	  or	  services.”456	  Consistent	  with	  the	  approach	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	  legislative	  purpose	  of	  the	  CCA,457	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  market	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449	  ibid.	  
450	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐	  68/94	  and	  C-­‐30/95	  France	  and	  Others	  v	  Commission	  [1988]	  ECR	  I-­‐1375	  [143].	  
451	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  s	  22(1)(b).	  	  
452	  ibid	  s	  22(6).	  
453	  See	  n	  92.	  
454	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  50(1).	  
455	  ibid	  s	  50(6).	  
456	  See,	  Robert	  Baxt,	  ‘The	  Australian	  Concept	  of	  Market	  –	  How	  It	  Came	  to	  Be’	  in	  Megan	  Richardson	  and	  
Philip	  L	  Williams,	  The	  Law	  and	  the	  Market	  (Federation	  Press	  1995)	  10-­‐32.	  
457	  The	  legislative	  purpose	  of	  the	  CCA	  is	  to	  enhance	  the	  welfare	  of	  Australians	  through	  the	  promotion	  
of	  competition	  and	  fair	  trading	  and	  provision	  for	  consumer	  protection.	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  
Act	  2010,	  s	  2.	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in	  Australia	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  geographic	  location,	  but	  whether	  the	  conduct	  
affects	  Australian	  consumers	  and	  suppliers.458	  	  
	  
Market	  definition	  is	  therefore	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  but	  rather	  a	  means	  to	  the	  
end	   of	   assessing	   the	   competitive	   effects	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	  market	   power.	  
Market	   power	   is	   typically	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ability	   of	   a	   firm	   in	   the	  
relevant	  market	  to	  profitably	  price	  above	  the	  competitive	  level	  for	  a	  sustained	  
period	  of	  time.	  As	  Brunt	  observes,	  “[t]he	  elaborateness	  of	  the	  exercise	  should	  
be	   tailored	   to	   the	   conduct	   at	   issue	   and	   the	   statutory	   terms	   governing	   the	  
breach	   (or	   authorisation).”459	   This	  means	   that	   the	   relevant	  market	   cannot	  
properly	  be	  defined	  in	  the	  abstract.	  It	  is	  defined	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  enables	  
the	   impugned	   conduct	   to	   be	   assessed	   within	   the	   specific	   context	   of	   the	  
process	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  individual	  case.460	  
	  
4.3	   Product	  Market	  Definition	  in	  the	  Premium	  Pay-­‐TV	  Context	  
Definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  product	  market	  typically	  begins	  with	  consideration	  
of	   the	   characteristics	   and	   intended	   use	   of	   the	   product(s)	   in	   question.461	  
However,	   substitution	   possibilities	   also	   depend	   on	   how	   consumers	   value	  
differences	   between	   such	   characteristics.462	   The	   standard	   quantitative	  
method	  for	  determining	  this	  is	  the	  “hypothetical	  monopolist”	  or	  SSNIP	  test.	  
This	   considers	   the	   response	   of	   consumers	   and	   suppliers	   to	   a	   small	   but	  
significant	   and	  non-­‐transitory	   increase	   in	   price	   (“SSNIP”)	   by	   a	   hypothetical	  
monopolist.	  First	  proposed	  in	  the	  US,463	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  has	  been	  adopted	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458	  ACCC	  v	  Air	  New	  Zealand	  Limited	  [2014]	  FCA	  1157.	  
459	  Maureen	  Brunt,	  ‘Market	  Definition	  Issues	  in	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Trade	  Practices	  Litigation’	  
(1990)	  18	  Australian	  Business	  Law	  Review	  86,	  126-­‐127,	  cited	  in	  Arnotts	  Limited	  &	  Ors	  v	  Trade	  Practices	  
Commission	  (1990)	  24	  FCR	  313	  [48].	  
460	  ACCC	  v	  Liquorland	  (Australia)	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2006]	  FCA	  826;	  (2006)	  ATPR	  42,123	  [429].	  
461	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  36.	  
462	  ibid.	  
463	  The	  SSNIP	  test	  was	  first	  proposed	  in	  the	  1982	  Merger	  Guidelines	  of	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice	  
and	   is	   now	   set	   out	   in	   the	   US	   Horizontal	   Merger	   Guidelines.	   ‘Horizontal	   Merger	   Guidelines’	   (US	  
Department	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  19	  August	  2010)	  para	  4.1.1.	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the	  UK/EU	  and	  Australia.464	  The	  adoption	  of	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  under	  
the	   SSNIP	   test	   represents	   a	   positive	   development	   on	   the	  more	   subjective	  
approach	   that	   previously	   existed	   in	   the	   UK/EU	   and	   Australia.465	   However,	  
seeking	  to	  apply	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  highlights	  the	  
limitations	  of	  adopting	  a	  purely	  quantitative	  approach.	  
	  
4.3.1	   Standard	  principles	  for	  defining	  the	  relevant	  product	  market	  	  
The	  relevant	  product	  market	  is	  said	  to	  encompass	  all	  those	  products/services	  
which	   are	   regarded	   as	   interchangeable	   or	   substitutable	   by	   consumers	   and	  
suppliers,	   by	   reason	   of	   the	   products’	   characteristics,	   prices	   and	   intended	  
use.466	   The	   process	   of	   defining	   the	   relevant	   product	   market	   begins	   with	  
identifying	   the	   products	   supplied	   by	   the	   firm(s)	   in	   question.	   Economic	  
substitutes	  for	  such	  products	  are	  then	  identified.	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  include	  
within	   the	   relevant	   product	   market	   only	   those	   substitutes	   whose	   prices	  
and/or	  other	  characteristics	  constrain	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  firm(s)	  and	  their	  rivals	  
from	  increasing	  price	  and/or	  reducing	  output	  or	  other	  competitive	  effort.	  This	  
is	  assessed	  from	  the	  demand-­‐side	  and	  the	  supply-­‐side.	  
	  
4.3.1.1	  Product	  market	  definition	  and	  demand-­‐side	  substitutability	  	  
The	   assessment	   of	   demand-­‐side	   substitutability	   involves	   determining	   the	  
range	  of	  products	  that	  are	  considered	  by	  consumers	  to	  be	  substitutable.467	  
Demand-­‐side	  substitution	  is	  described	  as	  “the	  most	  immediate	  and	  effective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  paras	  2.5-­‐2.13	  (UK);	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  
Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  17	  (EU).	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  paras	  4.19-­‐4.22;	  In	  the	  matter	  
of	  Fortescue	  Metals	  Group	  Limited	  [2010]	  ACompT	  2	  [1034]	  (AU).	  
465	   Reference	   is	   made	   here	   to	   the	   subjective	   considerations	   relating	   to	   the	   “special	   features”	   of	  
bananas	   (i.e.	   the	   appearance,	   taste,	   softness,	   seedlessness,	   easy	   handling	   and	   constant	   level	   of	  
production	   of	   bananas),	  which	   led	   the	   European	   Commission	   in	  United	   Brands	   to	   find	   a	   separate	  
banana	  market.	  United	  Brands	  (n	  32)	  [31].	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  in	  Top	  Performance	  Motors,	  the	  Australian	  
Industrial	  Court	  (now	  the	  Industrial	  Division	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia)	  notoriously	  relied	  on	  a	  
dictionary	  definition	  of	  “market”	  as	  “trade	  or	  traffic,	  especially	  as	  regards	  a	  particular	  commodity”,	  to	  
narrowly	  define	  the	  relevant	  market	  as	  the	  market	  for	  the	  Datsun	  motor	  car.	  Top	  Performance	  Motors	  
Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Ira	  Berk	  (Queensland)	  Pty	  Ltd	  (1975)	  24	  FLR	  286;	  5	  ALR	  465,	  per	  Joske	  J.	  
466	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  7.	  
467	  ibid	  para	  15.	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disciplinary	   force”	   on	   suppliers	   because	   a	   firm	   cannot	   have	   a	   significant	  
impact	  on	  the	  prevailing	  conditions	  of	  supply	  if	  consumers	  can	  easily	  switch	  
to	  other	  products	   and/or	   suppliers.468	   It	   is	   unnecessary	   for	   products	   to	  be	  
perfect	  substitutes	  (i.e.	  identical	  in	  terms	  of	  price,	  quality	  and	  otherwise),	  or	  
for	   substitution	   to	   be	   instantaneous	   or	   complete.469	   It	   is	   sufficient	   for	  
consumers	  to	  consider	  the	  products	  in	  question	  to	  be	  close	  substitutes.470	  As	  
the	  HCA	  established	  in	  Queensland	  Wire,471	  a	  market	  can	  exist	  if	  there	  is	  the	  
potential	  for	  close	  competition,	  even	  if	  none	  in	  fact	  exists.472	  
	  
In	   identifying	  close	  substitutes,	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  addresses	  the	  question	  as	  to	  
whether	  consumers	  would	  switch	  to	  readily	  available	  substitutes	  or	  suppliers	  
located	  elsewhere,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  SSNIP	  in	  the	  products	  and	  areas	  in	  issue.	  
This	  typically	  refers	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  price	  of	  5	  to	  10	  per	  cent,473	  for	  a	  period	  
of	   at	   least	   one	   year.474	   Such	   an	   increase	   in	   price	   is	   regarded	   in	   the	  UK	   as	  
indicative	  of	  a	  SSNIP.475	  In	  Australia,	  a	  SSNIP	  usually	  consists	  of	  a	  price	  rise	  for	  
the	  foreseeable	  future	  of	  at	  least	  5	  per	  cent	  above	  that	  which	  would	  prevail	  
in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   conduct	   in	   question.476	   The	   candidate	   market	  
constitutes	   the	   relevant	   market	   if	   a	   hypothetical,	   profit-­‐maximising	  
monopolist	  could	  profitably	  increase	  price	  accordingly.	  If	  a	  sufficient	  number	  
of	  consumers	  would	  switch	  so	  as	  to	  render	  the	  price	  increase	  unprofitable,	  
the	  SSNIP	  test	  is	  applied	  to	  a	  wider	  candidate	  market	  that	  encompasses	  such	  
products.	  This	  process	  is	  repeated	  to	  find	  the	  narrowest	  set	  of	  products	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468	  ibid	  para	  13.	  
469	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  para	  4.16.	  
470	  ibid.	  
471	  Queensland	  Wire	  Industries	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Broken	  Hill	  Pty	  Co	  Ltd	  [1989]	  HCA	  6;	  (1989)	  167	  CLR	  177.	  
472	  ibid	  [196].	  
473	  US	  Horizontal	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  463)	  9.	  
474	   ‘Market	   Definition’	   (OECD	   policy	   roundtable	   DAF/COMP(2012)19,	   11	   October	   2012)	   30	  
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition2012.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
475	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  5;	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  
443)	  para	  17.	  
476	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  para	  4.21.	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which	   a	   hypothetical	  monopolist	   could	   profitably	   sustain	   prices	   above	   the	  
competitive	  level.	  
	  
With	  regards	  to	  the	  period	  of	  time	  over	  which	  substitution	  possibilities	  are	  
assessed,	  in	  Tooth	  &	  Tooheys,477	  the	  ACT	  endorsed	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  
QCMA,478	   that	   substitution	   possibilities	   should	   be	   assessed	   in	   the	   “longer	  
run”.479	   This	   refers	   to	   “operational	   time”	   rather	   than	   calendar	   time.480	   It	  
depends	  on	  the	  commercial	  realities	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  question	  but	  does	  not	  
include	  supplies	  arising	  from	  entirely	  new	  entry.481	  	  
	  
This	   does	   not	  mean	  we	   seek	   to	   prophesy	   the	   shape	   of	   the	  
future	  -­‐	  to	  speculate	  […]	  Rather	  we	  ask	  of	  the	  evidence	  what	  
(would	  be)	  likely	  to	  happen	  to	  patterns	  of	  consumption	  and	  
production	   were	   existing	   suppliers	   to	   raise	   price	   or,	   more	  
generally,	  offer	  a	  poorer	  deal.	  For	  the	  market	   is	  the	  field	  of	  
actual	  or	  potential	  rivalry	  between	  firms.482	  
	  
In	  the	  UK,	  the	  CMA	  notes	  that	  the	  relevant	  time	  period	  may	  be	  significantly	  
shorter	   than	   one	   year.483	   This	   will	   depend,	   for	   instance,	   on	   how	   long	  
consumers	   take	   to	   respond	   to	  an	   increase	   in	  price	  and	   the	   frequency	  with	  
which	  consumers	  purchase	  the	  relevant	  product.484	  So	  in	  the	  communications	  
context,	  the	  relevant	  period	  of	  time	  may	  be	  longer	  in	  respect	  of	  technology	  in	  
which	  consumers	  typically	  invest	  every	  several	  years,	  but	  shorter	  for	  content	  
consumed	  more	  regularly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477	  In	  re	  Tooth	  &	  Co	  Limited;	  In	  re	  Tooheys	  Limited	  (1979)	  ATPR	  40-­‐113.	  
478	  QCMA	  (n	  34).	  
479	  ibid	  [17,247];	  Tooth	  &	  Tooheys	  (n	  477)	  [18,196].	  
480	  Telecom	  Corporation	  of	  NZ	  Ltd	  v	  Commerce	  Commission	  (1991)	  3	  NZBLC	  P99-­‐239	  [102,	  363];	  Re	  AGL	  
Cooper	  Basin	  Natural	  Gas	  Supply	  Arrangements	   (1997)	  ATPR	  41-­‐593	  [44,210];	  Seven	  Network	  Ltd	  v	  
News	  Limited	  [2007]	  FCA	  1062	  [1772].	  
481	  ibid.	  
482	  Tooth	  &	  Tooheys	  (n	  477)	  [18,196];	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  para	  4.8.	  
483	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  para	  3.6.	  
484	  ibid.	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Two	  key	  factors	  that	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  demand	  (and	  supply)	  responses	  to	  a	  
SSNIP	  are	  the	  base	  price	  from	  which	  the	  hypothetical	  price	  increase	  is	  applied	  
and	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  price.	  These	  factors	  are	  treated	  similarly	  in	  
the	  UK/EU	   and	  Australia	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   prevailing	  market	   price.485	   In	  
relation	   to	   abuse	   of	   dominance	   cases,	   however,	   it	   is	   recognised	   that	   the	  
prevailing	  price	  may	  already	  have	  been	  substantially	  increased.486	  This	  refers	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  firm	  in	  a	  position	  of	  market	  power	  may	  have	  raised	  prices	  
above	  the	  competitive	  level	  to	  the	  profit-­‐maximising	  level.487	  	  
	  
The	  risk	  of	  using	  a	  price	  that	  is	  above	  the	  competitive	  level	  was	  illustrated	  in	  
the	   US	   Du	   Pont	   case.488	   Du	   Pont	   produced	   almost	   75	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  
cellophane	  sold	  in	  the	  US.	  The	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  concluded	  that	  Du	  Pont	  did	  
not	  have	   significant	  market	  power	  because	  at	  prevailing	  prices	   there	  were	  
available	  substitutes	  for	  cellophane.	  The	  relevant	  market	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  
market	  for	  flexible	  packaging	  materials.	  Cellophane	  accounted	  for	  less	  than	  
20	   per	   cent	   of	   all	   flexible	   packaging	   material	   sold	   in	   the	   US.	   It	   was	  
consequently	   found	   that	   competition	   from	   other	  materials	   in	   that	  market	  
prevented	   Du	   Pont	   from	   possessing	   monopoly	   power	   in	   the	   sale	   of	  
cellophane.489	  	  
	  
This	  decision	  has	  been	  criticised	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  prevailing	  prices	  were	  above	  
the	  competitive	   level	   (as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power)	  and,	  at	  
lower	   competitive	   prices,	   there	   may	   not	   have	   been	   substitutes	   for	  
cellophane.490	  In	  which	  case,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  Du	  Pont	  would	  have	  been	  found	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  19;	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	   (n	  
444)	  para	  4.19.	  
486	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  19.	  
487	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  para	  5.5.	  
488	  United	  States	  v	  EI	  Du	  Pont	  de	  Nemours	  &	  Co	  351	  US	  377	  (1956).	  
489	  ibid	  351.	  
490	  See,	  Gene	  C	  Schaerr,	  ‘The	  Cellophane	  Fallacy	  and	  the	  Justice	  Department’s	  Guidelines	  for	  Horizontal	  
Mergers’	   (1985)	   94(3)	   Yale	   Law	   Journal	   670;	   Luke	  M	   Froeb	   and	   Gregory	   J	  Werden,	   ‘The	   Reverse	  
Cellophane	  Fallacy	  in	  Market	  Delineation’	  (1992)	  7(2)	  Review	  of	  Industrial	  Organisation	  241.	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to	  possess	  market	  power.	  Where	  the	  base	  price	  used	  in	  defining	  the	  relevant	  
market	   is	   above	   the	   competitive	   level,	   the	  market	  may	  be	   defined	  unduly	  
broadly.	  Market	  power	  may	  then	  not	  be	  identified,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  
“cellophane	  fallacy”.491	  This	  is	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  CMA’s	  Market	  Definition	  
Guidelines	  which	  note	  the	  possibility	  that	  market	  conditions	  may	  have	  been	  
distorted	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  market	  power	  will	  be	  accounted	  for	  when	  all	  of	  
the	  evidence	  is	  weighed	  in	  the	  round.492	  
	  
The	   European	   Commission	   acknowledges	   that	   determining	   whether	   the	  
prevailing	   price	   exceeds	   the	   competitive	   level	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   difficult	  
aspects	   of	   the	   SSNIP	   test.493	   Within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   EU	   regulatory	  
framework	   for	   electronic	   communications,494	   it	   suggests	   that	   national	  
regulatory	  authorities	  may	   rely	  on	  other	  criteria	   for	  assessing	  demand	  and	  
supply	   substitution,	   such	   as	   functionality	   of	   services	   and	   technical	  
characteristics.	  Where	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  a	  firm	  has	  engaged	  in	  
anti-­‐competitive	   behaviour,	   such	   as	   price-­‐fixing,	   or	   has	   enjoyed	   market	  
power,	  this	  may	  indicate	  that	  its	  prices	  are	  above	  the	  competitive	  level.495	  	  
	  
The	  SSNIP	  test	   is	   therefore	  regarded	  as	   just	  one	  tool	  or	  “intellectual	  aid	  to	  
focus	   the	   exercise”,	   as	   part	   of	   an	   equally	   qualitative	   approach	   to	   market	  
definition.496	  The	  question	  is	  whether,	  if	  a	  firm	  were	  to	  “give	  less	  and	  charge	  
more”,	  there	  would	  be	  much	  of	  a	  reaction.497	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  change	  in	  what	  is	  
offered	  may	  be	  as	  significant	  as	  a	  change	  in	  price.498	  Hence,	  in	  both	  Australia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491	  ibid.	  
492	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  para	  5.6.	  
493	  Commission	  guidelines	  on	  market	  analysis	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  significant	  market	  power	  under	  
the	   Community	   regulatory	   framework	   for	   electronic	   communications	   networks	   and	   services	   OJ	  
C(2002)165/6,	  para	  31.	  
494	  ibid.	  
495	  ibid.	  
496	  Seven	  Network	  Limited	  v	  News	  Limited	  [2007]	  FCA	  1062	  [1786];	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  
para	  4.22.	  
497	  QCMA	  (n	  34)	  [17,248].	  
498	  Seven	  Network	  Limited	  v	  News	  Limited	  [2009]	  FCAFC	  166	  [669].	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and	  the	  UK/EU,	  a	  range	  of	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  criteria	  are	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  when	  assessing	  the	  possibilities	  for	  demand-­‐side	  (and	  supply-­‐
side)	   substitution.499	   Qualitative	   criteria	   also	   extend	   beyond	   physical	  
properties,	   end	   use	   and	   industry	   perceptions,	   to	   include	   factors	   such	   as	  
switching	  costs	  for	  consumers	  and	  suppliers.500	  	  
	  
4.3.1.2	  Supply-­‐side	  substitutability	  in	  defining	  the	  relevant	  product	  market	  
Supply-­‐side	  substitutability	  refers	  to	  whether	  (and,	  if	  so,	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  
how	  quickly)	  firms	  may	  supply	  the	  product/service	  in	  issue	  in	  response	  to	  an	  
attempt	  by	  a	  hypothetical	  monopolist	  to	  sustain	  prices	  above	  the	  competitive	  
level.	  For	  substitutes	  to	  impose	  an	  effective	  competitive	  constraint,	  suppliers	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  switch	  production	  to	  the	  product/service	  in	  issue	  without	  any	  
significant	  impediment	  (such	  as	  substantial	  investment	  or	  significant	  delay).	  
The	  CMA	  regards	  supply-­‐side	  substitution	  as	  entry	  that	  occurs	  quickly	  (i.e.	  in	  
less	  than	  one	  year),	  effectively	  (i.e.	  on	  a	  large	  enough	  scale	  to	  affect	  prices)	  
and	  without	   the	  need	  for	  substantial	   sunk	  costs.501	  Similarly,	   the	  ACCC	  will	  
consider	  supply-­‐side	  substitutes	  where	  switching	  can	  take	  place	  quickly	  and	  
without	  significant	  investment	  in	  response	  to	  a	  SSNIP.502	  	  
	  
Supply-­‐side	   substitution	   is	   addressed	   sequentially	   after	   demand-­‐side	  
substitution	  in	  the	  ACCC’s	  Merger	  Guidelines.503	  This	  reflects	  the	  statement	  
in	   Tooth	   &	   Tooheys	   that,	   when	   defining	   the	   product	   and	   geographic	  
dimensions	  of	   the	  relevant	  market,	   supply-­‐side	  substitutes	  are	   to	  be	   taken	  
into	  consideration.504	  Similarly,	   in	  Queensland	  Wire,505	   the	  HCA	  stated	  that	  
both	  demand-­‐side	  and	  supply-­‐side	  substitutability	  shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499	  See,	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  paras	  3.7	  and	  3.16;	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  
para	  4.27.	  
500	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  8-­‐9;	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  para	  4.22.	  
501	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  para	  3.15.	  
502	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  4.24.	  
503	  ACCC	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  444)	  para	  4.23.	  
504	  Tooth	  &	  Tooheys	  (n	  477)	  [18,196].	  
505	  Queensland	  Wire	  (n	  471).	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in	  defining	  the	  relevant	  market.506	  Supply-­‐side	  substitution	  fulfils	  a	  seemingly	  
less	  prominent	   role	   in	   the	  UK,507	  where	   it	   is	   regarded	  as	  “a	  special	   case	  of	  
entry”.508	  It	   is	  taken	  into	  account	  only	  if	   it	   is	  reasonably	  likely	  to	  take	  place	  
and	  already	  constrains	  the	  supplier	  of	  the	  product/service	  in	  question.509	  In	  
the	   event	   of	   serious	   doubt	   as	   to	   whether	   to	   account	   for	   supply-­‐side	  
substitution,	   the	   market	   is	   defined	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   demand-­‐side	  
substitutability,510	  with	  the	  supply-­‐side	  considered	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  analysing	  
potential	  entry.511	  	  
	  
4.3.2	   Role	  of	  product-­‐based	  distinctions	  in	  defining	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  markets	  
Media	  outlets	  have	  traditionally	  been	  differentiated	  according	  to	  the	  mode	  of	  
distribution.	  Separate	  markets	  have	  been	  defined	  for	  print	  media,	  radio,	  FTA	  
television	   and	   pay-­‐TV.	   In	   the	   analogue	   era,	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   and	   FTA	  
television	  were	  distinguished	  by	  reference	  to	  differences	  between	  the	  nature	  
of	   their	   respective	   trading	   relationships	   and	   funding	   models.	   Such	  
characteristics	  were	  relied	  on	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  the	  MSG	  Media	  
Service	   case.512	   Admittedly,	   this	   case	   was	   decided	   prior	   to	   the	   digital	  
switchover	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  Internet	  as	  a	  broadcasting	  platform.	  However,	  
it	   remains	   important	   to	   note	   how	   the	   differences	   on	   which	   such	  
characteristics	   are	   based	   are	   diminishing.	   This	   highlights	   the	   decreasing	  
significance	  of	  product-­‐based	  distinctions	  in	  defining	  markets	  in	  the	  premium	  
pay-­‐TV	  context.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506	  ibid	  199.	  
507	  See,	  Dr	  Atilano	   J	  Padilla,	   ‘The	  Role	  of	  Supply-­‐Side	  Substitution	   in	   the	  Definition	  of	   the	  Relevant	  
Market	  in	  Merger	  Control’	  (Report	  for	  European	  Commission	  DG	  Enterprise	  A/4,	  June	  2001).	  
508	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  para	  3.15.	  
509	  ibid	  para	  3.18.	  
510	  ibid.	  
511	  ibid.	  
512	  MSG	  Media	  Service	  (Case	  IV/M.469)	  OJ	  L(1994)364/1.	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4.3.2.1	  Trading	  relationships	  and	  funding	  models	  in	  assessing	  substitutability	  
The	  direct	   trading	   relationship	   between	   content	   providers	   and	   subscribers	  
influenced	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  finding	  in	  MSG	  Media	  Service	  that	  pay-­‐
TV	  constitutes	  a	  product	  market	  distinct	  from	  commercial	  advertising-­‐funded	  
television,	   and	  public	   television	   financed	  by	   fees	  and	  advertising.513	  Whilst	  
with	   advertising-­‐funded	   television	   the	   trading	   relationship	   is	   between	   the	  
broadcaster	  and	  advertiser,	  the	  trading	  relationship	  in	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  between	  the	  
content	  provider	  and	  subscriber.514	  The	  conditions	  of	  competition	  that	  result	  
from	  these	  different	  trading	  relationships	  were	  found	  to	  be	  significant:	  
	  
Whereas	   in	   the	   case	   of	   advertising-­‐financed	   television	   the	  
audience	   share	   and	   the	   advertising	   rates	   are	   the	   key	  
parameters,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   the	   key	   factors	   are	   the	  
shaping	  of	   programmes	   to	  meet	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   target	  
groups	  and	  the	  level	  of	  subscriber	  prices.515	  
	  
The	  ACCC	  has	  similarly	  distinguished	  between	  FTA	  television	  and	  pay-­‐TV	  on	  
this	  basis.516	   It	  notes	  how	  the	  resulting	  differences	   in	   funding	  models	  have	  
demand-­‐side	  implications,	  since	  “viewers	  must	  be	  persuaded	  that	  pay	  TV	  is	  a	  
unique	  product	  and	  one	  which	  cannot	  be	  substituted	  by	  FTA	  broadcasts.”517	  
The	   resulting	   conditions	   of	   competition	   from	   the	   different	   trading	  
relationships	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  FTA	  television	  also	  influenced	  the	  OFT’s	  findings	  
in	  its	  1996	  review	  of	  Sky’s	  position	  in	  the	  wholesale	  UK	  pay-­‐TV	  market.518	  It	  
found	  that,	  whilst	  FTA	  channels	  competed	  with	  Sky	  for	  certain	  sports	  rights,	  
FTA	  television	  was	  unlikely	  to	  provide	  sustained	  and	  effective	  competition	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513	   ibid	   [32];	   Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere	   (Case	   No	   IV/M.993)	   OJ	   C(1998)1439	   [18];	  
Kirch/Richemont/Telepiu	  (Case	  No	  IV/M.410)	  OJ	  L(1994)2985	  [15].	  
514	  ibid.	  
515	  ibid.	  	  
516	  ACCC	  (n	  1)	  77.	  
517	  ibid	  78.	  
518	   ‘The	   Director	   General’s	   Review	   of	   BSkyB’s	   Position	   in	   the	   Wholesale	   Pay	   TV	   Market’	   (OFT,	  
December	  1996).	  “The	  fact	  that	  subscribers	  are	  prepared	  to	  pay	  considerable	  sums	  for	  pay-­‐TV,	  clearly	  
indicates	  that	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  a	  different	  product	  with	  a	  clear	  target.”	  Newscorp/Telepiù	  (n	  139)	  [42].	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pay-­‐TV	  in	  relation	  to	  sports	  broadcasting.519	  The	  ability	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  
charge	  subscription	  fees	  was	  perceived	  to	  render	  many	  events	  “potentially	  
far	  more	  valuable”	  to	  Sky	  than	  to	  FTA	  broadcasters.520	  	  
	  
As	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   competitive	   responses	   of	   FTA	  
broadcasters	   and	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   to	   the	   opportunities	   and	   challenges	  
presented	   by	   digitalisation	   and	   convergence	   blur	   the	   analogue-­‐era	  
distinctions	   between	   their	   respective	   trading	   relationships	   and	   funding	  
models.	   This	   includes	   the	   diversification	   of	   a	   number	   of	   FTA	   broadcasters	  
(including	   ITV	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Seven	   in	   Australia)	   into	   digital	   subscription	  
television.	  Advertising	  also	  arguably	  represents	  a	  potentially	  more	  significant	  
source	  of	  revenue	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  than	  has	  generally	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  This	  
is	  based,	  for	  instance,	  on	  SVOD	  platforms	  like	  Hulu	  offering	  subscription-­‐free	  
versions	  of	  their	  services	  with	  advertising.	  
	  
Responses	   by	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   to	   the	   possible	   diversion	   of	  
advertising	  spend	  to	  online	  services	  include	  increasing	  collaborations,	  such	  as	  
Sky’s	   recent	   advertising	   partnership	  with	  Virgin	  Media.521	   This	  will	   see	   the	  
extension	   of	   Sky’s	   AdSmart	   platform	   to	   the	   Virgin	  Media	   network.522	   It	   is	  
expected	  to	  increase	  Sky’s	  reach	  from	  11.4million	  to	  15million	  UK	  homes,	  and	  
enable	  Sky	  and	  Virgin	  Media	  to	  reach	  a	  total	  of	  30million	  individuals.523	  This	  
should	  put	  them	  on	  a	  par	  with	  social	  media	  platforms	  like	  Facebook.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519	  OFT	  (n	  518)	  para	  2.5.	  
520	  ibid.	  
521	  David	  Bond,	  ‘Sky	  links	  with	  up	  rival	  Virgin	  Media	  to	  fight	  Facebook	  and	  Google’	  Financial	  Times	  (15	  
June	   2017)	   <https://www.ft.com/content/df55ff5a-­‐5113-­‐11e7-­‐bfb8-­‐997009366969>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  
522	  ibid.	  With	  the	  launch	  of	  AdSmart	  in	  2014,	  Sky	  became	  the	  first	  UK	  broadcaster	  to	  show	  different	  
commercials	  to	  different	  households	  simultaneously.	  It	  allows	  advertisers	  to	  choose	  target	  audiences	  
based	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  age,	  gender	  and	  geographical	  location,	  similar	  to	  targeted	  advertising	  sold	  
online.	  
523	  ibid.	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The	   blurring	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   pay-­‐TV	   and	   FTA	   television	   was	  
envisioned	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  MSG	  Media	  Service.	  For	  instance,	  
it	  referred	  to	  the	  potential	  financing	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  from	  a	  mixture	  of	  sources.524	  
It	   did	   not,	   however,	   consider	   the	   possible	   implications	   for	   the	   standard	  
conceptual	  framework	  under	  the	  SSNIP	  test.	  Mixed	  source	  financing	  presents	  
fundamental	  challenges	  in	  applying	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  in	  terms	  of	  ascertaining	  the	  
appropriate	  price	  and	  where	  products/services	  are	  offered	  to	  users	  “free	  of	  
charge”.	  The	  competitive	  or	  prevailing	  price	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  determine.	  The	  
SSNIP	  test	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  products/services	  that	  are	  offered	  to	  users	  
for	  “free”.	  It	  will	  therefore	  be	  of	  limited	  application	  where	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  
price	  as	  such.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed,	  this	  includes	  where	  services	  are	  bundled	  
and	  where	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  engage	  in	  asymmetric	  
pricing.	  
	  
4.3.2.2	  Impact	  of	  asymmetric	  pricing	  by	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms	  
Reliance	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  trading	  relationship	  between	  broadcasters	  and	  
viewers	  assumes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  trading	  relationship.	  This	  relies	  on	  supply	  
and	   demand	   being	   met	   by	   a	   specific	   price.	   Due	   to	   bundling	   by	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms,	  a	  direct	  price	  may	  not	  be	  charged.	  Where	  
a	  direct	  price	  is	  charged,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  above	  marginal	  cost.	  Pay-­‐TV	  providers	  
are	  increasingly	  offering	  content	  and/or	  services	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  asymmetric	  
pricing	  or	  zero	  pricing	  on	  a	  “freemium”	  basis	  (offering	  a	  basic	  service	  for	  free	  
and	  enhanced	  features/content	  for	  a	  subscription	  fee	  (i.e.	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  
the	  Internet	  developed)).	  	  
	  
Where	  a	  direct	  price	   is	  charged,	  high	  fixed	  costs	  and	   low	  marginal	  costs	  of	  
distribution	   mean	   the	   “competitive	   price”	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   above	   marginal	  
cost.525	  Also,	  the	  socially-­‐optimal	  pricing	  structure	  may	  require	  some	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524	  MSG	  Media	  Service	  (n	  512)	  [32].	  
525	   ‘Market	   Definition	   and	   Market	   Power	   in	   Pay	   TV:	   Annex	   13	   to	   Pay	   TV	   Market	   Investigation	  
Consultation’	   (Ofcom,	   18	   December	   2007)	   para	   3.7	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price	  discrimination.526	  The	  focus	  is	  usually	  on	  the	  use	  of	  price	  discrimination	  
as	  a	  means	  of	  deterring	  entry.	  A	  recent	  empirical	  study	  of	  the	  Spanish	  local	  
television	   industry	   suggests	   however,	   that	   in	   the	   context	   of	   television	  
advertising,	   incumbents	   may	   in	   fact	   use	   price	   discrimination	   on	   the	  
advertising	   side	   as	   a	   strategic	   variable	   to	   accommodate	   entry.527	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  practice	  of	  price	  discrimination	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  
determine	  the	  competitive	  price	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  applying	  the	  SSNIP	  test.	  
The	   profitability	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   price	   on	   one	   side	   of	   the	  market	  will	   be	  
affected	   by	   interactions	   with	   the	   other	   side(s)	   of	   the	   market,	   further	  
complicating	  the	  task	  of	  identifying	  the	  competitive	  price.	  
	  
Applying	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  to	  current	  prices	  may	  suggest	  that	  the	  relevant	  market	  
should	   be	   widened	   to	   include	   rival	   networks/services,	   giving	   rise	   to	   the	  
“cellophane	  fallacy”.	  The	  cellophane	  effect	  compromised	  the	  scope	  for	  Ofcom	  
to	  apply	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  in	  its	  Third	  Pay-­‐TV	  Consultation.528	  Evidence	  relating	  
to	  Sky’s	  prices	  was	  found	  to	  be	  inconclusive	  as	  to	  whether	  such	  prices	  were	  
above	  the	  competitive	  level.529	  As	  already	  indicated,	  the	  “cellophane	  fallacy”	  
may	  be	  resolved	  by	  adopting	  a	  qualititative	  approach	  in	  applying	  the	  SSNIP	  
test	  which	  refers,	  for	  instance,	  to	  evidence	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  firms	  
and	  direct	  measures	  of	  market	  power.	  To	  this	  end,	  Ofcom	  used	  a	  range	  of	  
evidence	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  market	  and	  Sky’s	  market	  power.530	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The	  importance	  of	  qualitative	  considerations	  also	  arose	  in	  the	  Australian	  C7	  
case	  (discussed	  below):	  
	  
As	  we	  understand	  it,	  the	  test	  looks	  to	  the	  actual	  or	  likely	  effect	  
of	   competitive	   conduct	   […]	   However	   competitive	   conduct	  
may	   not	   have	   an	   immediate	   and	   obvious	   effect	   […]	  
Particularly	  in	  a	  relatively	  new	  industry,	  competitors	  may	  be	  
looking	  for	  longer	  term,	  rather	  than	  shorter	  term,	  advantages.	  
[…]	  The	  SSNIP	  test	  addresses	  the	  effects	  of	  competition,	  but	  it	  
does	  not	  define	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.531	  
	  
The	  European	  Commission	  is	  similarly	  aware	  of	  this	  issue	  within	  the	  broader	  
context	  of	  predatory	  pricing	  in	  network	  industries:	  
	  
[U]ndertakings	  should	  not	  be	  penalised	  for	  incurring	  ex	  post	  
losses	  where	  the	  ex	  ante	  decision	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  conduct	  
was	   taken	   in	   good	   faith,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   if	   they	   can	   provide	  
conclusive	  evidence	  that	   they	  could	  reasonably	  expect	   that	  
the	  activity	  would	  be	  profitable.532	  
	  
Conduct	   is	   therefore	   not	   assessed	   against	   hypothetical	   or	   theoretical	  
alternatives	   that	  might	  have	  been	  more	  profitable.	  The	   focus	   is	   instead	  on	  
economically	   rational	   and	   practicable	   alternatives	   that	   can	   reasonably	   be	  
expected	  to	  be	  profitable,	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  market.533	  	  
	  
The	  C7	  case	  followed	  claims	  by	  Seven	  that,	  between	  1999	  and	  2001,	  News	  
Ltd,	  PBL	  and	  Telstra	  parties	  engaged	  in	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  contrary	  to	  
Sections	  45	  and	  46	  of	  the	  CCA.	  It	  was	  alleged	  that	  News	  Ltd,	  PBL	  and	  Telstra	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parties	  had	  acquired	  AFL	  and	  NRL	  rights	  to	  put	  Seven’s	  C7	  sport	  subscription	  
channel	  out	  of	  business.	  Seven	  suggested	  that	  this	  was	  aimed	  at	  enabling	  Fox	  
Sports	  to	  dominate	  the	  markets	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  sports	  channels	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  
suppliers	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  services	  to	  subscribers.	  As	  already	  noted,	  
to	  determine	  a	   substantial	   lessening	  of	   competition	  within	   the	  meaning	  of	  
Section	  45,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  establish	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  relevant	  
market.	  Market	  definition	  was	  in	  fact	  critical	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  case.	  
	  
Seven	  pleaded	  separate	  markets	  for	  FTA	  and	  pay-­‐TV	  rights	  to	  the	  AFL	  and	  NRL,	  
on	   the	   basis	   that	   FTA	   television	   does	   not	   impose	   a	   close	   competitive	  
constraint	  on	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  pay	  a	  competitive	  price	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  rights.534	  
This	  required	  Seven	  to	  establish	  a	  wholesale	  sports	  channel	  market.	  At	  first	  
instance,	   Sackville	   J	   accepted	   that	   the	   SSNIP	   test	   should	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  
competitive	   price,	   rather	   than	   the	   monopoly	   price,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	  
“cellophane	  fallacy”	  and	  an	  overly	  broad	  market	  definition.535	  However,	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  sufficient	  quantitative	  data,	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  adopting	  a	  
qualitative	  approach.	  
	  
Sackville	   J	   concluded	   that	   Seven	  had	   failed	   to	  establish	  a	  wholesale	   sports	  
channel	  market.536	  On	  appeal	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Australia	  (“FCA”),	  News	  
Ltd	   suggested	   that	   Seven’s	   emphasis	   upon	   aspects	   of	   the	   evidence	   as	  
disclosing	  close	  competition	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  way	  the	  trial	  had	  been	  
conducted.537	  The	  FCA	  concluded	  that	  the	  case	  had	  been	  conducted	  on	  the	  
basis	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  C7	  constrained	  Fox	  Sports’	  
conduct	  as	  a	  supplier	  of	  sports	  channels	  with	  a	  “marquee	  sport”,	  all	  of	  the	  
evidence	   had	   to	   be	   examined	   using	   the	   SSNIP	   test	   as	   an	   aid	   to	   such	  
assessment.538	   This	  was	   taken	   to	  mean	   that	   all	   of	   the	   evidence	   had	   to	   be	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examined	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   whether	   it	   should	   be	   inferred	   that	   C7	  
constrained	  Fox	  Sports’	  conduct	  in	  connection	  with	  prices,	  quality	  and	  other	  
conditions	  of	  supply.539	  This	  was	  found	  to	  not	  be	  the	  case,	  so	  Seven’s	  claim	  
failed.	  
	  
4.3.2.3	  Impact	  of	  bundling	  on	  market	  definition	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  
The	  SSNIP	  test	  was	  developed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  independent	  
products.	  Whether	  it	  involves	  the	  bundling	  of	  content	  into	  channels,	  channels	  
into	  packages	  or	  pay-­‐TV	  with	  other	  communications	  services,	  bundling	  does	  
not	   necessarily	   disapply	   the	   standard	   principles	   of	   market	   definition.	  
However,	  it	  does	  complicate	  the	  assessment	  of	  substitutability	  by	  increasing	  
the	  number	  of	  products	  that	  may	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  pure	  bundling,	  where	  products	  are	  available	  only	  as	  part	  of	  a	  bundle	  
(i.e.	   a	   form	   of	   tying),	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   ascertain	   whether	   the	   bundle	   is	  
substitutable	  for	  any	  other	  bundles.	  	  
	  
More	   commonly	   in	   the	   communications	   sector	   is	   the	   incidence	   of	   mixed	  
bundling,	  where	  bundled	  products	  are	  also	  available	  as	  standalone	  products	  
but	   offered	   at	   a	   discount	   and/or	  with	   improved	   functionality	   as	   a	   bundle.	  
Ofcom	  suggests	  that	  the	  proportion	  of	  homes	  in	  the	  UK	  buying	  at	  least	  two	  
services	  from	  the	  same	  supplier	  as	  part	  of	  a	  bundle	  more	  than	  doubled	  to	  75	  
per	  cent	  in	  2016.540	  Deloitte	  reports	  that,	  in	  Australia,	  the	  percentage	  of	  pay-­‐
TV	   subscribers	  who	  would	   prefer	   to	   pay	   for	   shows	   on	   an	   individual	   basis,	  
rather	  than	  for	  packages	  of	  channels,	  is	  on	  the	  rise.541	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   suggests	   that	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   is	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   draw	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programming/hit	  shows,	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A	  key	  challenge	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mixed	  bundling	  is	  determining	  the	  demand	  for	  
the	  bundle	  and	   the	   services	  within	   the	  bundle	  as	   standalone	   services.	   The	  
conceptual	  approach	  under	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  implies	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  
of	  the	  bundle	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  be	  considered.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  determine	  
whether	  two	  different	  bundles	  are	  in	  the	  same	  market,	  or	  whether	  the	  bundle	  
is	  in	  the	  same	  market	  as	  its	  constituent	  products.	  Starting	  with	  the	  bundled	  
product,	   the	  question	   is	  whether	   consumers	  would	   “unpick”	   a	  bundle	   and	  
purchase	  its	  constituent	  products	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  SSNIP.	  	  
	  
A	  bundle	  may	  form	  the	  relevant	  product	  market.542	  The	  SSNIP	  test	  has	  been	  
applied	  by	  Pereira,	  Ribeiro	  and	  Vareda	  to	   indicate	  that	  triple-­‐play	  products	  
are	   a	   relevant	   product	   market	   in	   Portugal.543	   This	   may	   have	   significant	  
implications	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power	  in	  such	  markets	  by	  diluting	  
findings	  of	  market	  power.	   The	   treatment	  of	  bundles	  as	  a	   relevant	  product	  
market	   has	   been	   argued	   by	   dominant	   firms	   in	   a	   number	   of	   key	   EU	  
bundling/tying	   cases.544	   This	   is	   unsurprising	   given	   the	   need	   to	   identify	  
separate	  markets	   in	  order	   to	  demonstrate	   that	  a	   firm	   is	   leveraging	  market	  
power.	   However,	   based	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   demand-­‐side	   substitution,	  
evidence	   of	   separate	   consumer	   demand	   for	   bundled/tied	   products	   as	  
standalone	  services	  has	  been	  used	  to	  define	  distinct	  markets	  for	  bundled/tied	  
products.545	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
N4ZWFmaThSZ1JVK2RcL004YVMyeHBBOXdEU240aVJORWFPSWZXcFRDWFpoWWtsN3FIQ1hTQkpnP
SJ9>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
542	   Explanatory	   Note	   accompanying	   the	   Commission’s	   Recommendation	   on	   relevant	   product	   and	  
service	  markets	   within	   the	   electronic	   communications	   sector	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In	  applying	   the	  SSNIP	   test,	   there	  may	  be	  only	  a	  single	  bundle	  price.	   In	   this	  
case,	   imputed	  prices	  will	   need	   to	  be	  used.	  Where	   there	   are	  prices	   for	   the	  
constituent	  products,	  the	  use	  of	  prevailing	  prices	  may	  show	  more	  substitutes	  
than	   there	  are	   (i.e.	   if	   the	  prevailing	  price	   is	  already	  above	   the	  competitive	  
level).	   In	  which	  case,	   there	  needs	   to	  be	  an	  assessment	  as	   to	  whether	  such	  
prices	  are	  indeed	  at	  the	  competitive	  level,	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  profit	  margin	  
of	  the	  supplier,	  for	  example.	  
	  
In	   addressing	  whether	   such	  a	   SSNIP	  would	  be	  possible	  without	   consumers	  
“unpicking”	   the	   bundle,	   other	   factors	   such	   as	   economies	   of	   scope	   and	  
transaction	   cost	   savings	   should	   be	   taken	   in	   consideration.	   Consumers’	  
switching	  decisions	  can	  also	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  bundling	  of	  broadcasting	  and	  
telecommunications	  services,	  particularly	  where	  there	  are	  stipulated	  service	  
periods	  and	  penalties	  for	  early	  termination.546	  Consumers	  of	  bundled	  services	  
may	  be	  less	  sensitive	  to	  a	  relative	  change	  in	  price	  of	  one	  service	  when	  it	  forms	  
part	  of	  a	  bundle,	  compared	  to	  as	  a	  standalone	  service.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  
recent	  UK	  study	  which	   indicates	   that	  when	   individuals	  bundle	   their	  service	  
they	  are	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  change	  supplier.547	  
	  
4.4	   Geographic	  Market	  Definition	  in	  the	  Premium	  Pay-­‐TV	  Context	  
Geographic	  markets	   in	   the	   analogue	   broadcasting	   era	   have	   typically	   been	  
defined	   at	   the	   national,	   or	   even	   local,	   level.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	  
national/regional	  nature	  of	  traditional	  broadcast	  television	  licensing	  regimes.	  
It	   is	   also	   said	   to	   reflect	   language	   barriers,	   cultural	   factors,	   and	   differences	  
between	  the	  conditions	  of	  competition	  and	  regulatory	   regimes	   in	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546	  See,	  Hyungjin	  Kim	  and	  Hyunchul	  Kim,	  ‘Analysis	  on	  Lock-­‐in	  Effects	  by	  Estimating	  for	  the	  Switching	  
Costs	  in	  Telecommunications	  Bundles’	  (International	  Institute	  of	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Sciences,	  2016)	  
<http://www.iises.net/proceedings/27th-­‐international-­‐academic-­‐conference-­‐prague/table-­‐of-­‐
content/detail?article=analysis-­‐on-­‐lock-­‐in-­‐effects-­‐by-­‐estimating-­‐for-­‐the-­‐switching-­‐costs-­‐in-­‐
telecommunications-­‐bundles-­‐>	  accessed	  26	  June	  2017.	  
547	  Tim	  Burnett,	  ‘The	  Impact	  of	  Service	  Bundling	  on	  Consumer	  Switching	  Behaviour:	  Evidence	  from	  UK	  
Communication	  Markets’	   (University	  of	  Bristol,	  Centre	   for	  Market	  and	  Public	  Organisation	  working	  
paper	   no.14/321,	   April	   2014)	   <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-­‐
library/sites/cmpo/migrated/documents/wp321.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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countries.548	  There	  are	  also	  the	  technical	  constraints	  of	  establishing	  physical	  
networks	  which	  endure	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  laying	  of	  broadband	  networks,	  for	  
instance.	  However,	  trends	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  supplied	  
and	  consumed	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  indicate	  that	  the	  geographic	  scope	  of	  markets	  
in	  this	  context	  is	  broadening	  to	  become	  increasingly	  global.	  This	  broadening	  
of	  markets	  will	  inevitably	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  market	  
power	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  	  
	  
4.4.1	   General	  principles	  for	  defining	  the	  relevant	  geographic	  market	  
The	  relevant	  geographic	  market	  can	  be	  described	  as	   the	  area	   in	  which	   the	  
conditions	  of	   competition	   are	   sufficiently	   homogenous	   and	  distinguishable	  
from	  neighbouring	  areas,	  due	  to	  appreciable	  differences	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  
competition	  in	  those	  areas.549	  As	  with	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  product	  market,	  
the	  SSNIP	  test	  is	  typically	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  demand	  and	  supply	  dimensions	  
of	  geographic	  markets	  in	  the	  UK/EU	  and	  Australia.	  The	  European	  Commission	  
begins	   by	   establishing	   an	   initial	   working	   hypothesis	   based	   on	   broad	  
indications	  as	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  market	  shares	  between	  the	  parties	  and	  
their	  competitors,	  and	  a	  preliminary	  analysis	  of	  pricing	  and	  price	  differences	  
at	  the	  national	  and	  EU	  levels.550	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  checked	  against	  an	  analysis	  
of	  demand-­‐side	  characteristics	  (such	  as	  local/national	  preferences,	  consumer	  
purchasing	   patterns	   and	   product	   differentiation),	   in	   order	   to	   establish	  
whether	  firms	  in	  different	  areas	  constitute	  a	  real	  alternative	  source	  of	  supply	  
for	  consumers.551	  	  
	  
Supply	  factors	  may	  be	  checked	  to	  ensure	  suppliers	  located	  elsewhere	  do	  not	  
face	  impediments	  in	  developing	  their	  sales	  on	  competitive	  terms	  throughout	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548	  Newscorp/Telepiù	   (n	   139)	   [48].	   BSkyB/KirchPayTV	   (Case	   COMP/JV.37)	   OJ	   L(2000)2985	   [28-­‐29];	  
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere	  (Case	  IV/M.993)	  OJ	  C(1998)1439	  [23-­‐24].	  
549	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  8.	  
550	  ibid	  para	  28.	  
551	  ibid	  para	  29.	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the	  whole	  geographic	  market.552	  This	  can	  include	  the	  conditions	  of	  access	  to	  
distribution	  channels,	  costs	  associated	  with	  setting	  up	  distribution	  networks,	  
and	  technical	  standards	  and	  monopolies.	  For	  the	  ACCC,	  actual	  sales	  patterns,	  
the	  location	  of	  consumers,	  the	  place	  of	  sale	  and	  any	  geographical	  boundaries	  
that	   limit	   trade,	   serve	   as	   a	   starting	   point.553	   In	   addition	   to	   historical	   and	  
current	  market	  behaviour,	  whether	  consumers	  would	   readily	   turn	   to	  more	  
remote	  suppliers	  in	  response	  to	  a	  SSNIP	  by	  local	  suppliers,	  or	  whether	  remote	  
suppliers	   would	   choose	   to	   enter	   the	   local	   market,	   is	   also	   taken	   into	  
consideration.554	  An	  additional	  factor	  specific	  to	  geographic	  market	  definition	  
in	   the	   EU	   is	   the	   continuing	   process	   of	   market	   integration.555	   In	   the	  
communications	   context,	   this	   includes	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   digital	   single	  
market.556	  This	  is	  a	  possible	  area	  for	  divergence	  in	  the	  approaches	  to	  market	  
definition	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  post-­‐Brexit.	  
	  
In	   Deutsche	   Telekom,557	   the	   European	   Commission	   noted	   the	   geographic	  
scope	  of	  the	  market	  should	  be	  national	  to	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  “[t]he	  structure	  
of	  the	  cable	  markets	  in	  most	  Member	  States	  is	  subject	  to	  different	  conditions	  
in	  terms	  of	  geography,	  marketing	  and	  legislation.”558	  This	  includes	  where	  the	  
incumbent	  holds	  a	  monopoly	  position,	  as	  was	  found	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  MSG	  
Media	  Service.	  Telekom’s	  statutory	  monopoly	  on	  laying	  and	  operating	  cable	  
networks	   in	   public	   roads	   led	   the	   European	   Commission	   to	   find	   a	   national	  
German	  market	  for	  cable	  television	  networks.559	  Despite	  the	  introduction	  of	  
competition	   from	   private	   network	   operators,	   Telekom	   was	   still	   found	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552	  ibid	  para	  30.	  
553	  Fortescue	  (n	  464)	  [1022].	  
554	  ibid.	  
555	  European	  Commission	  Notice	  on	  Market	  Definition	  (n	  443)	  para	  32.	  
556	   See,	   ‘Digital	   Single	   Market:	   Two	   Years	   On’	   (European	   Commission,	   8	   November	   2016)	  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-­‐political/files/2-­‐years-­‐on-­‐dsm_en_0.pdf>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  
557	  Deutsche	  Telekom/BetaResearch	  (Case	  No	  IV/M.1027)	  OJ	  C(1998)1441.	  
558	  ibid	  [24].	  
559	  MSG	  Media	  Service	  (n	  512)	  [54].	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benefit	  from	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  from	  owning	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  television	  
networks	  in	  Germany.560	  
	  
4.4.2	   Impact	  of	  media	  globalisation	  on	  geographic	  market	  definition	  
The	   ability	   of	   viewers	   to	   access	   an	   increasing	   amount	   of	   content	   via	   the	  
Internet	   and	   the	   growth	   of	   online	   streaming	   challenge	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  
defining	  the	  geographic	  scope	  of	  markets	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  on	  
a	  national	  basis.	  Universal	  operations	  of	  SVOD	  platforms	  whose	  services	  can	  
be	  relatively	  easily	  adapted	  to	  support	  a	  multitude	  of	  languages,	  suggest	  that	  
the	  geographic	  scope	  of	  the	  markets	  for	  the	  supply	  and/or	  consumption	  of	  
premium	  non-­‐sport	  content	  at	  least	  may	  become	  international,	  if	  not	  global.	  
Exceptions	   will	   endure	   to	   justify	   narrower	   geographic	  markets,	   such	   as	   in	  
relation	   to	   rural	   and	   regional	   Australia	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  
digital	  divide.561	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  
following	  chapter,	  media	  globalisation	  does	  not	  render	  the	  national	  or	  local	  
irrelevant,	  but	  arguably	  rather	  more	  important.562	  	  
	  
Broadening	   the	   geographic	   scope	   of	   the	  market	   in	   this	  way	  will	   inevitably	  
have	   consequences	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   market	   power.	   This	   was	  
acknowledged	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  2001	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
music	  industry	  in	  AOL/Time	  Warner.563	  The	  geographic	  scope	  of	  the	  market	  
for	  online	  music	  delivery	  was	  found	  to	  extend	  beyond	  national	  borders	  and	  
be	  potentially	  global.564	  By	  contrast,	   it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  market	  for	  pay-­‐TV	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  ibid	  [61].	  
561	   ACCC	  Media	  Merger	   Guidelines	   (n	   91)	   para	   95.	   See,	   ‘Measuring	   Australia’s	   Digital	   Divide:	   The	  
Australian	   Digital	   Inclusion	   Index	   2016’	   (Roy	   Morgan	   Research,	   24	   August	   2016)	  
<https://digitalinclusionindex.org.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2016/08/Australian-­‐Digital-­‐Inclusion-­‐
Index-­‐2016.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
562	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  that	  neither	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  nor	  the	  public	  are	  
necessarily	  best	  served	  by	  the	  retention	  of	  media-­‐specific	  ownership	  rules	  in	  their	  existing	  form	  (i.e.	  
defined	  according	  to	  territorial	  borders	  on	  a	  national	  basis).	  
563	  AOL/Time	  Warner	  (Case	  No	  COMP/M.1845)	  OJ	  L(2001)268/28.	  
564	  ibid	  [27].	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(like	  the	  market	  for	  online	  video	  distribution)	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  national	  (due	  
to	  linguistic	  requirements	  of	  different	  national	  audiences).565	  
	  
Uncertainty	   remains,	   however,	   as	   to	   the	   basis	   for	   adopting	   such	   different	  
approaches	  to	  the	  online	  delivery	  of	  music	  and	  audio-­‐visual	  services,	  and	  the	  
distinction	  drawn	  between	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  online	  streaming	  services.	  The	  latter	  
distinction	  may	  not	  have	  been	  made	  if	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  today	  because	  
technological	   convergence	  has	  blurred	   this	  distinction.	  As	  developments	   in	  
the	  technology	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  music	  and	  audio-­‐visual	  services	  continue	  to	  
gather	   pace,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	   arise	   again	   as	   an	   area	   requiring	   further	  
consideration.	  Akin	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  adopting	  a	  technologically	  neutral	  
approach	   towards	   the	  distribution	  of	  content,	   the	   focus	  should	  be	  on	  how	  
much	  viewers	  value	  what	  is	  being	  supplied.	  
	  
In	  AOL/Time	  Warner,	  the	  European	  Commission	  considered	  that	  the	  focus	  in	  
the	  supply	  of	  films	  over	  the	  Internet	  is	  mainly	  on	  US	  content	  of	  international	  
appeal	  and	  such	  films	  are	  popular	   in	  all	  of	   the	  EEA	  countries.566	  Whilst	   the	  
content	   of	   US-­‐based	   SVOD	   platforms	   remains	   popular,	   less	   emphasis	  may	  
have	  been	  placed	  on	  this	  if	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  today.	  As	  already	  indicated,	  
there	  is	  increasing	  investment	  by	  broadcasters	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  on	  the	  
production	   of	   original	   drama	   and	   local	   content	   in	   particular	   offers	   an	  
opportunity	  for	  broadcasters	  to	  differentiate	  their	  services	  in	  the	  increasingly	  
crowded	  global	  marketplace.	  The	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  when	  the	  suggested	  
shift	   away	   from	   the	   definition	   of	  markets	   on	   a	   national	   basis	  may	   lead	   to	  
market	  definition	  on	  an	  international/global	  or	  a	  local	  basis.	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  ibid	  [36].	  
566	  ibid.	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4.5	   Functional	  Considerations	  in	  Defining	  Premium	  Pay-­‐TV	  Markets	  
The	   functional	   dimension	   of	   the	  market	   refers	   to	   the	   link	   in	   the	   chain	   of	  
production	   for	  a	   specific	  product.567	  Where	   the	  conduct	   in	   issue	   relates	   to	  
only	  one	  functional	  level	  in	  the	  supply	  chain,	  the	  functional	  dimension	  is	  likely	  
to	   be	   subsumed	   within	   the	   product	   market	   definition.568	   Otherwise,	  
determining	   the	   relevant	   functional	   dimension	   generally	   begins	   with	   the	  
functional	  activities	  of	  the	  firm(s)	  involved	  in	  the	  impugned	  conduct.569	  The	  
question	   is	   whether	   such	   functions	   comprise	   part	   of	   a	   single	   market	   or	  
separate	  markets.570	   In	   the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context,	   this	   is	  complicated	   in	  
particular	   by	   the	   multi-­‐sided	   nature	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   providers,	   and	   uncertainty	  
regarding	   the	   effects	   of	   multi-­‐homing	   by	   viewers	   and	   advertisers	   on	   the	  
appropriate	  functional	  dimension(s)	  of	  the	  relevant	  market.	  
	  
4.5.1	   Principles	  of	  functional	  market	  definition	  
Different	  functional	  levels	  of	  the	  market	  are	  often	  complements	  rather	  than	  
substitutes.	  Care	  must	  therefore	  be	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  different	  functional	  
levels	   are	   not	   combined	   into	   a	   single	   product	  market,	  where	   hypothetical	  
monopolists	   at	   separate	   functional	   levels	   could	   each	   profitably	   impose	   a	  
relevant	  increase	  in	  price.571	  Otherwise,	  combining	  the	  functional	  levels	  into	  
a	  single	  market	  may	  violate	  the	  principle	  of	  identifying	  the	  smallest	  market	  
under	   the	  SSNIP	   test.572	   In	   the	  UK,	   the	  CMA	  refers	   in	  general	   terms	   to	   the	  
possible	   effects	   of	   vertical	   integration	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   relevant	  
market.	   It	   notes	   that	   when	   considering	   the	   substitutes	   of	   a	   wholesale	  
product,	   it	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   consider	   substitution	   possibilities	   at	   the	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  ACCC	  v	  Metcash	  Trading	  Limited	  [2011]	  FCA	  967	  [157].	  
568	   Neville	   Norman	   and	   Rhonda	   Smith,	   ‘Functional	   Market	   Definition’	   (1996)	   4	   Competition	   and	  
Consumer	  Law	  Journal	  1,	  3.	  
569	  ibid	  8.	  
570	  ibid.	  
571	  Metcash	  (n	  567).	  
572	  ibid.	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downstream	  level.573	  However,	  more	  specific	  guidance	  on	  functional	  market	  
definition	  emerges	  from	  Australia.	  	  
	  
The	  ACCC	  states	  that	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  delineating	  the	  relevant	  functional	  
distinctions	  between	  media	  markets	  are	  the	  traditional	  product	  distinctions	  
between	  the	  upstream	  markets	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  content	  and	  provision	  of	  
advertising	  space	  to	  advertisers,	  and	  the	  downstream	  markets	  for	  providing	  
content	   to	   end	   users.574	   It	   recognises	   that	   media	   mergers	   often	   raise	  
considerable	   debate	   about	   functional	   market	   distinctions	   because	   of	   the	  
multi-­‐sided	   nature	   of	   media	   products.575	   The	   negative	   feedback	   between	  
advertisers	  and	  viewers	  is	  relevant	  to	  merger	  analysis	  under	  Section	  50	  of	  the	  
CCA	   only	   where	   it	   prevents	   or	   exacerbates	   a	   substantial	   lessening	   of	  
competition.576	   However,	   the	   potential	   significance	   of	   functional	   market	  
definition	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Australian	  merger	  analysis	  was	  emphasised	  in	  
Metcash.577	  
	  
Metcash	   Trading	   Limited	   (“Metcash”),	   Australia’s	   leading	   wholesale	  
distribution	  and	  marketing	  company,	  entered	  into	  an	  agreement	  to	  acquire	  
Franklins,	  a	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  grocery	  business	  in	  New	  South	  Wales.	  The	  
ACCC	  opposed	  the	  acquisition	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  would	  substantially	  lessen	  
competition	   in	   the	   wholesale	   supply	   of	   groceries	   to	   independent	  
supermarkets	   in	   New	   South	  Wales	   and	   the	   Australian	   Capital	   Territory	   (in	  
which	   the	   major	   supermarkets	   did	   not	   compete),	   by	   removing	   Metcash’s	  
closest	  and	  only	  genuine	  competitor.578	  At	  trial,	  Metcash	  was	  found	  to	  be	  so	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  For	  instance,	  where	  vertically-­‐integrated	  suppliers	  compete	  in	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  a	  product,	  the	  
ability	  of	  consumers	  to	  switch	  suppliers	  at	  the	  retail	  level	  may	  constrain	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  supplier	  to	  
raise	  the	  price	  of	  the	  wholesale	  product.	  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  para	  5.12.	  
574	  ACCC	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  91)	  para	  109.	  
575	  ibid	  para	  98.	  
576	  ibid	  para	  107.	  
577	  Metcash	  (n	  567).	  
578	   ‘ACCC	  to	  oppose	  Metcash	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  Franklins	  supermarkets’	   (ACCC	  media	  release	  
NR250/10,	   17	   November	   2010)	   <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-­‐release/accc-­‐to-­‐oppose-­‐metcash-­‐
proposed-­‐acquisition-­‐of-­‐franklins-­‐supermarkets>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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closely	   involved	   in	   the	   retail	   activities	   of	   stores	   under	   the	   Independent	  
Grocers	   of	   Australia	   (“IGA”)	   brand	   (owned	   by	   Metcash),	   that	   market	  
participants	  included	  (amongst	  others)	  Coles,	  Woolworths,	  Franklins-­‐branded	  
stores	   and	   IGA-­‐branded	   stores.579	   The	   Full	   Court	   of	   the	   Federal	   Court	   of	  
Australia	   (“FCAFC”)	   agreed	   the	   acquisition	   would	   not	   substantially	   lessen	  
competition	  but	  rather	  enable	  IGA	  retailers	  to	  compete	  more	  vigorously	  with	  
the	  major	  supermarkets.580	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  applying	  
the	  economic	  concept	  of	  a	  market	  “in	  a	  practical	  way	  to	  accommodate	  the	  
concerns	  of	  the	  [CCA]	  with	  those	  of	  business	  and	  commerce.”581	  
	  
4.5.2	   Functional	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  multi-­‐sided	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  
Functional	  issues	  can	  arise	  in	  defining	  markets	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  
as	  a	   result	  of	   the	   interactions	  between	  the	  viewer-­‐side	  and	  the	  advertiser-­‐
side	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms.	  The	  ACCC	  acknowledges	  
the	   complexities	   associated	   with	   the	   non-­‐complementary	   interaction	  
between	  viewers	  and	  advertisers	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  multi-­‐sided	  nature	  
of	   advertising-­‐funded	  media	   products.582	   It	   concludes,	   however,	   that	   such	  
interactions	  are	  present	   in	  other	  non-­‐media	  mergers	  and	   simply	   represent	  
“new	   applications	   of	   existing	   competitive	   analytical	   tools.”583	   By	   contrast,	  
Ofcom	  has	  explicitly	  opted	  to	  disregard	  the	  effects	  on	  advertising	  markets	  of	  
a	  price	  rise	  to	  retailers	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  defining	  markets	  
too	  broadly.584	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  UK/EU,	  functional	  
considerations	   generally	   form	   part	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   relevant	   product	  
market	  under	  the	  application	  of	  the	  SSNIP	  test.	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  Metcash	  (n	  567)	  [337-­‐342].	  
580	  ibid	  [460];	  ACCC	  v	  Metcash	  Trading	  Limited	  [2011]	  FCAFC	  151	  [385].	  
581	  ibid	  [382].	  
582	  ACCC	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  91)	  para	  109.	  
583	  ibid.	  
584	  Ofcom	  (n	  525)	  para	  4.33.	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It	  is	  suggested	  here,	  however,	  that	  interactions	  between	  the	  viewer-­‐side	  and	  
the	   advertiser-­‐side	   are	   likely	   to	   present	   more	   significant	   functional	  
considerations	  than	  is	  appreciated	  under	  Ofcom’s	  approach.	  Ofcom	  assumes	  
that	   an	   increase	   in	   a	   wholesale	   price	   to	   a	   retailer,	   if	   fully	   passed	   on	   to	  
consumers,	   is	   likely	   to	   lead	   viewers	   to	   switch	   away	   with	   a	   consequent	  
downward	   effect	   on	   advertising	   revenue.585	   However,	   this	   arguably	   over-­‐
simplifies	  the	  relationship	  between	  advertising	  revenue	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
audience,	  and	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  viewers	  switching	  supplier	  (though	  it	  has	  
been	  noted	  that	  the	  scope	  for	  switching	  is	  particularly	  limited	  in	  the	  premium	  
sport	  context).	  It	  has	  already	  been	  identified	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  advertising	  
revenue	  is	  not	  simply	  dependent	  on	  the	  number	  of	  viewers	  but,	  for	  instance,	  
the	  demographic	  and	  attention	  value	  of	  the	  audience.	  	  
	  
Ofcom	  considers	  that	  excluding	  the	  downward	  effect	  on	  advertising	  revenue	  
from	  viewers	  switching	  suppliers	  is	  likely	  to	  over-­‐estimate	  the	  profitability	  of	  
a	   wholesale	   price	   increase	   and	   lead	   to	   broader	   market	   definitions.586	   It	  
assumes	  that	  given	  the	  importance	  of	  revenue	  from	  subscriptions	  relative	  to	  
advertising	  revenue	  for	  premium	  channels,	  this	  effect	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  relatively	  
small.587	   However,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   increasing	   significance	   of	   advertising	  
revenue	  within	  the	  business	  models	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  new	  
entrants	  alike,	  it	  is	  proposed	  that	  the	  downward	  effect	  on	  advertising	  revenue	  
may	  well	  be	  more	  significant	  than	  this	  suggests.	  Excluding	  this	  effect	  will	  not	  
necessarily	  produce	  broader	  market	  definitions.	  Much	  will	  depend	  upon	  the	  
period	  of	  time	  over	  which	  the	  assessment	  is	  based,	  but	  also	  the	  likely	  effects	  
of	   multi-­‐homing	   and	   ad-­‐skipping	   on	   the	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   by	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	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4.5.3	   Effects	  of	  multi-­‐homing	  on	  market	  power	  in	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  	  
Multi-­‐homing	  by	  viewers	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  has	  relatively	  quickly	  
become	   commonplace.	   Viewers	   in	   the	   UK	   use	   an	   average	   of	   3.5	   sources	  
across	  all	  platforms	  in	  the	  consumption	  of	  news.588	  In	  Australia,	  76	  per	  cent	  
of	  online	  Australians	  watch	  television	  and	  use	   the	   Internet	  simultaneously,	  
and	   33	   per	   cent	   access	   content	   on	   two	   or	   more	   devices	   whilst	   watching	  
television.589	   As	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   switching,	   viewer	   multi-­‐homing	  
generates	  inefficiency	  in	  the	  process	  of	  matching	  advertisers	  to	  viewers,	  since	  
advertisers	  may	  not	  reach	  some	  viewers	  and	  impose	  on	  others	  too	  much.590	  	  
	  
The	  ability	  of	  viewers	  to	  skip	  or	  block	  television	  advertisements	  threatens	  to	  
restrict	  the	  ability	  of	  media	  firms	  to	  monetise	  their	  online	  video	  content	   in	  
particular.	  Ad-­‐block	  penetration	  per	  online	  capita	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  is	  
16	   per	   cent	   and	   20	   per	   cent,	   respectively.591	   It	   is	   reported	   that	   12million	  
people	  in	  the	  UK	  use	  ad-­‐blockers,	  at	  an	  estimated	  cost	  in	  2015	  to	  publishers	  
worldwide	  of	  around	  £15billion.592	  One	  response	  of	  broadcasters	  is	  to	  make	  
use	  of	  anti-­‐ad	  blocking	  technology,	  to	  reassure	  advertisers	  that	  their	  content	  
will	  be	  seen	  by	  their	  intended	  audiences.593	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  balance	  to	  be	  
struck,	  as	  exemplified	  by	   the	  experience	  of	   the	  digital	   terrestrial	   television	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588	   ‘News	   Consumption	   in	   the	   UK:	   Research	   Report’	   (Ofcom,	   15	   December	   2015)	   13	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/77222/News-­‐2015-­‐report.pdf>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	  
589	   ‘More	   Screens,	   Choice	   and	   Activities	   Across	   Devices:	   Q1	   2016	   Australian	  Multi-­‐Screen	   Report’	  
(Oztam,	   Nielsen	   and	   Regional	   Television	   Audience	   Measurement,	   8	   June	   2016)	  
<http://www.oztam.com.au/documents/Other/Q1%202016%20Australian%20Multi-­‐
Screen%20Report%20release.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	  
590	   Susan	   Athey,	   Emilio	   Calvano	   and	   Joshua	   S	   Gans,	   ‘The	   Impact	   of	   Consumer	   Multi-­‐homing	   on	  
Advertising	   Markets	   and	   Media	   Competition’	   Management	   Science	   (16	   December	   2016)	  
<http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2675>	  accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	  
591	   ‘2017	   Global	   Adblock	   Report:	   The	   state	   of	   the	   blocked	   web’	   (PageFair,	   February	   2017)	   8	  
<https://pagefair.com/downloads/2017/01/PageFair-­‐2017-­‐Adblock-­‐Report.pdf>	  accessed	  11	  August	  
2017.	  
592	  Mindi	  Chahal,	  ‘What	  does	  the	  rise	  of	  ad	  blocking	  mean	  for	  video?’	  (Marketing	  Week,	  18	  February	  
2016)	   <https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/02/18/what-­‐does-­‐the-­‐rise-­‐of-­‐ad-­‐blocking-­‐mean-­‐for-­‐
video/>	  accessed	  11	  August	  2017.	  
593	  Harry	  Tucker,	  ‘Australian	  TV	  networks	  are	  trying	  to	  combat	  ad	  blockers’	  Business	  Insider	  Australia	  
(11	   April	   2016)	   <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/australian-­‐tv-­‐networks-­‐are-­‐trying-­‐to-­‐combat-­‐
ad-­‐blockers-­‐2016-­‐4>	  accessed	  11	  August	  2017.	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platform	   Freeview	   in	   Australia.	   A	   strict	   ban	   on	   ad-­‐skipping	   meant	   that	  
Freeview	  was	  not	  taken	  up	  by	  a	  number	  of	  television	  services.	  The	  ban	  was	  
subsequently	   revised	   in	   order	   to	   get	   FreeviewPlus	   catch-­‐up	   television	   into	  
more	  Australian	  homes.594	  
	  
The	  consumption	  of	  content	  by	  viewers	  across	  multiple	  platforms	  may	  also	  
reduce	  the	  value	  of	  viewers	  to	  advertisers	  by	  reducing	  the	  quality	  of	  viewer	  
attention	  (particularly	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  media	  and	  the	  use	  of	  
social	  media	  to	  complement	  the	  consumption	  of	  content	  on	  other	  platforms).	  
Audience	  research	  over	  the	  past	  30	  years	  has	  shown	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  
mode	   of	   attention	   that	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   an	   audience.595	   Sometimes	  
viewing	  is	  distracted	  and	  sometimes	  it	  is	  fully	  engaged.596	  However,	  a	  recent	  
study	  by	  Athey,	  Calvano	  and	  Gans	   indicates	  that	  higher	  readership	  attracts	  
higher	  per-­‐consumer	  revenues,	  so	  consumer	  switching	  increases	  a	  publisher’s	  
incentive	   to	   invest	   in	   quality	   content	   that	   attracts	   a	   greater	   share	   of	  
consumers.597	   This	   suggests	   that	   high-­‐reach	   publishers	   have	   an	   advantage	  
over	   traditional	  publishers.598	   In	   the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context,	   it	   reinforces	  
the	  potential	  significance	  of	  the	  high	  subscriber	  figures	  of	  global	  operations	  
like	  Netflix,	  compared	  to	  the	  audience	  shares	  of	  the	  likes	  of	  Sky	  and	  Foxtel.	  
	  
As	   regards	   the	   impact	   of	  multi-­‐homing	   by	   advertisers,	   it	   has	   already	   been	  
acknowledged	   that	   traditional	   broadcast	   television	   remains	   a	   principal	  
platform	   for	   the	   consumption	   of	   audio-­‐visual	   content	   in	   both	   the	   UK	   and	  
Australia.	  However,	  second	  or	  ancillary	  screens	  are	  said	  to	  hold	  the	  key	  for	  
advertisers	  to	  monetise	  an	  increasingly	  fragmented	  audience.599	  For	  instance,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594	  Adam	  Turner,	  ‘Freeview	  relaxes	  ad-­‐skipping	  restriction’	  The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  (4	  June	  2015)	  
<http://www.smh.com.au/digital-­‐life/computers/gadgets-­‐on-­‐the-­‐go/freeview-­‐relaxes-­‐adskipping-­‐
restrictions-­‐20150603-­‐ghg1kh.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
595	  Sherryl	  Wilson,	  ‘In	  the	  Living	  Room:	  Second	  Screens	  and	  TV	  Audiences’	  (2016)	  17(2)	  Television	  and	  
New	  Media	  174,	  182.	  
596	  ibid.	  
597	  Athey,	  Calvano	  and	  Gans	  (n	  590).	  
598	  ibid.	  
599	  Wilson	  (n	  595)	  178.	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Athey,	   Calvano	   and	   Gans	   assume	   higher-­‐value	   advertisers	   endogenously	  
purchase	   multiple	   advertisements	   on	   multiple	   publishers	   because	   higher-­‐
value	  advertisers	  find	  the	  value	  of	  advertising	  across	  publishers	  to	  be	  greater	  
than	   the	   market	   price.600	   However,	   uncertainty	   remains	   as	   to	   how	   the	  
possible	   effects	  of	   viewer	  multi-­‐homing,	   specifically	   in	   the	   consumption	  of	  
premium	   pay-­‐TV,	   are	   mitigated	   (if	   at	   all)	   by	   the	   ability	   and	   incentive	   for	  
advertisers	  to	  multi-­‐home.	  
	  
4.6	   Temporal	  Factors	  in	  Defining	  Markets	  in	  the	  Premium	  Pay-­‐TV	  Context	  
In	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context,	   it	   is	   in	  relation	  to	  live	  sports	  coverage	  that	  
temporal	   considerations	  would	   appear	  most	   pertinent,	   such	   as	   how	   often	  
exclusive	  rights	  contracts	  come	  up	  for	  renewal.	  The	  temporal	  dimension	  of	  
markets	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  live	  sports	  coverage	  is	  also	  relevant	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
such	   coverage	   is	   a	   perishable	   good.	   Given	   the	   interest	   of	   spectators	   in	  
uncertainty	  of	   outcome,	   the	   interest	  of	   viewers	   (and	  hence	  advertisers)	   in	  
televised	  sport	   is	   time-­‐sensitive.601	  The	  commercial	  value	  of	  a	   live	  sporting	  
event	  diminishes	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  event	  takes	  place	  i.e.	  once	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  
uncertainty	  of	  outcome.	  This	  remains	  unchanged	  in	  the	  digital	  era,	  where	  the	  
greatest	   scope	   for	   change	   and	   therefore	   the	   focus	   here	   is	   in	   relation	   to	  
premium	  movies	   and	   drama.	   The	   decreasing	   significance	   of	  movie	   release	  
windows	   and	   the	   simultaneous	   supply	   online	   of	   whole	   series	   of	   exclusive	  
dramas	   raise	   important	   questions	   about	   the	   appropriate	   timeframes	   for	  
defining	  markets	  in	  the	  movie	  and	  drama	  contexts.	  This	  may	  have	  implications	  
for	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power	  held	  by	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  in	  
such	  markets.	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  Athey,	  Calvano	  and	  Gans	  (n	  590)	  	  
601	  Chris	  Gratton	  and	  Harry	  A	  Solberg,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Sports	  Broadcasting	  (Routledge	  2007)	  145.	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4.6.1	   Timeframe	  for	  assessing	  substitution	  possibilities	  	  
The	   timeframe	   over	   which	   demand-­‐side	   and	   supply-­‐side	   substitution	   are	  
assessed	   is	   relevant	   in	   applying	   the	   SSNIP	   test	   to	   define	   the	   product	   and	  
geographic	  markets.	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  distinct	  temporal	  aspect	  to	  the	  
relevant	  market.	  The	  CMA	  briefly	  notes	   in	   its	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  
how	   the	   timing	   of	   production	   and	   purchasing	   can	   affect	  markets,	   but	   the	  
temporal	  dimension	  is	  ultimately	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  product	  dimension	  of	  
the	  relevant	  market.602	  Temporal	  market	  definition	  is	  not	  expressly	  referred	  
to	   in	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   Notice	   on	   Market	   Definition.	   In	   United	  
Brands,603	  the	  United	  Brands	  Company	  argued	  that	  the	  sale	  of	  bananas	  was	  
subject	  to	  seasonal	  change,	  particularly	  in	  the	  summer	  months,	  when	  faced	  
with	  competition	  from	  summer	  fruits.604	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  concluded	  that	  any	  
impact	   on	   banana	   sales	   was	   insufficient	   for	   other	   fruit	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	  
forming	  part	  of	  the	  same	  market.605	  	  
	  
An	  emphasis	  on	  short-­‐run	  analysis	  was	  reinforced	  in	  Tetra	  Pak	  II.606	  Tetra	  Pak	  
was	  a	  world	   leader	   in	  the	  field	  of	  packaging	   liquid	  and	  semi-­‐liquid	  foods	   in	  
cartons	  (and	  effectively	  sole	  producer	  in	  the	  EU	  of	  machines	  for	  the	  aseptic	  
packaging	   of	   liquid	   foods	   and	   the	   cartons	   used	   in	   such	   packaging).	   It	   was	  
alleged	  that	  Tetra	  Pak	  had	  abused	  its	  dominant	  position	  through	  predatory	  
and	  discriminatory	  pricing,	  and	  tying	  the	  sale	  of	  cartons	  and	  machines.	  Tetra	  
Pak	  argued	   the	   relevant	  market	   should	   include	  a	  variety	  of	  other	   forms	  of	  
aseptic	   and	   non-­‐aseptic	   packaging	   to	   form	   a	   packaging	   market	   for	   liquid	  
foods.	  However,	  the	  European	  Commission	  rejected	  this	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  
different	   forms	  of	  packaging	   competed	  with	  one	  another	  only	   in	   the	   long-­‐
term:607	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  CMA	  Market	  Definition	  Guidelines	  (n	  442)	  paras	  5.1-­‐5.3.	  
603	  United	  Brands	  (n	  32).	  
604	  ibid	  [15].	  
605	  ibid	  [21].	  
606	  Tetra	  Pak	  II	  (n	  544).	  
607	  ibid	  [93].	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The	   reason	   why	   […]	   the	   analysis	   used	   to	   define	   a	   market	  
should	  cover	  only	  a	   short	  period	   is	   that	  over	  a	   long	  period,	  
during	  which	  techological	  progress	  may	  occur	  and	  consumer	  
habits	  evolve,	  structures	  will	  change	  and	  the	  very	  boundaries	  
between	   the	   various	   markets	   shift.	   A	   short	   period	  
corresponds	   more	   to	   the	   economic	   operative	   time	   during	  
which	   a	   given	   company	   exercises	   its	   power	   on	   the	  market	  
[…].608	  
	  
As	  already	   indicated,	  such	  a	  short-­‐term	  approach	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  
exercise	  of	  market	  power	  as	  a	  static	  exercise	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  appropriate	  in	  
the	   pay-­‐TV	   industry	   because	   of	   strong	   dynamic	   competition.	   Chapter	   3	  
demonstrates	  how	  this	  is	  reinforced	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  The	  focus	  in	  Australia	  
on	  assessing	  substitution	  possibilities	  in	  the	  longer-­‐run	  is	  therefore	  arguably	  
more	  appropriate.	  However,	  the	  Australian	  approach	  arguably	  still	  requires	  
refinement	  in	  defining	  markets	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  	  
	  
The	   approach	   to	   temporal	  market	   definition	   should	   reflect	   the	   conduct	   in	  
issue	  and	  the	  specific	  economic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  question.	  In	  
the	  premium	  sport	  context,	   this	   includes	  high	  capital	   investment	  and	   long-­‐
term	   exclusive	   contracts.	   In	   the	   Superleague	   case,609	   Burchett	   J	   suggested	  
that	   the	  appropriate	  period	  of	   time	   for	   considering	   the	   competitive	   forces	  
was	  at	  least	  10	  years.610	  Notably,	  the	  decision	  in	  this	  case	  did	  not	  turn	  on	  the	  
definition	  of	  the	  relevant	  market.	  A	  period	  of	  5	  years	  would	  arguably	  now	  be	  
more	  appropriate	  to	  reflect	  the	  regularity	  of	  rights	  auctions.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608	  ibid	  [94].	  
609	  News	  Ltd	  v	  Australian	  Rugby	  Football	  League	  Ltd	  [1996]	  FCA	  1256.	  
610	  ibid	  [95].	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4.6.2	   Relevance	  of	  release	  windows	  in	  defining	  premium	  movie	  markets	  
In	  the	  premium	  movie	  context,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  system	  of	  release	  windows	  
on	   the	   ability	   of	   different	   types	   of	   broadcasters	   to	   access	   the	   rights	   to	  
premium	   movies	   has	   formed	   the	   basis	   for	   defining	   a	   series	   of	   separate	  
markets	   for	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	  movies.	   Release	  windows	   refer	   to	   the	  
period	   of	   time	   between	   the	   public	   release	   of	   a	   movie	   in	   cinemas	   and	   its	  
release	  on	  VOD,	  DVD,	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  FTA	  television.	  For	  instance,	  the	  traditional	  
release	  of	  movies	  on	  pay-­‐TV	  before	  FTA	  television	  has	  been	   interpreted	  as	  
preventing	  FTA	  broadcasters	  from	  competing	  effectively	  for	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  rights	  
to	  premium	  movies.611	  In	  2011,	  the	  European	  Commission	  identified	  separate	  
markets	   for	   the	   release	   windows	   for	   VOD,	   pay-­‐per-­‐view,	   the	   first	   pay-­‐TV	  
window,	  the	  second	  pay-­‐TV	  window	  and	  FTA	  television.612	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   declining	   significance	   and	   shrinking	   of	   release	   windows	  
reinforces	  the	  decreasing	  appropriateness	  of	  product-­‐based	  distinctions	  (i.e.	  
based	   on	   the	   mode	   of	   distribution)	   and	   the	   need	   to	   adopt	   a	   broader	  
conceptualisation	  of	  competition	  across	  the	  wider	  communications	  sector.613	  
Relevant	   to	   this	   analysis	   is	   the	   shrinking	   of	   release	  windows	   for	   premium	  
movies.	  It	  is	  reported	  that	  Hollywood	  studios	  are	  preparing	  to	  release	  movies	  
for	  home	  viewing	  less	  than	  45	  days	  after	  they	  debut	  in	  cinemas	  (halving	  the	  
prevailing	  standard	  of	  90	  days).614	  In	  some	  instances,	  release	  windows	  have	  
been	  dispensed	  with	  altogether,	  with	  the	  simultaneous	  release	  of	  movies	  in	  
cinemas	  and	  on	  pay-­‐TV,	  the	  Internet,	  DVD	  and	  FTA	  television,	  at	  effectively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611	  ‘British	  Sky	  Broadcasting	  Group	  PLC	  and	  Manchester	  United	  PLC:	  A	  Report	  on	  the	  Proposed	  Merger’	  
(Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission,	  1999)	  para	  2.51.	  
612	  HBO/Ziggo/HBO	  Nederland	  (Case	  COMP/M.6369)	  OJ	  C(2011)10049	  [18].	  
613	  On	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  system	  of	  release	  windows	  in	  the	  EU,	  see	  ‘Analysis	  of	  the	  Legal	  Rules	  
for	  Exploitation	  Windows	  and	  Commercial	  Practices	  in	  EU	  Member	  States	  and	  of	  the	  Importance	  of	  
Exploitation	   Windows	   for	   New	   Business	   Practices’	   (European	   Commission,	   2014)	  
<https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/analysisofthelegalrulesforexploitationwindows
.pdf>	  accessed	  8	  September	  2017.	  
614	  Ben	  Fritz,	  ‘From	  Multiplex	  to	  Living	  Room,	  in	  45	  Days	  or	  Less’	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (26	  March	  
2017)	   <https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-­‐multiplex-­‐to-­‐living-­‐room-­‐in-­‐45-­‐days-­‐or-­‐less-­‐
1490532001>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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the	  same	  time.615	  The	  definition	  of	  separate	  markets	  for	  each	  release	  window	  
must	  be	   supported	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	   substitutability	  between	   the	  different	  
release	  windows	  or	  formats.	  
	  
4.6.3	   Temporal	  dimension	  of	  premium	  drama	  markets	  
The	  success	  of	  premium	  drama	  series	  lies	  in	  their	  release	  exclusively	  from	  a	  
particular	  SVOD	  platform	  or	  pay-­‐TV	  provider.	  Whole	  series	  are	  often	  released	  
at	   once,	   consistent	   with	   the	   current	   trend	   of	   viewers	   binge-­‐watching	   the	  
latest	  “box	  set”	  at	  the	  time	  of	  release	  or	  at	  some	  later	  date.	  Application	  of	  the	  
general	  approach	  to	  temporal	  market	  definition	  suggests	  the	  likely	  definition	  
of	  narrow	  markets,	  potentially	   for	   the	   release	  of	   individual	  dramas.616	  This	  
would	  have	  significant	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  likely	  over-­‐estimation	  of	  
market	  power	  and	  unnecessarily	   impeding	  innovation	  incentives.	  Given	  the	  
rise	   of	   premium	   drama,	   this	   is	   arguably	   an	   area	   in	   need	   of	   detailed	  
consideration.	  
	  
4.7	   Conclusions	   	  
Network	  effects,	  multi-­‐homing,	   the	  perishable	  nature	  of	   live	  sports	  events,	  
and	   the	   role	   for	   exclusivity	   and	   long-­‐term	   supply	   arrangements,	   together	  
render	  markets	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  unique.	  This	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  
disapply	  the	  standard	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  market	  definition.	  However,	  
it	   has	   been	   identified	   that	   the	   SSNIP	   test	   will	   be	   of	   limited	   application	   in	  
defining	  relevant	  product	  and	  geographic	  markets	  in	  this	  context.	  Asymmetric	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615	  For	  example,	  A	  Field	  in	  England	  was	  the	  first	  UK	  film	  to	  be	  released	  simultaneously	  in	  cinemas,	  on	  
DVD,	  on	  television	  and	  via	  VOD.	  Samuel	  Wigley,	  ‘A	  Field	  in	  England	  marks	  UK	  distribution	  first’	  (British	  
Film	   Institute,	   2	   November	   2015)	   <http://www.bfi.org.uk/news-­‐opinion/news-­‐bfi/features/field-­‐
england-­‐marks-­‐uk-­‐distribution-­‐first>	   accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	   In	  Australia,	   the	   retention	  of	  movie	  
release	  windows	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  effort	  to	  combat	  particularly	  high	  rates	  of	  online	  piracy.	  Ben	  
Grubb,	   ‘“Piracy	   window”	   for	   movie	   downloads	   reduced’	   Sydney	   Morning	   Herald	   (16	   June	   2014)	  
<http://www.smh.com.au/digital-­‐life/digital-­‐life-­‐news/piracy-­‐window-­‐for-­‐movie-­‐downloads-­‐
reduced-­‐20140616-­‐zs93v.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
616	  The	  definition	  of	  separate	  markets	   for	   individual	  blockbusters	  over	  a	   limited	  period	  of	  time	  has	  
been	  envisaged	  elsewhere.	  See,	  Damien	  Geradin,	  ‘Competition	  Law	  Problems	  Raised	  by	  the	  Entry	  of	  
Incumbent	  Telecommunications	  Operators	  in	  the	  Media	  Content	  Delivery	  Market’	  (2005)	  6(3)	  Journal	  
of	  Network	  Industries	  143.	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pricing	   and	   bundling	   by	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   as	  multi-­‐sided	   platforms	   require	  
consideration	   of	   interactions	   between	   the	   viewer-­‐side	   and	   advertiser-­‐side.	  
Data	  issues	  can	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  revenue	  and	  subscriber	  figures	  where	  pay-­‐
TV	  providers	  supply	  content/services	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  via	  the	   Internet.	  
The	   increasing	   focus	   on	   dynamic	   competition	   also	   limits	   the	   scope	   for	  
adopting	   a	   quantitative	   approach	   on	   which	   the	   SSNIP	   test	   relies.	   This	  
reinforces	   the	   importance	   of	   supplementing	   quantitative	   analysis	   with	   a	  
qualitative	  assessment	  of	  the	  market.	  
	  
As	  regards	  the	  factors	  that	  should	  form	  part	  of	  a	  qualitative	  assessment	  of	  the	  
market,	   less	   emphasis	   should	   be	   placed	   on	   product-­‐based	   distinctions	  
founded	   on	   analogue-­‐era	   assumptions	   regarding	   the	   trading	   relationships	  
and	  funding	  models	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  other	  broadcasters.	  
Comparisons	  at	  the	  technological	  level	  should	  be	  replaced	  by	  consideration	  
of	  how	  such	  content/services	  affect	  the	  overall	  experience	  of	  viewers	  as	  the	  
consumers	   of	   bundled	   communications	   services.	   As	   will	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  
following	  chapter,	  this	  approach	  was	  evident	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  the	  European	  
Commission’s	   recent	  assessment	  of	  Facebook’s	  acquisition	  of	  Whatsapp.617	  
However,	  from	  a	  market	  definition	  perspective,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  and	  
consistent	   framework	   for	   determining,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   whether	   the	  
“cellophane	  fallacy”	  is	  a	  potential	  issue	  (where	  a	  direct	  price	  is	  charged)	  and,	  
in	   resolving	   the	   “cellophane	   fallacy”,	   consideration	   of	   other	   evidence	   and	  
more	  direct	  measures	  of	  market	  power.	  
	  
With	  the	  bundling	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  increasing	  incidence	  of	  vertical	  integration,	  
functional	   market	   considerations	   are	   increasingly	   important.	   Ofcom’s	  
disregard	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  price	  increases	  on	  the	  advertising	  side	  is	  therefore	  
likely	   to	   lead	   to	   inaccurate	  market	  definitions,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  broader	  
market	  definitions	  as	  it	  assumes.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  UK	  may	  have	  something	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  Facebook/WhatsApp	  (n	  58).	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to	  learn	  from	  the	  more	  substantive	  guidance	  on	  functional	  market	  definition	  
that	  emerges	  from	  Australia.	  This	  is	  subject	  to	  enduring	  uncertainty	  regarding	  
the	  application	  of	  such	  guidance	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context.	  For	  instance,	  
the	  practical	  application	  of	  the	  FCAFC’s	  statement	  in	  Metcash	  on	  the	  correct	  
approach	  in	  the	  event	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  CCA	  and	  the	  
interests	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   providers.	   Appropriate	   consideration	   of	   the	   functional	  
dimension	  of	   the	   relevant	  market	   is	   important	   for	  ensuring	  against	  unduly	  
narrow	  market	  definitions	  and	  hence	  the	  over-­‐assessment	  of	  market	  power.	  
	  
In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   the	   continuing	   process	   of	   media	  
globalisation	   implies	   wider	   market	   definitions	   (particularly	   in	   relation	   to	  
premium	   non-­‐sport	   content).	   There	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   shift	   from	   defining	  
markets	   on	   a	   national	   basis	   towards	   the	   definition	   of	   international,	   if	   not	  
global,	  markets.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   potential	   for	   change	   is	   arguably	  most	  
pronounced	   in	   the	   context	  of	  premium	  drama.	  Broadening	   the	  geographic	  
scope	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  markets	  in	  this	  way	  will	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  
assessment	  of	  the	  market	  power	  held	  by	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  This	  is	  
especially	   significant	   given	   the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   premium	   drama	  
within	  the	  business	  models	  of	  SVOD	  platforms	  and,	   in	  response,	  traditional	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  suggested	  increase	  in	  the	  
importance	  of	  local	  drama	  highlights	  a	  possible	  tension	  between	  the	  local	  and	  
the	  global	   in	  determining	  the	  geographic	  scope	  of	  markets	   in	  the	  premium	  
drama	  context.	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  tension	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  
as	  already	  indicated,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  premium	  drama	  context	  that	  new	  entry	  poses	  
the	  greatest	  scope	  for	  undermining	  the	  market	  positions	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  
providers.	  	  
	  
From	  a	   temporal	   perspective,	   broader	  market	  definitions	   are	   also	   likely	   to	  
result	   from	   the	   decreasing	   significance	   and	   shrinking	   of	   movie	   release	  
windows.	  Defining	  appropriately	  broad	  temporal	  markets	  for	  premium	  drama	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will	   also	   be	   important	   for	   reflecting	   the	   impact	   of	   new	   entry	   by	   SVOD	  
platforms	  on	  the	  market	  power	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  The	  temporal	  
aspect	   of	   premium	   drama	   markets	   is	   also	   an	   area	   in	   need	   of	   particular	  
consideration	  because	  of	  the	  simultaneous	  release	  of	  exclusive	  drama	  series	  
in	   their	  entirety,	  which	  could	   lead	   to	  unduly	  narrow	  market	  definitions	   for	  
individual	  series.	  Whether	  viewers	  choose	  to	  watch	  whole	  series	  around	  the	  
date	  of	   release	  or	  at	   some	   later	  date	  may	  also	  be	   relevant	   in	  defining	   the	  
product	  market.	   An	   issue	   which	   emerges	   here	   and	   reappears	   later	   in	   the	  
thesis	  is	  whether	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  content/services	  constitute	  substitutes	  or	  
complements.	  This	   is	  critical	  because,	  as	  seen	  within	  the	  context	  of	  market	  
definition,	   the	   central	   concept	   in	   the	   existing	   regulatory	   frameworks	   is	  
typically	   one	   of	   substitutability	   rather	   than	   complementarity.	   Meanwhile,	  
significant	   uncertainty	   remains	   amongst	   economists	   on	   the	   appropriate	  
approach	  to	  assessing	  substitutability	  where	  the	  SSNIP	  test	  cannot	  be	  applied.	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CHAPTER	  5	  
	  
MEDIA	  OWNERSHIP	  AND	  MERGER	  REGULATION	  OF	  PREMIUM	  PAY-­‐TV	  	  
	  
5.1	   Introduction	  
Concentration	  of	  media	  ownership	  raises	  particular	  regulatory	  concerns	  due	  
to	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   the	   role	   for	   the	   media	   in	   ensuring	   the	   effective	  
functioning	   of	   a	   democratic	   society.618	   By	   ensuring	   that	   no	   single	   media	  
proprietor	  can	  exercise	  excessive	  influence	  over	  the	  political	  process,	  media	  
plurality	  offers	  citizens	  access	  to	  a	  diversity	  of	  viewpoints	  from	  which	  to	  make	  
informed	   decisions.	   Regulating	   market	   concentration	   through	   the	  
enforcement	  of	  merger	  control	  rules	  can	  promote	  media	  pluralism.	  However,	  
plurality	  issues	  can	  arise	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  competition	  concerns.	  Also,	  in	  the	  
event	  of	  countervailing	  efficiencies,	  general	  competition	  law	  may	  tolerate	  a	  
level	  of	  market	  concentration	  that	  is	  undesirable	  from	  a	  plurality	  perspective.	  
Hence	  the	  introduction	  in	  the	  analogue	  era	  of	  media-­‐specific	  ownership	  rules	  
to	  operate	  alongside	  merger	  regulation	  under	  general	  competition	  law.619	  	  
	  
In	   an	   era	   of	   content	   abundance,	   media	   pluralism	   remains	   a	   regulatory	  
concern,	   including	   within	   the	   context	   of	   premium	   content.	   However,	   this	  
chapter	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  ensuring	  that	  mergers	  in	  this	  context	  
are	   assessed	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   reinforced	   tendency	   towards	   market	  
concentration	   in	   the	  digital	  era,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	   rise	  of	   the	  multi-­‐
media	  firm.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  media-­‐specific	  ownership	  rules	  
in	   the	  UK	   is	   regarded	  as	  apt.	  Though	  such	   liberalisation	  did	   form	  part	  of	  a	  
package	  of	  reforms	  under	  the	  EA2002	  (as	  amended	  by	  the	  CA2003),	  which	  
crucially	  included	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  test.	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport,	  
A	  New	  Future	  for	  Communications	  (White	  Paper,	  Cm	  5010,	  2000)	  35.	  
619	   Protection	   of	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   media	   pluralism	   also	   relies,	   for	   instance,	   on	   the	   effective	  
enforcement	   of	   rules	   relating	   to	   journalistic	   and	   editorial	   independence,	   television	   advertising,	  
conflicts	  of	  interest,	  and	  impartiality	  and	  accountability.	  
	  	  148	  
is	  proposed	  that	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  this	  test	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  
introduction	  of	   such	  a	   test	   in	  Australia.	  This	   could	  also	  be	  used	   to	  address	  
concerns	   about	   local	   media	   ownership,	   thereby	   supporting	   the	   case	   for	  
liberalisation	  of	   local	  media	  ownership	   rules	   in	  Australia.	  However,	   the	  UK	  
regulatory	   framework	   is	   not	   beyond	   criticism	   as	   regards	   its	   application	   to	  
media	  mergers	   in	   the	  digital	   era.	   In	   the	   light	  of	   this,	   the	   chapter	  proposes	  
modifications	  to	  minimise	  the	  regulatory	  restrictions	  that	  may	  otherwise	  be	  
unnecessarily	  imposed	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  multi-­‐
media	  firm	  in	  an	  increasingly	  global	  communications	  industry.	  	  
	  
5.2	   Concentration	  of	  Media	  Ownership,	  Competition	  and	  the	  Public	  Interest	  
Media	  ownership	  is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  ownership	  of	  other	  assets	  by	  the	  
role	   for	   the	   media	   in	   facilitating	   and	   promoting	   an	   informed	   democratic	  
society.620	  The	  public	  interest	  lies	  in	  viewers	  being	  able	  to	  access	  a	  diversity	  
of	  viewpoints.	  Excessive	  concentration	  in	  media	  ownership	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  
over-­‐representation	   or	   under-­‐representation	   of	   particular	   political	  
viewpoints,	   and	  marginalisation	   of	   certain	   social	   or	   cultural	   values.621	   The	  
public	  interest	  in	  viewpoint	  diversity	  is	  therefore	  assumed	  to	  be	  best	  served	  
by	  less	  concentrated	  markets.622	  However,	  the	  relationship	  between	  market	  
concentration	   and	  media	   pluralism	   or	   diversity	   is	  more	   complex	   than	   this	  
suggests,	  particularly	  in	  innovation-­‐driven	  industries	  like	  premium	  pay-­‐TV.	  	  
	  
5.2.1	   Meaning	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  pluralism	  and	  diversity	  
Media	   pluralism	   and	   diversity	   are	   closely-­‐related	   but	   distinct	   concepts.	  
“Media	   pluralism”	   is	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   independent	  media	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620	  HL	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Communications	  (n	  53)	  vol	  1,	  62.	  
621	  Gillian	  Doyle,	  Media	  Ownership:	  The	  Economics	  and	  Politics	  of	  Convergence	  and	  Concentration	  in	  
the	  UK	  and	  European	  Media	  (SAGE	  Publishing	  2002)	  13.	  
622	  This	  implies	  that	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  media	  outlets	  ensures	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  viewpoints	  but,	  as	  
will	  be	  seen,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	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owners	   and	   “media	   diversity”	   to	   diversity	   of	   content.623	   So	   whilst	   media	  
diversity	  typically	  refers	  to	  the	  range	  of	  different	  programmes	  or	  services	  that	  
are	  available	  to	  viewers,	  media	  pluralism	  can	  be	  said	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  choices	  
for	   viewers	   between	   the	   suppliers	   of	   such	   programmes	   or	   services.624	  
However,	  as	  Hitchens	  notes,625	   the	  term	  “media	  pluralism”	   is	  almost	  never	  
used	   in	   Australia,	   where	   “media	   diversity”	   is	   often	   used	   to	   connote	   both	  
internal	  and	  external	  pluralism.626	  
	  
Media	   pluralism	   can	   also	   be	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   both	   plurality	   of	   suppliers	  
(external	  pluralism)	  and	  diversity	  in	  the	  range	  of	  content	  (internal	  pluralism).	  
Plurality	   in	  the	  ownership	  of	  media	  outlets	  does	  not	  guarantee	  diversity	  of	  
content,	  but	  it	  does	  at	  least	  provide	  the	  possibility	  for	  media	  diversity.627	  The	  
number	   of	   media	   outlets	   that	   may	   ensure	   media	   plurality	   is	   context-­‐
dependent.	   It	  will	   depend,	   for	   instance,	   on	   the	   economics	   of	   the	   relevant	  
market,	   the	   type	   of	   owner,	   management	   strategies	   and	   consumer	  
preferences.628	   Brocas	   et	   al	   find	   that	   a	  market	   with	   four	   firms	   has	   better	  
information	   transmission	   than	   a	   market	   with	   two	   firms,	   and	   there	   is	   an	  
additional	  increase	  in	  efficiency	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  six	  independent	  firms.629	  
As	  will	  be	  seen,	  however,	  a	  purely	  quantitative	  approach	  does	  not	  have	  due	  
regard	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  media	  landscape.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623	  Rachael	  Craufurd	  Smith,	  ‘Bright-­‐Line	  versus	  Responsive	  Regulation:	  Some	  Thoughts	  from	  the	  United	  
Kingdom’	  in	  Robert	  Picard,	  Miklos	  Sukosd	  and	  Peggy	  Valcke,	  Media	  Pluralism	  and	  Diversity:	  Concepts,	  
Risks	  and	  Global	  Trends	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2015)	  311.	  
624	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  
(n	  618).	  
625	  Lesley	  Hitchens,	  ‘Reviewing	  Media	  Pluralism	  in	  Australia’	  in	  Picard,	  Sukosd	  and	  Valcke	  (n	  623)	  252.	  
626	   ibid.	   ‘Media	   Diversity,	   Competition	   and	   Market	   Structure:	   Discussion	   Paper’	   (Department	   of	  
Broadband,	   Communications	   and	   the	   Digital	   Economy,	   2011)	   11.	   The	   thesis	   generally	   uses	  media	  
pluralism	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  number	  of	  suppliers	  and	  media	  diversity	  to	  refer	  to	  diversity	  of	  content.	  
627	  Craufurd	  Smith	  (n	  623)	  312.	  
628	  ibid.	  
629	  Rachael	  Craufurd	  Smith	  and	  Damian	  Tambini,	  ‘Measuring	  Media	  Plurality	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  
(2012)	   4(1)	   Journal	   of	   Media	   Law	   35,	   59;	   Isabelle	   Brocas,	   Juan	   D	   Carrillo	   and	   Simon	   Wilkie,	   ‘A	  
Theoretical	  Analysis	  of	   the	   Impact	  of	  Local	  Market	  Structure	  on	  the	  Range	  of	  Viewpoints	  Supplied’	  
(FCC	   media	   study	   no.9,	   June	   2011)	   3	   <https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-­‐
307525A1.pdf>	  accessed	  30	  March	  2017.	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A	  more	  holistic	  approach	  is	  required	  in	  defining	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  
pluralism.	   This	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   study	   on	   monitoring	   media	   pluralism	  
commissioned	  by	  the	  European	  Commission.630	  The	  study	  employs	  a	  working	  
definition	   of	   media	   pluralism	   based	   on	   a	   range	   of	   factors	   including	   the	  
diversity	  of	  media	  supply,	  use	  and	  distribution	  in	  relation	  to	  ownership	  and	  
control,	  media	   types	   and	   genres,	   political	   viewpoints,	   cultural	   expressions,	  
and	  local	  and	  regional	  interests.631	  Such	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  demonstrates	  how	  
media	   pluralism	   cannot	   legitimately	   be	   reduced	   to	   purely	   quantitative	  
measures	  of	  concentration	  in	  ownership.632	  This	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  enduring	  
uncertainty	   regarding	   the	   relationship	  between	  diversity	  of	  ownership	  and	  
diversity	  of	  content.	  
	  
5.2.2	   Relationship	  between	  market	  concentration	  and	  diversity	  of	  content	  
Media	  market	  concentration	  can	  arise	  from	  the	  mono-­‐media	  merger	  of	  firms	  
at	  the	  same	  level	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  a	  particular	  media	  product,	  or	  cross-­‐media	  
mergers	  between	  firms	  at	  different	  levels	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  a	  particular	  media	  
product	  or	  different	  types	  of	  media.	  The	  consequent	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  
of	  media	  outlets	  may	  enable	  the	  merged	  firm	  to	  exercise	  market	  power	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  substantially	  lessens	  competition	  and	  perhaps	  reduces	  diversity	  of	  
content.	  By	  regulating	  the	  concentration	  of	  market	  power,	  the	  enforcement	  
of	   merger	   control	   rules	   can	   produce	   outcomes	   that	   support	   content	  
diversity.633	   However,	   the	   focus	   of	   merger	   control	   rules	   on	   safeguarding	  
against	   the	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   market	   power	   (as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630	  Professor	  Peggy	  Valcke	  et	  al,	  ‘Independent	  Study	  on	  Indicators	  for	  Media	  Pluralism	  in	  the	  Member	  
States	  -­‐	  Towards	  a	  Risk-­‐Based	  Approach’,	  Final	  Report,	  Annex	  III,	  UK	  Country	  Report	  (Prepared	  for	  the	  
European	   Commission	   Directorate-­‐General	   Information	   Society	   and	   Media,	   July	   2009)	   8	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.pdf>	  accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	  
631	  ibid	  5.	  
632	  ibid	  8.	  
633	  The	  Rt	  Hon	  Lord	  Justice	  Leveson,	   ‘An	   Inquiry	   into	  the	  Culture,	  Practices	  and	  Ethics	  of	  the	  Press:	  
Report’	   (The	   Stationary	   Office,	   November	   2012)	   182	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270939/0780_i.p
df>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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opposed	   to	   its	  mere	   existence),	  means	   that	   general	   competition	   law	  may	  
tolerate	  a	  level	  of	  market	  concentration	  that	  is	  considered	  undesirable	  from	  
a	  media	  plurality	  perspective.634	  	  
	  
Ownership	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  best	  proxy	  for	  viewpoints	  on	  the	  basis	  
that	   having	   editorial	   control	   and	   setting	   the	   news	   agenda	   places	   media	  
owners	  in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  what	  is	  said	  and	  how	  it	  is	  said.635	  Having	  a	  
number	  of	  different	  sources	  provides	  the	  possibility	  that	  new	  and	  different	  
voices	  may	   emerge.	   However,	   it	   does	   not	   guarantee	   diversity	   of	   content.	  
According	  to	  Hotelling’s	  principle	  of	  minimum	  differentiation,636	  where	  there	  
is	  non-­‐price	  competition	  in	  competitive	  markets	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  advertising-­‐
funded	  television,	  for	  instance),	  rational	  profit-­‐maximising	  firms	  will	  gravitate	  
towards	   supplying	   programmes	   aimed	   at	   the	   median	   of	   the	   spectrum	   of	  
consumer	  taste.637	  This	  principle	  remains	  relevant	  within	  the	  context	  of	  digital	  
broadcasting	  because,	  in	  an	  era	  of	  content	  abundance,	  user	  attention	  remains	  
scarce.638	  Certain	  types	  of	  programmes,	   like	  crime	  dramas,	  remain	  of	  mass	  
appeal	  and	  are	  widely	  replicated	  across	  networks.	  A	  number	  of	  channels	  may	  
therefore	  compete	  by	  sharing	  a	  market	  for	  one	  type	  of	  programme	  of	  mass	  
appeal	  and	  still	  be	  more	  profitable	  than	  if	  they	  were	  to	  individually	  provide	  
more	  niche	  content.	  	  
	  
The	   precise	   impact	   of	  market	   concentration	   on	   content	   diversity	   has	   long	  
provoked	  debate	   in	   academic	   and	  policy	  discourse.	  A	  US	   study	   in	   1992	  by	  
Owen	   and	   Wildman	   finds	   that	   in	   an	   advertising-­‐supported	   broadcast	  
economy	  with	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  channels,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  tendency	  towards	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634	  ibid.	  
635	   ‘Media	   Ownership	   Rules	   Review’	   (Ofcom,	   31	   July	   2009)	   paras	   2.5	   and	   2.7	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/91676/morrcondoc.pdf>	   accessed	   13	  
August	  2017.	  
636	  Harold	  Hotelling,	  ‘Stability	  in	  Competition’	  (1929)	  39(153)	  The	  Economic	  Journal	  41.	  
637	  ibid.	  
638	  See	  generally,	  Greg	  Taylor,	  ‘Scarcity	  of	  Attention	  for	  a	  Medium	  of	  Abundance’	  in	  Mark	  Graham	  and	  
William	  H	  Dutton,	  Society	  and	   the	   Internet:	  How	  Networks	  of	   Information	  and	  Communication	  are	  
Changing	  Our	  Lives	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2014)	  ch	  16.	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the	  duplication	  of	  content.639	  In	  a	  study	  commissioned	  in	  1997	  by	  the	  Council	  
of	  Europe,640	  Professor	  Gillian	  Doyle	  notes	  how	  the	  level	  of	  media	  pluralism	  
in	  any	  given	  market	  is	  influenced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  including	  the	  size	  
of	  the	  market,	  the	  number	  of	  autonomous	  suppliers,	  diversity	  at	  the	  content	  
level,	  and	  consolidation	  of	  editorial	  or	  other	  functions.641	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  
whilst	   diversity	   of	   ownership	   does	   not	   guarantee	   diversity	   of	   output,	   it	  
positively	  contributes	  to	  pluralism	  because	  “[e]ven	  if	  all	  suppliers	  choose	  to	  
rely	   on	   or	   share	   many	   of	   the	   same	   sources	   of	   content,	   their	   rivalry	   will	  
promote	  a	  culture	  of	  dissent	  which	  is	  healthy	  for	  democracy.”642	  	  
	  
A	  further	  study	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  almost	  a	  decade	  later	  
concludes	   there	   is	   not	   a	   strong	   link	   between	   market	   concentration	   and	  
content	   diversity.643	   It	   reports	   that	   highly	   concentrated	   markets	   can	  
demonstrate	   similar	   levels	   of	   content	   diversity	   as	   less	   concentrated	  
markets.644	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  contemporaneous	  study	  undertaken	  for	  
the	   European	   Commission	   which	   highlights	   how	   high	   market	   share	   or	  
concentration	  may	  be	  beneficial	  for	  funding	  certain	  types	  of	  programmes	  that	  
are	   considered	   to	   be	   important	   for	   pluralism.645	   Interestingly,	   expensive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639	  Owen	  and	  Wildman	  (n	  23).	  
640	  Gillian	  Doyle,	   ‘Media	   Consolidation	   in	   Europe:	   The	   Impact	   on	   Pluralism’	   (Council	   of	   Europe,	   19	  
January	  1998).	  
641	  ibid	  7.	  
642	  ibid	  32.	  
643	   David	  Ward,	   ‘Final	   Report:	   Study	   on	   the	   Assessment	   of	   Content	   Diversity	   in	   Newspapers	   and	  
Television	   in	   the	   Context	   of	   Increasing	   Trends	   Towards	   Concentration	   of	   Media	   Market’	  
(Commissioned	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  2006)	  4.	  
644	   ibid.	   This	   is	   supported	   by	   a	   number	   of	   empirical	   studies,	   including	   an	   early	   study	   on	   radio	  
broadcasting	   in	   the	  US	   by	   Steiner	  which	   found	   “a	   discriminating	  monopoly	   controlling	   all	   stations	  
would	   produce	   a	   socially	  more	   beneficial	   program	   pattern”,	   whilst	   “a	   collusive	   oligopoly,	   pooling	  
outlets	   and	   profits,	   would	   never	   engage	   in	   duplication”.	   Steiner	   (n	   184)	   206.	   In	   2001,	   Berry	   and	  
Waldfogel	   found	   that	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   radio	   broadcasters	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   increasing	   the	  
number	   of	   formats.	   Steven	   T	   Berry	   and	   Joel	   Waldfogel,	   ‘Do	   Mergers	   Increase	   Product	   Variety?	  
Evidence	  from	  Radio	  Broadcasting’	  (2001)	  116(3)	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  1009.	  
645	   ‘Impact	  Study	  of	  Measures	  (Community	  and	  National)	  concerning	  the	  Promotion	  of	  Distribution	  
and	   Production	   of	   TV	   Programmes	   provided	   for	   under	   Article	   25(a)	   of	   the	   TV	   Without	   Frontiers	  
Directive:	  Final	  Report’	   (David	  Graham	  and	  Associates	  Limited	  prepared	  for	  the	  Audiovisual,	  Media	  
and	   Internet	   Unit	   of	   the	   Information	   Society	   and	   Media	   Directorate-­‐General	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission,	   24	   May	   2005)	   section	   8.2.3	   <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-­‐detail/-­‐
/publication/34ea216b-­‐95ec-­‐4fdc-­‐8c6e-­‐3cff704ff0a3>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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drama	   series	   were	   included	   under	   this	   heading.646	   The	   relevance	   of	   the	  
concepts	  of	  media	  pluralism	  and	  diversity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  premium	  drama,	  
and	  premium	  content	  more	  generally,	  is	  somewhat	  contentious.	  
	  
5.2.3	   Relevance	  of	  pluralism	  and	  diversity	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  
Proceeding	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  media	  pluralism	  and	  diversity	  are	  integral	  to	  the	  
effective	  functioning	  of	  a	  democratic	  society,	  the	  association	  between	  these	  
concepts	  and	  content	  such	  as	  news	  and	  current	  affairs	  is	  uncontroversial.647	  
It	  is	  desirable	  that	  there	  is	  also	  diversity	  in	  respect	  of	  other	  types	  of	  content.	  
By	  contributing	  to	  the	  way	  that	  viewers	  as	  citizens	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  a	  
society,	  other	  genres	  (including	  movies	  and	  dramas)	  may	  assist	  in	  developing	  
the	  political	  discourse.	  However,	  where	  the	  primary	  function	  of	  content	  is	  to	  
entertain,	   the	   case	   for	   intervening	   in	   the	   market	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   media	  
diversity	  is	  arguably	  weaker.648	  Premium	  sport	  is	  different	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
the	  socio-­‐cultural	  functions	  of	  televised	  sport	  are	  difficult	  to	  dismiss	  (even	  if	  
one	  does	  not	  necessarily	  agree	  that	  such	  functions	  justify	  regulation	  to	  retain	  
the	  coverage	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  on	  FTA	  television).	  Interestingly,	  Ofcom	  
maintains	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  any	  plurality	  review	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  news	  and	  
current	  affairs,	  from	  which	  it	  expressly	  excludes	  sports	  news.649	  
	  
However,	   it	   is	  not	  necessarily	  clear	  where	  the	  boundary	  lies	  between	  news	  
and	  entertainment,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  sports	  coverage.	  It	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646	  ibid.	  
647	  Witness	  Statement	  of	  Vince	  Cable	   in	   the	  matter	  of	   the	  Leveson	   Inquiry,	  30	  April	  2012,	  para	  81	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp
-­‐content/uploads/2012/05/Witness-­‐Statement-­‐of-­‐Vince-­‐Cable-­‐MP.pdf>	  accessed	  17	  October	  2016.	  
648	  Pay-­‐TV	  has	  been	  distinguished	  from	  digital	  interactive	  television	  services	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  latter	  
are	   largely	  transactional	  or	   informational	  services,	  whilst	  pay-­‐TV	   is	  a	   largely	  entertainment	  service.	  
British	  Interactive	  Broadcasting/Open	  (Case	  IV/36.539)	  OJ	  L(1999)312/1	  [23].	  
649	  Ofcom	  takes	  this	  position	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  news	  and	  current	  affairs	  are	  the	  most	  relevant	  forms	  of	  
content	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  public	  policy	  goals	  of	  media	  plurality.	  This	  includes	  contributing	  to	  a	  
well-­‐functioning	  democratic	  society	  by	  informing	  citizens	  and	  preventing	  too	  much	  influence	  of	  one	  
media	  owner	  over	  the	  political	  process.	  ‘Measuring	  Media	  Plurality:	  Ofcom’s	  Advice	  to	  the	  Secretary	  
of	   State	   for	   Culture,	   Olympics,	   Media	   and	   Sport’	   (Ofcom,	   19	   June	   2012)	   para	   3.16	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0031/57694/measuring-­‐media-­‐plurality.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  given	  the	  way	  content	  is	  now	  supplied,	  it	  is	  often	  
difficult	   to	   isolate	   news	   from	   entertainment,	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   media	  
plurality	  should	  therefore	  be	  extended	  beyond	  news	  and	  current	  affairs.650	  
The	  same	  can	  also	  be	  said	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  content	  is	  now	  consumed.	  The	  
increasing	  consumption	  of	   live	  sports	  highlights	   in	  real	  time	  or	  near-­‐live	  on	  
mobile	  platforms	  (as	  a	  substitute	  or	  complement	  for	  watching	  live	  coverage	  
on	   television	   or	   a	   computer)	   raises	   fundamental	   questions	   as	   to	   what	  
constitutes	  “news”	  and	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  consuming	  content	  “live”.	  Ofcom’s	  
caution	   about	   extending	   the	   category	   of	   news	   and	   current	   affairs	   to	  
encompass	  sports	  news	  is	  understandable.	  However,	  a	  continued	  refusal	  to	  
include	  sports	  news	  within	  the	  category	  of	  news	  (at	  least	  as	  a	  form	  of	  “soft”	  
news)	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  ineffective	  or	  counter-­‐productive	  regulation	  by	  failing	  
to	  reflect	  market	  reality.	  
	  
5.3	   Merger	  Regulation	  and	  Media	  Ownership	  in	  the	  UK	  
Media	  mergers	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  subject,	  as	  in	  other	  sectors,	  to	  potential	  scrutiny	  
on	  competition	  grounds	  under	  the	  standard	  merger	  regime	  in	  the	  EA2002	  (as	  
amended	  by	  the	  CA2003).	  Where	  there	  is	  a	  concentration	  with	  a	  Community	  
dimension,	  the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  applies	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  
has	  sole	  jurisdiction	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  concentrations.651	  Despite	  this,	  the	  UK	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Digital,	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  can	  intervene	  in	  media	  
mergers	  at	  the	  UK	  and	  EU	  levels	  on	  public	  interest	  grounds.	  A	  media-­‐specific	  
public	  interest	  test	  can	  be	  desirable	  from	  a	  competition	  perspective	  since	  it	  
may	  facilitate	  mergers	  which	  might	  not	  otherwise	  take	  place.	  However,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
650	   Claire	   Enders	   evidence	   to	   the	   Leveson	   Inquiry,	   9	   July	   2012,	   para	   22	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp
-­‐content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-­‐by-­‐Claire-­‐Enders-­‐Enders-­‐Analysis.pdf>	   accessed	   17	   October	  
2016.	  
651	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  (n	  33)	  arts	  21(2)	  and	  21(3).	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UK	  test	  is	  not	  beyond	  criticism,	  particularly	  as	  regards	  the	  substantial	  degree	  
of	  discretion	  that	  is	  conferred	  in	  applying	  the	  test.652	  	  
	  
5.3.1	   Standard	  merger	  regime	  in	  the	  UK	  under	  the	  EA2002	  
The	   CMA	   bears	   primary	   responsibility	   for	   reviewing	   relevant	   merger	  
situations	  under	  the	  EA2002.	  A	  relevant	  merger	  situation	  arises	  where	  two	  or	  
more	  enterprises	  cease	  to	  be	  distinct,	  or	  where	  arrangements	  are	  in	  progress	  
or	  contemplation	  which,	  if	  carried	  into	  effect,	  will	  lead	  to	  enterprises	  ceasing	  
to	  be	  distinct.653	  Enterprises	  cease	   to	  be	  distinct	   if	   they	  are	  brought	  under	  
common	   ownership	   or	   control.654	   This	  may	   take	   the	   form	   of	   legal	   control	  
arising	  from	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  controlling	  interest,655	  de	  facto	  control	  over	  
commercial	   policy,656	   or	   the	   ability	   to	   materially	   influence	   commercial	  
policy.657	  Where	  enterprises	  cease	  to	  be	  distinct,	  a	  merger	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  
review	   if	   it	   satisfies	   the	   “turnover”	   test	   or	   the	   “share	   of	   supply”	   test.658	  
Relevant	   merger	   situations	   that	   qualify	   for	   review	   are	   assessed	   on	  
competition	  grounds	  by	  the	  CMA	  against	  the	  test	  of	  a	  substantial	  lessening	  of	  
competition.659	  A	  merger	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  substantial	  lessening	  of	  competition	  
when	   it	  has	  a	  “significant	  effect	  on	  rivalry	  over	   time,	  and	  therefore	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652	   See,	   Rachael	   Craufurd	   Smith,	   ‘Is	   the	  UK	   “Media	   Plurality	   Test”	   Fit	   for	   Purpose?’	   (15	   July	   2011)	  
<http://www.cfom.org.uk/2011/07/is-­‐the-­‐uk-­‐media-­‐plurality-­‐test-­‐fit-­‐for-­‐purpose/>	   accessed	   13	  
October	  2016.	  
653	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  ss	  23	  and	  33.	  
654	  ibid	  s	  26(1).	  
655	  ibid	  s	  26(2).	  A	  “controlling	  interest”	  refers	  to	  more	  than	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  voting	  rights	  at	  general	  
meeting	  (with	  a	  simple	  majority	  being	  required	  to	  pass	  an	  ordinary	  resolution).	  Companies	  Act	  2006,	  
s	  282.	  
656	  ibid	  s	  26(3).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  statutory	  definition	  of	  the	  “ability	  to	  control	  commercial	  policy”,	  
the	   CMA	   indicates	   that	   where	   shareholdings	   are	   widely	   dispersed,	   such	   control	   can	   arise	   with	   a	  
shareholding	  of	  around	  30	  per	  cent.	  ‘Anticipated	  acquisition	  by	  West	  Midlands	  Travel	  Limited	  of	  the	  
joint	  venture	  shares	  of	  Laing	  Infrastructure	  Holdings	  Limited	  and	  Ansaldo	  Transporti	  Sistemi	  Ferroviari	  
SpA	  in	  Altram	  LRT	  Limited’	  (CMA,	  5	  April	  2006)	  paras	  27	  and	  33.	  
657	  ibid	  s	  26(4).	  “Material	  influence”	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  conferred	  by	  a	  shareholding	  of	  more	  
than	  25	  per	  cent,	  since	  this	  is	  sufficient	  to	  block	  a	  special	  resolution.	  Companies	  Act	  2006,	  s	  283.	  Lower	  
shareholdings	  may	  suffice	  where	  there	  are	  indications	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  exercise	  material	  influence.	  	  
658	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  s	  23.	  ‘Merger	  Assessment	  Guidelines’	  (CMA,	  September	  2010)	  paras	  3.3.1	  and	  
3.3.3.	  
659	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  ss	  22(1)(b)	  and	  33(1)(b).	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competitive	  pressure	  on	  firms	  to	  improve	  their	  offer	  to	  customers	  or	  become	  
more	  efficient	  or	  innovative.”660	  	  
	  
5.3.1.1	  Review	  of	  turnover-­‐based	  thresholds	  for	  EU	  merger	  notifications	  
The	  turnover-­‐based	  jurisdictional	  threshold	  for	  the	  review	  of	  mergers	  in	  the	  
UK	   is	   satisfied	   where	   the	   annual	   UK	   turnover	   of	   the	   acquired	   enterprise	  
exceeds	   £70million.661	   Turnover	   is	   also	   relevant	   in	   determining	  whether	   a	  
concentration	  has	  a	  Community	  dimension	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  EU	  Merger	  
Regulation.662	   However,	   debate	   on	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   turnover-­‐based	  
thresholds	  for	  merger	  notifications	  is	  gathering	  pace.	  At	  the	  EU	  level,	  there	  is	  
additional	   concern	   about	   whether	   turnover-­‐based	   thresholds	   capture	   all	  
transactions	  that	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  competition	  in	  the	  Internal	  market.663	  
The	   turnover-­‐based	   thresholds	   in	   the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  are	   subject	   to	  
review	   under	   the	   European	   Commission’s	   consultation	   on	   procedural	   and	  
jurisdictional	  aspects	  of	  EU	  merger	  control.664	  
	  
Debate	  on	  the	  utility	  of	  turnover-­‐based	  jurisdictional	  thresholds	  is	  especially	  
pertinent	  in	  the	  digital	  economy.	  Acquisition	  targets	  that	  are	  emerging	  firms	  
may	  not	  as	  yet	  generate	  substantial	  turnover,	  but	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  highly	  
valued	  and	  represent	  a	  potentially	  important	  competitive	  force.665	  This	  was	  
evident	   from	   Facebook’s	   acquisition	   of	  WhatsApp	   in	   2014.666	  WhatsApp’s	  
turnover	  was	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  acquisition	  to	  constitute	  a	  concentration	  
with	  a	  Community	  dimension.	  Nevertheless,	  Facebook	  paid	  US€19billion	  for	  
WhatsApp,	   which	   indicated	   the	   significant	   future	   value	   that	   Facebook	  
expected	   to	   realise	   from	   the	   acquisition.	   The	   acquisition	   was	   ultimately	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660	  CMA	  Merger	  Assessment	  Guidelines	  (n	  658)	  para	  3.3.1.	  
661	  ibid	  para	  4.1.3.	  
662	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  (n	  33)	  art	  1.	  
663	  ‘Evaluation	  of	  Procedural	  and	  Jurisdictional	  Aspects	  of	  EU	  Merger	  Control:	  Consultation	  Document’	  
(European	  Commission,	  7	  October	  2016)	  20.	  
664	  ibid	  18-­‐26.	  
665	  ibid	  3.	  
666	  Facebook/WhatsApp	  (n	  58).	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reviewed	   by	   the	   European	   Commission	   after	   Facebook	   requested	   a	   “one-­‐
stop-­‐shop”	   review	   to	   avoid	   notifying	   multiple	   jurisdictions	   with	   different	  
requirements.667	   However,	   this	   case	   demonstrates	   how	   turnover	   is	   not	  
always	  the	  deciding	  factor	  that	  makes	  a	  target	  an	  attractive	  merger	  partner.	  
	  
Where	   the	   key	   factors	   are	   rather	   the	   target’s	   assets	   and/or	   ability	   to	  
innovate,668	   reliance	   on	   a	   turnover-­‐based	   threshold	   may	   prevent	   some	  
transactions	  from	  being	  reviewed.	  One	  option	  is	  to	  incorporate	  a	  transaction	  
value-­‐based	  threshold.	  This	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  high	  price	  that	  firms	  can	  
be	  willing	  to	  pay	  based	  on	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  future	  value	  of	  the	  assets	  of	  
target	  firms	  (regardless	  of	  current	  turnover).	  A	  shift	  in	  this	  direction	  is	  evident	  
from	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  a	  test	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ninth	  amendment	  to	  the	  
German	  Act	  against	  Restraints	  of	  Competition,	  which	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  9	  
June	  2017.	  
	  
Under	   the	   new	   threshold,	   a	   transaction	   will	   require	   clearance	   if:	   (i)	   the	  
transaction	  value	  exceeds	  EU€400million;	  and	   (ii)	   the	   target	  has	   significant	  
business	   activities	   in	   Germany.669	   The	   requirement	   that	   the	   target	   has	  
significant	  business	  activities	  in	  Germany	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  
transaction	   value-­‐based	   threshold	   is	   not	   drawn	   too	   widely.	   The	   European	  
Commission	   has	   consulted	   on	   a	   similar	   approach.670	   However,	   given	   the	  
difficulties	  in	  ascertaining	  that	  this	  requirement	  is	  satisfied	  where	  the	  target	  
is	  an	  emerging	  firm,	  the	  requirement	  should	  arguably	  apply	  to	  both	  target	  and	  
acquiring	  firms	  (as	  previously	  considered	  in	  Germany).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation	  (n	  33)	  art	  4(5).	  
668	   European	   Competition	   Commissioner	   Margrethe	   Vestager,	   ‘Refining	   the	   EU	   Merger	   Control	  
System’	   (Speech	   at	   the	   Studienvereinigung	   Kartellrecht,	   Brussels,	   10	   March	   2016)	  
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-­‐2019/vestager/announcements/refining-­‐
eu-­‐merger-­‐control-­‐system_en>	  accessed	  2	  May	  2017.	  
669	  The	  new	  threshold	  applies	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  existing	  turnover-­‐based	  thresholds	  under	  which:	  (i)	  
both	  parties	  must	  have	  a	  combined	  worldwide	  revenue	  of	  more	  than	  EU€500million;	  (ii)	  one	  party	  
must	  have	  German	  revenues	  of	  more	  than	  EU€25million;	  and	   (iii)	  another	  party	   to	  the	  transaction	  
must	  have	  German	  revenues	  of	  more	  than	  EU€5million.	  Act	  against	  Restraints	  of	  Competition,	  s	  35.	  
670	  European	  Commission	  (n	  663).	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Transaction	  value-­‐based	  thresholds	  should	  target	  mergers	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  
reviewed,	   without	   unduly	   increasing	   the	   regulatory	   burdens	   for	   emerging	  
firms	   or	   deterring	   efficiency-­‐enhancing	   consolidations.	   This	   will	   depend,	  
amongst	  other	  things,	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  individual	  country.	  
In	  turn,	  this	  will	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  scope	  for	  direct	  and	  indirect	  network	  
effects,	   economies	   of	   scale,	   and	   the	   possibilities	   for	   multi-­‐homing	   and	  
switching	   in	   the	   relevant	   industry.	  The	   threshold	   should	  also	  be	   subject	   to	  
regular	  review	  to	  account	  for	  the	  rapid	  rate	  of	  technological	  development	  in	  
the	  digital	  economy.	  	  
	  
The	  introduction	  of	  a	  transaction-­‐value	  based	  threshold	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  could	  
have	   implications	   for	  merger	  regulation	   in	   the	  UK	  come	  March	  2019	   if,	   for	  
instance,	  the	  UK	  joins	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  (“EEA”)	  because	  the	  EEA	  
Agreement	  replicates	  the	  substantive	  EU	  competition	  rules.671	  If	  the	  UK	  does	  
not	  join	  the	  EEA,	  merging	  parties	  may	  need	  to	  make	  multiple	  notifications	  for	  
transactions	  that	  satisfy	  the	   jurisdictional	   thresholds	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EU.	  
The	   commercial	   uncertainty	   that	   would	   arise	   from	   the	   risk	   of	   conflicting	  
decisions	   at	   the	  UK	   and	   EU	   levels	   renders	   this	   an	   area	   in	   need	   of	   serious	  
consideration,	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   the	   investment	   incentives	   on	  which	   the	  
future	  development	  of	  digital	  markets	  in	  the	  UK	  depends.	  
	  
5.3.2	   Intervention	  in	  merger	  situations	  under	  Section	  42	  of	  the	  EA2002	  
The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  may	  issue	  an	  Intervention	  Notice	  under	  Section	  42(2)	  
of	  the	  EA2002	  if	  “he	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  or	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  one	  or	  more	  
than	  one	  public	   interest	  consideration	   is	   relevant	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	   the	  
relevant	  merger	  situation”.672	  Once	  an	  Intervention	  Notice	  has	  been	  issued,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671	  Agreement	  on	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area	  OJ	  L(1994)1,	  pt	  IV,	  ch	  1.	  
672	  A	  Special	  Intervention	  Notice	  may	  be	  issued	  under	  Section	  59(2)	  of	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  if	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  has	  reasonable	  grounds	  for	  suspecting	  that	  it	  is	  or	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  special	  
merger	  situation	  has	  been	  or	  will	  be	  created.	  A	  “special	  merger	  situation”	  may	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
provision	  of	  broadcasting	  of	  any	  description,	  where	  at	   least	  25	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  broadcasting	  of	   that	  
description	   provided	   in	   the	   UK	   was	   provided	   by	   the	   person(s)	   by	   whom	   one	   of	   the	   enterprises	  
concerned	  was	   carried	   on.	   Assessment	   of	   the	  merger	   situation	  will	   then	   be	   limited	   to	   the	   public	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Ofcom	   has	   a	   duty	   to	   advise	   on	   any	   media	   public	   interest	   aspects	   of	   the	  
transaction.673	   Meanwhile,	   the	   CMA	   must	   investigate	   and	   report	   on	   any	  
relevant	  competition	  issues.674	  In	  deciding	  whether	  to	  make	  an	  adverse	  public	  
interest	  finding	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  relevant	  merger	  situation,675	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  is	  required	  to	  accept	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  CMA	  as	  to	  any	  anti-­‐competitive	  
outcome.676	  The	  relevant	  public	  interest	  considerations	  for	  broadcasting	  and	  
cross-­‐media	  mergers	  are	  set	  out	  in	  Section	  58(2C)	  of	  the	  EA2002	  (as	  inserted	  
by	  Section	  375	  of	  the	  CA2003).	  	  
	  
5.3.2.1	  Merger	  interventions	  on	  the	  media	  plurality	  ground	  
The	   first	   consideration	   in	   Section	   58(2C)(a)	   is	   the	   media	   plurality	   public	  
interest	  consideration.	  This	  specifies	  the	  need	  in	  relation	  to	  every	  different	  
audience	   in	   the	   UK,	   for	   there	   to	   be	   a	   “sufficient	   plurality	   of	   persons	  with	  
control	   of	   the	   media	   enterprises	   serving	   that	   audience”.677	   There	   is	   no	  
legislative	   definition	   of	   “sufficient	   plurality	   of	   persons”.	   However,	   the	  
Explanatory	  Notes	  to	  Section	  375	  of	  the	  CA2003	  state	  that	  Section	  58(2C)(a)	  
is	  “concerned	  primarily	  with	  ensuring	  that	  ownership	  of	  media	  enterprises	  is	  
not	  overly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  persons.”678	  This	  
is	   said	   to	   encompass	   the	   need	   for	   a	   diversity	   of	   viewpoints,	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  
sufficient	  number	  of	  views	  being	  expressed,	  but	  also	  “variety	  in	  those	  views	  
and	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  outlets	  and	  publications	  in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  
expressed.”679	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
interest.	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  ss	  59(3D)	  and	  59A	  (as	  inserted	  by	  Section	  378(1)	  of	  the	  Communications	  
Act	  2003).	  
673	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  s	  44A.	  
674	  ibid	  s	  44.	  
675	  ibid	  s	  54(2).	  
676	  ibid	  s	  54(7)(a).	  
677	   The	   other	   media	   public	   interest	   considerations	   include:	   (b)	   the	   need	   for	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
broadcasting	  throughout	  the	  UK	  which	  is	  of	  high	  quality,	  and	  calculated	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  
tastes	  and	  interests;	  and	  (c)	  the	  need	  for	  persons	  in	  control	  of	  and	  carrying	  on	  media	  enterprises	  to	  
have	   a	   genuine	   commitment	   to	   attaining	   the	   standards	   objectives	   set	   out	   in	   Section	   319	   of	   the	  
Communications	  Act	  2003.	  
678	  Explanatory	  Notes	  to	  the	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  para	  802.	  
679	   ‘Guidance	  on	  the	  Operation	  of	  the	  Public	   Interest	  Merger	  Provisions	  relating	  to	  Newspaper	  and	  
Other	   Media	   Mergers’	   (Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	   May	   2004)	   para	   5.11	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In	  ascertaining	  whether	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  plurality,	  
the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  therefore	  considers	  not	  simply	  the	  number	  of	  media	  
enterprises	  but	  also	  the	  relative	  audience	  shares	  of	  the	  media	  enterprises.680	  
Whilst	   the	   public	   interest	   considerations	   in	   Section	   58(2C)	   of	   the	   EA2002	  
elaborate	  somewhat	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  plurality,	  
there	   is	   considerable	   discretion	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   sufficiency	   of	  
plurality.	   Uncertainty	   as	   to	   the	   criteria	   for	   intervening	   on	   media	   public	  
interest	   grounds	   can	   undermine	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   such	   interventions,	  
particularly	   when	   the	   circumstances	   of	   a	   case	   suggest	   that	   such	   an	  
intervention	  appears	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  market	  forces.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  by	  
the	   circumstances	   surrounding	   the	   first	   Intervention	   Notice	   to	   be	   issued	  
under	  Section	  58(2C)(a),	   relating	   to	  Sky’s	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	   shares	   in	  
ITV.	  
	  
5.3.2.2	  Sky’s	  proposal	  to	  acquire	  a	  17.9	  per	  cent	  shareholding	  in	  ITV	  
On	  26	   February	   2007,	   an	   Intervention	  Notice	  was	   issued	   in	   respect	   of	   the	  
proposed	  acquisition	  by	  Sky	  of	  a	  17.9	  per	  cent	  shareholding	  in	  ITV.681	  Ofcom	  
reported	   concerns	   that	   following	   the	   acquisition	   there	   might	   not	   be	   a	  
sufficient	  plurality	  of	  persons	  with	  control	  of	  media	  enterprises	  serving	  the	  
UK	   cross-­‐media	   audience	   for	   national	   news	   or	   UK	   television	   audience	   for	  
national	  news.682	  The	  OFT	  concluded	  that	  Sky	  could	  acquire	  material	  influence	  
over	  ITV,683	  and	  this	  might	  substantially	  lessen	  competition	  in	  the	  television	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100512170615/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file1433
1.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
680	  ibid	  paras	  7.10-­‐7.11.	  
681	  David	  Saunders,	  ‘Intervention	  notice	  given	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  42	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002’,	  26	  February	  
2007	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110120022640/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file3801
7.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
682	  ‘Report	  for	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  44A	  of	  the	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  of	  British	  Sky	  
Broadcasting	   plc’s	   acquisition	   of	   17.9%	   shareholding	   in	   ITV	   plc’	   (Ofcom,	   27	   April	   2007)	   para	   5.1	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110120022633/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file3960
7.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
683	  ‘Acquisition	  by	  British	  Sky	  Broadcasting	  Group	  plc	  of	  a	  17.9	  per	  cent	  stake	  in	  ITV	  plc:	  Report	  to	  the	  
Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Trade	   and	   Industry’	   (OFT,	   27	   April	   2007)	   para	   5	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market	   as	   a	   whole.684	   It	   referred	   to	   the	   guidance	   notes	   of	   the	   then	  
Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  on	  the	  public	   interest	   in	  newspaper	  and	  
other	  media	  mergers.685	  These	  notes	  state	  that	  the	  analytical	  framework	  for	  
predicting	   post-­‐merger	   effects	   is	   to	   compare	   the	   predicated	   post-­‐merger	  
competitive	  outcome	  with	  the	  outcome	  absent	  the	  merger.686	  The	  best	  proxy	  
for	  the	  counterfactual	  is	  said	  to	  be	  prevailing	  competitive	  conditions	  on	  the	  
basis	   that	   these	   are	   observable	   and	   subject	   to	   verification	   from	   multiple	  
sources.687	  Also	   taken	   into	  account	  are	   likely	  and	   imminent	  changes	   in	   the	  
structure	  of	  competition.688	  
	  
The	  OFT	  relied	  on	  the	  counterfactual	  of	  an	  independent	  ITV.689	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  
referred	  to	  its	  finding	  in	  2002	  of	  Sky’s	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  paid-­‐
for	  premium	  sport	  and	  movie	  content	  at	  the	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  levels	  in	  the	  
UK.690	  However,	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  since	  this	  finding	  call	  
into	   question	   the	   use	   of	   an	   independent	   ITV	   as	   the	   appropriate	  
counterfactual.	  The	  most	  notable	  change	  is	  arguably	  the	  formation	  of	  Virgin	  
Media	   in	   2006,	   as	   Sky’s	   proposal	   to	   acquire	   ITV	   appeared	   to	   be	   aimed	   at	  
blocking	   a	   rival	   bid	   from	  Virgin	  Media.	   A	  more	   appropriate	   counterfactual	  
could	   have	   been	   the	   acquisition	   of	   ITV	   by	   Virgin	  Media.	   The	   OFT	   did	   not	  
consider	   Virgin	   Media’s	   acquisition	   of	   ITV	   to	   be	   likely	   and	   imminent.691	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  there	  should	  have	  been	  greater	  consideration	  
of	   the	   potentially	   countervailing	   impact	   of	   Virgin	  Media’s	   presence	   in	   the	  
market	  on	  the	  ability	  and	  incentive	  for	  Sky	  to	  exploit	  its	  market	  position	  in	  an	  
anti-­‐competitive	  manner.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/555de3c940f0b669c40000d3/SkyITV.pdf>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	  
684	  ibid	  para	  145.	  
685	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (n	  679).	  
686	  ibid	  para	  3.23.	  
687	  ibid	  para	  3.24.	  
688	  ibid.	  
689	  OFT	  (n	  683)	  para	  103.	  
690	  ibid	  para	  33.	  
691	  ibid	  para	  100.	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An	  arguably	  more	  constructive	  outcome	  of	  this	  case	  arises	  from	  the	  emphasis	  
that	   the	   CC	   placed	   on	   adopting	   a	   qualitative	   approach	   to	   assessing	   the	  
sufficiency	  of	  plurality	  of	  persons.	  The	  CC	  did	  not	  consider	  it	  necessary	  to	  take	  
a	  view	  on	  precisely	  how	  many	  owners	  would	  constitute	  a	  sufficient	  level	  of	  
plurality	  of	  persons.	  It	  instead	  looked	  qualitatively	  at	  sufficiency	  in	  terms	  of	  
internal	  and	  external	  plurality.692	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  concluded	  that	  the	  
transaction	  operated	  against	   the	  public	   interest	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  adverse	  
effect	  on	  competition.693	  Sky	  was	  consequently	  required	  to	  partially	  divest	  of	  
its	  shareholding	  in	  ITV	  to	  below	  7.5	  per	  cent.694	  	  
	  
On	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case,	   the	   transaction	   was	   found	   to	   raise	   competition	  
concerns.	  However,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  finding,	  it	  is	  clear	  how	  tension	  
could	   have	   arisen	   between	   regulating	   media	   mergers	   according	   to	   the	  
principles	  of	  competitive	  markets	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  plurality.	  
Resolving	   such	   tension	   would	   have	   been	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	  
substantial	  degree	  of	  discretion	  that	  prevails	   in	  assessing	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  
plurality	  of	  persons.	  
	  
5.3.3	   Issue	  of	  European	  Intervention	  Notices	  under	  Section	  67	  of	  the	  EA2002	  
As	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   EU’s	   exclusive	   competency	   in	   relation	   to	  
concentrations	  with	  a	  Community	  dimension,	  Article	  21(4)	  of	  the	  EU	  Merger	  
Regulation	  provides	  that	  Member	  States	  may	  take	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  
protect	  legitimate	  interests	  other	  than	  those	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  the	  
EU	  Merger	  Regulation.695	  Plurality	  of	  the	  media	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  legitimate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692	   ‘Acquisition	   by	   British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   Group	   plc	   of	   17.9	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   shares	   in	   ITV	   plc’	  
(Competition	   Commission,	   20	   December	   2007)	   para	   5.15	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110120022628/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file4321
8.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
693	  ‘Final	  decisions	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  &	  Regulatory	  Reform	  on	  British	  
Sky	   Broadcasting	   Group’s	   acquisition	   of	   a	   17.9%	   shareholding	   in	   ITV	   plc	   dated	   29	   January	   2008’	  
(Department	  for	  Business,	  Enterprise	  and	  Regulatory	  Affairs,	  29	  January	  2008).	  
694	  ibid	  para	  25.	  
695	   Such	   interests	   must	   still	   be	   compatible	   with	   the	   general	   principles	   and	   other	   provisions	   of	  
Community	  law.	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interests	   which	   are	   expressly	   referred	   to	   in	   Article	   21(4).696	   This	   applies	  
notwithstanding	  that	  the	  European	  Commission	  may	  find	  the	  transaction	  in	  
question	   does	   not	   raise	   competition	   concerns.	   It	   therefore	   reflects	  
recognition	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  that	  the	  broader	  importance	  of	  the	  media	  means	  
that	  it	  may	  warrant	  regulatory	  protection	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  beyond	  that	  
afforded	  by	  market	   forces	  and	  the	  enforcement	  of	  EU	  or	  domestic	  merger	  
control	  rules.	  
	  
The	  process	  for	  intervening	  on	  this	  basis	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  set	  out	  in	  Section	  67(2)	  
of	  the	  EA2002.	  This	  provides	  that	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  may	  issue	  a	  European	  
Intervention	  Notice	  if	  “he	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  or	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  one	  or	  
more	  than	  one	  public	  interest	  consideration	  is	  relevant	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  
the	  relevant	  merger	  situation”.697	  The	  first	  European	  Intervention	  Notice	  to	  
be	  issued	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  legitimate	  interest	  of	  media	  plurality	  was	  issued	  
on	   4	   November	   2010,	   in	   relation	   to	   News	   Corporation’s	   (subsequently	  
abandoned)	   proposal	   to	   acquire	   Sky	   (then	   BSkyB).698	   The	   European	  
Commission	  approved	  the	  transaction	  on	  competition	  grounds	  under	  the	  EU	  
Merger	  Regulation.699	  However,	  this	  was	  without	  prejudice	  to	  investigation	  in	  
the	  UK	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  transaction	  was	  compatible	  with	  the	  UK’s	  interest	  
in	  media	  plurality.	  The	  proposed	  acquisition	  by	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  of	  
Sky,	   which	   is	   currently	   being	   considered	   by	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State/CMA,	  
provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  how	  much	  the	  market	  has	  changed	  since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696	  Public	  security	  and	  prudential	  rules	  are	  the	  other	  legitimate	  interests	  referred	  to	  in	  Section	  21(4)	  
of	  the	  EU	  Merger	  Regulation.	  
697	  Once	  a	  European	  Intervention	  Notice	  has	  been	  issued,	  the	  CMA	  and	  Ofcom	  must	  investigate	  and	  
report	   in	   accordance	  with	   Articles	   4	   and	   4A	   of	   the	   Enterprise	   Act	   2002	   (Protection	   of	   Legitimate	  
Interests)	  Order	  2003,	  respectively.	  	  
698	  Andrew	  Rees,	  ‘European	  intervention	  notice	  given	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  67	  Enterprise	  Act	  2002	  –	  
anticipated	   acquisition	   of	   British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   plc	   by	   News	   Corporation’,	   4	   November	   2010	  
<http://old.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/bskyb-­‐intervention-­‐notice-­‐nov-­‐2010.pdf>	   accessed	  
24	  July	  2017.	  
699	  ‘Commission	  clears	  News	  Corp’s	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  BSkyB	  under	  EU	  merger	  rules’	  (European	  
Commission	  press	  release	  IP/10/1767,	  21	  December	  2010)	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐
10-­‐1767_en.htm>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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2010,	   and	   whether	   the	   prevailing	   regulatory	   framework	   permits	   due	  
consideration	  of	  such	  change.	  
	  
5.3.3.1	  News	  Corporation’s	  proposal	  in	  2010	  to	  acquire	  BSkyB	  
On	  the	  pluralism	  point,	  Ofcom	  concluded	  that	  News	  Corporation’s	  proposed	  
acquisition	   of	   BSkyB	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	   Sky)	   could	   be	   expected	   to	  
operate	  against	  the	  public	  interest.700	  It	  considered	  that	  there	  might	  not	  be	  a	  
sufficient	   plurality	   of	   persons	   with	   control	   of	   media	   enterprises	   providing	  
news	   and	   current	   affairs	   to	   UK-­‐wide,	   cross-­‐media	   audiences.701	   Notably,	  
sports	   news	  was	   expressly	   excluded	   from	  Ofcom’s	   definition	   of	   news	   and	  
current	   affairs.702	   After	   News	   Corporation	   proposed	   undertakings	   to	  
guarantee	  the	  independence	  of	  Sky’s	  24-­‐hour	  news	  channel,	  Ofcom	  conceded	  
on	  the	  plurality	  point.703	  	  
	  
As	  already	  noted,	  News	  Corporation	  was	  obliged	  to	  withdraw	  its	  bid	  at	  the	  
height	  of	  the	  phone	  hacking	  scandal	  surrounding	  the	  News	  of	  the	  World.704	  It	  
is	  likely	  that	  the	  merger	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  allowed	  to	  proceed.	  In	  
addition	   to	  highlighting	  how	  competition	   law	  does	  not	  necessarily	   address	  
concerns	  about	  media	  plurality,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  this	  case	  demonstrates	  the	  
limitations	   of	   the	   UK’s	   legal	   safeguards	   for	   preserving	   media	   pluralism.705	  
Exposure	   of	   the	   prevalence	   of	   unethical	   journalistic	   practices	   within	   the	  
British	  press	   led	   to	   the	  public	   inquiry	   chaired	  by	   Lord	   Justice	   Leveson.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700	  ‘Report	  on	  Public	  Interest	  Test	  on	  the	  Proposed	  Acquisition	  of	  British	  Sky	  Broadcasting	  Group	  plc	  
by	   News	   Corporation’	   (Ofcom,	   31	   December	   2010)	   para	   7.1	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/81413/public-­‐interest-­‐test-­‐report.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
701	  ibid.	  
702	  ibid	  para	  3.7.	  
703	  Letter	  from	  Ofcom	  to	  the	  Rt	  Hon	  Jeremy	  Hunt	  (then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Culture,	  Olympics,	  Media	  
and	   Sport)	   22	   June	   2011	   <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/78421/uils-­‐
further-­‐advice.pdf>	  accessed	  4	  April	  2017.	  
704	  ‘News	  Corp	  withdraws	  bid	  for	  BSkyB’	  BBC	  News	  (13	  July	  2011)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-­‐14142307>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
705	  Paul	  Smith,	  ‘Too	  Much	  or	  Not	  Enough:	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Television	  Broadcasting	  Regulation	  in	  
the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (2013)	  9(3)	  Westminster	  Papers	  143,	  153.	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terms	   of	   reference	   for	   Part	   1	   of	   the	   Inquiry	   included	   to	   make	  
recommendations	   “for	   a	   new	  more	   effective	   policy	   and	   regulatory	   regime	  
which	  supports	  […]	  the	  plurality	  of	  the	  media”.706	  The	  report	  for	  Part	  1	  of	  the	  
Inquiry,	  which	  was	  published	  on	  29	  November	  2012,	  acknowledges	  the	  need	  
for	  a	  more	  pluralistic	  press.707	  However,	   it	  deferred	  to	  the	  UK	  Government	  
and	  Parliament	  on	  the	  specifics	  of	  media	  pluralism,	  including	  the	  meaning	  of	  
“sufficiency	  of	  plurality”.708	  	  
	  
Ofcom’s	  conclusions	  relating	  to	  News	  Corporation’s	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  
Sky	  were	  based	  on	  the	  finding	  that,	  despite	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Internet,	  
traditional	  broadcast	  television	  (more	  specifically,	  the	  BBC)	  remains	  dominant	  
in	  the	  consumption	  of	  news.709	  The	  BBC	  was	  found	  to	  account	  for	  the	  largest	  
proportion	   of	   news	  minutes	   consumed	   per	   head	   per	   day	   by	   platform	   and	  
provider	  at	  43.5	  per	  cent,	  compared	  to	  23.7	  per	  cent	  for	  a	  combined	  News	  
Corporation	  and	  Sky.710	  Also,	  the	  consumption	  of	  news	  online	  was	  found	  to	  
be	  consumed	  largely	  via	  the	  websites	  of	  traditional	  broadcasters.	  Traditional	  
broadcasters	   (including	  the	  online	  services	  of	  the	  same)	  remain	  overall	   the	  
most	  popular	  source	  for	  news	  consumption	  in	  the	  UK,	  with	  the	  BBC	  retaining	  
a	  weekly	   reach	  of	  66	  per	  cent	  across	   television	  and	  radio,	  and	  51	  per	  cent	  
online.711	  Also,	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  BBC’s	  online	  users	  say	  that	  BBC	  News	  is	  their	  
main	  source	  of	  online	  news.712	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   Leveson	   Inquiry,	   ‘Terms	   of	   Reference:	   Part	   1’,	   para	   2(a)	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ab
out/terms-­‐of-­‐reference/>	  accessed	  14	  October	  2016.	  
707	  Report	  of	  the	  Leveson	  Inquiry	  (n	  633).	  
708	   ‘Measurement	   Framework	   for	   Media	   Plurality’	   (Ofcom,	   5	   November	   2015)	   para	   2.9	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/84174/measurement_framework_for_me
dia_plurality_statement.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  October	  2016.	  
709	  Ofcom	  (n	  700)	  para	  5.28.	  
710	  ibid	  59.	  
711	  Richard	  Fletcher,	  David	  AL	  Levy,	  Nic	  Newman	  and	  Rasmus	  Kleis	  Nielsen,	  ‘Reuters	  Institute	  Digital	  
News	  Report	  2016’	  (University	  of	  Oxford	  Reuters	  Institute	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Journalism,	  undated)	  34	  
<https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital-­‐News-­‐Report-­‐2016.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
712	  ibid.	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However,	   there	   is	   increasing	   demand	   for	   online	   news,	   especially	   from	  
alternative	   sources.	   This	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   strategic	   decision	   of	   The	  
Independent	  in	  2016	  to	  close	  its	  print	  operations	  and	  to	  embrace	  an	  online-­‐
only	  future.713	  This	  decision	  is	  made	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  media	  
(like	  Facebook	  and	  Twitter)	  and	  digital	  publishers	  that	  often	  focus	  more	  on	  
issues	  that	  receive	  less	  (if	  any)	  coverage	  by	  traditional	  broadcast	  media.	  This	  
makes	   it	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   print	   publishers	   to	   attract	   and	  monetise	  
readers.714	  This	  trend	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  consumption	  preferences	  of	  millenials,	  
for	  whom	  social	  media	  has	  overtaken	  traditional	  broadcast	  television	  as	  their	  
main	  source	  of	  news.715	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  there	   is	  also	  the	  
issue	   of	  multi-­‐homing	   by	   viewers.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   such	   developments,	   it	   is	  
important	   that	   sufficient	   emphasis	   is	   placed	   on	   dynamic	   analysis	   in	   the	  
ongoing	  assessment	  of	  the	  proposed	  acquisition	  by	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  
of	  the	  remaining	  shares	  in	  Sky.	  
	  
5.3.3.2	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox’s	  proposal	  to	  acquire	  the	  remaining	  shares	  in	  Sky	  
In	   April	   2017,	   the	   European	   Commission	   unconditionally	   approved	   the	  
proposal	  by	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  to	  purchase	  the	  remaining	  shares	  in	  Sky	  
that	   it	  does	  not	  already	  own.716	   It	  found	  that	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  and	  
Sky	   are	  mainly	   active	   in	   different	  markets	   in	   the	   relevant	  Member	   States	  
(Austria,	   Germany,	   Ireland,	   Italy	   and	   the	   UK).	   The	   parties	   were	   found	   to	  
compete	  with	  one	  another	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  extent,	  mainly	  in	  the	  acquisition	  
of	  television	  content	  and	  the	  wholesale	  supply	  of	  basic	  pay-­‐TV	  channels.717	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  first	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  newspaper	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  future’	  
The	   Independent	   (12	   February	   2016)	   <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/the-­‐
independent-­‐becomes-­‐the-­‐first-­‐national-­‐newspaper-­‐to-­‐embrace-­‐a-­‐global-­‐digital-­‐only-­‐future-­‐
a6869736.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
714	  Mark	  Sweney,	  ‘Facebook’s	  rise	  as	  news	  source	  hits	  publishers’	  revenues’	  The	  Guardian	   (15	  June	  
2016)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jun/15/facebooks-­‐news-­‐publishers-­‐reuters-­‐
institute-­‐for-­‐the-­‐study-­‐of-­‐journalism>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
715	   ‘Social	   media	   “outstrips	   TV”	   as	   news	   source	   for	   young	   people’	   BBC	   News	   (15	   June	   2016)	  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐36528256>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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The	   European	   Commission	   concluded	   that	   the	   transaction	   was	   therefore	  
likely	  to	  lead	  to	  only	  a	  limited	  increase	  in	  Sky’s	  share	  of	  these	  markets.718	  
	  
The	  European	  Commission’s	  decision	   is	  without	  prejudice	   to	   the	  European	  
Intervention	  Notice	  that	  was	  issued	  in	  the	  UK	  on	  16	  March	  2017.719	  In	  lieu	  of	  
a	  reference	  to	  the	  CMA	  for	  a	  Phase	  2	  investigation,	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  
and	  Sky	  proposed	  undertakings	  (which	  are	  discussed	  below).720	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  Karen	  Bradley	  stated	  she	  was	  minded-­‐not-­‐to	  accept	  such	  undertakings	  
and	  was	  instead	  minded-­‐to	  refer	  the	  proposed	  acquisition	  on	  media	  plurality	  
grounds.721	  This	  thesis	  welcomes	  the	  recent	  findings	  of	  the	  CMA	  and	  Ofcom	  
(to	  the	  extent	  that	  Ofcom	  supports	  such	  a	  referral).722	  It	  takes	  issue,	  however,	  
with	   some	   points	   made	   in	   Ofcom’s	   report	   on	   the	   basis	   that,	   rather	   than	  
resolve	   questions	   about	   media	   plurality,	   developments	   in	   the	   supply	   and	  
consumption	  of	  audio-­‐visual	  content	  arguably	  raise	  additional	  questions.	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719	   This	   intervention	   is	   made	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   media	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   commitment	   to	  
broadcasting	   standards	   under	   Sections	   58(2C)(a)	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  67	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  Act	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  Fox,	  Inc.’	  (Rt	  Hon	  Karen	  Bradley	  MP,	  
Secretary	   of	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   for	   Culture,	   Media	   and	   Sport,	   16	   March	   2017)	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/600344/Europea
n_Intervention_Notice_Sky_Fox__16_March_2017.pdf>	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  5	  April	  2017.	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  accessed	  31	  July	  2017.	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  State’s	  decision	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  the	  proposed	  takeover	  of	  Sky	  plc	  by	  21st	  
Century	   Fox,	   Inc.’	   <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/skyfox-­‐merger>	   accessed	   24	   July	  
2017.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  has	  since	  confirmed	  her	  intention	  to	  make	  a	  referral	  to	  the	  CMA	  on	  the	  
grounds	  of	  media	  plurality	  ground	  and	  genuine	  commitment	  to	  broadcasting	  standards.	  Statement	  
from	  the	  Culture	  Secretary	  (n	  75).	  
722	  ‘Public	  interest	  test	  for	  the	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  Sky	  plc	  by	  21st	  Century	  Fox,	  Inc:	  Ofcom’s	  report	  
to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State’	   (Ofcom,	   20	   June	   2017)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/103620/public-­‐interest-­‐test-­‐report.pdf>	  
accessed	  13	  August	  2017;	  ‘A	  report	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	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  Media	  and	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  in	  response	  
to	  the	  European	  intervention	  notice	  issued	  on	  16	  March	  2017	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  anticipated	  acquisition	  
by	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox,	   Inc	   of	   Sky	   PLC’	   (CMA,	   20	   June	   2017)	  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623569/170620_C
F_Sky_-­‐_CMA_report_Redacted.pdf>	  accessed	  13	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  2017.	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Ofcom	  considers	  that	  the	  proposed	  transaction	  raises	  public	  interest	  concerns	  
about	  the	  risk	  of	  increased	  influence	  of	  the	  Murdoch	  Family	  Trust	  over	  the	  UK	  
news	  agenda	  and	  political	  process.723	  This	  is	  a	  legitimate	  concern,	  given	  the	  
scale	  of	   the	  merged	  entity,	  and	   its	   reach	  across	  print,	   radio,	   television	  and	  
online.	   It	   is	   understood	   that	   the	  Murdoch	   Family	   Trust	  would	  become	   the	  
third	   biggest	   provider	   of	   news	   in	   the	   UK	   (behind	   only	   the	   BBC	   and	  
Independent	   Television	   News).724	   Yet	   Ofcom	   considers	   that	   the	   proposed	  
undertakings	  in	  lieu	  would	  prevent,	  remedy	  or	  mitigate	  any	  adverse	  effects	  
on	   media	   plurality.725	   It	   is	   suggested	   here,	   however,	   that	   the	   proposed	  
remedies	  appear	  inadequate	  in	  their	  current	  form.	  This	  reinforces	  questions	  
about	   Ofcom’s	   role,	   albeit	   advisory,	   under	   the	   prevailing	   regulatory	  
framework	  (in	  a	  media	  system	  that	  was	  ultimately	  not	  cleared	  by	  Leveson	  as	  
being	  fit	  for	  purpose).	  	  
	  
The	  proposed	  remedies	  are	  behavioural	  in	  nature.	  They	  include	  commitments	  
to	  maintain	  and	  ring-­‐fence	  funding	  for	  a	  Sky-­‐branded	  news	  service	  for	  a	  5-­‐
year	  period,	  and	  to	  have	  a	  separate	  editorial	  board	  for	  Sky	  News.	  News	  Corp	  
claims	  the	  rise	  in	  online	  news	  (e.g.	  Facebook	  and	  Huffington	  Post)	  has	  diluted	  
its	   power	   over	   the	   supply	   of	   news	   in	   the	   UK.	   However,	   Ofcom	   found	   the	  
opposite,	  namely	  that	  News	  Corp’s	  most	  popular	  title,	  The	  Sun,	  continues	  to	  
grow	   and	   remains	   the	  most	  widely	   read	   daily	   printed	   newspaper	   in	  Great	  
Britain.726	  With	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  Internet	  users	  in	  the	  UK	  consuming	  news	  online	  
via	  The	  Sun	  or	  Sky	  News,	  following	  the	  transaction	  the	  Murdoch	  Family	  Trust	  
would	  have	  material	  influence	  over	  news	  providers,	  with	  a	  combined	  reach	  
second	  only	  to	  that	  of	  the	  BBC.727	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  Ofcom	  (n	  722)	  4.	  
724	  ibid	  para	  1.5.	  
725	  ibid	  6.	  
726	  ibid	  paras	  6.1.4	  and	  6.15.	  
727	  ibid	  para	  2.10.4.	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The	  5-­‐year	  period	  of	  the	  proposed	  commitments	  is	  notably	  half	  the	  10-­‐year	  
period	  that	  News	  Corporation	  proffered	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  proposed	  acquisition	  
of	  Sky	  in	  2010.	  After	  the	  expiry	  of	  the	  5-­‐year	  period,	  News	  Corp	  could	  retain	  
such	  a	  service	  but	  the	  funding	  would	  not	  need	  to	  be	  ring-­‐fenced.	  This	  could	  
undermine	   the	   independence	   and/or	   quality	   of	   the	   Sky	  News	   service.	   The	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  proposed	  commitments	  would	  ensure	  the	  independence	  
of	  the	  proposed	  board	  is	  also	  questionable.	  For	  instance,	  the	  board	  members	  
would	  be	  selected	  by	  the	  Nominating	  and	  Corporate	  Governance	  Committee	  
of	   the	   board	   of	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox,728	   and	   the	   board	   would	   have	  
obligations	   to	   report	   to	   the	   board	   of	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox.729	   Given	  
general	   concerns	   about	   the	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   of	   behavioural	  
remedies,	   the	   focus	   should	   arguably	   be	   on	   securing	   structural	   remedies,	  
including	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  separate	  company	  for	  Sky	  News	  (as	  required	  by	  
Ofcom	  in	  relation	  to	  News	  Corporation’s	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  Sky	  in	  2010).	  
	  
The	  main	   question	   remains	   as	   it	   stood	   at	   the	   time	   of	   News	   Corporation’s	  
proposed	  acquisition	  of	  Sky,	   that	   is	  whether	  a	  Fox-­‐owned	  Sky	  News	  would	  
give	   the	  Murdoch	   Family	   Trust	   excessive	   influence	   over	   UK	   news	   and	   the	  
political	  agenda	  when	  combined	  with	  its	  other	  media	  operations.	  Additional	  
considerations	   that	   have	   arisen	   since	   News	   Corporation’s	   proposed	  
acquisition	  of	  Sky	  include	  questions	  about	  the	  impartiality	  of	  Fox	  News	  (the	  
US	   cable	   and	   satellite	   television	   news	   channel	   owned	   by	   the	   Fox	  
Entertainment	  Group	  (which	  is	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox)),	  and	  
the	  increased	  role	  of	  the	  Internet	  in	  the	  supply	  and	  consumption	  of	  news.	  The	  
increasing	  supply	  and	  consumption	  of	  news	  online	  reinforces	  questions	  about	  
the	  meaning	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  plurality,	  such	  as	  the	  definition	  
and	  measurement	  of	   “control”,	   and	   the	   impact	  of	  online	  news	   sources	  on	  
viewer	  “choice”.	  There	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  more	  attention	  should	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
728	  n	  720,	  para	  4.1(i).	  
729	  ibid	  para	  4.1(iv).	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paid	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  news,	  given	  
that	  online	  and	  social	  media	  platforms	  (like	  Google,	  Facebook	  and	  Twitter)	  do	  
not	   produce	   news	   items	   as	   such,	   but	   rather	   provide	   a	   platform	   to	   direct	  
viewers	  to	  news	  items	  produced	  by	  others.	  Little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  this	  may	  be	  improving	  the	  options	  open	  to	  viewers	  in	  their	  capacity	  
as	  consumers	  or	  citizens.	  	  
	  
Following	  Sky’s	  acquisition	  of	  Telefónica	  UK’s	  O2	  and	  BE	  broadband	  (which	  
was	   part	   of	   O2)	   and	   fixed-­‐line	   telephony	   business	   in	   2013,730	   Sky	   has	  
positioned	  itself	  well	  to	  be	  able	  to	  supply	  broadband	  as	  a	  standalone	  service	  
or	  as	  part	  of	  a	  bundle	  of	  services	  including	  pay-­‐TV.	  Ofcom	  reports	  that,	  as	  at	  
the	   end	   of	   2015,	   Sky	   served	   almost	   one	   quarter	   of	   the	   UK’s	   home	   fixed	  
broadband	  market,	  with	  a	  23	  per	  cent	  market	  share.731	  Sky	  is	  also	  active	  in	  
the	  mobile	  market	  following	  its	  launch	  of	  Sky	  Mobile	  in	  November	  2016.	  Sky	  
Mobile	   focuses	   on	   offering	   data	   plans	   for	   high	   quality	   streaming	   and	  
downloads,	   allowing	   customers	   to	   “roll	   over”	   unused	  data	   for	   up	   to	   three	  
years.732	   This	   reflects	   the	   increasing	   dependence	   of	   viewers	   on	   Internet	  
access	   in	  the	  consumption	  of	  audio-­‐visual	  content.	  The	  resulting	   impact	  on	  
the	  relative	  position	  of	  Sky	  as	  a	  gatekeeper	  for	  access	  to	  content	  (particularly	  
sports	   news	   and	  movies)	   should	   be	   a	   chief	   consideration	   in	   reviewing	   the	  
likely	  effects	  of	  the	  proposed	  acquisition	  on	  the	  broader	  media	  landscape.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
730	  This	  acquisition	  was	  announced	  a	  month	  after	  the	  announcement	  of	  BT’s	  acquisition	  of	  EE.	  ‘Sky	  to	  
Acquire	   Telefónica	   UK’s	   Broadband	   and	   Fixed-­‐Line	   Telephony	   Business’	   (O2	   news,	   1	  March	   2013)	  
<http://news.o2.co.uk/?press-­‐release=sky-­‐to-­‐acquire-­‐telefonica-­‐uks-­‐broadband-­‐and-­‐fixed-­‐line-­‐
telephony-­‐business>	  accessed	  3	  May	  2017.	  
731	   ‘Ofcom	   Facts	   &	   Figures	   2016’	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/12828/facts-­‐figures-­‐table16.pdf>	  accessed	  
3	  May	  2017.	  
732	  Andrew	  Griffin,	   ‘Sky	  Mobile	   launches,	  hoping	  to	  fix	  everything	  wrong	  with	  phone	  contracts’	  The	  
Independent	   (29	   November	   2016)	   <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-­‐style/gadgets-­‐and-­‐
tech/news/sky-­‐mobile-­‐launch-­‐phone-­‐network-­‐date-­‐price-­‐tariff-­‐offers-­‐best-­‐deal-­‐data-­‐
a7446211.html>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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The	  acquisition	  of	  Sky	  by	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  would	  see	  the	  UK’s	  largest	  
pay-­‐TV	  provider	  fully	  controlled	  by	  a	  US	  firm.	  It	  would	  enable	  a	  single	  person	  
(i.e.	   the	  Murdoch	   Family	   Trust)	   to	   secure	   control	   of	   Sky	  News	   and	  pay-­‐TV	  
operations	  in	  the	  UK.	  Its	  UK	  news	  media	  outlets	  already	  include	  The	  Times,	  
The	   Sunday	   Times	   and	  The	   Sun,	   as	  well	   as	   radio	   group	   TalkSport	   (which	   it	  
controls	   through	  News	  Corp).	   It	   has	  been	   suggested	  elsewhere	   that,	   given	  
News	   Corp’s	   continuing	   domination	   of	   newspaper	   circulation,	   further	  
expansion	   of	   its	   power	   should	   be	   a	   cause	   for	   concern.733	   In	   view	   of	   the	  
increasing	   consumption	   of	   news	   online	   and	   Sky’s	   growth	   as	   an	   internet	  
service	   provider,	   it	   is	   suggested	   here	   that	   such	   concerns	   merit	   serious	  
consideration.	  
	  
Bundling	  raises	  further	  issues	  here,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  sports	  coverage.	  
The	  proposed	   transaction	   could	   strengthen	   the	   ability	   of	   Sky,	   Twenty-­‐First	  
Century	  Fox	  and/or	  News	  Corp	   to	  bundle	   content	  and	   services.	  As	  already	  
noted,	   Ofcom’s	   prevailing	   approach	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   news	   and	   current	  
affairs	  is	  to	  exclude	  sports	  news.	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  the	  impact	  
of	  sports	  coverage	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  attract	  and	  retain	  audiences	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
under-­‐estimated.734	   This	   reinforces	   the	   case	   for	   extending	   the	   category	   of	  
news	  and	  current	  affairs	  to	  include	  sports	  news.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  as	  owner	  of	  the	  Fox	  Entertainment	  Group,	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  
Fox	   has	   control	   over	   the	   broadcast	   rights	   to	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   premium	  
movies.	   It	  may	  be	  able	  to	  exploit	  such	  control	   in	  negotiations	  with	  services	  
that	   depend	   on	   Sky’s	   carriage	   to	   almost	   a	   quarter	   of	   UK	   households.	   This	  
could	  restrict	  the	  relative	  ability	  of	  other	  movie	  distributors	  to	  access	  viewers,	  
with	   possible	   adverse	   effects	   on	  media	   plurality	   and/or	   content	   diversity.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733	  Steven	  Barnett,	  Martin	  Moore	  and	  Damian	  Tambini,	  ‘Media	  plurality,	  the	  Fox-­‐Sky	  bid,	  and	  the	  case	  
for	   referral	   to	  Ofcom’	   (London	  School	  of	  Economics	  Media	  Policy	  Project	  media	  policy	  brief	  no.18,	  
March	   2017)	   14	   <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/files/2013/09/LSE-­‐MPP-­‐Policy-­‐Brief-­‐18-­‐
Media-­‐Plurality.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
734	  Ofcom	  (n	  722)	  para	  A2.94.	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There	   is	  also	   the	  possibility	   that	   this	   could	   stifle	   innovation	  and	   the	   future	  
development	  of	  online	  media	  services	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  
This	   is	  another	  area	  that	  requires	  particular	  attention	   in	  the	   light	  of	  Brexit.	  
Exceptions	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   net	   neutrality,	   for	   example,	   are	   strictly	  
regulated	  at	  the	  EU	  level.735	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  rules	  in	  this	  area	  may	  
apply	  in	  the	  UK	  from	  March	  2019.	  Brexit	  may	  require	  the	  UK	  to	  set	  out	  its	  own	  
net	   neutrality	   guidance.	   This	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   informed	   by	   the	   EU	   approach.	  
However,	  there	  could	  be	  the	  opportunity	  to	  address	  some	  loopholes,	  such	  as	  
whether	  zero-­‐rating	  (where	  providers	  offer	  services	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  £0)	  is	  allowed.	  	  
	  
5.4	   Media	  Ownership	  and	  Merger	  Regulation	  in	  Australia	  
Media	  mergers	  in	  Australia	  are	  subject	  to	  media-­‐specific	  ownership	  rules	  in	  
the	  BSA	  and	  potential	  scrutiny	  under	  the	  standard	  merger	  regime	  in	  the	  CCA.	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  UK	  merger	  regime,	  there	  is	  no	  provision	  for	  intervening	  in	  
media	   mergers	   on	   public	   interest	   grounds.	   The	   introduction	   of	   a	   media-­‐
specific	  public	  interest	  test	  in	  Australia	  was	  proposed	  over	  15	  years	  ago,	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  proposals	  made	  by	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  in	   its	  report	  on	  
broadcasting.736	  More	  recently,	  it	  featured	  as	  a	  key	  recommendation	  of	  the	  
Convergence	   Review.737	   As	   in	   the	   UK,	   fundamental	   questions	   about	   who	  
should	  decide	  when	  a	  media	  market	  is	  excessively	  concentrated,	  and	  on	  what	  
basis,	  arise	   in	   relation	  to	   the	  test	  proposed	  by	   the	  Convergence	  Review.738	  
However,	   it	  will	  be	  suggested	   that	  a	  modified	  version	  of	   the	  UK	   test	  could	  
serve	  as	  a	  model	  for	  Australia,	  and	  a	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  test	  could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735	  Regulation	  (EU)	  2015/2120	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  25	  November	  2015	  
laying	   down	   measures	   concerning	   open	   internet	   access	   and	   amending	   Directive	   2002/22/EC	   on	  
universal	  service	  and	  users’	  rights	  relating	  to	  electronic	  communications	  networks	  and	  services	  and	  
Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  531/2012	  on	  roaming	  on	  public	  mobile	  communications	  networks	  within	  the	  Union	  
[2015]	  OJ	  L310/1.	  
736	   ‘Broadcasting’	   (Productivity	   Commission	   Inquiry	   Report,	   3	   March	   2000)	  
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/broadcasting/report/broadcst.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  
2017.	  
737	  Convergence	  Review	  Report	  (n	  77)	  18,	  21.	  
738	  ibid.	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be	  used	  to	  address	  concerns	  about	  local	  media	  ownership	  in	  place	  of	  retaining	  
media	  ownership	  rules	  that	  have	  become	  technologically-­‐obsolete.	  
	  
5.4.1	   Australian	  media	  ownership	  regulation	  under	  the	  BSA	  
A	  policy	  of	  media	  diversity	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  legislative	  objectives	  of	  the	  BSA,	  
which	   refer	   to	   the	   availability	   of	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   radio	   and	   television	  
services	  offering	  entertainment,	  education	  and	  information,	  and	  diversity	  in	  
the	   control	  of	  broadcasting	   services.739	   The	   rules	  on	  media	  ownership	  and	  
control	   in	   the	  BSA	  do	  not	   directly	   apply	   to	   pay-­‐TV,	   but	   they	   are	   pertinent	  
because	   of	   their	   inherent	   impact	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   broader	   media	  
industry.	  The	  BSA	  made	  two	  major	  changes	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  ownership	  
of	  television	  broadcasting	  in	  Australia.	  Firstly,	  media	  ownership	  was	  limited	  
to	  one	  of	  the	  three	  regulated	  media	  platforms	  (print	  newspapers,	  radio	  and	  
television)	  in	  a	  given	  market	  under	  the	  “one	  to	  a	  market”	  rule	  for	  commercial	  
television	  broadcasting	   licences.740	  Secondly,	   the	   threshold	   restriction	  on	  a	  
person	  controlling	  commercial	  television	  broadcasting	  licences	  serving	  more	  
than	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  of	  Australia,741	  was	   increased	  to	  75	  per	  
cent	   under	   what	   is	   now	   known	   as	   the	   “75	   per	   cent	   reach”	   rule.742	   This	  
previously	   replaced	   a	   restriction	  on	   a	   person	   from	  owning	  more	   than	   two	  
stations.	   The	   effect	   of	   this	   was	   to	   separate	   television	   licences	   into	  
metropolitan	  networks	  (Seven,	  Nine	  and	  Ten)	  and	  regional	  networks.	  	  
	  
5.4.1.1	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Amendment	  (Media	  Ownership)	  Act	  2006	  
Following	   the	   Broadcasting	   Services	   Amendment	   (Media	   Ownership)	   Act	  
2006,	  the	  BSA	  allows	  cross-­‐media	  mergers	  subject	  to	  the	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rule,	  the	  
“one	  to	  a	  market”	  rule	  and	  the	  “5/4	  minimum	  voices”	  rule.743	  The	  “2	  out	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
739	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  3(1).	  
740	  ibid	  ss	  53	  and	  55.	  
741	  Broadcasting	  (Ownership	  and	  Control)	  Act	  1987,	  s	  22.	  
742	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  53(1).	  	  
743	  It	  also	  removed	  restrictions	  on	  the	  foreign	  control	  of	  commercial	  broadcasting	  licences	  and	  foreign	  
directorships.	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Amendment	  (Media	  Ownership)	  Act	  2006,	  sch	  2,	  para	  4	  (repealing	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3”	  rule	  prevents	  a	  person	  from	  controlling	  more	  than	  two	  out	  of	  three	  of	  the	  
regulated	  media	  platforms	  in	  the	  same	  licence	  area.744	  This	  platform-­‐based	  
approach	   is	   in	  contrast	   to	  the	  deregulatory	  approach	   in	   the	  UK,	  where	  the	  
national	  cross-­‐media	  ownership	  rule	  imposes	  an	  absolute	  limit	  of	  20	  per	  cent	  
on	  the	  ownership	  of	  national	  newspaper	  circulation	  and	  ITV	   licence.745	  The	  
“one	   to	   a	  market”	   rule	  prevents	   a	  person	   from	  controlling	  more	   than	  one	  
commercial	  television	  broadcasting	  licence	  in	  any	  given	  licence	  area.746	  The	  
“5/4	   minimum	   voices”	   rule	   imposes	   a	   minimum	   requirement	   of	   five	  
independently-­‐controlled	  media	  voices	  in	  metropolitan	  areas	  and	  four	  such	  
voices	  in	  regional	  areas.747	  	  
	  
Cross-­‐media	   ownership	   in	   Australia	   is	   also	   subject	   to	   the	   prohibition	   on	  
transactions	  that	  result	  in	  an	  “unacceptable	  3-­‐way	  control	  situation”.748	  Such	  
a	  situation	  arises	  when	  a	  person	  who	  wishes	  to	  acquire	  a	  new	  commercial	  
radio	  broadcasting	   licence	   in	  any	  given	   licence	  area	   is	  also	   in	  a	  position	   to	  
control:	  (i)	  a	  commercial	  television	  licence,	  where	  more	  than	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  
the	  licence	  area	  population	  of	  the	  first	  radio	  licence	  area	  is	  attributable	  to	  the	  
licence	  area	  of	  the	  commercial	  television	  broadcasting	  licence;	  (ii)	  a	  second	  
radio	  licence	  in	  the	  same	  licence	  area;	  or	  (iii)	  a	  newspaper	  associated	  with	  the	  
same	   licence	   area.749	   Firms	   seeking	   to	   expand	   their	   media	   holdings	   are	  
therefore	  restricted	  to	  one	  of	  the	  regulated	  media	  platforms.	  This	  may	  have	  
contributed	  to	  domination	  of	  the	  Australian	  media	  by	  such	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
large	  firms	  specialising	  in	  one	  of	  the	  three	  regulated	  media.750	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  pt	  5,	  div	  4).	  The	  media	  industry	  remains	  classified	  as	  a	  sensitive	  sector	  
under	  Australia’s	  foreign	  investment	  policy.	  Foreign	  Acquisitions	  and	  Takeovers	  Regulation	  2015,	  s	  55.	  
744	  This	  rule	  also	  provides	  for	  some	  additional	  local	  programming	  obligations	  for	  regional	  commercial	  
television	  broadcasting	  licensees.	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Amendment	  (Media	  Ownership)	  Act	  2006,	  ss	  
61AA	  and	  61AEA.	  
745	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  sch	  14,	  pt	  1,	  para	  1.	  
746	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  ss	  54	  and	  56.	  
747	  ibid	  ss	  61AG	  and	  61AB.	  
748	  ibid	  s	  61AMA.	  
749	  ibid	  s	  61AEA.	  
750	  Many	  of	  these	  firms	  have	  also	  developed	  cross-­‐media	  interests	  in	  unaffected	  media	  like	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  
the	  Internet.	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5.4.1.2	  Broadcasting	  Legislation	  Amendment	  (Broadcasting	  Reform)	  Bill	  2017	  
The	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  Bill	  proposes	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  
rule	  and	  the	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rule.751	  It	  also	  proposes	  that	  commercial	  television	  
broadcasting	  licensees	  should	  be	  required	  to	  broadcast	  a	  prescribed	  amount	  
of	   local	   content	   each	   week	   to	   ensure	   diversity	   of	   content	   in	   regional	  
Australia.752	  The	  Media	  Reform	  Bill	  was	  previously	  introduced	  in	  March	  2016	  
but	  lapsed	  at	  prorogation.	  It	  was	  reintroduced	  as	  the	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  Bill	  
into	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   on	   1	   September	   2016	   and	   is	   currently	  
before	  the	  Senate.753	  Progression	  of	  the	  Bill	  is	  slow	  amidst	  concerns	  regarding	  
the	  potential	  impact	  of	  the	  proposed	  repeal	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  and	  “2	  
out	  of	  3”	  rules	  on	  media	  diversity	  in	  an	  already	  highly	  concentrated	  market.	  
	  
It	   is	   arguable,	   however,	   that	   the	   utility	   of	   the	   “75	   per	   cent	   reach”	   rule	   is	  
currently	   undermined	   in	   any	   event	   by	   the	   programming	   links	   that	   exist	  
between	   the	   metropolitan	   and	   regional	   networks	   under	   affiliation	  
agreements.	  Under	  these	  agreements,	  viewers	   in	  regional	  Australia	  receive	  
many	   of	   the	   same	   commercial	   television	   services	   as	   viewers	   in	   the	  
metropolitan	  areas.	  Such	  agreements	  are	  admittedly	  a	  matter	  for	  commercial	  
negotiation.	  As	  the	  media	  sector	  continues	  to	  evolve,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  
that	  such	  agreements	  will	  endure	  (at	  least	  not	  in	  their	  current	  form).	  Also,	  the	  
adequacy	   of	   the	   services	   received	   in	   regional	   Australia	   under	   such	  
arrangements	  remains	  disputed,	  together	  with	  the	  ongoing	  issue	  of	  coverage	  
black	   spots	   in	   rural	  areas.754	  There	   is	  also	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  
viewers	   in	   rural	   and	   regional	   areas	  are	  disadvantaged	  by	  Australia’s	  digital	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
751	  Schedules	  1	  and	  2.	  	  
752	  Schedule	  3.	  
753	  The	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  Bill	  remains	  stalled	  in	  the	  Senate,	  being	  opposed	  by	  Labor,	  the	  Greens	  
and	  much	  of	  the	  crossbench.	  
754	  Lucy	  Barbour,	  ‘Dump	  media	  ownership	  restrictions	  to	  save	  those	  “suffering”	  with	  TV	  blackspots,	  
Liberal	  MP	  says’	  ABC	  News	  (27	  September	  2015)	  <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-­‐09-­‐27/regional-­‐
australians-­‐suffering-­‐with-­‐tv-­‐blackspots/6806536>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
	  	  176	  
divide.755	   Nevertheless,	   these	   issues	   do	   not	   in	   themselves	   warrant	   the	  
retention	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  rule.	  
	  
The	   growth	   of	   online	   streaming	   means	   that	   metropolitan	   networks	   are	  
delivering	   an	   increasing	   amount	   of	   content	   across	   Australia,	   including	   in	  
regional	  areas.	  Since	  Seven’s	  foray	  in	  2015	  into	  the	  live	  streaming	  of	  its	  three	  
broadcast	   television	  channels	   (Seven,	  7TWO	  and	  7mate)	  across	  all	  delivery	  
platforms	  and	  in	  all	  Seven-­‐owned	  capital	  cities	  and	  regions,	  Nine	  and	  Ten	  have	  
also	  been	  developing	  their	  online	  streaming	  services.	  Whether	  the	  availability	  
of	   services	   online	   is	   regarded	   as	   substitutable	   for	   traditional	   broadcast	  
television	  is	  another	  issue.	  As	  already	  suggested,	  this	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  
the	  case	  with	  multi-­‐homing,	  for	  instance,	  where	  the	  relevant	  concept	  may	  not	  
be	  substitutability	  but	  rather	  complementarity.	  	  
	  
The	  argument	  remains	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  rule	  and	  the	  
“2	  out	  of	  3”	  rule	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  media	  ownership,	  rather	  than	  influence,	  is	  
outdated.	  The	  proposed	  repeal	  of	  the	  two	  rules	  could	  provide	  opportunities	  
for	  metropolitan	  and	  regional	  broadcasters	  to	  merge,	  and	  thereby	  strengthen	  
their	  ability	  to	  compete	  against	  SVOD	  platforms	  operating	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  
Applying	  only	  to	  traditional	  broadcast	  media	  is	  also	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  identified	  
trends	  in	  the	  growing	  significance	  of	  online	  streaming.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  
“2	  out	  of	  3”	  rule	  is	  retained,	  the	  loophole	  regarding	  online	  newspapers	  should	  
at	  least	  be	  addressed.	  However,	  with	  the	  proposed	  repeal	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  
reach”	  rule	  and	  the	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rule,	  it	  would	  become	  even	  more	  paramount	  
that	  Australia’s	  approach	  to	  media	  merger	  regulation	  under	  the	  CCA	  is	  fit	  for	  
purpose	  in	  a	  converged	  digital	  environment.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755	   Anna	   Vidot,	   ‘Almost	   half	   of	   regional	   Australians	   report	   internet	   is	   “very	   poor”,	   “inadequate”:	  
University	  of	  Canberra	  survey’	  ABC	  News	  (21	  June	  2016)	  <http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2016-­‐
06-­‐21/almost-­‐half-­‐of-­‐regional-­‐australia-­‐reports-­‐internet-­‐very-­‐poor/7529734>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  digital	  divide	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  physical	  access	  to	  the	  Internet,	  depending	  
on	  education	  and	  income,	  for	  example.	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5.4.2	   Regulation	  of	  media	  mergers	  in	  Australia	  under	  Section	  50	  of	  the	  CCA	  
As	   in	   other	   sectors,	   a	   media	   merger	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   regulation	   under	  
Section	  50	  of	  the	  CCA	  if	  it	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  acquisition	  will	  have	  
the	  effect	  or	  likely	  effect	  of	  substantially	  lessening	  competition	  in	  a	  market	  in	  
Australia.	  This	  is	  irrespective	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  acquisition	  or	  whether	  it	  results	  
in	   control	   of	   the	   acquired	   firm.	   A	   wide	   range	   of	   factors	   are	   taken	   into	  
consideration	   when	   assessing	   whether	   and,	   if	   so,	   to	   what	   extent	   an	  
acquisition	  will	  enable	  the	  acquiring	  firm	  to	  exercise	  increased	  influence	  over	  
the	  acquired	  firm.	  This	  was	  evident	  from	  the	  ACCC’s	  assessment	  in	  2015/2016	  
of	  Foxtel’s	  proposal	  to	  acquire	  a	  minority	  shareholding	  in	  Ten.756	  
	  
5.4.2.1	  Foxtel’s	  proposal	  to	  acquire	  a	  minority	  shareholding	  in	  Ten	  	  
The	   ACCC	   considered	   whether	   the	   then	   anticipated	   acquisition(s)	   would	  
enable	   Foxtel	   to	   exercise	   an	   increased	   degree	   of	   influence	   over	   Ten.757	  
Amongst	  other	  things,	  it	  considered	  the	  significance	  of	  Foxtel’s	  investment	  in	  
Ten,	  Foxtel’s	  right	  to	  appoint	  directors	  to	  Ten’s	  board,	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  
the	   rest	   of	   the	   board.758	   Particular	   concern	   was	   expressed	   about	   the	  
advantage	  Ten	  would	  gain	   in	   relation	   to	  acquiring	  premium	  sport	   content,	  
which	  might	  substantially	  lessen	  competition	  in	  the	  FTA	  television	  market	  or	  
broader	  market	   for	   the	   supply	  of	   television	  viewing	   services.759	   It	  was	  also	  
considered	  that	  the	  proposed	  acquisition(s)	  might	  reduce	  competition	  in	  the	  
sale	  of	  advertising,	  and	  reduce	  or	  eliminate	  competition	  for	  advertising	  sales	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756	  The	  proposed	  acquisition(s)	  provided	  for	  Foxtel	  to	  acquire	  up	  to	  a	  15	  per	  cent	  shareholding	  in	  Ten	  
and	   for	  Ten	   to	  acquire	  a	  24.99	  per	   cent	   stake	   in	  Multi	  Channel	  Network	   (a	   supplier	  of	   advertising	  
opportunities	  on	  subscription	  television	  channels).	  There	  was	  also	  an	  option	  for	  Ten	  to	  acquire	  a	  10	  
per	  cent	  shareholding	  in	  Presto	  (the	  joint	  venture	  between	  Foxtel	  and	  Seven	  West	  Media).	  
757	  ‘Foxtel	  Management	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Ten	  Network	  Holdings	  Ltd	  -­‐	  proposed	  acquisitions’	  (ACCC	  Public	  
Competition	   Assessment,	   2	   March	   2016)	  
<http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1190276/fromItemId/751043>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	  
758	  ibid	  paras	  50-­‐51.	  
759	  ‘Foxtel	  Management	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  Ten	  Network	  Holdings	  Ltd	  proposed	  acquisitions’	  (ACCC	  Statement	  
of	   Issues,	   14	   September	   2015)	   para	   5	  
<http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1190276/fromItemId/751043>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	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between	  Ten	  and	  Foxtel.760	  However,	  the	  ACCC	  concluded	  that	  the	  other	  FTA	  
television	  networks,	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  online	   streaming	   services	  would	  
continue	  to	  have	  sufficient	  alternatives	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  obtain	  content	  to	  
attract	  viewers.761	  
	  
The	  ACCC’s	  decision	  in	  this	  case	  does	  not	  appear	  overly	  controversial	  given	  
the	   nature	   of	   the	   transaction	   and	   market	   conditions	   at	   that	   time.	   The	  
proposed	   acquisition(s)	   involved	   minority	   interests	   between	   entities	   that	  
would	   ultimately	   remain	   separate.	   However,	   there	   have	   been	   significant	  
developments	  regarding	  the	  links	  between	  Ten	  and	  Foxtel,	  particularly	  since	  
Ten	  recently	  entered	  into	  receivership.762	  Such	  developments	  arguably	  call	  for	  
more	  careful	  consideration	  of	  current	  proposals	  for	  the	  takeover	  of	  Ten,	  from	  
both	  a	  competition	  and	  media	  diversity	  perspective.	  
	  
5.4.2.2	  Takeover	  proposals	  in	  respect	  of	  Ten	  since	  it	  entered	  into	  receivership	  	  
It	  was	  recently	  reported	  that	  CBS	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  potential	  bidder	   in	  the	  
impending	   takeover	   of	   Ten.763	   Shortly	   prior	   to	   this,	   the	   ACCC	   reportedly	  
confirmed	  that	  it	  would	  allow	  a	  50-­‐50	  takeover	  of	  Ten	  by	  the	  special	  purpose	  
vehicles	  of	  Lachlan	  Murdoch	  and	  Bruce	  Gordon.764	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  Ten’s	  
largest	   single	   shareholder,	   Bruce	   Gordon	   is	   also	   owner	   of	   regional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760	  ibid.	  
761	  ACCC	  (n	  757)	  para	  5.	  
762	  Max	  Mason,	  ‘CBA	  to	  appoint	  Network	  Ten	  receiver’	  The	  Australian	  Financial	  Review	  (30	  June	  2017)	  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0IUAPwN1j3YJ:www.afr.com/business/
media-­‐and-­‐marketing/tv/cba-­‐to-­‐appoint-­‐network-­‐ten-­‐receiver-­‐20170630-­‐
gx215x+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	  accessed	  11	  August	  2017.	  
763	   David	   Crowe	   and	   Rosie	   Lewis,	   ‘CBS	   bid	   for	   Ten	   Network	   reignites	   call	   for	   media	   reform’	   The	  
Australian	   (29	  August	  2017)	  <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/broadcast/cbs-­‐bid-­‐
for-­‐ten-­‐network-­‐reignites-­‐call-­‐for-­‐media-­‐reform/news-­‐story/9940bbef41c384d2c1f00d3331578042>	  
accessed	  8	  September	  2017.	  Since	  this	  news	  emerged	  shortly	  prior	  to	  the	  printing	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  
focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  proposed	  takeover	  of	  Ten	  by	  the	  special	  purpose	  vehicles	  of	  Lachlan	  Murdoch	  and	  
Bruce	  Gordon.	  
764	  Max	  Mason,	   ‘ACCC	   will	   allow	   Network	   Ten	   takeover	   by	   Lachlan	  Murdoch,	   Bruce	   Gordon’	   The	  
Australian	   Financial	   Review	   (24	   August	   2017)	  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UQ63EMXnLNoJ:www.afr.com/business
/media-­‐and-­‐marketing/tv/accc-­‐will-­‐allow-­‐network-­‐ten-­‐takeover-­‐by-­‐lachlan-­‐murdoch-­‐bruce-­‐gordon-­‐
20170823-­‐gy2uvz+&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	  accessed	  26	  August	  2017.	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broadcaster	   WIN	   Corporation	   and	   affiliate	   partner	   of	   Ten.	   Whilst	   the	  
proposed	   transaction	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   reduce	   media	   diversity	   in	  
Australia,	  it	  is	  reported	  that	  the	  ACCC	  does	  not	  consider	  that	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  
a	  substantial	  lessening	  of	  competition.765	  
	  
The	   takeover	   of	   Ten	   by	   Lachlan	   Murdoch	   and	   Bruce	   Gordon	   would	   be	  
prohibited	   by	   the	   “2	   out	   of	   3”	   and	   “75	   per	   cent	   reach”	   rules,	   hence	   the	  
proposed	   takeover	   through	   special	   purpose	   vehicles.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
proposed	   takeover	   arguably	   raises	   serious	   concerns	   about	  media	   diversity	  
and	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  role	  of	  FTA	  television	  in	  this	  regard.	  This	  does	  not	  
in	  itself	  outweigh	  the	  case	  for	  repealing	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  and	  “2	  out	  of	  
3”	   rules.	   It	   is	   instead	   contended	   that	   this	   supports	   the	   case	   for	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  test	  in	  Australia.	  This	  could	  be	  
used	  to	  address	  concerns	  about	  the	  proposed	  transaction,	  subject	  to	  further	  
clarification	  regarding	  the	  ACCC’s	  approach	  in	  applying	  Section	  50	  of	  the	  CCA	  
to	  media	  mergers	  (particularly	  media	  mergers	  involving	  premium	  pay-­‐TV).	  
	  
In	  determining	  whether	  a	  merger	  or	  acquisition	  will	  have	  the	  effect	  or	  likely	  
effect	   of	   substantially	   lessening	   competition	   in	   a	   market	   in	   Australia,	   the	  
matters	   listed	  in	  Section	  50(3)	  of	  the	  CCA	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  This	  
includes	   barriers	   to	   entry,	   the	   availability	   of	   substitutes,	   the	   dynamic	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   market	   (including	   growth,	   innovation	   and	   product	  
differentiation),	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  acquisition	  would	  result	  in	  the	  removal	  
of	  a	  vigorous	  and	  effective	  competitor,	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  vertical	  
integration	  in	  the	  market.	  Prohibition	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  parties	  
obtaining	   clearance	   from	   the	   ACCC,	   provided	   that	   it	   does	   not	   believe	   the	  
merger	  will	  substantially	  lessen	  competition.766	  Authorisation	  may	  be	  granted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765	  ibid.	  
766	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  ss	  95AC	  and	  95AN(1).	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by	  the	  ACT	  where	  it	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  the	  merger	  will	  result	  or	  be	  likely	  
to	  result	  in	  such	  a	  benefit	  to	  the	  public	  that	  it	  should	  be	  allowed.767	  
	  
“Public	  benefit”	  was	  broadly	  interpreted	  by	  the	  ACT	  in	  QCMA	  to	  encompass	  
“anything	  of	  value	   to	   the	  community	  generally”,768	   including	   the	  economic	  
goals	  of	  efficiency	  and	  progress.769	  In	  theory,	  this	  broad	  interpretation	  allows	  
the	   possibility	   for	   merging	   parties	   to	   claim	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   possible	  
justifications.770	  However,	   the	  ACT	   stressed	   that	   this	  will	   be	   limited	  by	   the	  
requirements	  that	  the	  public	  benefit	  is	  the	  result	  or	  likely	  result	  of	  the	  merger,	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  otherwise	  available	  and	  that	  it	  is	  substantial.771	  Substantiality	  is	  
assessed	  by	  reference	  to	  notions	  of	  what	  is	  achievable,	  taking	  into	  account	  
the	   size	   and	   significance	   of	   the	   merger,	   and	   the	   markets	   under	  
consideration.772	  	  
	  
The	   significance	   of	   findings	   on	   the	   markets	   under	   consideration	   is	  
demonstrated	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   proposed	   takeover	   of	   Ten.	   The	   ACCC’s	  
relative	  ambivalence	  towards	  the	  proposed	  takeover	  may	  be	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  
part,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  WIN	  Corporation	  and	  Ten	  are	  broadcast	  within	  different	  
geographic	  areas	  i.e.	  regional	  and	  metropolitan	  areas,	  respectively.	  However,	  
this	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  consolidation	  of	  metropolitan	  and	  
regional	  networks	  that	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  follow	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  
reach”	  and	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rules.	   It	  also	  arguably	  relies	  on	  an	  overly	  simplistic	  
vision	   of	   broadcasting	   that	   does	   not	   consider	   the	   effects	   of	   media	  
globalisation	   on	   the	   supply	   and	   consumption	   of	   content	   by	   viewers	   in	  
metropolitan	  and	  regional	  areas.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
767	  ibid	  ss	  95AT	  and	  95AZH(1)-­‐(2).	  
768	  QCMA	  (n	  34)	  [17,243].	  
769	  ibid.	  
770	  Robert	  J	  Glance,	   ‘Merging	  Down	  Under:	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  Australian	  and	  United	  States	  
Merger	  Guidelines’	  (1995)	  28(2)	  Cornell	  International	  Law	  Journal	  501,	  521.	  
771	  QCMA	  (n	  34)	  [17,243].	  
772	  ibid	  [17,244].	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In	  confirming	  that	  it	  would	  allow	  the	  proposed	  takeover	  of	  Ten	  by	  the	  special	  
purpose	  vehicles	  of	  Lachlan	  Murdoch	  and	  Bruce	  Gordon,	  the	  ACCC	  says	  that	  
the	  parties	  and	  associated	  parties	  will	  remain	  subject	  to	  general	  competition	  
law.773	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  ACCC	  considers	  that	  the	  proposed	  transaction	  
does	   not	   meet	   the	   requirements	   for	   regulation	   under	   Section	   50	   of	   the	  
CCA.774	  This	  raises	  questions	  about	  whether	  the	  existing	  approach	  to	  media	  
merger	  regulation	  under	  Section	  50	  is	  fit	  for	  purpose	  and	  support	  the	  case	  for	  
introducing	   a	   media-­‐specific	   public	   interest	   test.	   The	   ACCC’s	   draft	   Media	  
Merger	  Guidelines	  arguably	  represent	  an	   important	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  
further	  clarification	  in	  this	  regard.775	  
	  
5.4.3	   Proposals	  to	  introduce	  a	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  test	  in	  Australia	  
A	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  UK	  public	  interest	  test	  in	  the	  EA2002	  could	  serve	  as	  
a	   model	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   media-­‐specific	   public	   interest	   test	   in	  
Australia.	   As	   previously	   recommended	   by	   the	   Productivity	   Commission,776	  
such	  a	  test	  should	  apply	  to	  all	  media	  mergers	  (as	  in	  the	  UK	  where	  the	  media	  
public	  interest	  considerations	  apply).	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  
Convergence	  Review	  that	  a	  public	  interest	  test	  should	  apply	  only	  in	  relation	  
to	  changes	  in	  control	  of	  content	  service	  enterprises	  of	  national	  significance.777	  
Adopting	  the	  concept	  of	  “changes	  in	  control	  of	  content	  service	  enterprises	  of	  
national	   significance”	  would	   introduce	   unnecessary	   uncertainty	   as	   regards	  
the	   substantial	   degree	   of	   discretion	   that	   would	   be	   conferred	   on	   the	  
communications	   regulator	   that	   the	   Convergence	   Review	   recommended	  
should	  be	  established	  to	  administer	  its	  proposed	  test.	  However,	  the	  scope	  of	  
the	  UK	  test	  would	  also	  require	  further	  consideration	  if	  it	  is	  to	  form	  the	  basis	  
for	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  a	  test	  in	  Australia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
773	  Michael	  Janda	  and	  David	  Chau,	  ‘Ten	  takeover	  by	  Lachlan	  Murdoch	  and	  Bruce	  Gordon	  gets	  ACCC	  
green	  light’	  ABC	  News	  (24	  August	  2017)	  <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-­‐08-­‐24/ten-­‐takeover-­‐by-­‐
murdoch-­‐gordon-­‐gets-­‐accc-­‐green-­‐light/8837964>	  accessed	  26	  August	  2017.	  
774	  ibid.	  
775	  ACCC	  Draft	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  90).	  
776	  Productivity	  Commission	  Inquiry	  Report	  (n	  736)	  38.	  
777	  Convergence	  Review	  Report	  (n	  77)	  18.	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5.4.3.1	  Scope	  of	  the	  recommended	  public	  interest	  test	  for	  Australia	  
Introduced	   in	   the	   pre-­‐convergence	   era,	   the	   UK	   test	   applies	   to	   traditional	  
broadcast	   media.	   It	   applies	   in	   respect	   of	   “media	   enterprises”	   which	   are	  
defined	   as	   enterprises	   that	   consist	   in	   or	   involve	   broadcasting.778	  
“Broadcasting”	  means	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  that	  must	  be	  licensed	  under	  
Parts	   1	   or	   3	   of	   the	   Broadcasting	   Act	   1990,	   or	   under	   Parts	   1	   or	   2	   of	   the	  
Broadcasting	  Act	  1996.779	  Any	  extension	  of	  the	  UK	  test	  (or	  any	  such	  test	  that	  
may	  be	  introduced	  in	  Australia)	  to	  online	  streaming	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  in	  
one	  respect	  with	  the	  underlying	  argument	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reduced	  
role	  for	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  However,	  as	  regards	  the	  
impact	   of	   sector-­‐specific	   regulation	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   market,	   it	   is	  
important	   that	   regulatory	   frameworks	   apply	   in	   a	   technologically-­‐neutral	  
manner	  to	  all	  available	  distribution	  platforms.	  	  
	  
5.4.3.2	  Administration	  of	  an	  Australian	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  test	  	  
As	   regards	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   proposed	   public	   interest	   test,	   it	   is	  
suggested	  that	  the	  advisory	  role	  that	  Ofcom	  fulfils	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  UK	  test	  is	  
important.	  It	  has	  been	  seen	  how	  the	  UK	  test	  only	  applies	  if	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  intervenes	  in	  a	  media	  merger,	  which	  then	  requires	  Ofcom	  to	  advise	  on	  
whether	  the	  merger	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  However,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
is	   not	   bound	   to	   follow	   the	   advice	   of	   Ofcom.	   It	   is	   suggested	   that,	   from	   an	  
institutional	  and	  procedural	  perspective,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  media-­‐specific	  
public	   interest	   test	   in	   Australia	   would	   reinforce	   the	   case	   for	   returning	   to	  
having	  a	  separate	  industry-­‐specific	  regulator	  for	  the	  communications	  sector.	  
This	  would	  be	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  institutional	  arrangement	  with	  Ofcom	  in	  
the	  UK,	  with	  an	  exception	  in	  respect	  of	  general	  competition	  law	  enforcement	  
which	  falls	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  ACCC,780	  and	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  ACCC	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  Enterprise	  Act	  2002,	  s	  58A(1).	  
779	  ibid	  s	  44(9)(a).	  
780	  n	  128,	  10.	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Commissioner	  with	   primary	   responsibility	   for	   communications	   functions	   in	  
the	  CCA.	  
	  
As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  Australia	  has	  a	  history	  of	  separate	  regulators,	  with	  the	  
ACCC	  established	   in	  1995	  upon	  the	  recommendation	  of	   the	  Hilmer	  Review	  
(through	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  the	  Australian	  Trade	  Practices	  Commission	  and	  
the	   Prices	   Surveillance	   Authority).	   The	   Hilmer	   Review	   considered	   that	  
adopting	   an	   integrated	   approach	   under	   a	   single,	   economy-­‐wide	   body	  was	  
necessary	  at	  that	  time	  to	  advance	  the	  reform	  of	  Australian	  competition	  policy	  
at	  the	  national	  level.781	  The	  ACCC	  is	  an	  independent	  statutory	  authority	  and	  
economy-­‐wide	  regulator.	  Within	  its	  organisational	  structure,	  it	  has	  a	  division	  
for	   infrastructure	   regulation	  but	  not	   for	  communications	   regulation	   (whilst	  
there	  is	  a	  separate	  division	  for	  the	  energy	  sector	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Australian	  
Energy	   Regulator).	   Under	   the	   current	   institutional	   arrangement,	  
responsibilities	  are	  divided	  between	  the	  Department	  of	  Communications	  and	  
the	   Arts,	   the	   Minister	   for	   this	   department,	   the	   Attorney-­‐General’s	  
Department,	  ACMA	  and	  the	  ACCC.782	  
	  
The	  recommendation	  here	  for	  an	  industry-­‐specific	  regulator	  for	  the	  Australian	  
communications	   sector	   is	   based	   on	   the	   general	   assumption	   that	   industry-­‐
specific	  regulators	  are	  better	  placed	  than	  generalist	  economy-­‐wide	  regulators	  
to	   deal	   with	   the	   technical	   and	   economic	   issues	   that	   arise	   in	   technology	  
intensive	   and	   emerging	   markets.	   The	   relationship	   between	   competition	  
authorities	  and	  industry	  regulators	  (which	  in	  turn	  depends	  on	  the	  interface	  
between	   sectoral	   regulation	   and	   general	   competition	   law)	   remains	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  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36)	  320-­‐321.	  
782	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  this	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  inconsistent	  decision-­‐making.	  See,	  for	  
example,	  ‘Submission	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Communications	  and	  the	  Arts	  Draft	  Report	  
“Review	   of	   the	   Australian	   Communications	   and	  Media	   Authority”’	   (Optus,	   17	   June	   2016)	   para	   12	  
<https://www.communications.gov.au/sites/g/files/net301/f/submissions/acma-­‐review-­‐-­‐optus.pdf>	  
accessed	  16	  August	  2017.	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contentious.783	  However,	  concerns	  about	  the	   impact	  of	  having	  an	   industry-­‐
specific	  communications	  regulator	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  competition	  powers	  in	  
Australia	  could	  be	  addressed	  through	  concurrency	  regulations	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  
exist	   in	   the	  UK.784	  With	   the	   likely	   continuation	   in	   the	   increase	   of	   bundled	  
services	  across	   the	  communications	  sector,	  and	  utility	  sector	  more	  broadly	  
with	   the	   rise	   of	   the	  multi-­‐utility	   firm,785	  maintaining	   effective	   concurrency	  
regulations	  will	  become	  increasingly	  important	  in	  any	  event.	  	  
	  
5.5	   Local	  Media	  Ownership	  Rules	  in	  a	  Global	  Communications	  Sector	  
It	  is	  arguable	  that,	  in	  the	  digital	  era,	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  local	  and	  even	  national	  
media	  ownership	  rules	  has	  become	  redundant	  and	  unworkable.	  The	  ability	  of	  
viewers	  to	  access	  content	  from	  all	  over	  the	  World	  via	  the	  Internet	  is	  likely	  to	  
undermine,	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  single	  firm	  to	  control	  the	  supply	  
of	  content	   in	  any	  given	  region	  or	   territory.	  To	   the	  extent	   that	   this	   remains	  
possible,	  there	  is	  the	  decreasing	  relevance	  of	  territorial	  borders	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  audio-­‐visual	  content	  is	  supplied	  and	  consumed.	  This	  calls	  
into	  question	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  national	  government	  to	  enforce	  media-­‐specific	  
ownership	   rules	   that,	   as	   seen	   within	   the	   UK	   and	   Australian	   contexts,	   are	  
typically	   geographically	   confined	   to	   the	   national	   or	   local	   level.	   As	   the	  
European	   Council	   notes,	   with	   the	   global	   nature	   of	   the	   Internet,	   it	   is	   not	  
possible	   to	   contain	   rules	   on	   media	   plurality	   within	   geographically-­‐defined	  
boundaries.786	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
783	  See,	  Maher	  M	  Dabbah,	  ‘The	  Relationship	  between	  Competition	  Authorities	  and	  Sector	  Regulators’	  
(2011)	  70(1)	  Cambridge	  Law	  Journal	  113.	  
784	  Competition	  Act	  1998	  (Concurrency)	  Regulations	  2014;	  ‘Memorandum	  of	  understanding	  between	  
the	  Competition	  and	  Markets	  Authority	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  Communications	  –	  concurrent	  competition	  
powers’	  (8	  February	  2016).	  
785	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jillian	  Ambrose,	  ‘First	  Utility	  enters	  the	  broadband	  market	  by	  undercutting	  the	  
Big	   Four’	   The	   Telegraph	   (24	   July	   2017)	   <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/24/first-­‐
utility-­‐enters-­‐broadband-­‐market-­‐undercutting-­‐big-­‐four/>	  accessed	  8	  September	  2017.	  
786	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  of	  the	  Representatives	  of	  the	  Governments	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  
meeting	  within	   the	  Council,	  on	  media	   freedom	  and	  pluralism	   in	   the	  digital	  environment	   [2014]	  OJ	  
C32/6,	  para	  10.	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Media-­‐specific	  ownership	  rules	  are	  also	  largely	  still	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  
owners	   of	   traditional	   broadcast	   media	   platforms	   and	   the	   unproven	  
assumption	   that	   a	   particular	   number	   of	   owners	   is	   optimal	   for	   ensuring	  
diversity	  of	  content.	  This	   fails	   to	  reflect	   the	   increasing	  prevalence	  of	  cross-­‐
media	  ownership	  involving	  non-­‐traditional	  broadcast	  media	  platforms.	  With	  
local	  media	  interests	  held	  by	  firms	  that	  also	  have	  interests	  in	  other	  forms	  of	  
media	  on	  a	  national	  or	  international	  scale.	  Difficulty	  lies	  in	  ascertaining	  how	  
to	  legitimately	  separate	  such	  interests	  in	  enforcing	  (local)	  media	  ownership	  
rules.	  
	  
Particular	  issues	  arise	  at	  the	  local	  level	  where,	  in	  an	  era	  of	  content	  abundance,	  
local	  content	  production	  remains	  a	  legitimate	  area	  for	  regulatory	  concern.	  In	  
fact,	   in	   a	   global	   society,	   the	   issue	   of	   protecting/promoting	   local	   content	  
production	   is	   arguably	   increasingly	   important.	   As	   international	   content	  
suppliers	   provide	   increasing	   amounts	   of	   content	   in	   formats	   aimed	   at	   a	  
multicultural	   or	   transcultural	   audience,	   local	   content	   becomes	   potentially	  
more	  important	  in	  defining	  the	  national	  and	  cultural	  interests	  of	  audiences	  in	  
individual	  countries,	  and	  hence	  their	  place	  in	  a	  global	  society.	  However,	  this	  
is	  not	  necessarily	  best	  achieved	  by	  media-­‐specific	  ownership	  rules,	  given	  the	  
direct	  impact	  of	  such	  rules	  on	  market	  structure.	  As	  already	  indicated,	  there	  
are	  other	  means	  of	  protecting/promoting	  local	  content,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  
public	   service	   mandates	   of	   public	   service	   broadcasters	   and	   the	   licence	  
conditions	  imposed	  on	  broadcasters	  under	  national	  licensing	  regimes.	  	  
	  
The	   liberalisation	   of	   local	   media	   ownership	   rules	   in	   the	   UK	   is	   therefore	  
regarded	   as	   apt.	   By	   the	  Media	   Ownership	   (Radio	   and	   Cross-­‐Media)	   Order	  
2011,	   the	   UK	   Government	   removed	   remaining	   restrictions	   on	   media	  
ownership	  at	   the	   local	   level.	  This	   followed	   the	   recommendation	  of	  Ofcom,	  
influenced	   by	   the	   perceived	   need	   to	   allow	   firms	   greater	   flexibility	   to	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consolidate	   and	   establish	   themselves	   as	   multi-­‐media	   corporations.787	  
However,	   the	   issue	   of	   liberalising	   local	   media	   ownership	   rules	   is	   not	  
straightforward	   (including	   in	   the	   UK	   given	   the	   devolved	   nations	   and	  
North/South	   divide).	   The	   geographic	   size	   of	   Australia,	   with	   its	   dispersed	  
population	   (albeit	   concentrated	   capital	   cities	   on	   the	   East	   coast)	   inherently	  
makes	  local	  media	  an	  issue.	  
	  
However,	   the	   protection	   of	   local	   media	   is	   not	   necessarily	   best	   served	   by	  
media-­‐specific	   ownership	   rules	   and	   this	   is	   arguably	   demonstrated	   by	   the	  
Australian	  experience	  to	  date.	  By	  preventing	  the	  metropolitan	  licensees	  from	  
expanding	   into	   non-­‐metropolitan	   areas,	   the	   “75	   per	   cent	   reach”	   rule	   was	  
intended	  to	  encourage	  smaller	  regional	  operators	  to	  aggregate	  and	  establish	  
their	  own	  networks.788	  Tolerance	  of	  affiliation	  and	  networking	  arrangements	  
has	  been	  identified	  as	  undermining	  the	  production	  of	  local	  content.789	  Given	  
such	  conditions	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  test,	  the	  
liberalisation	   of	   local	   media	   ownership	   rules	   in	   the	   form	   that	   has	   been	  
undertaken	  in	  the	  UK	  would	  not	  necessarily	  serve	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  the	  
protection/promotion	  of	  local	  content	  in	  Australia.	  	  
	  
The	   case	   for	   liberalising	   media	   ownership	   rules	   in	   Australia	   is	   made	   with	  
regard	  to	  the	  broader	  regulatory	  landscape.	  Reference	  is	  made	  here	  to	  the	  
other	  areas	  in	  which	  provision	  is	  made	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  local	  content	  in	  
Australia.	  This	  includes	  the	  imposition	  of	  minimum	  levels	  of	  local	  content	  by	  
commercial	   television	   licensees	   in	   regional	   markets	   by	   the	   Broadcasting	  
Services	   Amendment	   (Media	   Ownership)	   Act	   2006.790	   There	   are	   also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787	  ‘Report	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport)	  on	  the	  Media	  Ownership	  Rules’	  (Ofcom,	  
17	   November	   2009)	   6-­‐7	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/42198/morrstatement.pdf>	   accessed	   14	  
August	  2017.	  
788	  Productivity	  Commission	  Inquiry	  Report	  (n	  736)	  367-­‐368.	  
789	  ibid	  368.	  
790	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  43A	  (as	  inserted	  by	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Schedule	  2	  of	  the	  Broadcasting	  
Services	  Amendment	  (Media	  Ownership)	  Act	  2006).	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requirements	   on	   Australian	   drama	   in	   the	   BSA	   and	   Australian	   Content	  
Standard	   (though	   Australian	   content	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   same	   as	   local	  
content).791	   The	   introduction	   of	   a	   media-­‐specific	   public	   interest	   test	   in	  
Australia	   in	   a	   form	   similar	   to	   that	   proposed	   in	   this	   thesis	   would	   further	  
undermine	  the	  necessity	  for	  local	  media	  ownership	  rules.	  	  
	  
5.5	   Conclusions	  
The	  regulation	  of	  media	  mergers	  (including	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context)	  
concerns	   a	   range	   of	   complex	   social	   and	   cultural,	   as	   well	   as	   economic,	  
considerations.	  Competition	  issues	  are	  met	  with	  fundamental	  issues	  such	  as	  
media	  pluralism,	  diversity	  and	  localness	  of	  content.	  This	  is	  no	  less	  pronounced	  
in	  the	  digital	  era.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  arguably	  more	  so	  given	  the	  increasing	  tendency	  
towards	  market	  concentration,	  and	  possible	  tension	  between	  local	  and	  global	  
considerations	   in	   regulating	   multi-­‐media	   firms	   catering	   for	   a	   transcultural	  
audience.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  this	  does	  not	  justify	  the	  retention	  
of	  technologically-­‐obsolete	  media	  ownership	  rules.	  Hence	  the	  case	  has	  been	  
made	  for	  further	  deregulation	  of	  such	  rules,	  particularly	  in	  Australia.	  
	  
Deregulation	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  UK,	  in	  relation	  to	  cross-­‐
media	   mergers	   and	   local	   content	   in	   particular,	   may	   not	   necessarily	   be	  
appropriate	   in	   Australia	   on	   account	   of	   its	   geographically-­‐dispersed,	   small	  
population	   and	   smaller	   market.	   However,	   the	   proposed	   repeal	   of	   the	  
technologically-­‐obsolete	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  and	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rules	  under	  the	  
Broadcasting	  Reform	  Bill	   is	  welcomed.	  Repealing	  these	  rules	  would	  also	  be	  
desirable	  in	  that	  it	  would	  enable	  Australian	  broadcasters	  to	  restructure	  and	  
rescale	  their	  businesses	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increasing	  competition	  from	  new	  media	  
at	  the	  national	  and	  international	  levels.	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  modified	  version	  
of	  a	  UK-­‐style	  public	  interest	  test	  could	  address	  enduring	  concerns	  about	  local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
791	  Australian	  Content	  Standard	  (n	  226).	  Part	  7	  of	  the	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992	  requires	  10	  per	  
cent	  of	  total	  drama	  expenditure	  on	  subscription	  television	  broadcasting	  services	  to	  be	  expended	  on	  
Australian	  (or	  New	  Zealand)	  drama.	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content	  (such	  as	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  proposed	  takeover	  of	  Ten	  by	  the	  special	  
purpose	   vehicles	   of	   Lachlan	   Murdoch	   and	   Bruce	   Gordon).	   It	   has	   been	  
suggested	   that	   the	   administration	   of	   such	   a	   test	   would	   justify	   the	  
establishment	  of	  an	  industry-­‐specific	  regulator	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Ofcom,	  and	  
the	  appointment	  of	  a	  communications	  commissioner	  within	  the	  ACCC.	  These	  
recommendations	   are	   timely	   in	   view	   of	   the	   ACCC’s	   revision	   of	   its	   Media	  
Merger	  Guidelines.	  
	  
Recent	   developments	   in	   the	   UK	   relating	   to	   the	   proposed	   acquisition	   by	  
Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox	   of	   the	   remaining	   shares	   in	   Sky	   call	   into	   question	  
whether	   the	   current	   regulatory	   regime	   is	   fit	   for	   purpose.	   This	   chapter	   has	  
emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  likely	  effects	  of	  the	  proposed	  
acquisition	   are	   assessed	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   supply	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   within	   the	  
broader	   media	   landscape.	   As	   already	   noted,	   since	   News	   Corporation’s	  
proposed	  acquisition	  of	  Sky	  in	  2010,	  there	  has	  been	  the	  split	  of	  the	  former	  
News	   Corporation	   into	   News	   Corp	   and	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox.792	   Since	  
then,	   however,	   Sky	   has	   developed	   considerably	   as	   an	   internet	   service	  
provider.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   identified	   trends	   relating	   to	   the	   increasing	  
consumption	   of	   news	   online,	   Sky’s	   growth	   as	   an	   internet	   service	   provider	  
since	  2010	  calls	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  possible	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  
competition	   and	   media	   plurality	   from	   a	   multi-­‐media,	   multi-­‐platform	  
perspective.	  	  
	  
The	   importance	  of	  adopting	  a	  suitably	  dynamic	  approach	   to	  media	  merger	  
regulation	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  arguably	  reinforced	  in	  the	  light	  of	  Brexit.	  As	  regards	  the	  
prevention	  and	  promotion	  of	  national	  champions,	  merger	  control	  rules	  affect	  
the	  ability	  of	  national	  champions	  to	  acquire	  a	  dominant	  position	  at	   the	  UK	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792	   The	  difference	   this	  makes	   in	  practice	   is	   arguably	  undermined	  by	   the	   fact	   that	  Rupert	  Murdoch	  
remains	  executive	  chairman	  of	  both	  companies,	  Lachlan	  Murdoch	  is	  co-­‐executive	  chairman	  of	  Twenty-­‐
First	   Century	   Fox,	   and	   James	  Murdoch	   is	   chief	   executive	   officer	   of	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox	   and	  
chairman	  of	  Sky.	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level,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  critical	  mass	  to	  compete	  on	  the	  Internal	  market	  
and	   global	   marketplace.	   The	   possible	   introduction	   of	   a	   transaction-­‐value	  
based	   threshold	   for	   merger	   notifications	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   could	   have	  
implications	   for	   the	   UK.	   Potential	   divergence	   over	   time	   between	   the	  
approaches	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  could	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  regulatory	  
costs	  and	  commercial	  risk	  for	  broadcasters	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  significance	  of	  
territorial	   borders	   otherwise	   appears	   to	   be	   declining	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
supply	  and	  consumption	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV.	  Given	  the	  challenges	  associated	  
with	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   transaction-­‐value	   based	   threshold,	   the	   UK	  may	  
benefit	  from	  waiting	  to	  see	  how	  the	  German	  experience	  plays	  out.	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CHAPTER	  6	  
	  
REGULATION	  OF	  EXCLUSIVITY	  AND	  THE	  MIGRATION	  OF	  CONTENT	  TO	  PAY-­‐TV	  
	  
6.1	   Introduction	  
Granting	   the	   rights	   to	  broadcast	   premium	  content	  on	   an	  exclusive	  basis	   is	  
established	  commercial	  practice	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  
is	  not	  without	  controversy	  from	  a	  competition	  law	  perspective,	  particularly	  
where	   it	   involves	   the	   joint	  selling	  of	   live	  sports	   rights.	   In	   the	  analogue	  era,	  
anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   was	   introduced	   in	   both	   countries	   to	   limit	   the	  
migration	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  exclusively	  to	  pay-­‐TV	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  
public	   interest	   lies	   in	   viewers	   being	   able	   to	   watch	   such	   events	   on	   FTA	  
television.	  By	  restricting	  the	  ability	  of	  rights	  owners	  and	  broadcasters	  to	  enter	  
into	  exclusive	  rights	  arrangements	  in	  respect	  of	  listed	  events,	  anti-­‐siphoning	  
regulation	  affects	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  markets	  for	  such	  
rights.	   Exclusive	   licensing	   is	   otherwise	   subject	   to	   the	   prohibitions	   on	   anti-­‐
competitive	  agreements	  in	  Chapter	  I	  of	  the	  CA1998/Article	  101	  of	  the	  TFEU	  
and	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  CCA	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  Australia,	  respectively.	  
	  
The	  regulatory	  challenge	  is	  to	  adopt	  an	  approach	  that	  promotes	  downstream	  
competition	   in	   the	   retail	   supply	   of	   premium	   content	   to	   viewers	   without	  
unnecessarily	  hindering	  competition	  in	  the	  wholesale	  supply	  and	  acquisition	  
of	  the	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  such	  content.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  chapter	  emphasises	  
the	  importance	  of	  applying	  the	  existing	  legal	  frameworks	  in	  a	  technologically-­‐
neutral	  manner.	  This	  calls	  for	  revision	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  both	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  
rules	  and	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules.	  As	  regards	  the	  residual	  role	  
for	   competition	   law,	   the	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	   ability	   and	   incentive	   for	  
rights	   owners	   and	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   to	   enter	   into	   exclusive	   rights	  
arrangements	  is	  reducing	  in	  the	  digital	  age	  of	  convergence.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  
increasing	   prevalence	   of	   multi-­‐platform	   diversification,	   rights	   sharing	   by	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commercial	  negotiation	  or	  as	  a	  requirement	  of	  general	  competition	  law,	  and	  
the	   increasing	  popularity	  of	  direct-­‐to-­‐viewer	  models	  of	  distribution.	  To	   the	  
extent	  that	  there	  remains	  such	  an	  incentive,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  the	  prospect	  
of	   establishing	   consumer	   harm	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   reduced	  when	   a	   duly	   broad	  
conception	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   competition	   in	   the	   broader	   communications	  
environment	  is	  adopted.	  	  
	  
6.2	   Economic	  Rationale	  for	  Exclusive	  Rights	  to	  Premium	  Content	  
The	  motivation	   for	   rational,	  profit-­‐maximising	   firms	   to	  enter	   into	  exclusive	  
rights	   arrangements	   is	   fundamentally	   based	   on	   the	   higher	   return	   that	  
exclusivity	  offers	  to	  rights	  owners	  and	  broadcasters.793	  The	  price	  that	  a	  single	  
broadcaster	  will	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  exclusive	  rights	   is	   likely	  to	  exceed	  the	  
sum	  of	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  multiple	  broadcasters	   for	  non-­‐exclusive	  rights.794	  
Exclusive	  content	  provides	  a	  means	  by	  which	  broadcasters	  may	  differentiate	  
their	   services	   in	   an	   increasingly	   crowded	   marketplace.	   The	   possibility	   of	  
attracting	   more	   viewers	   creates	   the	   potential	   to	   increase	   revenue	   via	  
subscription	   fees	   and/or	   advertising	   revenue.	  Also,	  where	  broadcast	   rights	  
are	   sold	   on	   a	   collective	   basis,	   exclusivity	   ensures	   maximum	   short-­‐term	  
profitability.	  	  
	  
The	  efficiency	  rationale	   for	  exclusivity	  underpins	   the	  theory	  of	   the	  Chicago	  
School	  that	  incumbent	  firms	  are	  unable	  to	  profitably	  use	  exclusivity	  to	  exclude	  
more	  efficient	  rivals	  from	  the	  market.	  Exclusivity	  is	  rationalised	  by	  legitimate	  
business	   purposes,	   such	   as	   safeguarding	   relationship-­‐specific	   investments	  
and	  protecting	  upstream	  firms	  from	  free-­‐riding	  by	  downstream	  rivals.	  Where	  
exclusion	   is	   socially	   inefficient,	   the	   transfer	   from	   the	   excluding	   firm	   to	  
consumers	  should	  exceed	  the	  gain	  of	  the	  incumbent	  firm	  in	  deterring	  entry	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  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐185/00,	  T-­‐216/00,	  T-­‐299/00	  and	  T-­‐300/00	  Métropole	  Télévision	  SA	  (M6)	  and	  Others	  
v	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [2002]	  ECR	  II-­‐03805	  [60].	  	  
794	   Anne-­‐Marie	  Wachtmeister,	   ‘Broadcasting	   of	   Sports	   Events	   and	   Competition	   Law’	   (Competition	  
Policy	   Newsletter,	   June	   1998)	   2	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_037_en.html>	  accessed	  31	  October	  2016.	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or	  inducing	  exit.	  This	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  
US	   Supreme	   Court’s	   judgment	   in	   the	  United	   Shoe	  Machinery	   case.795	   The	  
United	  Shoe	  Machinery	  Corporation	  was	  found	  to	  have	  attempted	  to	  prevent	  
entry	   into	   the	  US	   shoe	  machinery	  market	   (in	  which	   it	   held	   an	  85	  per	   cent	  
share),	   by	   inducing	   shoe	   manufacturers	   to	   enter	   into	   exclusive	   supply	  
arrangements.	  Posner	  argued	  that	  customers	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  participate	  
in	  strengthening	   its	  monopoly	  position	  without	  being	  compensated	   for	   the	  
loss	  of	  any	  alternative	  and	  less	  costly	  sources	  of	  supply.796	  	  
	  
The	   specific	   economic	   characteristics	   of	   premium	  pay-­‐TV	  arguably	   support	  
the	  efficiency	  rationale	  for	  exclusive	  broadcast	  rights.	  Content	  exclusivity	  may	  
be	   the	  most	   efficient	  way	   of	   guaranteeing	   the	   value	   of	   a	   given	   broadcast	  
and/or	   enabling	   a	   broadcaster	   to	   attract	   sufficient	   subscribers	   to	   achieve	  
critical	  mass	  in	  order	  to	  recoup	  investment	  in	  innovation.	  However,	  as	  post-­‐
Chicago	   School	   economists	   note,	   there	   will	   be	   circumstances	   in	   which	  
exclusive	   arrangements	   may	   be	   entered	   into	   by	   dominant	   firms	   with	   the	  
purpose	   of	   raising	   rivals’	   costs	   and	   deterring	   efficient	   entry.797	   Exclusive	  
dealing	  may	  reduce	  static	  efficiency	  by	  distorting	  competition,	  hindering	  the	  
distribution	   of	   content	   through	   new	   platforms	   and	   increasing	   the	   prices	  
charged	  to	  consumers,	  resulting	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  consumer	  welfare.798	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  United	  States	  v	  United	  Shoe	  Machinery	  347	  US	  521	  (1954).	  
796	  Richard	  A	  Posner,	  Antitrust	  Law:	  An	  Economic	  Perspective	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  1976)	  203.	  
However,	   a	  monopolist	  may	  not	  need	   to	   compensate	  every	   customer,	   just	  enough	   to	  prevent	   the	  
strongest	  rival	  from	  becoming	  a	  viable	  competitor.	  J	  Mark	  Ramseyer,	  Eric	  B	  Rasmunsen	  and	  John	  S	  
Wiley,	  ‘Naked	  Exclusion’	  (1991)	  81(5)	  American	  Economic	  Review	  1137.	  
797	  Antonio	  Nicita	  and	  Giovanni	  B	  Ramello,	  ‘Exclusivity	  and	  Antitrust	  in	  Media	  Markets:	  The	  Case	  of	  
Pay-­‐TV	  in	  Europe’	  (2005)	  12(3)	  International	  Journal	  of	  the	  Economics	  of	  Business	  371,	  378;	  Philippe	  
Aghion	  and	  Patrick	  Bolton,	  ‘Contracts	  as	  a	  Barrier	  to	  Entry’	  (1987)	  77(3)	  American	  Economic	  Review	  
388;	  Ramseyer,	  Rasmunsen	  and	  Wiley	  (n	  796);	  Herbert	  Hovenkamp,	  Federal	  Antitrust	  Policy:	  The	  Law	  
of	  Competition	  and	  its	  Practice	  (West	  Publishing	  Co	  1994).	  	  
798	  Antonio	  Nicita	  and	  Giovanni	  B	  Ramello,	  ‘Property,	  Liability	  and	  Market	  Power:	  The	  Antitrust	  Side	  of	  
Copyright’	  (2007)	  3(3)	  Review	  of	  Law	  &	  Economics	  7;	  David	  Harbord	  and	  Marco	  Ottaviani,	  ‘Contracts	  
and	  Competition	  in	  the	  Pay-­‐TV	  Market’	  (July	  2001)	  <http://faculty.london.edu/mottaviani/CWC.pdf>	  
accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	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There	  is	  also	  the	  “double-­‐marginalisation”	  problem	  where	  firms	  with	  market	  
power	  at	  different	  levels	   in	  the	  vertical	  supply	  chain	  both	  charge	  a	  positive	  
mark-­‐up,	  inducing	  a	  deadweight	  loss	  to	  occur	  twice,	  resulting	  in	  excessively	  
high	  market	  prices.799	  This	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  where	  premium	  
channels	  are	  retailed	  by	  third	  parties.	  Since	  wholesale	  prices	  are	  structured	  
as	   a	   price	   per	   subscriber,	   retailers	   have	   less	   of	   an	   incentive	   to	   attract	  
additional	  subscribers	  by	  advertising	  or	  reducing	  retail	  prices,	  compared	  to	  
when	   the	   wholesale	   price	   is	   a	   fixed	   lump	   sum	   payment.800	   It	   has	   been	  
suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  foreclosure	  effects	  of	  exclusivity	  may	  also	  be	  
magnified	   where	   there	   are	   networks	   effects	   (and	   where	   consumers	   have	  
substantial	  switching	  costs).801	  	  
	  
However,	  this	  must	  be	  seen	  within	  the	  context	  of	  network	  effects	  arising	  (as	  
suggested	  in	  Chapter	  2)	  as	  an	  inherent	  characteristic	  of	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  industry.	  
Competition	   is	   for	   the	   market.	   So	   where	   rights	   are	   acquired	   by	   a	   pay-­‐TV	  
provider,	   content	   may	   migrate	   exclusively	   to	   pay-­‐TV	   for	   the	   period	   of	  
exclusivity.	  Given	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  functions	  of	  televised	  sport,	  the	  possible	  
migration	  of	  content	   to	  pay-­‐TV	  raises	  particular	  concerns	   in	   the	  context	  of	  
major	   sporting	   events,	   some	   of	   which	   are	   consequently	   subject	   to	   anti-­‐
siphoning	  regulation.	  
	  
6.3	   Anti-­‐Siphoning	  Regulation	  of	  the	  Migration	  of	  Sports	  Coverage	  to	  Pay-­‐TV	  
By	   listing	   certain	   events	   for	   coverage	   on	   FTA	   television,	   anti-­‐siphoning	  
regulation	  inherently	  limits	  the	  ability	  of	  rights	  owners	  to	  grant	  the	  broadcast	  
rights	  to	  such	  events	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis.	  Restricting	  the	  freedom	  of	  rights	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  Joseph	  J	  Spengler,	  ‘Vertical	  Integration	  and	  Antitrust	  Policy’	  (1950)	  58	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Economy	  
247.	  
800	  ‘Market	  Power	  in	  Pay	  TV:	  Annex	  7	  to	  Pay	  TV	  Market	  Investigation	  Second	  Consultation’	  (Ofcom,	  30	  
September	   2008)	   para	   2.110	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/41503/annex7.pdf>	   accessed	   14	   August	  
2017.	  
801	   Paul	   Klemperer,	   ‘Markets	  with	   Consumers’	   Switching	   Costs’	   (1987)	   102(2)	  Quarterly	   Journal	   of	  
Economics	  375;	  Carl	  Shapiro,	  ‘Exclusivity	  in	  Network	  Industries’	  (1999)	  7(3)	  George	  Mason	  Law	  Review	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owners	   to	   negotiate	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   with	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   confers	   a	  
competitive	  advantage	  on	  FTA	  broadcasters	   in	  the	  wholesale	  acquisition	  of	  
the	  rights	  to	  listed	  events	  and	  imposes	  a	  downward	  pressure	  on	  the	  market	  
value	   of	   such	   rights.	   The	   market	   impact	   of	   the	   more	   comprehensive	  
Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules	   is	   therefore	   especially	   contentious.	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  a	  markedly	  different	  outcome	  would	  
have	  prevailed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  rules,	  given	  that	  the	  Australian	  market	  
is	  relatively	  small	  with	  fewer,	  less	  well	  financed	  players.	  Whilst	  acknowledging	  
the	   ongoing	   debate	   as	   to	   whether	   anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   has	   become	  
obsolete,	   the	   focus	   here	   is	   on	   ensuring	   that	   the	   rules	   are	   applied	   in	   a	  
technologically-­‐neutral	   manner,	   so	   as	   to	   minimise	   unnecessary	   (and	  
potentially	  counter-­‐productive)	  regulatory	  interventions	  in	  the	  market.	  
	  
6.3.1	   Listing	  of	  events	  in	  the	  UK	  under	  the	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1996	  
The	  concept	  of	  listing	  events	  in	  the	  UK	  developed	  as	  a	  voluntary	  agreement	  
between	  the	  BBC	  and	  ITV,	   in	  1956,	  that	  neither	  party	  would	  seek	  exclusive	  
broadcast	   rights	   to	   events	   like	   the	   Olympic	   Games	   and	   Fédération	  
Internationale	  de	  Football	  Association	   (“FIFA”)	  World	  Cup.802	  This	   followed	  
the	  passing	  of	  the	  Television	  Act	  in	  1954,	  under	  which	  the	  Postmaster-­‐General	  
was	   empowered	   to	   make	   regulations	   to	   prevent	   the	   making	   of	   exclusive	  
arrangements	   for	   the	   broadcasting	   of	   sports	   and	   other	   events	   of	   national	  
interest	  to	  a	  restricted	  audience.803	  Shortly	  after	  the	  launch	  of	  Sky	  Television	  
some	  30	  years	  later,	  the	  Cable	  and	  Broadcasting	  Act	  was	  enacted	  in	  1984	  to	  
prevent	   events	   of	   national	   importance	   and	   significance	   from	   migrating	  
exclusively	  to	  pay-­‐TV.	  This	  required	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  be	  offered	  to	  the	  BBC	  
and	   ITV	  on	  comparable	   terms.804	  The	  concept	  of	   listing	  “protected”	  events	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802	  ‘Review	  of	  Free-­‐to-­‐air	  Listed	  Events’	  (Report	  by	  the	  Independent	  Advisory	  Panel	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
State	   for	   Culture,	   Media	   and	   Sport,	   November	   2009)	   para	   13	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/images/consultations/inde
pendentpanelreport-­‐to-­‐SoS-­‐Free-­‐to-­‐air-­‐Nov2009.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	  
803	  Television	  Act	  1954,	  s	  7(1).	  
804	  Cable	  and	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1984,	  s	  14.	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was	   subsequently	   incorporated	   into	   the	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1990	  and	   is	  now	  
contained	  in	  Part	  IV	  of	  the	  BA1996.	  
	  
The	  listing	  of	  events	  under	  the	  BA1996	  is	  subject	  to	  regulation	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  
by	  the	  AVMSD.	  Article	  14	  of	  the	  AVMSD	  provides	  that	  a	  Member	  State	  may	  
take	  measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  broadcasters	  do	  not	  broadcast,	  on	  an	  exclusive	  
basis,	  events	  regarded	  by	  the	  Member	  State	  as	  being	  of	  major	  importance	  for	  
society,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  deprive	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  the	  public	  in	  
that	   Member	   State	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   following	   such	   events	   on	   FTA	  
television.805	  This	  applies	  to	  “outstanding	  events	  which	  are	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  
general	  public”.806	   In	  the	  UK,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  
Sport	  is	  empowered	  by	  Section	  97(1)	  of	  the	  BA1996	  to	  designate	  sporting	  or	  
other	   events	  of	   national	   importance	  or	   interest	   as	   listed	  events.	   “National	  
interest”	  is	  defined	  in	  geographical	  terms	  as	  interest	  within	  England,	  Scotland,	  
Wales	   or	   Northern	   Ireland.807	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   legislative	   definition	   of	  
“national	  importance”,	  the	  Department	  for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  defines	  
a	   listed	   event	   as	   “one	   which	   is	   generally	   felt	   to	   have	   a	   special	   national	  
resonance”,	   that	   contains	  an	  element	  which	   “serves	   to	  unite	   the	  nation,	  a	  
shared	  point	  on	  the	  national	  calendar”.808	  
	  
Listed	  events	   are	   set	  out	   in	  Ofcom’s	  Code	  on	   Sports	   and	  Other	   Listed	  and	  
Designated	  Events.809	  The	  current	  list	  of	  events	  is	  reproduced	  in	  Appendix	  3	  
of	  the	  thesis.	  Notably,	  the	  list	  remains	  unchanged,810	  aside	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  
it	   is	  now	  comprised	  of	   two	  groups	  of	  events:	  Group	  A	  events	  and	  Group	  B	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805	  AVMSD	  (n	  92)	  art	  14(1).	  
806	  ibid	  recital	  52.	  
807	  ibid	  s	  97(4).	  
808	   ‘Coverage	   of	   Sport	   on	   Television’	   (Department	   for	   Culture,	   Media	   and	   Sport,	   undated)	   4	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/PDF/sport_on_television.p
df>	  accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	  
809	  Ofcom	  Code	  on	  Listed	  Events	  (n	  110).	  
810	  This	  is	  based	  on	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  current	  list	  with	  the	  list	  as	  set	  out	  in	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  
Commission,	   ‘British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   Group	   plc	   and	   Manchester	   United	   PLC:	   A	   Report	   on	   the	  
Proposed	  Merger’	  (Stationary	  Office,	  Cm	  4305,	  1999)	  appendix	  4.2	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events.811	  Full	  live	  coverage	  of	  Group	  A	  events	  must	  be	  offered	  to	  qualifying	  
services.	  A	  “qualifying	  service”	  is	  a	  service	  provided	  without	  any	  consideration	  
being	  required	  for	  reception	  of	  it	  and	  one	  that	  is	  received	  by	  at	  least	  95	  per	  
cent	  of	  the	  UK	  population.812	  This	  includes	  BBC1,	  BBC2,	  ITV1,	  Channel	  4	  and	  
Five.813	  
	  
Group	   A	   events	   generally	   include	   events	   that	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   of	  
international	  importance,	  such	  as	  the	  Olympic	  Games,	  FIFA	  World	  Cup	  finals	  
and	  UEFA	  Champions	  League	  finals.	  Live	  coverage	  of	  Group	  B	  events	  may	  be	  
shown	  on	  pay-­‐TV	  as	   long	  as	   secondary	  coverage	   (i.e.	  deferred	  coverage	  or	  
highlights)	  is	  offered	  to	  the	  BBC,	  ITV,	  Channel	  4	  and	  Five.	  This	  concerns	  events	  
of	  a	   largely	  national	  nature,	  such	  as	  cricket	  test	  matches	  played	  in	  England	  
and	   Six	   Nations	   rugby	   tournament	   matches	   involving	   home	   countries.	  
However,	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules	  do	  not	  require	  or	  guarantee	  live	  coverage	  of	  
listed	  events	  on	  FTA	  television	  in	  the	  UK.814	  
	  
Notably,	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  coverage	  of	  Group	  A	  events	  
through	  on-­‐demand	  services	  or	  platforms.	  For	  instance,	  the	  rules	  do	  not	  apply	  
to	   BBC	   iPlayer	   (even	   though	   the	   television	   licence	   requirement	   has	   been	  
extended	   to	   BBC	   iPlayer).815	   Audience	   fragmentation	   resulting	   from	   the	  
increasing	  consumption	  of	  content	  (and	  sport	  in	  particular)	  on	  mobile	  devices	  
reinforces	   debate	   regarding	   the	   threshold	   for	   a	   substantial	   proportion	   of	  
society	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  Article	  14	  of	  the	  AVMSD.	  A	  point	  may	  be	  reached	  
at	  which	  no	  service	   is	  received	  by	  95	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  UK	  population.	  There	  
have	   already	   been	   calls	   from	   FTA	   broadcasters	   for	   the	   threshold	   to	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811	  See,	  ‘New	  Protection	  for	  Football	  on	  Television	  in	  Revision	  of	  Listed	  Sporting	  Events’	  (Department	  
for	  Culture,	  Media	  and	  Sport	  press	  release	  135/98,	  25	  June	  1998).	  
812	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1996,	  s	  98(2).	  
813	  Ofcom	  Code	  on	  Listed	  Events	  (n	  110)	  annex	  2.	  
814	  ibid	  para	  1.10.	  
815	  BBC	  iPlayer	  largely	  replicates	  the	  FTA	  broadcast	  but	  has	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  additional	  content	  
available	   exclusively	   on	   BBC	   iPlayer.	   For	   instance,	   in	   2016,	   BBC	   Three	   ceased	   to	   exist	   as	   a	   linear	  
broadcast	  television	  channel,	  becoming	  available	  only	  on	  BBC	  iPlayer	  and	  social	  media	  platforms.	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reduced	  to	  90	  per	  cent.816	  If	  no	  FTA	  channels	  meet	  the	  95	  per	  cent	  threshold,	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers	  could	  secure	  exclusive	  access	  to	  listed	  events.	  A	  90	  per	  cent	  
threshold	   is	   considered	   low	   enough	   to	   cover	   FTA	   broadcasters	   for	   the	  
foreseeable	  future	  whilst	  still	  excluding	  pay-­‐TV	  channels.817	  
	  
By	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  2017,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  has	  been	  empowered	  
to	  amend	  this	  threshold.818	  However,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  renders	  the	  UK	  
listed	  events	  regime	  any	  more	  effective	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  is	  questionable.	  The	  
fact	  that	  a	  FTA	  channel	  can	  be	  received	  by	  95	  or	  90	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  channel	  is	  actually	  watched	  by	  that	  many	  viewers.	  In	  
a	   fragmented	   multi-­‐channel	   environment,	   it	   would	   arguably	   be	   more	  
appropriate	  to	  adopt	  some	  measure	  that	  tests	  whether	  a	  channel	   is	  widely	  
watched	  (i.e.	  an	  audience	  share	  test,	  based	  on	  share	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  
minutes	  viewed	  across	  a	  calendar	  year).	  Until	  such	  time	  as	  the	  UK	  leaves	  the	  
EU,	  any	  such	  measure	  would	  still	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  
AVMSD	  that	  qualifying	  services	  are	  available	  to	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  the	  
population.	   Finding	   such	   a	  measure	   that	   is	   quantifiable	   and	  operational	   in	  
practice	   may	   be	   difficult.	   However,	   there	   remain	   obvious	   limitations	   with	  
replacing	  one	  quantitative	   threshold	  with	   another,	  which	   could	   itself	   soon	  
become	  outdated	  and	  would	  necessitate	  constant	  review.	  This	  amendment	  
therefore	  represents	  a	  temporary	  measure,	  not	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  
	  
Another	   problematic	   area	   is	   the	   exclusion	   of	   electronic	   versions	   of	  
newspapers	  and	  magazines	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  AVMSD.819	  At	  a	  time	  when	  
print	  media	  is	  rapidly	  moving	  online	  and	  digital	  newspapers	  are	  increasingly	  
supplementing	   their	  articles	  with	  videos,	   this	  exclusion	   is	  problematic.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
816	  Katie	  Morley,	  ‘BBC	  fears	  it	  could	  lose	  rights	  to	  major	  sporting	  events	  as	  broadcast	  rules	  ignore	  “iPad	  
era”’	  The	  Telegraph	   (14	  February	  2017)	  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/14/bbc-­‐fears-­‐
could-­‐lose-­‐rights-­‐major-­‐sporting-­‐events-­‐broadcast/>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
817	  ibid.	  
818	  Broadcasting	  Act	  1996,	  s	  98(5A)	  (as	  inserted	  by	  Section	  97	  of	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  2017);	  HL	  Deb	  
8	  February	  2017,	  vol	  778,	  col	  1764.	  
819	  AVMSD	  (n	  92)	  recital	  28.	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ECJ	   recently	   provided	   some	   clarity	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   exclusion	   in	  New	  
Media	  Online.820	  The	  ECJ	  provided	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  
video	   section	   of	   a	   newspaper’s	   website	   constitutes	   an	   on-­‐demand	   audio-­‐
visual	  media	  service	  subject	  to	  the	  AVMSD.	  This	  ruling	  was	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  
that	  short	  videos	  placed	  in	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  area	  of	  a	  newspaper’s	  website	  are	  
comparable	  to	  television	  broadcasts.821	  	  
	  
What	   constitutes	   a	   “short”	   video	   for	   this	   purpose	   and	   whether	   digital	  
newspapers	  will	  find	  ways	  of	  placing	  videos	  other	  than	  in	  stand-­‐alone	  areas	  
of	  their	  websites	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  The	  legislative	  proposal	  to	  amend	  the	  
AVMSD,	   adopted	   on	   25	  May	   2016,822	   provides	   that	   the	   principal	   purpose	  
requirement	  of	  providing	  programmes	  to	  inform,	  entertain	  or	  educate,	  shall	  
be	  satisfied	  if	  the	  service	  has	  audio-­‐visual	  content	  and	  form	  that	  is	  dissociable	  
from	   the	  main	   activity	   of	   the	   service	   provider.823	   The	   stand-­‐alone	  parts	   of	  
online	   newspapers	   “featuring	   audiovisual	   programmes	   or	   user-­‐generated	  
videos	   where	   those	   parts	   can	   be	   considered	   dissociable	   from	   their	   main	  
activity”	  are	  given	  as	  an	  example.824	  However,	  market	  reality	  arguably	  calls	  
for	  further	  consideration	  of	  this	   increasingly	   important	  area	  going	  forward.	  
Particularly	   if	   the	   category	   for	   news	   and	   current	   affairs	   is	   extended	   to	  
encompass	  sports	  news	  (as	  advocated	  in	  this	  thesis)	  because	  sports	  news	  is	  
likely	  to	  include	  audio-­‐visual	  highlights	  and	  highlights	  on	  television	  are	  subject	  
to	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules	  (unlike	  under	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820	  Case	  C-­‐347/14	  New	  Media	  Online	  GmbH	  v	  Bundeskommunikationssenat	  and	  Der	  Bundeskanzler,	  1	  
July	  2015.	  
821	  The	  ECJ	  ruled	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  “programme”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  1(1)(b)	  of	  the	  AVMSD	  
includes	  within	  the	  website	  of	  a	  newspaper,	  videos	  of	  short	  duration	  consisting	  of	  local	  news	  bulletins,	  
sports	  and	  entertainment	  clips.	  Also,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  Article	  1(1)(a)(i)	  of	  the	  AVMSD,	  assessment	  of	  
the	  principal	  purpose	  of	  a	  service	  making	  videos	  available	   in	  the	  electronic	  version	  of	  a	  newspaper	  
must	  focus	  on	  whether	  the	  service	  has	  content	  and	  form	  independent	  of	  the	  journalistic	  activity	  of	  the	  
website	  operator.	  ibid	  [24,	  37].	  
822	   ‘Proposal	   for	   a	   Directive	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   amending	   Directive	  
2010/13/EU	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  certain	  provisions	  laid	  down	  by	  law,	  regulation	  or	  administrative	  
action	  in	  Member	  States	  concerning	  the	  provision	  of	  audiovisual	  media	  services	  in	  view	  of	  changing	  
market	  realities’	  COM	  (2016)	  287.	  
823	  ibid	  para	  3.	  
824	  ibid.	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6.3.2	   Listing	  of	  events	  under	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules	  
The	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules	  were	  introduced	  in	  1994,	  the	  same	  year	  
that	  cable	  television	  was	  initially	  licensed	  in	  Australia.825	  Whilst	  pay-­‐TV	  was	  in	  
its	  infancy,	  FTA	  broadcasters	  and	  the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia	  were	  
concerned	   that	  major	   sporting	   events	  would	   be	   “siphoned-­‐off”	   to	   pay-­‐TV.	  
Seven,	   Nine	   and	   Ten	   were	   also	   concerned	   that	   pay-­‐TV	   would	   divert	  
advertising	   revenue	   away	   from	   commercial	   FTA	   television	   at	   a	   time	  when	  
television	  advertising	  revenue	  was	  already	   in	  decline.826	   Influenced	  by	  how	  
extensive	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  list	  became,	  concern	  then	  emerged	  
about	  FTA	  broadcasters	  “hoarding”	  the	  rights	  to	  listed	  events.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  
introduction	  in	  1999	  of	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐hoarding”	  rules.827	  However,	  as	  
the	  “anti-­‐hoarding”	   rules	  have	  been	  of	   limited	  practical	   significance,828	   the	  
ongoing	   debate	   firmly	   remains	   focused	   on	   the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	  
rules.	  	  	  
	  
The	   Minister	   for	   the	   Department	   of	   Communications	   and	   the	   Arts	   is	  
empowered	  by	   Section	  115(1)	   of	   the	  BSA	   to	   give	  notice,	   specifying	   events	  
which	   in	   the	  opinion	  of	   the	  Minister	   should	  be	  made	  available	   free	   to	   the	  
general	   public,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   national	   importance	   and	   cultural	  
significance	   of	   such	   events.	   Such	   notice	   triggers	   a	   licence	   condition	   that	  
prohibits	   pay-­‐TV	   providers	   from	   acquiring	   the	   right	   to	   televise	   that	   event	  
ahead	  of	  the	  ABC,	  SBS,	  Seven,	  Nine	  or	  Ten.829	  If	  broadcasting	  the	  event	  on	  FTA	  
television	  will	   reach	  more	   than	  50	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  Australian	  population,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825	  See,	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  Gazette	  GN	  26,	  6	  July	  1994,	  1766.	  
826	   Bob	   Stewart,	   Australian	   Sport-­‐-­‐better	   by	   Design?	   The	   Evolution	   of	   Australian	   Sport	   Policy	  
(Psychology	  Press	  2004)	  169.	  
827	  The	  “anti-­‐hoarding”	  rules	  require	  Seven,	  Nine	  and	  Ten	  to	  offer	  to	  the	  ABC	  and	  SBS,	  for	  a	  nominal	  
charge,	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  events	  that	  have	  been	  designated	  by	  the	  Minister	  but	  which	  they	  do	  not	  
intend	  to	  exercise.	  ABC	  and	  SBS	  are	  subject	  to	  similar	  obligations	  to	  offer	  unused	  rights	  to	  one	  another.	  
Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  ss	  146E	  and	  146L;	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Designated	  Series	  of	  Events)	  
Declaration	  No.1	  of	  2000,	  sch.	  
828	  There	  is	  no	  obligation	  on	  offerees	  to	  accept	  offers	  and,	  to	  date,	  only	  the	  2002	  and	  the	  2006	  FIFA	  
World	  Cup	  tournaments	  have	  been	  designated	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐hoarding”	  rules.	  
829	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  s	  99	  and	  sch	  2,	  para	  10(1)(e).	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pay-­‐TV	  provider	  may	  also	  broadcast	  the	  same	  event.830	  Where	  the	  broadcast	  
rights	  to	  an	  event	  are	  not	  taken	  up,	  the	  event	   is	  automatically	  de-­‐listed	  12	  
weeks	   before	   it	   commences.831	   Once	   an	   event	   has	   been	   de-­‐listed,	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  may	  apply	  for	  the	  right	  to	  televise	  it.	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  UK,	  there	  
is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   listed	   events	   will	   be	   broadcast	   on	   FTA	   television	   in	  
Australia.	  
	  
The	   first	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   list	   was	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Broadcasting	  
Services	   (Events)	   Notice	   No.1	   of	   1994.832	   This	   was	   superseded	   by	   the	  
Broadcasting	   Services	   (Events)	   Notice	   (No.1)	   2004.	   The	   current	   list	   is	  
contained	  in	  the	  Schedule	  to	  the	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Events)	  Notice	  (No.1)	  
2010,	  which	  is	  reproduced	  in	  Appendix	  4	  of	  the	  thesis.	  A	  comparison	  of	  these	  
lists	  shows	  how	  extensive	  the	  original	  list	  was	  and	  how	  over	  the	  subsequent	  
23	   years	   it	   has	   not	   changed	   dramatically.	   The	   main	   changes	   are	   that	  
basketball	  is	  no	  longer	  listed,	  but	  the	  Olympic	  Games	  and	  the	  Commonwealth	  
Games	  have	  been	  added	  to	  the	  list.	  
	  
The	  comprehensiveness	  of	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  list	   in	  relation	  to	  
the	  UK	  list	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  types	  of	  sports	  that	  are	  listed	  and	  the	  number	  of	  
events	  listed	  for	  each	  type	  of	  sport.	  The	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  list	  refers	  
to	   36	   classes	   of	   events	   across	   12	   different	   categories	   of	   sport.	   This	   is	   in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  19	  classes	  of	  events	  that	  are	  listed	  in	  the	  UK	  across	  7	  categories	  
of	  sport	  (with	  only	  10	  such	  classes	  being	  listed	  for	  full	  live	  coverage).	  Unlike	  
the	  UK	  list,	  the	  Australian	  list	  extends	  to	  each	  match/round	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
foreign	   tournaments,	   including	   the	   English	   Football	   Association	   (“FA”)	   Cup	  
final	  and	  each	  round	  of	  the	  US	  Masters	  golf	  tournament.833	  Also,	  with	  respect	  
to	  national	  leagues,	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  list	  includes	  every	  regular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830	  ibid	  para	  10(1)(e)(ii).	  
831	  De-­‐listing	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  Minister	  publishing	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  event	  in	  question	  continues	  to	  
be	  specified	  in	  the	  notice.	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Act	  1992,	  ss	  115(1AA)	  and	  115(1AB).	  
832	  See,	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  Gazette	  GN	  26,	  6	  July	  1994,	  1762.	  
833	  Broadcasting	  Services	  (Events)	  Notice	  (No.1)	  2010,	  sch,	  paras	  8.1	  and	  11.3.	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season	  and	  play-­‐off	  match	  played	  in	  both	  the	  AFL	  and	  the	  NRL.834	  Meanwhile,	  
the	  Premier	  League	  is	  not	  a	  listed	  event	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  
Being	  more	  comprehensive	  than	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules,	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐
siphoning”	  rules	  impose	  greater	  restrictions	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  sports	  rights	  
owners	  in	  Australia	  to	  monetise	  their	  rights.	  This	  was	  noted,	  for	  example,	  by	  
the	  AFL	  in	  its	  submission	  to	  the	  Productivity	  Commission’s	  1999	  inquiry	  into	  
broadcasting	  in	  Australia,835	  in	  which	  the	  inability	  to	  negotiate	  a	  package	  of	  
rights	   for	   FTA	   television	   and	   pay-­‐TV	   was	   said	   to	   constrain	   the	   AFL’s	   total	  
television	  revenue.836	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  extensiveness	  of	  
the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules	   have	   hindered	   the	   development	   of	  
Australian	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  analogue	  era.837	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules,	  
for	   instance,	   the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules	   do	   not	   allow	   pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  to	  secure	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  the	  live	  coverage	  of	  listed	  events.	  
	  
Any	  extension	  of	   the	  rules	   to	  online	  media	  could	  pose	  a	  similar	   risk	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  Australian	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  
justify	   the	   prevailing	   platform-­‐based	   approach	   to	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules.	  The	  rules	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  sports	  coverage	  
broadcast	   via	   the	   Internet	   or	   mobile	   devices.	   In	   its	   2010	   review	   of	   anti-­‐
siphoning	   regulation	   in	   the	   digital	   era,	   the	   Department	   of	   Broadband,	  
Communications	   and	   the	   Digital	   Economy	   (now	   the	   Department	   of	  
Communications	  and	  the	  Arts)	  found	  no	  need	  to	  extend	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐
siphoning”	   rules	   beyond	   traditional	   broadcast	   television	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
834	  ibid	  paras	  4.1	  and	  5.1.	  
835	   ‘Submission	   to	   the	  Productivity	  Commission	  –	   Inquiry	   into	  Broadcasting’	   (AFL,	  December	  1999)	  
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/broadcasting/submissions/subdr240/subdr240.pdf>	  
accessed	  10	  August	  2017.	  	  
836	  ibid	  20.	  
837	  See,	  for	  example,	  ‘Submission	  to	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  –	  Broadcasting	  Inquiry’	  (ASTRA,	  May	  
1999)	   12	  
<https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/broadcasting/submissions/australian_subscription_tel
evision_and_radio/sub080.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  August	  2017.	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evidence	  of	  sports	  coverage	  being	  siphoned-­‐off	  to	  new	  media.838	  However,	  
the	  number	  of	  Australians	  who	  consume	  sport	  content	  online	  is	  increasing,839	  
and	  this	  trend	  is	  likely	  to	  gather	  pace	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  NBN.840	  
	  
Since	   this	   review,	   Seven,	   Nine	   and	   Ten	   have	   developed	   their	   own	   online	  
services.	  In	  2016,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  an	  Australian	  FTA	  network	  used	  its	  digital	  
platform	  to	  charge	  viewers	  for	  access	  to	  sports	  coverage.	  Reference	  is	  made	  
here	   to	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   Seven	   Olympics	   app,	   which	   cost	   the	   individual	  
viewer	  AU$20-­‐25	   for	   live	  coverage	  of	   the	  2016	  Rio	  Olympic	  Games.841	  This	  
blurring	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   services	   of	   FTA	   television	   and	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  undermines	   the	  generic	   justification	   for	   listing	  events	   to	  
ensure	  viewers	  can	  watch	  them	  at	  no	  additional	  direct	  cost.	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  
that,	   as	   with	   the	   UK	   “listing”	   rules,	   the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules	  
should	  apply	  in	  a	  platform-­‐neutral	  way.	  
	   	  
6.3.3	   Importance	  of	  technological-­‐neutrality	  in	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  
A	  common	  argument	  advanced	  by	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  in	  particular,	  
is	  that	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  limits	  the	  earning	  potential	  for	  sports	  bodies,	  
and	  reduces	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  sports	  coverage	  on	  television.	  Anti-­‐
siphoning	  rules	  should	  therefore	  apply	  in	  the	  same	  way	  to	  every	  player	  or	  not	  
at	   all.	   By	   not	   applying	   to	   SVOD	   platforms,	   anti-­‐siphoning	   rules	   impose	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
838	   ‘Sport	   on	   Television:	   A	   Review	   of	   the	   Anti-­‐Siphoning	   Scheme	   in	   the	   Contemporary	   Digital	  
Environment’	  (Department	  of	  Broadband,	  Communications	  and	  the	  Digital	  Economy,	  November	  2010)	  
31-­‐32	  
<https://www.clearinghouseforsport.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/405850/ReviewReport.pd
f>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
839	  Monique	  Perry,	  ‘Connecting	  people	  with	  sport:	  11.2	  million	  Australians	  go	  online	  for	  sports	  content’	  
(Nielsen,	   10	   May	   2017)	   <http://www.nielsen.com/au/en/insights/news/2017/connecting-­‐people-­‐
with-­‐sport.html>	  accessed	  16	  May	  2017.	  
840	  ‘Evidence	  relating	  to	  the	  Broadcasting	  Services	  Amendment	  (Anti-­‐Siphoning)	  Bill	  2012’	  (ASTRA,	  20	  
April	  2012)	  18.	  
841	   Jake	  Mitchell,	   ‘Rio	  Olympics:	  Seven	   to	   launch	  paid	   subscription	  service’	  The	  Australian	  Business	  
Review	   (6	   June	   2016)	  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:dVFffLZG9scJ:www.theaustralian.com.au
/business/media/rio-­‐olympics-­‐seven-­‐to-­‐launch-­‐paid-­‐subscription-­‐service/news-­‐
story/5f93d949500601d70dee4c95c765a9fc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	   accessed	  
13	  August	  2017.	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arbitrary	  restriction	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  acquire	  
the	   broadcast	   rights	   to	   major	   sporting	   events.	   This	   restriction	   may	  
legitimately	   have	   been	   considered	   as	   appropriate	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
introduction	   of	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV.	   Perversely,	   however,	   it	   places	   domestic	  
content	   producers	   at	   a	   competitive	   disadvantage	   to	   the	   likes	   of	   Netflix,	  
Facebook	  and	  Google,	  to	  which	  advertising	  revenue	  is	  being	  diverted.	  In	  this	  
respect,	  the	  current	  loophole	  in	  respect	  of	  SVOD	  is	  arguably	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  
	  
Adopting	   a	   technologically-­‐neutral	   approach	   to	   the	   enforcement	   of	   anti-­‐
siphoning	   rules	   is	   also	   consistent	   and	   necessary	   in	   connection	   with	   the	  
support	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  thesis	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  Australian	  media-­‐specific	  
ownership	  rules.	  The	  market	  would	  arguably	  otherwise	  be	  distorted	  further	  
in	  favour	  of	  the	  “winners”	  of	  the	  proposed	  media	  ownership	  reforms.	  Also,	  
the	  anti-­‐siphoning	   rules	  are	   currently	  based	  on	  a	  definition	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  as	   it	  
emerged	  in	  the	  analogue	  era.	  It	  does	  not	  reflect	  the	  broader	  definition	  of	  pay-­‐
TV	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  which	  includes	  the	  subscription-­‐based	  television	  services	  
of	   FTA	   broadcasters,	   telecommunications	   service	   providers	   and	   SVOD	  
platforms.	  
	  
6.4	   Regulation	  of	  Exclusive	  Broadcast	  Rights	  under	  UK/EU	  Competition	  Law	  
As	   with	   exclusive	   licensing	   generally,	   the	   granting	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   to	  
broadcast	  premium	  content	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  potentially	  subject	  to	  the	  Chapter	  I	  
prohibition	  on	  anti-­‐competitive	  agreements,	  or	  the	  corresponding	  prohibition	  
in	  Article	  101	  of	  the	  TFEU	  where	  there	  is	  an	  effect	  on	  trade	  between	  Member	  
States.842	   Undertakings	   can	   infringe	   Article	   101	   by	   object,	   where	   the	  
agreement	  is	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  anti-­‐competitive	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  price-­‐fixing,	  
import/export	  restrictions	  and	  absolute	  territorial	  protection),	  or	  by	  effect.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
842	  No	   known	  decisions	  have	  been	  made	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   joint	   selling	  of	   sports	   rights	   by	   a	   single	  
supplier	  under	  Article	  102	  of	   the	  TFEU	  or	   Section	  46	  of	   the	  CCA.	  As	   seen	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	  
adverse	  structural	  effects	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  arrangements	  of	  excessive	  duration	  and/or	  scope	  may	  
also	  be	  relevant	  in	  merger	  appraisals.	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This	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  exemption	  from	  prohibition	  under	  Article	  
101(3)	  of	  the	  TFEU	  or	  the	  Vertical	  Agreements	  Block	  Exemption	  Regulation	  
(which	   exempts	   (non-­‐object)	   exclusive	   distribution	   agreements	   where	   the	  
market	  share	  of	  neither	  the	  supplier	  nor	  the	  buyer	  exceeds	  30	  per	  cent).843	  
The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  regulation	  under	  Article	  101,	  since	  it	   is	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  
that	  seminal	  cases	  have	  established	  the	  analytical	  framework	  for	  examining	  
exclusive	   distribution	   and	   supply	   agreements	   (including	   where	   exclusivity	  
forms	  part	  of	  a	  collective	  selling	  arrangement).	  Despite	  Brexit,	  such	  case	  law	  
is	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  underpin	  UK	  law	  in	  this	  area	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  
	  
6.4.1	   Exclusive	  licensing	  of	  sports	  rights	  under	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  TFEU	  	  
Exclusive	  distribution	  and	  supply	  agreements	  have	  traditionally	  been	  received	  
with	  some	  suspicion	  at	  the	  EU	   level	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  may	  be	  used	  to	  
erect	   barriers	   to	   trade	   between	  Member	   States.	   This	   is	   exemplified	   by	   an	  
early	   ruling	   of	   the	   ECJ	   in	   Consten	   and	   Grunding.844	   There	   was	   a	   sole	   and	  
exclusive	  distribution	  agreement	  between	  Grundig	  (a	  German	  manufacturer	  
of	  electrical	  and	  electronic	  equipment)	  and	  a	  French	  distributor	  of	  a	  range	  of	  
Grundig	   products	   (including	   radio	   receivers,	   recorders,	   dictaphones	   and	  
television	  sets).	  The	  ECJ	  found	  the	  agreement	  to	  be	  restrictive	  of	  competition	  
by	  object	  for	  restricting	  which	  distributors	  could	  sell	  the	  relevant	  products,	  
and	   for	   limiting	  how	  the	   relevant	  products	  could	  be	   imported/exported.845	  
Since	  the	  agreement	  was	  found	  to	  be	  restrictive	  of	  competition	  by	  object,	  it	  
was	  considered	  unnecessary	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  agreement	  on	  the	  
market.846	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843	  Commission	  Regulation	  No.330/2010	  of	  20	  April	  2010	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  101(3)	  of	  the	  
Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  categories	  of	  vertical	  agreements	  and	  concerted	  
practices	  [2010]	  OJ	  L102/1,	  art	  3(1).	  
844	   Joined	   Cases	   C-­‐56-­‐64	   and	   C-­‐58-­‐64	  Etablissements	   Consten	   SARL	   and	  Grundig-­‐Verkaufs-­‐GmbH	   v	  
Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  [1966]	  ECR	  00429.	  
845	  ibid	  343.	  
846	  ibid	  342.	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Following	  Coditel	  II,847	  exclusive	  broadcast	  rights	  are	  not	  as	  such	  prohibited	  
by	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  TFEU.	  A	  Belgian	  film	  distribution	  company	  acquired	  
the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  distribute	  a	  film	  in	  Belgium.	  A	  German	  version	  of	  the	  film	  
was	   subsequently	   obtained	   by	   Belgian	   television	   provider	   (Coditel)	   and	  
distributed	  to	  Coditel’s	  subscribers.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  
existence	  and	  exercise	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights,	  the	  ECJ	  confirmed	  that	  
neither	  copyright	  in	  a	  film	  nor	  the	  right	  to	  exhibit	  a	  film	  in	  themselves	  infringe	  
Article	   101(1).848	  Advocate	  General	  Reischl	   acknowledged	  how	   the	   specific	  
subject-­‐matter	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  a	  film	  is	  comprised	  of	  not	  only	  the	  right	  to	  
prevent	   unauthorised	   third	   parties	   from	  exploiting	   it,	   but	   also	   the	   right	   to	  
have	  it	  exploited	  by	  a	  single	  person.849	  However,	  the	  ECJ	  confirmed	  that	  the	  
exercise	  of	  such	  rights	  may	  infringe	  Article	  101(1),	  where	  economic	  or	  legal	  
circumstances	   restrict	   film	  distribution	   to	   an	   appreciable	   degree	  or	   distort	  
competition	   on	   the	   market,	   having	   regard	   to	   the	   characteristics	   of	   that	  
market.850	  
	  
The	  issue	  of	  the	  potential	  barriers	  to	  entry	  arose	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Premier	  
League’s	   first	   television	  deal	   in	  1992	  with	  Sky	  and	  the	  BBC.	   In	   the	  Football	  
Association	  case,851	  the	  European	  Commission	  sanctioned	  a	  5-­‐year	  licensing	  
agreement	   under	  which	   the	   English	   Football	   Association	   granted	   exclusive	  
rights	  for	  the	  BBC	  and	  Sky	  (then	  BSkyB)	  to	  alternate	  the	  transmission	  of	  live	  
matches	  between	  1988	  and	  1993.	  Whilst	  this	  was	  deemed	  to	  infringe	  Article	  
101(1),	   an	   exemption	   was	   granted	   under	   Article	   101(3).	   Exclusivity	   for	   a	  
period	  of	   five	   years	  was	   considered	  necessary	   for	   Sky	  as	  a	  new	  entrant	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847	  Case	  262/81	  Coditel	  SA,	  Compagnie	  générale	  pour	  la	  diffusion	  de	  la	  télévision,	  and	  others	  v	  Ciné-­‐
Vog	  Films	  SA	  and	  others	  [1982]	  ECR	  3381.	  
848	  ibid	  [17].	  
849	  Opinion	  of	  Advocate	  General	  Reischl	  in	  Case	  262/81	  delivered	  on	  14	  September	  1982,	  3412.	  
850	  Coditel	  II	  (n	  847)	  [17-­‐19].	  
851	  See,	  Draft	  notice	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  19	  (3)	  of	  Council	  Regulation	  No.17	  concerning	  a	  notification	  in	  
Case	  No	  IV/33.145	  ITVA/Football	  Authorities	  and	  Case	  No	  IV/33.245	  BBC,	  BSB	  and	  Football	  Association	  
[1993]	  OJ	  C94,	  6.	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embrace	  the	  then	  emerging	  satellite	  broadcasting	  technology.852	  This	  follows	  
the	  finding	  of	  the	  ECJ	  in	  Société	  Technique	  Minière	  that	  exclusive	  distribution	  
agreements	   will	   not	   restrict	   competition	   contrary	   to	   Article	   101(1)	   if	  
appointing	  an	  exclusive	  distributor	  is	  necessary	  to	  enable	  a	  manufacturer	  to	  
enter	  a	  new	  market,853	  so	  long	  as	  there	  is	  no	  absolute	  territorial	  protection	  
(as	  in	  Consten	  and	  Grundig).854	  The	  issue	  of	  absolute	  territorial	  protection	  has	  
arisen	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  premium	  movie	  rights	  by	  Sky.	  As	  noted	  
in	   Chapter	   1,	   the	   European	   Commission	   has	   accepted	   commitments	   from	  
Paramount,	  and	  such	  commitments	  notably	  apply	  to	  film	  licensing	  contracts	  
with	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  services	  and	  SVOD	  services	  alike.855	  
	  
Then	   EU	   Competition	   Commissioner	   Karel	   Van	   Miert	   subsequently	  
commented	  that	  the	  5-­‐year	  term	  was	  in	  retrospect	  “probably	  too	  long”,	  as	  
satellite	   broadcasting	   developed	   more	   rapidly	   than	   expected.856	   In	   the	  
KNVB/Sport	  7	  case,857	  an	  exclusive	  7-­‐year	  term	  was	  considered	  too	  long.	  This	  
case	   concerned	   the	   collective	   selling	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   (and	   preferential	  
treatment)	  by	   the	  Dutch	   football	  association	   to	   then	  emerging	  commercial	  
television	  broadcaster,	  Sport	  7.	  	  
	  
There	  was	  not	  a	  formal	  decision	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  since	  Sport	  7	  
ceased	   broadcasting	   in	   December	   1997.858	   Prior	   to	   this,	   however,	  
Commissioner	   Van	   Miert	   expressed	   concern	   about	   the	   duration	   of	   the	  
agreement	   (and	   the	   renewal	   clause).859	   The	  exclusive	   licensing	  of	   rights	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852	   Hazel	   Fleming,	   ‘Exclusive	   Rights	   to	   Broadcast	   Sporting	   Events	   in	   Europe’	   (1999)	   European	  
Competition	  Law	  Review	  143,	  145.	  
853	  Case	  56/65	  Société	  Technique	  Minière	  v	  Maschinenbau	  Ulm	  GmbH	  [1966]	  ECR	  235,	  250.	  
854	  Consten	  and	  Grundig	  (n	  844).	  
855	  n	  72.	  
856	   Karel	  Van	  Miert,	   ‘Sport	   and	  Competition’	   (Speech	   to	   the	  European	   Sport	   Forum,	  27	  November	  
1997).	  
857	   See,	   Notification	   of	   a	   licensing	   agreement	   for	   the	   broadcasting	   of	   Dutch	   football	   matches	   in	  
KNVB/Sport	  7	  (Case	  No	  IV/36.033)	  [1996]	  OJ	  C228/4.	  
858	  Fleming	  (852)	  146.	  
859	  Van	  Miert	  (n	  856).	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sporting	  events	  as	  part	  of	  collective	  selling	  arrangements	  has	  been	  received	  
with	  particular	  caution	  by	  the	  European	  Commission.	  Reducing	  the	  duration	  
and	  scope	  of	  exclusivity	  under	  such	  arrangements	  has	  been	  perceived	  as	  one	  
way	  of	  allaying	  concerns	  over	  the	  control	  of	  sports	  rights	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  
small	  number	  of	  established	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.860	  	  
	  
6.4.2	   Role	  of	  exclusivity	  in	  the	  joint	  selling	  of	  sports	  rights	  in	  the	  UK/EU	  
The	  collective	  selling	  of	  television	  rights	  involves	  sports	  clubs	  as	  rights	  owners	  
assigning	  the	  media	  rights	  in	  their	  matches	  to	  the	  relevant	  association/league	  
and	  the	  association/league	  then	  selling	  the	  rights	  on	  behalf	  of	  all	  the	  clubs.	  
For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Premier	  League,	  all	  television	  rights	  are	  owned	  
by	  the	  FAPL,	  rather	  than	  the	  individual	  clubs.	  The	  FAPL	  sells	  television	  rights	  
to	  Premier	  League	  matches	  on	  behalf	  of	  all	  of	  the	  clubs	  and	  distributes	  the	  
revenue	  from	  such	  rights	   in	  accordance	  with	  Rule	  D	  of	  the	  Premier	  League	  
Handbook.861	  The	  individual	  clubs	  agree	  to	  provide	  such	  rights,	  facilities	  and	  
services	  to	  enable	  the	  FAPL	  to	  fulfil	  this	  role.862	  
	  
Traditionally,	  an	  association	  would	  sell	  all	  media	  rights	  in	  one	  large	  exclusive	  
contract	  to	  a	  single	  broadcaster	  in	  each	  territory.	  As	  clubs	  are	  prevented	  from	  
competing	   in	   the	   sale	   of	   the	   rights,	   a	   collective	   selling	   arrangement	  
constitutes	   a	   horizontal	   restriction	   on	   competition.	   However,	   collective	  
selling	  may	  be	  preferable	  from	  a	  social	  welfare	  perspective	  where	  leagues	  are	  
small	  and	  relatively	  homogenous	   in	   terms	  of	  bargaining	  power,	  and	  where	  
teams	  receive	  little	  performance-­‐related	  revenue.863	  By	  creating	  a	  single	  point	  
of	   sale,	   collective	   selling	   can	   provide	   efficiencies	   through	   improved	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860	  This	  is	  subject	  to	  criticism	  regarding	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  approach.	  For	  
instance,	  lost	  viewership	  from	  the	  Premier	  League’s	  collective	  selling	  arrangements	  during	  2003	  was	  
said	  to	  be	  as	  much	  as	  200million	  over	  the	  year.	  David	  Harbord	  and	  Stefan	  Szymanski,	  ‘Restricted	  View:	  
The	  Rights	  and	  Wrongs	  of	  FA	  Premier	  League	  Broadcasting’	  (Report	  for	  the	  Consumers’	  Association,	  
2003)	  25	  <http://market-­‐analysis.co.uk/PDF/Topical/CAFAPL-­‐SkyReport.pdf>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2017.	  
861	  Premier	  League	  Handbook	  (n	  177).	  
862	  ibid	  Rule	  D.3.	  
863	  See,	  Sonia	  Falconieri,	  Frédéric	  Palomino	  and	  József	  Sákovics,	  ‘Collective	  versus	  Individual	  Sale	  of	  
Television	  Rights	  in	  League	  Sports’	  (2004)	  2(5)	  Journal	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Association	  833.	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production	  and	  distribution.	  In	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  negotiating	  exclusive	  
rights	  on	  a	  collective	  basis	  within	  the	  commercial	  exploitation	  of	  sports	  rights,	  
commitments	  may	  be	  used	  to	  limit	  the	  potentially	  restrictive	  effects	  of	  such	  
exclusivity	  on	  the	  market.	  	  
	  
However,	  this	  is	  subject	  to	  restrictions	  that	  the	  market	  may	  itself	  impose	  on	  
the	   number	   of	   firms	   that	   may	   compete	   effectively,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   in	  
Attheraces.864	  In	  2002,	  49	  of	  the	  then	  59	  British	  racecourses	  agreed	  to	  pool	  
their	  media	  rights	  and	  sell	   them	  to	  a	  new	  channel	   funded	  by	  a	  consortium	  
comprised	  of	  Sky,	  Channel	  4	  and	  Arena	  Leisure	  Plc.	  The	  OFT’s	  decision	  that	  
the	   arrangement	   infringed	   the	   Chapter	   I	   prohibition	   of	   the	   CA1998	   was	  
overturned	  by	  the	  Competition	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  (“CAT”).865	  Interactive	  betting	  
on	  horse	  racing	  was	  then	  an	  emerging	  product	  in	  the	  UK.	  To	  compete,	  it	  was	  
necessary	  to	  acquire	  rights	  from	  as	  many	  racecourses	  as	  possible.866	  The	  CAT	  
found	  there	  could	  be	  only	  one	  successful	  bidder	  and	  collective	  negotiation	  
was	   the	   only	   viable	   means	   of	   achieving	   critical	   mass.	   This	   may	   apply	   to	  
emerging	  platforms	  in	  the	  broadcasting	  context.	  
	  
6.4.2.1	  EU	  position	  on	  exclusivity	  in	  the	  collective	  negotiation	  of	  sports	  rights	  
A	   quantitative	   approach	   has	   emerged	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   commitments	   the	  
European	   Commission	   requires,	   as	   initially	   evident	   in	   UEFA	   Champions	  
League.867	  This	  case	  concerned	  the	  sole	  and	  exclusive	  right	  of	  UEFA	  to	  sell	  FTA	  
and	  pay-­‐TV	  rights	  on	  behalf	  of	  UEFA	  Champions	  League	  clubs.	  UEFA	  proposed	  
to	  sell	  the	  rights	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis,	  in	  a	  single	  bundle	  to	  one	  broadcaster	  
per	  defined	  territory,	  for	  a	  period	  of	  several	  consecutive	  years.	  The	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864	  The	  Racecourse	  Association	  &	  Others	  and	   the	  British	  Horseracing	  Board	  v	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  
[2005]	  CAT	  29	  (Attheraces).	  
865	  Decision	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  No.CA98/2/2004,	  Notification	  by	  Arena	  Leisure	  plc/Attheraces	  
Holdings	   Limited/British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   Group	   plc/Channel	   Four	   Television	   Corporation/The	  
Racecourse	  Association	  Limited,	  5	  April	  2004	  (Case	  CP/1442-­‐01)	  [342	  and	  447].	  
866	  Attheraces	  (n	  864)	  [168].	  
867	   Joint	   selling	   of	   the	   commercial	   rights	   of	   the	   UEFA	   Champions	   League	   (Case	   37.398)	   [2003]	   OJ	  
L291/25.	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Commission	  expressed	   concern	   that	   this	  would	   lead	   to	  only	  one	   source	  of	  
supply	  and	  a	  single	  large	  broadcaster	  per	  territory	  acquiring	  all	  of	  the	  rights.868	  
There	  was	  also	  concern	  that	  some	  of	  the	  rights	  would	  remain	  unused.869	  
	  
UEFA	   put	   forward	   the	   solidarity	   argument	   (noted	   in	   Chapter	   2),	   that	   its	  
centralised	   model	   supports	   the	   development	   of	   European	   football	   by	  
ensuring	   a	   fairer	   distribution	   of	   revenue,	   improving	   production	   and	  
stimulating	   the	   development	   of	   sport.	   The	   European	   Commission	  
acknowledged	   the	   argument	   in	   principle,	   but	   rejected	   it	   as	   grounds	   for	  
exemption	   on	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case.870	   The	   rights	   were	   split	   into	   several	  
different	  rights	  packages,	  the	  term	  was	  limited	  to	  no	  more	  than	  three	  years,	  
and	   the	  packages	  were	   to	  be	  sold	  separately	  by	  means	  of	  a	  public	  bidding	  
process.	  Holdbacks	  were	  reduced	  and	   individual	  clubs	  were	  allowed	  to	  sell	  
certain	   rights	   in	   parallel	   with	   UEFA	   on	   a	   non-­‐exclusive	   basis.	   The	  
commitments	  aimed	  to	  increase	  the	  opportunities	  for	  more	  broadcasters	  to	  
acquire	   the	   rights.	   However,	   the	   long-­‐term	   effect	   on	   the	   market	   is	  
questionable	   given	   that,	   as	   already	   noted,	   all	   UK	   television	   rights	   to	  
exclusively	   broadcast	   live	  UEFA	  Champions	   League	  matches	   for	   2015-­‐2018	  
are	  now	  held	  by	  BT.	  
	  
Similar	   commitments	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   European	   Commission’s	  
decision	  in	  the	  Bundesliga	  case.871	  This	  included	  the	  unbundling	  of	  rights	  into	  
packages	  to	  be	  offered	  on	  a	  transparent	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  basis,	  with	  
terms	  again	  limited	  to	  three	  years	  and	  holdbacks	  reduced.	  The	  appropriate	  
period	  of	  exclusivity	  will	   depend	  upon	   the	   facts	  of	   the	   individual	   case.	   For	  
instance,	   in	   its	   Telepiù/Stream	   merger	   decision,872	   which	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
868	  ibid	  [19].	  
869	  ibid.	  
870	  ibid	  [164-­‐167].	  
871	   Joint	   selling	   of	   the	   media	   rights	   to	   the	   German	   Bundesliga	   (Case	   COMP/C.2-­‐37.214)	   OJ	  
L(2005)134/46.	  This	  was	  notably	  a	  commitments	  decision,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  exemption	  decision.	  
872	  Newscorp/Telepiù	  (n	  139).	  
	  	  210	  
creation	  of	  SkyItalia,	  the	  European	  Commission	  limited	  the	  exclusive	  period	  
in	   respect	   of	   football	   rights	   to	   two	   years	   and	   to	   direct-­‐to-­‐home	   satellite	  
transmission	  only.873	   Limiting	   the	   term	  of	   the	  exclusive	  agreements	   to	   two	  
years	  was	  considered	  appropriate	  in	  view	  of	  the	  strong	  market	  position	  held	  
by	  SkyItalia.874	  	  
	  
A	   decade	   after	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Premier	   League,	   the	   European	  
Commission	  expressed	  concerns	  similar	  to	  those	  raised	  in	  the	  UEFA	  case.875	  A	  
statement	  of	  objections	  was	  issued	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  FAPL’s	  joint	  selling	  
arrangements	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  foreclosing	  the	  market	  for	  other	  broadcasters	  
and	   limiting	   media	   coverage	   of	   football	   events	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	  
consumers.876	   The	   restrictions	   on	   competition	   were	   not	   considered	  
indispensable	  for	  guaranteeing	  solidarity	  between	  the	  clubs.877	  Commitments	  
effective	  from	  the	  2007/2008	  season	  included	  the	  sale	  of	  live	  and	  near-­‐live	  
rights	   in	   packages,878	   by	   means	   of	   a	   transparent	   and	   non-­‐discriminatory	  
bidding	  process.879	  No	  holdback	  provision	  was	  permitted	  in	  relation	  to	  mobile	  
rights,880	  and	  no	  single	  buyer	  was	  allowed	  to	  acquire	  all	  of	  the	  packages	  of	  live	  
rights.881	   In	  this	  respect,	  the	  decision	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  that	   in	  the	  
UEFA	  case,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  compels	  the	  sharing	  of	  the	  rights.	  However,	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  this	  was	  achievable	  in	  practice	  was	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  broadcasters	  were	  in	  a	  position	  to	  bid	  for	  the	  rights.	  
This	  was	  exemplified	  by	  the	  Setanta	  saga,	  following	  which	  Sky	  remained	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873	  An	  exclusive	  period	  of	  three	  years	  was	  permitted	  for	  movie	  rights.	  ibid	  [233-­‐234].	  
874	  ibid	  [235].	  
875	  FA	  Premier	  League	  (n	  353).	  
876	   ‘Commission	  opens	  proceedings	   into	  joint	  selling	  of	  media	  rights	  to	  the	  English	  Premier	  League’	  
(European	  Commission	  press	  release	  IP/02/1951,	  20	  December	  2002)	  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_IP-­‐02-­‐1951_en.htm?locale=en>	  accessed	  14	  July	  2017.	  
877	  ibid.	  
878	  FA	  Premier	  League	  (n	  353)	  annex,	  commitments	  2	  and	  4.	  
879	  ibid	  commitments	  7	  and	  8.	  
880	  ibid	  commitment	  5.	  
881	  ibid	  commitment	  3.2.	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dominant	  bidder	  for	  the	  live	  rights	  to	  the	  Premier	  League,	  until	  BT	  secured	  
two	  of	  the	  rights	  packages	  in	  2015.	  
	  
6.4.2.2	  UK	  position	  on	  the	  joint	  selling	  of	  exclusive	  sports	  rights	  
The	  joint	  selling	  of	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  the	  Premier	  League	  has	  more	  recently	  
been	  under	  the	  regulatory	  spotlight	  in	  the	  UK.	  On	  18	  November	  2014,	  Ofcom	  
commenced	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   joint	   selling	   of	   live	   UK	   audio-­‐visual	  
media	   rights	   for	   Premier	   League	   football	   matches.882	   This	   followed	   a	  
complaint	  from	  Virgin	  Media	  that	  the	  Premier	  League	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  
matches	   available	   for	   live	   television	   in	   the	   UK	   to	   41	   per	   cent	   allegedly	  
infringed	  the	  Chapter	  I	  prohibition	  of	  the	  CA1998	  and/or	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  
TFEU.	  On	  10	  August	  2016,	  Ofcom	  closed	  the	  case.883	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  took	  into	  
account	   the	  Premier	   League’s	  decision	   to	   increase	   the	  number	  of	  matches	  
available	  for	  live	  television	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  a	  minimum	  of	  190	  per	  season	  from	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  2019/2020	  season.884	  
	  
The	  next	  auction	  will	  also	  include	  a	  “no	  single	  buyer”	  rule,	  reserving	  at	  least	  
42	   matches	   per	   season	   for	   a	   second	   buyer.885	   This	   broadly	   replicates	   the	  
commitments	  accepted	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  However,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  there	  
will	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  firms	  that	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  
to	  compete	  aggressively	  for	  such	  rights.	  This	  is	  not	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  basis	  
for	  further	  regulatory	  intervention	  in	  the	  market,	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  inherent	  
characteristic	   of	   the	  market.	   The	   issue	   is	   the	   relative	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  
discussed	   commitments	   offer	   a	   more	   competitive	   outcome	   than	   market	  
forces	  alone	  would	  provide,	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  oligopolistic	  nature	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
882	   ‘Ofcom	   investigation	   into	   Premier	   League	   football	   rights’	   (Ofcom	  media	   release,	   18	  November	  
2014)	   <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-­‐ofcom/latest/media/media-­‐releases/2014/premier-­‐
league>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
883	  ‘Competition	  Act	  investigation	  into	  the	  sale	  of	  live	  UK	  audio-­‐visual	  media	  rights	  to	  Premier	  League	  
matches’	   (Ofcom	   Competition	   Bulletin	   CW/01138/09/14,	   8	   August	   2016)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-­‐ofcom/latest/bulletins/competition-­‐bulletins/all-­‐closed-­‐
cases/cw_01138>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
884	  ibid.	  
885	  ibid.	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market.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  less	  hostile	  response	  in	  Australia	  to	  the	  collective	  
negotiation	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  may	  be	  preferable.	  
	  
6.5	   Australian	  Competition	  Law	  on	  Exclusive	  Broadcast	  Rights	  	  
As	  under	  UK/EU	  competition	  law,	  the	  granting	  of	  exclusive	  broadcast	  rights	  is	  
not	   in	   itself	   unlawful	   under	   Australian	   competition	   law.	   However,	   if	   the	  
licensing	  agreement	  contains	  an	  exclusionary	  provision	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Section	   4D	   of	   the	   CCA,886	   or	   has	   the	   purpose,	   effect	   or	   likely	   effect	   of	  
substantially	   lessening	   competition,	   it	  may	  be	   subject	   to	  prohibition	  under	  
Section	  45	  of	  the	  CCA.887	  There	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  exemption	  for	  exclusive	  
dealing	  arrangements	   that	  are	  notified	  pursuant	   to	  Section	  47	  of	   the	  CCA.	  
With	   the	   exception	   of	   third-­‐line	   forcing,888	   exclusive	   dealing	   will	   infringe	  
Section	  47	  only	  where	  it	  has	  the	  purpose,	  effect	  or	  likely	  effect	  of	  substantially	  
lessening	   competition.889	   This	   is	   most	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   case	   if	   there	   is	  
considered	  to	  be	  insufficient	  interbrand	  competition.	  Whilst	  in	  the	  C7	  case,890	  
the	  requirements	  of	  neither	  Sections	  45	  nor	  47	  were	  found	  to	  be	  satisfied.891	  	  
	  
6.5.1	   Joint	  selling	  of	  exclusive	  rights	  under	  Sections	  4D	  and	  45	  of	  the	  CCA	  
It	  has	  been	  suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  given	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Australian	  market,	  
and	  the	  structure	  and	  funding	  of	  elite	  sport	   in	  Australia,	  the	  negotiation	  of	  
sports	   rights	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   anything	   other	   than	   on	   a	   collective	   basis.892	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
886	  Section	  4D	  of	  the	  CCA	  provides	  that	  “[a]	  provision	  of	  a	  contract,	  arrangement	  or	  understanding	  will	  
be	  an	  exclusionary	  provision	  if	  it	  is	  between	  competitors	  and	  has	  the	  purpose	  of	  preventing,	  restricting	  
or	  limiting	  the	  supply	  of	  goods/services	  to,	  or	  acquisition	  of	  goods/services	  from,	  particular	  persons,	  
by	  a	  party	  or	  related	  body	  corporate.”	  
887	  Where	  an	  exclusive	  supply	  arrangement	  is	  entered	  into	  by	  a	  corporation	  with	  substantial	  market	  
power,	   it	  may	  also	  contravene	  the	  prohibition	  on	  the	  misuse	  of	  market	  power	   in	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  
CCA.	  Section	  46	  is	  considered	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  within	  the	  context	  of	  unilateral	  refusal	  to	  supply.	  
888	  For	  the	  definition	  of	  third-­‐line	  forcing,	  see	  n	  109.	  The	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  Bill	  proposes	  the	  
prohibition	  of	  third-­‐line	  forcing	  only	  where	  it	  has	  the	  purpose,	  effect	  or	  likely	  effect	  of	  substantially	  
lessening	  competition.	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Amendment	  (Competition	  Policy	  Review)	  Bill	  2017,	  
sch	  7.	  
889	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  47(10).	  
890	  Seven	  Network	  Limited	  v	  News	  Limited	  [2007]	  FCA	  1062;	  [2009]	  FCAFC	  166.	  
891	  ibid	  [3302-­‐3304].	  
892	  Healey	  (n	  20)	  226-­‐227.	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Healey	  refers	  to	  the	  small	  Australian	  market,	  the	  number	  of	  games	  played	  in	  
the	  individual	  codes,	  the	  failure	  of	  any	  football/soccer	  code	  to	  truly	  dominate	  
the	  viewer	  landscape,	  and	  the	  relatively	  under-­‐developed	  nature	  of	  most	  club	  
brands.893	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   bigger	   football	   clubs	   in	   the	   UK	   (such	   as	  
Manchester	   United	   and	   Arsenal	   which	   are	   listed	   on	   the	   London	   Stock	  
Exchange),	  Australian	  clubs	  appear	  relatively	  under-­‐funded.894	  This	  may	  partly	  
explain	   the	   less	  hostile	   response	  of	   the	  ACCC	  and	  Australian	   courts	   to	   the	  
negotiation	  of	  exclusive	  sports	  rights	  on	  a	  collective	  basis.	  
	  
The	  collective	  negotiation	  of	  exclusive	  broadcast	  rights	  may	  infringe	  Section	  
45	  of	  the	  CCA	  or	  give	  rise	  to	  cartel	  conduct.895	  Prohibition	  as	  such	  is	  subject	  
to	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  parties	  securing	  authorisation	  from	  the	  ACCC.896	   In	  
2006,	  the	  Coalition	  of	  Major	  Professional	  Sports	  sought	  authorisation	  for	  the	  
collective	   negotiation	   of	   agreements	   with	   sports	   betting	   operators	   for	   a	  
period	   of	   five	   years.	   The	   operators	   would	   be	   entitled	   to	   offer	   and	   accept	  
wagers	  on	  events	  played	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  applicants,	  which	  included	  
the	  NRL,	  the	  Australian	  Rugby	  Union	  and	  Football	  Federation	  Australia.897	  	  
	  
The	   ACCC	   found	   that	   the	   possible	   anti-­‐competitive	   effects	   of	   the	  
arrangements	  included	  inhibiting	  competition	  between	  coalition	  members	  to	  
supply	  information	  to	  sports	  betting	  operators.898	  This	  could	  have	  increased	  
costs	  for	  such	  operators	  which	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  consumers.	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
893	  ibid	  226.	  
894	  ibid.	  
895	   “Cartel	   conduct”	   includes	  price-­‐fixing,	  dividing	  markets,	   restricting	  output	  and	  bid-­‐rigging.	   Such	  
conduct	   is	   prohibited	  where	  made	  or	   given	  effect	   to	   in	   a	   contract,	   arrangement	  or	  understanding	  
between	  parties,	  two	  or	  more	  of	  whom	  are	  competitors	  (or	  would	  be	  competitors	  but	  for	  the	  conduct	  
in	  question).	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  44ZZRD.	  
896	  ibid	  s	  88.	  
897	  Other	  applicants	  included	  the	  Lawn	  Tennis	  Association	  of	  Australia	  Limited,	  PGA	  Tour	  of	  Australia	  
Limited	  and	  Cricket	  Australia.	  Application	  for	  Authorisation	  (A91007),	  lodged	  by	  the	  Coalition	  of	  Major	  
Professional	  Sports	  in	  relation	  to	  collective	  negotiations	  with	  sports	  betting	  operators,	  11	  July	  2006.	  
898	   ACCC	  Determination	   on	   the	  Application	   for	   Authorisation	   (A91007),	   lodged	   by	   the	   Coalition	   of	  
Major	   Professional	   Sports	   in	   relation	   to	   collective	   negotiations	   with	   sports	   betting	   operators,	   13	  
December	  2006,	  i.	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concluded,	   however,	   that	   any	   such	   detriment	   would	   be	   outweighed	   by	  
transaction	   cost	   savings	   and	   the	   public	   benefits	   which	   were	   likely	   to	   be	  
generated	   by	   the	   arrangements.899	  Whilst	   this	   was	   a	   collective	   bargaining	  
case,	  it	  indicates	  the	  ACCC’s	  willingness	  to	  identify	  the	  efficiencies	  that	  may	  
be	  generated	  by	  collective	  negotiations,	  when	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  such	  efficiency	  
gains	  will	  benefit	  consumers.	  	  
	  
Collective	  negotiations	  may	  also	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  exclusionary	  provision	  under	  
Section	  4D	  of	  the	  CCA.	  However,	  it	  would	  appear	  more	  difficult	  to	  ascribe	  a	  
specific	  purpose	   to	   sports	   leagues	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   Section	  4D	   following	  
News	   Ltd	   v	   South	   Sydney.900	   This	   case	   concerned	   the	   exclusion	   of	   South	  
Sydney	  from	  becoming	  a	  member	  of	  the	  then	  newly	  formed	  NRL.	  Gleeson	  CJ	  
stated	  that	  “purpose”	  in	  Section	  4D	  was	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  motive,	  and	  
the	  relevant	  purpose	  was	  the	  end	  the	  parties	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  they	  included	  
the	   relevant	   term.901	  The	   relevant	   term	   in	   this	   case	  concerned	   limiting	   the	  
competition	   to	   14	   teams	   on	   the	   understanding	   that	   this	   was	   the	   most	  
appropriate	  number	  of	  teams	  for	  a	  viable	  and	  sustainable	  competition.902	  In	  
overturning	  the	  decision	  of	   the	  FCAFC,	   the	  HCA	  concluded	  that	   the	  parties	  
had	  not	  acted	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  excluding	  any	  particular	  club(s).903	  Notably,	  
the	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  Bill	  proposes	  the	  repeal	  of	  Section	  4D.904	  	  
	  
6.6	   Foreclosure	  Effects	  of	  Exclusive	  Rights	  to	  Premium	  Content	  in	  the	  Digital	  Era	  
The	  ability	  and	  incentive	  of	  rights	  owners	  and	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  
enter	   into	   exclusive	   rights	   arrangements	   in	   the	   digital	   era	   is	   arguably	  
diminishing.	   Multi-­‐platform	   diversification	   suggests	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  
distribution	   of	   premium	   content	   on	   a	   non-­‐exclusive	   basis.	   The	   perceived	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
899	  ibid	  ii.	  
900	  News	  Limited	  v	  South	  Sydney	  District	  Rugby	  League	  Football	  Club	  Limited	  [2003]	  HCA	  45.	  
901	  ibid	  [18].	  
902	  ibid	  [214-­‐215].	  
903	  South	  Sydney	  District	  Rugby	  League	  Football	  Club	  Ltd	  v	  News	  Limited	  [2001]	  FCA	  862.	  
904	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Amendment	  (Competition	  Policy	  Review)	  Bill	  2017,	  sch	  4,	  para	  1.	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rewards	  of	  exclusivity	   for	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  appear	   to	  be	  reducing	  with	   the	  
increasing	  tendency	  for	  premium	  content	  to	  be	  shared	  under	  joint	  purchasing	  
and	  sub-­‐licensing	  arrangements.	  The	  scope	  for	  entering	  into	  exclusive	  rights	  
arrangements	   is	   also	   limited	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   direct-­‐to-­‐viewer	   model	   of	  
distribution.	   These	   developments	   call	   for	   a	   review	   of	   the	   conceptual	  
framework	   for	   assessing	   the	   foreclosure	   effects	   of	   exclusive	   rights	  
arrangements	  involving	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  
	  
6.6.1	   Increase	  in	  non-­‐exclusive,	  multi-­‐platform	  distribution	  strategies	  
Multi-­‐platform	  diversification	  refers	  to	  the	  transition	  of	  single	  sector	  media	  
firms	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  content	  and	  services	  via	  multiple	  platforms.	  Aided	  
by	   technological	   convergence,	   this	   trend	   has	   been	   identified	   from	   the	  
changing	  broadcasting	  environments	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
competitive	  responses	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  new	  entrants	  alike.	  
The	  adoption	  of	  non-­‐exclusive,	  multi-­‐platform	  distribution	  strategies	  will	  be	  
limited,	  to	  some	  extent,	  by	  the	  increased	  transaction	  costs	  of	  entering	  into	  
multiple	   contracts.905	   There	   are	   also	   the	   costs	   involved	   in	   developing	   a	  
revenue	   model	   that	   is	   fully	   adapted	   to	   the	   economic	   characteristics	   of	  
digitalisation	  and	  the	  Internet,	  including	  the	  supply	  of	  content	  on	  a	  freemium	  
basis.906	  	  
	  
Offering	   content	   free-­‐of-­‐charge	   can	   be	   used	   to	   expand	   the	   user	   base	   and	  
generate	  network	  externalities,	  and	  sell	  higher-­‐quality	  content	  to	  some	  users	  
at	  a	  positive	  price.907	  However,	  distributing	  content	  across	  multiple	  platforms	  
also	  offers	  the	  potential	  to	  realise	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope.	  It	  facilitates	  
the	  provision	  of	  additional	  and	  improved	  access	  to	  content,	  whilst	  enhancing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
905	  Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith	  (n	  24)	  46.	  
906	  Gillian	  Doyle,	  ‘From	  Television	  to	  Multi-­‐Platform:	  Less	  from	  More	  or	  More	  for	  Less?’	  (2010)	  16(4)	  
Convergence:	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  Research	  into	  New	  Media	  Technologies	  431,	  445.	  
907	  Jean	  J	  Gabszewicz,	  Joana	  Resende	  and	  Nathalie	  Sonnac,	  ‘Media	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms’	  in	  Picard	  
and	  Wildman	  (n	  236)	  22.	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the	   possibilities	   for	   sustaining	   effective	   audience	   engagement.908	  
Connectivity	   also	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   transform	   relationships	   between	  
content	   suppliers	   and	   viewers,	   thereby	   providing	   additional	   business	  
opportunities.909	   These	   opportunities	   are	   increasingly	   valuable	   to	  
broadcasters	  in	  a	  gradually	  more	  crowded	  market.	  
	  
The	  adoption	  of	  non-­‐exclusive,	  multi-­‐platform	  distribution	  strategies	  provides	  
the	  possibility	  of	  opening	  up	  access	  to	  broadcast	  rights	  that	  would	  otherwise	  
only	  be	  available	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  established	  broadcasters.	  This	  implies	  
an	   increase	   in	   downstream	   competition	   in	   the	   retail	   supply	   of	   content	   to	  
viewers	  and	  the	  opportunity	  for	  greater	  diversity	  of	  content.910	  This	  should	  
feature	   in	  the	  assessment	  of	  possible	  foreclosure	  effects	  of	  the	  granting	  of	  
premium	  content	  rights	  on	  an	  exclusive	  basis.	  Of	  course,	  rights	  owners	  may	  
retain	  an	   incentive	   to	  grant	  exclusive	   rights	   to	  an	   individual	  broadcaster	   in	  
respect	   of	   a	   specific	   distribution	   platform.	   It	   therefore	   becomes	   especially	  
important	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   exclusive	   rights	   is	   clearly	   defined.	   This	   begins	  
fundamentally	  with	  how	  “broadcasting”	  is	  defined.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  multi-­‐media	  environment,	  the	  definition	  of	  “broadcasting”	  is	  increasingly	  
open	   to	   interpretation.	   This	   is	   exemplified	   by	   the	   recent	   judgment	   of	   the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  in	  WIN	  v	  Nine	  Network.911	  In	  this	  case,	  
live	   streaming	   was	   not	   deemed	   to	   constitute	   “broadcasting”	   within	   the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  programme	  supply	  agreement	  between	  WIN	  Corporation	  and	  
Nine,	  Clause	  2.1	  of	  which	  stated:912	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
908	  Doyle	  (n	  906)	  437.	  
909	  Gillian	  Doyle,	  ‘Multi-­‐Platform	  Media	  and	  the	  Miracle	  of	  the	  Loaves	  and	  Fishes’	  (2015)	  12(1)	  Journal	  
of	  Media	  Business	  Studies	  49,	  61.	  
910	  Recent	  research	  suggests	  that	  whilst	  multi-­‐platform	  distribution	  is	  improving	  content	  diversity,	  it	  is	  
also	  in	  many	  cases	  encouraging	  the	  recycling	  of	  the	  same	  content	  across	  multiple	  platforms,	  placing	  
greater	  emphasis	  on	  a	  narrow	  range	  of	  high	  impact	  content.	  Katherine	  Champion,	  Gillian	  Doyle	  and	  
Philip	   Schlesinger,	   ‘Researching	   Diversity	   of	   Content	   in	   a	  Multi-­‐Platform	   Context’	   (2015)	   3(1)	   The	  
Political	  Economy	  of	  Communication	  39.	  
911	  WIN	  Corporation	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Nine	  Network	  Australia	  Pty	  Limited	  [2016]	  NSWSC	  523.	  
912	  ibid	  [4].	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Nine	  grants	  WIN	  the	  exclusive	  licence	  to	  broadcast	  on	  and	  in	  
the	  licence	  areas	  covered	  by	  the	  WIN	  Stations	  the	  programme	  
schedule	  broadcast	  by	  Nine	  on	  each	  of	  the	  channels	  known	  as	  
‘Nine’,	  ‘NineHD’,	  ‘9Go’,	  ‘9Gem’,	  ‘Extra’	  and	  ‘9Life’	  (the	  ‘Nine	  
Channels’),	  to	  be	  picked	  up	  by	  WIN	  at	  Nine’s	  NPC.913	  
	  
Nine	  was	  transmitting	  its	  programme	  schedule	  by	  live	  Internet	  streaming	  in	  
the	  licence	  areas	  covered	  by	  the	  WIN	  Stations	  (the	  WIN	  licence	  areas).	  WIN	  
claimed	  Nine	  was	  in	  breach	  of	  contract	  by	  broadcasting	  within	  the	  meaning	  
of	  Clause	  2.1,	  and	  even	  if	  Nine	  was	  not	  broadcasting	  as	  such,	  it	  still	  breached	  
an	  implied	  obligation	  not	  to	  live	  stream	  in	  the	  WIN	  licence	  areas.	  WIN	  argued	  
that	  it	  would	  be	  strange	  if	  the	  parties,	  knowing	  of	  the	  potential	  to	  deliver	  Nine	  
programming	   by	   various	   means	   (such	   as	   the	   Internet),	   intended	   to	   limit	  
exclusivity	  to	  traditional	  broadcast	  FTA	  television.914	  	  
	  
The	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   New	   South	  Wales	   concluded	   that	   the	   definition	   of	  
“broadcasting”	   was	   restricted	   to	   FTA	   broadcasting	   on	   two	   main	   grounds.	  
Firstly,	   the	   reference	   to	   licence	  areas	   could	   refer	  only	   to	  FTA	  broadcasting	  
because	  the	  relevant	  licences	  covered	  just	  FTA	  television.915	  Secondly,	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  agreement,	  Nine	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  grant	  Internet	  streaming	  
rights	  to	  WIN	  in	  relation	  to	  all	  content	  (including	  the	  NRL)	  that	  was	  the	  subject	  
of	  Nine’s	  FTA	  television	  broadcast.916	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  live	  streaming	  was	  
technologically	  available	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  agreement	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  
insufficient	   in	   itself	   to	   include	   live	   streaming	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
913	  ibid	  [1].	  
914	  ibid	  [47].	  
915	  ibid	  [82].	  
916	  ibid	  [83].	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agreement.	  As	  a	   consequence,	  Nine	  was	  not	  prevented	   from	  streaming	   its	  
programme	  schedule	  live	  via	  the	  Internet.917	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sufficient	   degree	   of	   legal	   certainty	   for	   the	  
duration	   of	   commercial	   agreements,	   particularly	   in	   innovation-­‐driven	  
industries	   requiring	   substantial	   investment.	  However,	   this	   is	   an	   instance	   in	  
which	   tension	   can	   arise	   between	   the	   need	   for	   commercial	   certainty	   and	  
resolving	   contractual	   disputes	   in	   a	   way	   that	   adequately	   reflects	   economic	  
reality	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  industry.	  The	  New	  South	  Wales	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
indicated	  that	  the	  word	  “broadcast”	  can	  have	  different	  meanings	  depending	  
on	  the	  context.918	  So	  the	  finding	  in	  this	  case	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  concept	  
of	  “broadcasting”	  will	  necessarily	  be	  interpreted	  again	  in	  this	  way.	  
	  
However,	   the	   approach	   adopted	   in	   this	   case	   is	   arguably	   overly	   restrictive,	  
particularly	   as	   regards	   the	   reasoning	   behind	   the	   second	   ground	   for	   the	  
Supreme	  Court’s	  decision.	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  seems	  to	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  
the	  sentiment	  which	  underpins	  the	  HCA’s	  statement	  in	  Queensland	  Wire	  that,	  
even	  if	  there	  have	  not	  been	  any	  transactions	  in	  a	  market,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  (for	  
market	  definition	  purposes)	  if	  there	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  close	  competition.919	  
Since	  live	  streaming	  was	  technologically	  available	  when	  the	  agreement	  was	  
made,	   there	   was	   the	   potential	   for	   dealings	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   granting	   of	  
Internet	   streaming	   rights.	   If	   the	   line	   of	   reasoning	   followed	   in	  WIN	   v	   Nine	  
Network	  was	  adopted	  more	  generally	  going	  forward,	   it	  could	  disregard	  the	  
need	  of	   contracting	  parties	   for	  both	   commercial	   certainty	   and	   flexibility	   in	  
adapting	  to	  changes	  in	  commercial	  reality	  in	  the	  digital	  economy.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
917	  This	  decision	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  WIN	  Corporation	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Nine	  
Network	  Australia	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2016]	  NSWCA	  297.	  
918	  ibid	  [27].	  
919	  Queensland	  Wire	  (n	  471)	  [109].	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6.6.2	   Growth	  of	  the	  direct-­‐to-­‐viewer	  model	  of	  distribution	  
It	  has	  been	  identified	  that	  rights	  owners	  are	   increasingly	  supplying	  content	  
directly	   to	   viewers,	   as	   a	   means	   of	   capitalising	   on	   the	   additional	   revenue	  
stream	  from	  pay-­‐TV	  or	  pay-­‐per-­‐view	  subscriptions,	  and	  monetising	  the	  global	  
reach	   of	   the	   Internet.	   This	   trend	   is	   attributable	   in	   part	   to	   the	   increasing	  
investment	   in	   the	  production	  of	  exclusive	  dramas	  and	   the	  direct	   supply	  of	  
sports	  coverage	  by	  rights	  owners	  (either	  in	  place	  or	  in	  addition	  to	  coverage	  
under	   rights	   arrangements	   with	   third	   parties).	   Manchester	   United	   set	   a	  
precedent	  in	  this	  regard	  in	  the	  UK	  with	  the	  launch	  of	  MUTV	  in	  1998.	  Some	  10	  
years	  later,	  Australian	  soccer	  teams	  began	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  with	  the	  launch	  in	  
2009	   by	   Collingwood	   Football	   Club	   of	   its	   official	   YouTube	   channel,	  
CollingwoodTV.	   There	   are	   higher	   costs	   and	   risks	   in	   adopting	   the	   direct-­‐to-­‐
viewer	  model	  of	  distribution.	  For	  instance,	  sports	  clubs	  have	  fewer	  financial	  
guarantees	  when	  marketing	  their	  rights	  themselves,	  and	  this	  may	  put	  their	  
ability	  to	  offer	  high	  quality	  content	  at	  risk.920	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   economic	   potential	   to	   be	   realised	   by	   supplying	   content	  
directly	  to	  viewers	  is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  Real	  Madrid	  in	  2016	  to	  
distribute	  content	  via	  Facebook	  Live.	  Real	  Madrid	  TV	  has	  since	  gone	  live	  on	  
Facebook	  more	  than	  128	  times,	  generating	  over	  110million	  video	  views,	  with	  
its	   content	   (including	   behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	   footage,	   and	   pre-­‐game	   and	   post-­‐
game	   programmes)	   appearing	   in	   social	   feeds	   over	   a	   billion	   times.921	   The	  
economic	   potential	   will	   depend	   of	   course	   on	   the	   reputation	   and	   relative	  
performance	  of	   the	   individual	   club.922	  Generally	   speaking,	   however,	   this	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920	  Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith	  (n	  24)	  46.	  
921	  Tony	  Connelly,	  ‘Real	  Madrid's	  decision	  to	  take	  its	  TV	  channel	  to	  Facebook	  Live	  could	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  
things	   to	   come’	   (The	   Drum,	   26	   October	   2016)	   <http://www.thedrum.com/news/2016/10/26/real-­‐
madrids-­‐decision-­‐take-­‐its-­‐tv-­‐channel-­‐facebook-­‐live-­‐could-­‐be-­‐sign-­‐things-­‐come>	   accessed	   30	   July	  
2017.	  
922	   Mike	   Ozanian,	   ‘The	   World's	   Most	   Valuable	   Soccer	   Teams	   2016’	   Forbes	   (11	   May	   2016)	  
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2016/05/11/the-­‐worlds-­‐most-­‐valuable-­‐soccer-­‐teams-­‐
2016/>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2017.	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significant	  from	  an	  advertising	  revenue	  perspective,	  given	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  
social	  media	  as	  an	  advertising	  platform.923	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   that	   multi-­‐sided	   platform	   considerations	   are	   taken	   into	  
account	  when	  assessing	  whether	  exclusive	  rights	  arrangements	  are	  restrictive	  
of	  competition.	  In	  the	  Cartes	  Bancaires	  case	  the	  ECJ	  expressly	  extended	  the	  
contextual	   analysis	   as	   to	  whether	   conduct	   is	   restrictive	   of	   competition	   by	  
object,	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  TFEU,	  to	  all	  of	  the	  sides	  of	  
card	  payment	  systems	  as	  multi-­‐sided	  platforms.924	   In	   the	  MasterCard	   case,	  
the	  ECJ	  broadened	  the	  assessment	  of	  any	  countervailing	  efficiencies	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  Article	  101(3)	   “not	  only	  on	   the	  market	   in	   respect	  of	  which	   the	  
restriction	  has	  been	  established,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  market	  which	  includes	  the	  
other	   group	   of	   consumers	   associated	   with	   that	   system”.925	   Since	   the	  
European	   Commission	   can	   rely	   on	   aspects	   of	   all	   sides	   of	   a	   multi-­‐sided	  
market/platform	  to	  establish	  a	  restriction	  on	  competition	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
Article	   101(1),	   undertakings	   should	   be	   able	   to	   rely	   on	   countervailing	  
efficiencies	  arising	  from	  the	  various	  sides	  of	  the	  market/platform	  in	  seeking	  
exemption	  from	  prohibition	  under	  Article	  101(3).	  
	  
This	   is	   especially	   pertinent	   in	   the	   context	  of	   exclusive	   rights	   arrangements	  
which	  give	   rise	   to	  partial,	   rather	   than	   full,	   foreclosure.926	  Where	  broadcast	  
rights	   are	   granted	   on	   an	   exclusive	   basis	   for	   a	   specified	   period	   of	   time,	  
competitors	   in	   the	   downstream	   supply	   of	   content	   to	   viewers	   will	   be	  
foreclosed	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  market,	  but	  will	  still	  have	  some	  demand	  from	  
viewers/advertisers	   on	   the	   other	   side.	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   such	   demand	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
923	  In	  the	  UK,	  for	  instance,	  digital	  ad	  spend	  grew	  16.4	  per	  cent	  in	  2015	  to	  £8.61billion	  and	  ad	  spend	  on	  
social	  media	  sites	  grew	  45	  per	  cent	  to	  £1.25billion.	  ‘Digital	  adspend	  grows	  at	  fastest	  rate	  for	  seven	  
years’	   (Internet	   Advertising	   Bureau	   UK,	   14	   April	   2016)	  
<https://www.iabuk.net/about/press/archive/digital-­‐adspend-­‐grows-­‐at-­‐fastest-­‐rate-­‐for-­‐seven-­‐
years>	  accessed	  17	  November	  2016.	  
924	  Cartes	  Bancaires	  (n	  57)	  [53].	  
925	  MasterCard	  (n	  57)	  [237].	  
926	  Armstrong	  and	  Wright	  (n	  250)	  374.	  
	  	  221	  
mitigates	   the	   foreclosure	   effects	   of	   exclusivity	  will	   depend	   on	   the	   level	   of	  
product	   differentiation	   on	   the	   viewer/advertiser	   side(s).	   The	   increasing	  
supply	  of	  exclusive	  dramas	  in	  particular	  is	  likely	  to	  mitigate	  any	  such	  effects,	  
assuming	  that	  viewers/advertisers	  will	  be	  more	   likely	  to	  regard	  the	  various	  
distribution	  platforms	  as	  substitutable	  in	  consuming	  dramas.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  multi-­‐sided	  platform	  nature	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  
supports	  the	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reducing	  likelihood	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  
foreclosure	   from	   exclusive	   agreements	   for	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	  
content	  or	  services.	  
	  
6.6.3	   Dilution	  of	  exclusivity	  with	  joint	  purchasing	  and	  sub-­‐licensing	  
The	  sharing	  of	  rights	  under	  joint	  purchasing	  and	  sub-­‐licensing	  arrangements	  
is	  emerging	  as	  a	  strategic	  way	  in	  which	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  FTA	  broadcasters	  
alike	  can	  collaborate	  to	  meet	  the	  escalating	  cost	  of	  acquiring	  sports	  rights	  in	  
particular.	  For	  example,	  in	  2014,	  BT	  and	  Sky	  agreed	  a	  4-­‐year	  deal	  to	  split	  the	  
broadcast	   rights	   for	   live	   coverage	   of	   the	   inaugural	   European	   Rugby	  
Champions	  Cup	  and	  European	  Rugby	  Challenge	  Cup.927	  With	  only	  the	  finals	  
being	  listed	  as	  Group	  A	  events	  under	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  rules,	  live	  coverage	  of	  
the	  remainder	  of	  these	  competitions	  can	  be	  broadcast	  on	  pay-­‐TV,	  provided	  
that	   secondary	   coverage	   is	   offered	   to	   FTA	   broadcasters.	   Admittedly,	   the	  
circumstances	  leading	  up	  to	  this	  agreement	  were	  unique	  in	  that	  Sky	  and	  BT	  
had	  each	  entered	  into	  exclusive	  agreements	  for	  rights	  to	  European	  club	  rugby	  
before	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  club	  game	  in	  2014	  (when	  the	  European	  Rugby	  
Cup	  was	  replaced	  by	  European	  Professional	  Club	  Rugby).928	  However,	  splitting	  
the	  rights	  meant	  both	  parties	  could	  avoid	  the	  time	  and	  expense	  of	  litigation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
927	  Paul	  Rees,	  ‘A	  beginner’s	  guide:	  the	  new	  European	  Rugby	  Champions	  Cup	  explained’	  The	  Guardian	  
(11	  April	  2014)	  <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2014/apr/11/beginners-­‐guide-­‐european-­‐
rugby-­‐champions-­‐cup>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2017.	  
928	   In	   2012,	   Sky	   renewed	   its	   contract	  with	  Heineken	   Cup	   organisers,	   the	   European	   Rugby	   Cup.	   At	  
around	  the	  same	  time,	  BT	  reached	  an	  agreement	  with	  Premiership	  Rugby	  in	  respect	  of	  any	  European	  
games	  involving	  its	  clubs,	  after	  the	  English	  and	  French	  sides	  announced	  that	  they	  were	  severing	  ties	  
with	   the	   European	   Rugby	   Cup.	   Ben	   Rumsby,	   ‘TV	   giants	   BT	   and	   Sky	   close	   to	   historic	   deal	   to	   share	  
coverage	   of	   European	   club	   rugby’	   The	   Telegraph	   (13	   February	   2014)	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The	  sharing	  of	  sports	  rights	  has	  received	  a	  mixed	  response,	  particularly	  at	  the	  
EU	   level.	   This	   is	   exemplified	   by	   the	   differing	   responses	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission	   and	   European	   Courts	   in	   the	   Eurovision	   case.929	   The	   European	  
Broadcasting	   Union	   (“EBU”)	   coordinated	   a	   programme	   exchange	   system	  
under	  which	  EBU	  members	  could	  jointly	  acquire	  and	  share	  television	  rights.	  
The	  European	  Commission	  found	  that	  the	  arrangement	  greatly	  restricted,	  if	  
not	   eliminated,	   competition	   between	   EBU	   members,	   and	   between	   EBU	  
members	   and	   non-­‐EBU	  members,	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   rights	   to	   international	  
sporting	  events	  in	  particular.930	  Exemption	  was	  granted	  under	  Article	  101(3)	  
on	  the	  basis	   that	   the	   joint	  negotiations	   improved	  purchasing	  conditions	  by	  
reducing	   transaction	   costs.931	   It	   was	   considered	   that	   consumers	   would	  
receive	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  benefit	  in	  the	  form	  of	  more	  and	  better	  quality	  sports	  
programmes	  than	  members	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  able	  to	  provide.932	  
However,	   the	   General	   Court	   annulled	   this	   decision	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	  
European	  Commission	  was	  incorrect	  in	  finding	  that	  the	  sub-­‐licensing	  system	  
guaranteed	   competitors	   of	   EBU	   members	   sufficient	   access	   to	   the	  
transmission	  rights	  for	  sporting	  events	  held	  by	  EBU	  members.933	  	  
	  
Concerns	  were	   similarly	   raised	  by	   the	   European	  Commission	   following	   the	  
notification	   of	   a	   joint	   purchasing	   agreement	   between	   Telefónica	   and	  
Sogecable,	   relating	  to	  the	  broadcast	  rights	   to	  Spanish	  First	  League	  Football	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/rugbyunion/10637587/TV-­‐giants-­‐BT-­‐and-­‐Sky-­‐close-­‐to-­‐historic-­‐
deal-­‐to-­‐share-­‐coverage-­‐of-­‐European-­‐club-­‐rugby.html>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2017.	  
929	  EBU/Eurovision	  System	  (Case	  IV/32.150)	  Commission	  Decision	  93/403/EEC	  [1993]	  OJ	  L179/23.	  
930	  ibid	  [49].	  
931	  ibid	  [59].	  
932	  ibid	  [68].	  
933	  Judgment	  of	  the	  General	  Court	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐185/00,	  T-­‐299/00	  and	  T-­‐300/00	  M6	  v	  Commission,	  
Gestevisión	   Telecinco	   v	   Commission	   and	   SIC	   v	   Commission.	  The	  decision	  of	   the	  General	   Court	  was	  
subsequently	   upheld	   by	   the	   ECJ.	   Case	   C-­‐470/02	   P	   Appeal	   brought	   on	   23	   December	   2002	   by	   the	  
European	   Broadcasting	   Union	   against	   the	   judgment	   delivered	   on	   8	   October	   2002	   by	   the	   Second	  
Chamber,	  Extended	  Composition,	  of	  the	  General	  Court	  in	  Joined	  Cases	  T-­‐185/00,	  T-­‐216/00,	  T-­‐299/00	  
and	  T-­‐300/00	  [2003]	  OJ	  C55/13.	  
	  	  223	  
matches	  for	  11	  seasons	  ending	  in	  2009.934	  The	  case	  was	  closed	  following	  the	  
merger	  of	  Vía	  Digital	  and	  Sogecable.935	  Prior	  to	  this,	  the	  European	  Commission	  
considered	   that	   the	   agreement	  would	  have	   foreclosed	   the	   Spanish	  pay-­‐TV	  
market,	  the	  success	  of	  which	  (as	  in	  many	  other	  countries)	  was	  said	  to	  heavily	  
rely	   on	   the	   live	   coverage	   of	   football	  matches.936	   Following	   a	   Statement	   of	  
Objections,	  the	  parties	  granted	  access	  to	  the	  rights	  to	  new	  entrants	  into	  cable	  
and	  digital	  terrestrial	  television	  in	  Spain,	  and	  also	  allowed	  competitors	  to	  set	  
the	  prices	  for	  pay-­‐per-­‐view	  matches.937	  
	  
The	  most	  notable	  instance	  of	  rights	  sharing	  in	  Australia	  arguably	  remains	  the	  
Content	  Supply	  Agreement	  between	  Foxtel	  and	  Optus	  in	  2002.	  This	  provided	  
for	  the	  supply	  of	  Foxtel	  channels	  to	  Optus	  for	  resale	  on	  Optus’	  hybrid	  fiber-­‐
coaxial	  broadband	  network	  until	  31	  December	  2010,	  and	  certain	  pay-­‐TV	  rights	  
to	   Austar.938	   It	  was	   authorised	   by	   the	   ACCC	   subject	   to	   undertakings.939	   As	  
regards	  access	   to	   content,	   Foxtel	  and	  Austar	  each	  undertook	   to	  enter	   into	  
agreements	  with	  infrastructure	  operators	  who	  requested	  to	  be	  supplied	  with	  
Foxtel/Austar	  pay-­‐TV	  services,	  and	  to	  supply	  infrastructure	  operators	  of	  ADSL	  
networks	  on	  the	  same	  terms	  in	  the	  event	  that	  Foxtel/Austar	  supplied	  a	  retail	  
pay-­‐TV	  service	  using	  ADSL.940	  Foxtel	  also	  undertook	  to	  not	  acquire	  the	  pay-­‐TV	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
934	   Decision	   of	   the	   Commission	   of	   14	   August	   2002,	   referring	   to	   Case	   No	   COMP/M.2845	  
Sogecable/Canalsatélite	  Digital/Vía	  Digital	  to	  the	  competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Spain	  in	  
accordance	  with	  Article	  9	  of	  Council	  Regulation	  No.4064/89.	  
935	  ‘Commission	  closes	  its	  probe	  of	  Audiovisual	  Sport	  after	  Sogecable/Vía	  Digital	  merger’	  (European	  
Commission	   press	   release	   IP/03/655,	   8	   May	   2003)	  
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HwKwXOZaoo4J:europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_IP-­‐03-­‐655_en.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2017.	  
936	  ‘Commission	  withdraws	  threat	  of	  fines	  against	  Telefonica	  and	  Sogecable,	  but	  pursues	  examination	  
of	   their	   joint	   football	   rights’	   (European	  Commission	  press	   release	   IP/00/1352,	  23	  November	  2000)	  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_IP-­‐00-­‐1352_en.htm?locale=en>	  accessed	  30	  July	  2017.	  
937	  ibid.	  
938	   ‘Breakthrough	   agreement	   in	   subscription	   television’	   (Optus	   media	   release,	   5	   March	   2002)	  
<https://media.optus.com.au/media-­‐releases/2002/breakthrough-­‐agreement-­‐in-­‐subscription-­‐
television/>	  accessed	  8	  May	  2017.	  
939	   ‘ACCC	   accepts	   Foxtel-­‐Optus	   pay	   TV	   deal’	   (ACCC	  media	   release	  MR279/02,	   13	  November	   2002)	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/media-­‐release/accc-­‐accepts-­‐foxtel-­‐optus-­‐pay-­‐tv-­‐deal>	   accessed	   8	   May	  
2017.	  
940	  Asymmetric	  Digital	  Subscriber	  Line	  is	  a	  type	  of	  digital	  subscriber	  line	  broadband	  communications	  
technology	  that	  is	  used	  for	  connecting	  to	  the	  Internet.	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rights	   to	   various	   shared	   channels	  on	   an	  exclusive	  basis,941	   and	   to	   supply	   a	  
percentage	  of	  non-­‐affiliated	  channels.	  	  
	  
The	   expiry	   of	   these	   undertakings	   was	   followed	   by	   court-­‐enforceable	  
undertakings	  from	  Foxtel	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  ACCC’s	  approval	  of	  Foxtel’s	  
proposed	   acquisition	   of	   Austar.942	   The	   undertakings	   prohibit	   Foxtel	   from	  
acquiring	  exclusive	  IPTV	  rights	  for	  or	  renewing	  exclusive	  IPTV	  arrangements	  
in	  relation	  to	  62	  channels	  (including	  a	  number	  of	  movie	  channels).	  However,	  
the	  undertakings	  do	  not	  preclude	   Foxtel	   from	  acquiring	  exclusive	   rights	   to	  
individual	   sports,	   which	   are	   otherwise	   subject	   to	   the	   restrictions	   imposed	  
under	   the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules.	   The	   ACCC	   considers	   that	   by	  
reducing	  content	  exclusivity,	  the	  undertakings	  will	  lower	  barriers	  to	  entry,	  and	  
promote	   new	   and	   effective	   competition	   in	   metropolitan	   and	   regional	  
telecommunications	  and	  pay-­‐TV	  markets.	  Yet	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  of	  this	  in	  
practice.	  
	  
Granted	  for	  an	  8-­‐year	  period,	  the	  undertakings	  will	  cease	  to	  be	  enforceable	  
in	  2020.	  At	  this	  time,	  Foxtel’s	  ability	  to	  acquire	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  premium	  
non-­‐sport	   content	   will	   be	   enhanced.	   This	   will	   not	   necessarily	   call	   for	  
additional	  regulatory	  intervention	  in	  the	  market,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  
consideration	  in	  the	  ACCC’s	  review	  of	  the	  proposed	  takeover	  of	  Ten	  via	  the	  
special	  purpose	  vehicles	  of	  Lachlan	  Murdoch	  and	  Bruce	  Gordon.	  This	  would	  
be	  recommended	  even	  if	  there	  was	  more	  than	  3	  years	  until	  the	  expiry	  of	  the	  
undertakings	  and	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ACCC	  says	  it	  bases	  its	  assessment	  
on	  what	   a	  market	   is	   likely	   to	   look	   like	   in	   the	   next	   2-­‐3	   years.943	   As	   already	  
indicated,	  a	  longer-­‐run	  approach	  than	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  appropriate	  in	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
941	  This	  refers	  to	  channels	  broadcast	  by	  both	  Foxtel	  and	  Optus	  prior	  to	  the	  agreements:	  Antenna,	  BBC	  
World,	  Cartoon	  Network,	  CNBC,	  CNN,	  Disney,	  National	  Geographic,	  RAI,	  Sky	  News,	  Sky	  Racing,	  TCM,	  
TVSN,	  World	  Movies	  and	  ESPN	  International.	  
942	   ‘Foxtel	   -­‐	   proposed	   acquisition	   of	   Austar	   United	   Communications	   Limited’	  
<http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1044881/fromItemId/751043?pageDefini
tionItemId=86167>	  accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	  
943	  ACCC	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  91)	  4.	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cases	   in	   assessing	   the	   market	   and	   market	   power	   in	   the	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	  
context.	  It	  is	  questionable	  whether	  the	  expiry	  of	  the	  undertakings	  would	  call	  
for	   further	   regulation.	  As	   argued	   in	   relation	   to	   Sky	   in	   the	  UK,	   the	   case	   for	  
asymmetric	   regulation	   is	   diminished	   by	   new	   entry,	   particularly	   by	   online	  
streaming	   services	   (i.e.	   since	   2012,	   the	   online	   streaming	   landscape	   has	  
changed	  dramatically	  with	  the	  entry	  of	  Stan	  and	  Netflix	  Australia).	  
	  
6.7	   Conclusions	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  for	  exclusive	  broadcast	  rights	  to	  major	  sporting	  
events	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  is	  inherently	  affected	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
UK	  “listing”	  rules	  and	  the	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules.	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  
how	  these	  rules	  restrict	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  owners	  of	  rights	  to	  listed	  events	  to	  
enter	   into	   exclusive	   rights	   arrangements	   with	   pay-­‐TV	   providers.	   Such	  
restrictions	   are	   particularly	   pronounced	   in	   Australia	   given	   the	   more	  
comprehensive	   nature	   of	   the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules,	   and	   the	  
absence	  of	  a	  dual	  listing	  regime.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  existing	  rules	  discriminate	  
between	   traditional	   broadcast	   television	   and	   new	   media	   arguably	  
undermines	  the	  normative	  basis	  for	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation,	  namely	  to	  keep	  
the	  coverage	  of	  listed	  events	  on	  FTA	  television.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  in	  Australia	  
by	  Seven’s	  decision	  to	  charge	  viewers	  to	  access	  sports	  coverage	  via	  its	  app.	  
Anti-­‐siphoning	   rules	   therefore	   also	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   undermine	   the	  
relative	   investment	   incentives	   of	   FTA	   broadcasters	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  SVOD	  platforms	  on	  the	  other.	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  that	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  is	  applied	  in	  a	  technologically-­‐
neutral	   way	   across	   available	   platforms,	   even	   if	   this	   means	   extending	   the	  
scope	  of	  such	  regulation.	  This	  calls	  for	  something	  more	  than	  the	  reduction	  in	  
the	  threshold	  for	  “qualifying	  services”	  in	  the	  UK	  under	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  
Act.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  the	  Australian	  
“anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Broadband,	   Communications	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and	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  in	  2010,944	  there	  was	  little	  support	  for	  extending	  the	  
“anti-­‐siphoning”	   list	   to	   new	   platforms.	   New	   media	   services	   were	   then	  
perceived	  to	  “remain	  in	  their	  infancy	  in	  Australia”.945	  An	  obvious	  development	  
in	   this	   regard	   is	  Optus’	  entry	   into	   the	  supply	  of	   live	  sports	  coverage	  via	   its	  
mobile	  and	  broadband	  services,	  and	  acquisition	  of	  broadcast	  rights	  for	  cricket	  
and	   the	   Premier	   League.	   This	   thesis	   therefore	   urges	   the	   review	   of	   anti-­‐
siphoning	  regulation	  in	  both	  Australia	  and	  the	  UK,	  and	  for	  the	  focus	  of	  such	  
reviews	  to	  be	  on	  technological-­‐neutrality.	  	  
	  
Beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   there	  
remains	   an	   incentive	   for	   rights	   owners	   and	   broadcasters	   to	   enter	   into	  
exclusive	  rights	  arrangements,	  the	  limits	  of	  adopting	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  
to	  assessing	  the	  foreclosure	  effects	  and	  regulation	  of	  such	  arrangements	  are	  
evident.	   The	   European	   Commission’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   very	   existence	   and	  
duration	  of	  exclusivity	  in	  the	  Football	  Association	  and	  KNVB/Sport	  7	  cases,946	  
for	  instance,	  undermines	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  that	  exclusive	  rights	  are	  
not	  in	  themselves	  incompatible	  with	  Article	  101(1)	  of	  the	  TFEU,	  by	  implying	  
that	   such	   rights	   are	   inherently	   restrictive	   of	   competition.	   The	   potential	  
difficulties	  of	  this	  approach	  are	  reinforced	  by	  suggestions	  made	  by	  former	  EU	  
Competition	  Commissioner	  Mario	  Monti	  that	  exclusivity	  for	  a	  period	  longer	  
than	  one	  season	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  market	  foreclosure,	  and	  may	  be	  justified	  
only	   if	   the	   firm	   acquiring	   the	   rights	   wishes	   to	   enter	   a	   new	   market	   or	   to	  
introduce	   new	   technology	   requiring	   substantial	   investment.947	   This	   is	  
significant	  since	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  in	  obtaining	  exemption	  from	  prohibition	  
under	  Article	  101(3)	  shifts	  to	  the	  parties	  to	  demonstrate	  there	  are	  no	  ways	  
less	  restrictive	  of	  competition	  for	  achieving	  the	  relevant	  ends.	  Also,	  from	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944	  Department	  of	  Broadband,	  Communications	  and	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  (n	  838).	  
945	  ibid	  31.	  
946	   Football	   Association	   (n	   834);	   KNVB/Sport	   7	   (n	   840).	   The	   European	   Commission	   has	   similarly	  
considered	   the	   existence	   of	   exclusive	   movie	   rights	   to	   be	   restrictive	   of	   competition.	  
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram	  (Case	  No	  COMP/M.2050)	  OJ	  L(2000)2985.	  
947	   Mario	   Monti,	   ‘Sport	   and	   Competition’	   (Speech	   00/152,	   Brussels,	   17	   April	   2000)	  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_SPEECH-­‐00-­‐152_en.htm>	  accessed	  8	  May	  2017.	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advertising	  revenue	  perspective,	  a	  period	  of	  one	  season	  (which	  could	  be	  less	  
than	  a	  year	  depending	  on	  the	  event),	  is	  unlikely	  to	  reflect	  the	  frequency	  with	  
which	  television	  advertising	  budgets	  are	  allocated,	  giving	  rise	  to	  disparity	  in	  
the	  timeframes	  over	  which	  the	  viewer-­‐side	  and	  advertising-­‐side	  are	  assessed.	  
	  
The	   European	   Commission’s	   use	   of	   commitments	   to	   limit	   the	   duration	   of	  
exclusivity	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  balance	  the	  promotion	  of	  new	  entry	  and	  
support	   for	   technological	  progress	  without	  seriously	  distorting	  competition	  
and	   damaging	   market	   structure.948	   However,	   the	   period	   of	   exclusivity	   is	  
misleading,	   for	  what	   is	   important	   is	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  parties	  are	   locked	  
in.949	  In	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context,	  this	  requires	  consideration	  of	  the	  wider	  
market	  conditions	  and	  exclusivity	  as	  characteristic	  of	  effective	  competition.	  
Subiotto	   and	  Graf	   go	   so	   far	   as	   to	   propose	   a	   presumption	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  
validity	   of	   exclusive	   broadcast	   licences	   under	   EU	   competition	   law.950	   They	  
suggest	  that	  the	  duration	  and	  scope	  of	  exclusivity	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  more	  
detailed	   consideration	   only	   where	   there	   are	   high	   market	   shares.951	   This	  
sounds	   appropriate	   provided	   the	   approach	   that	   is	   adopted	   in	   determining	  
market	  shares	  reflects	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  competition	  for	  the	  market.	  This	  
includes	  adopting	  a	  longer-­‐run	  approach	  in	  assessing	  the	  possible	  foreclosure	  
effects	   of	   exclusivity	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   increase	   in	   multi-­‐platform	  
diversification,	   direct-­‐to-­‐viewer	   distribution,	   and	   the	   sharing	   of	   rights	  
(whether	  by	  commercial	  negotiation	  or	  as	  a	  requirement	  of	  regulation).	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
948	  Nikos	  T	  Nikolinakos,	  EU	  Competition	  Law	  and	  Regulation	  in	  the	  Converging	  Telecommunications,	  
Media	  and	  IT	  Sectors	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2006)	  168-­‐169.	  
949	  Aghion	  and	  Bolton	  (n	  797)	  389.	  
950	  Thomas	  Graf	  and	  Romano	  Subiotto,	  ‘Analysis	  of	  the	  Principles	  Applicable	  to	  the	  Review	  of	  Exclusive	  
Broadcasting	  Licences	  under	  EC	  Competition	  Law’	  (2003)	  26(4)	  World	  Competition	  589.	  
951	  ibid.	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CHAPTER	  7	  
	  
ACCESS	  REGULATION	  AND	  INDISPENSABILITY	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  PREMIUM	  PAY-­‐TV	  	  
	  
7.1	   Introduction	  
The	  competitive	  access	  problem	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  has	  shifted	  from	  networks	  
to	  content,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  “premium	  content	  bottleneck”.	  Issues	  
of	   access	   to	   content	   and	   carriage	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   are	  
inherently	  interrelated.	  Securing	  access	  to	  the	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  premium	  
content	  is	  of	  little	  commercial	  value	  without	  access	  to	  the	  physical	  means	  by	  
which	   to	   distribute	   such	   content	   to	   viewers,	   and	   vice	   versa.	   The	  
interrelationship	  between	  content	  and	  carriage	  is	  reinforced,	  in	  particular,	  in	  
the	   UK	   by	   the	   vertical	   integration	   of	   Sky	   (and	   more	   recently	   BT),	   and	   in	  
Australia	   by	   Telstra’s	   50	   per	   cent	   stake	   in	   Foxtel	   (and	   Telstra’s	   forward	  
integration	  into	  the	  retail	  distribution	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  services).	  Competing	  at	  both	  
the	   wholesale	   and	   retail	   levels	   may	   provide	   firms	   with	   the	   ability	   and	  
incentive	  to	  act	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  adversely	  affects	  competition	   in	  those	  or	  
related	  markets.	  This	  may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  an	  outright	  or	  constructive	  refusal	  
to	   provide	   third	   parties	   with	   access	   to	   content	   and/or	   technical	   pay-­‐TV	  
facilities	  under	  their	  control.952	  	  
	  
Regulatory	  responses	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  have	  been	  to	  operate	  sector-­‐
specific	  access	  regulation	  alongside	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  prohibitions	  on	  
refusal	   to	   supply	   in	   Chapter	   II	   of	   the	   CA1998/Article	   102	   of	   the	   TFEU	   and	  
Section	   46	   of	   the	   CCA,	   respectively.	   This	   includes	   the	   provision	   for	   access	  
regulation	  in	  the	  UK	  under	  the	  CA2003,	  and	  in	  Australia	  the	  general	  access	  
regime	   in	   Part	   IIIA	   of	   the	   CCA	   for	   bottleneck	   infrastructure	   and	   the	  
telecommunications	  access	  regime	  in	  Part	  XIC	  of	  the	  CCA.	  It	  will	  be	  suggested	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  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  “technical	  pay-­‐TV	  facilities”	  refers	  to	  transmission	  networks	  and	  
other	  access	  technologies	  used	  to	  supply	  audio-­‐visual	  content	  to	  viewers.	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that	  the	  residual	  role	  for	  Section	  46	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  more	  significant	  with	  
the	  proposed	  amendments	  to	  the	  access	  regimes	  in	  the	  Competition	  Policy	  
Review	  Bill	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  Section	  46.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  
prohibitions	  on	  refusal	   to	  supply	   in	  both	  countries	   typically	   fulfil	  a	   residual	  
role	  where	  the	  sector-­‐specific	  access	  regimes	  do	  not	  apply.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  issue	  that	  arises	  at	  the	  intersection	  between	  general	  competition	  law	  
and	   sector-­‐specific	   access	   regulation	   in	   this	   context	   is	   whether	   premium	  
content	   and/or	   technical	   pay-­‐TV	   facilities	   constitute	   “essential	   facilities”.	  
Denying	   third	   parties	   access	   to	   an	   essential	   facility	   represents	   a	   subset	   of	  
refusal	   to	   supply.	  Mandating	   access	   to	   premium	   content/technical	   pay-­‐TV	  
facilities	   on	   “fair,	   reasonable	   and	   non-­‐discriminatory”	   terms	   assumes	   that	  
access	   is	   indispensable	   for	  downstream	  competition	   in	   the	   retail	   supply	  of	  
premium	   content	   to	   viewers.	   Evens,	   Iosifidis	   and	   Smith	   are	   amongst	  
proponents	  of	  the	  systematic	  application	  of	  the	  “essential	  facilities”	  doctrine	  
to	  all	  premium	  content	  and	  all	  delivery	  platforms.953	  	  
	  
At	   a	   time	   when	   the	   role	   for	   sector-­‐specific	   access	   regulation	   is	   arguably	  
diminishing,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  applying	  the	  concept	  of	  
“essential	   facilities”	   in	   the	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   context	   becomes	   increasingly	  
significant.	  It	  will	  inherently	  determine	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  residual	  role	  for	  the	  
regulation	  of	  access	  under	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU	  and	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  CCA.	  
Based	  on	  regulatory	  and	  technological	  developments	  relating	  to	  the	  supply	  
and	  consumption	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  digital	  era,	  this	  chapter	  questions	  
the	  relevance	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  indispensability	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  challenges	  
the	   scope	   for	   legitimately	   regulating	  premium	  content	  or	   technical	   pay-­‐TV	  
facilities	  as	  essential	  facilities.	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  Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith	  (n	  368)	  545.	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7.2	   Monopoly	  Problem	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  Essential	  Facilities	  
Access	   issues	  arise	   in	   industries,	   like	  pay-­‐TV,	  where	  there	  are	  facilities	  that	  
exhibit	   natural	   monopoly	   characteristics	   which	   may	   be	   uneconomical	   to	  
duplicate.954	   A	   natural	   monopoly	   exists	   where	   demand	   for	   a	   product	   or	  
service	   can	   be	   fulfilled	   at	   a	   lower	   cost	   by	   a	   single	   firm	   than	   by	   multiple	  
firms.955	  Standard	  natural	  monopolies	   include	  electricity	  transmission	  grids,	  
gas	  pipelines	  and	  telephone	  networks.	  Natural	  monopoly	  is	  a	  sufficient,	  but	  
not	  necessary,	  condition	  for	  a	  facility	  to	  be	  deemed	  as	  essential.956	  Under	  the	  
“essential	   facilities”	   doctrine,	   upstream	   inputs	   which	   cannot	   be	   easily	  
replicated	   without	   significantly	   increasing	   rivals’	   costs	   are	   regarded	   as	  
indispensable	  for	  downstream	  competition.	  	  
	  
A	  firm	  in	  control	  of	  an	  essential	  facility	  may	  have	  the	  ability	  and	  incentive	  to	  
restrict	  access	  by	  third	  parties.	  This	  may	  entail	  an	  outright	  refusal	  to	  supply,	  
or	   a	   constructive	   refusal	   to	   supply	   where	   access	   is	   offered	   but	   on	  
uncompetitive	   terms.957	   However,	   imposing	   a	   duty	   to	   supply	   does	   not	  
necessarily	  ensure	  a	  more	  competitive	  outcome	  (and	  potentially	  risks	  a	  less	  
competitive	  outcome)	  than	  that	  which	  might	  otherwise	  prevail	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  regulatory	  intervention	  in	  the	  market.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  ascertain	  
the	   limited	   circumstances	   in	  which	   a	   profit-­‐maximising	   facility	   owner	  may	  
have	  the	  ability	  and	  incentive	  to	  restrict	  access	  by	  third	  parties.	  
	  
7.2.1	   Incentives	  for	  facility	  owners	  to	  restrict	  access	  by	  third	  parties	  
A	  facility	  owner	  will	  not	  necessarily	  seek	  to	  restrict	  access	  by	  third	  parties.958	  
As	  a	  rational,	  profit-­‐maximising	  monopolist,	  a	  facility	  owner	  has	  an	  incentive	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  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36)	  239.	  
955	  William	   J	   Baumol,	   ‘On	   the	  Proper	   Cost	   Tests	   for	  Natural	  Monopoly	   in	   a	  Multiproduct	   Industry’	  
(1977)	  67	  American	  Economic	  Review	  809,	  810.	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  Stephen	  King	  and	  Rodney	  Maddock,	  ‘Competition	  and	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  Essential	  Facilities:	  Making	  the	  Right	  
Policy	  Choices’	  (1996)	  Economic	  Papers	  15,	  28.	  
957	   The	   expression	   “refusal	   to	   supply”	   is	   hereafter	   used	   to	   refer	   generically	   to	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   outright	   and	  
constructive	  refusals	  to	  supply,	  unless	  stated	  otherwise.	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  R	  Ratner,	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  University	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to	  earn	  a	  monopoly	  profit	  and	  this	  may	  be	  achieved	  by	  increasing	  the	  price	  
that	  is	  charged	  to	  access	  seekers.959	  High	  prices	  may	  discourage	  some	  access	  
seekers	  but	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  anti-­‐competitive.	  Where	  such	  pricing	  gives	  
rise	   to	   a	   constructive	   refusal	   to	   supply,	   the	   facility	   owner	   may	   argue	  
efficiencies	  as	  a	   legitimate	  business	   justification.	  However,	  the	  access	  price	  
that	  is	  charged	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  facility	  owner’s	  
incentive	  to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  its	  facility	  by	  third	  parties	  (e.g.	  where	  it	  lacks	  
the	  interest	  and/or	  expertise	  to	  develop	  new	  applications	  for	  the	  facility).	  	  
	  
Where	   the	   facility	   owner	   is	   vertically-­‐integrated,	   it	   may	   have	   a	   particular	  
incentive	   to	   refuse	   to	   supply	   third	   parties.	   Where	   the	   facility	   owner	   also	  
competes	   in	  a	  downstream	  market	  against	  access	  seekers,	   the	  potential	   to	  
charge	   monopoly	   prices	   may	   be	   exceeded	   by	   the	   incentive	   to	   deny	  
downstream	  competitors	  access	   to	   the	   facility,	  or	   to	  offer	  access	  on	   terms	  
that	  discriminate	  against	  them.960	  A	  rational,	  profit-­‐maximising	  facility	  owner	  
would	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  exclude	  access	  seekers	  which	  are	  more	  efficient	  
than	   itself	   in	   the	   vertically-­‐related	   market	   because	   such	   firms	   may	   earn	  
monopoly	  profit	  for	  it.961	  Also,	  where	  a	  facility	  owner’s	  integrated	  operations	  
are	   inefficient,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	  encourage	  new	  entry,	  without	   any	  need	   for	  
regulatory	  intervention	  in	  the	  market.962	  	  
	  
Proponents	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  would	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  single	  monopoly	  
profit	   that	   a	   facility	   owner	   can	   earn.963	   On	   this	   basis,	   the	   motives	   for	   a	  
monopolist	   to	   vertically-­‐integrate	   would	   be	   restricted	   to	   economic	   ones	  
based	  on	  reducing	  transaction	  costs	  and	  realising	  efficiencies.	  This	  limits	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Foreclosure	  of	   an	  Essential	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  or	   Simple	  Horizontal	  Monopoly?’	   (1990)	  33	   Journal	  of	   Law	  and	  
Economics	  419,	  420.	  
959	  David	  J	  Gerber,	  ‘Rethinking	  the	  Monopolist’s	  Duty	  to	  Deal:	  A	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Critique	  of	  the	  
Doctrine	  of	  “Essential	  Facilities”’	  (1988)	  74	  Virginia	  Law	  Review	  1069,	  1084.	  
960	  Ratner	  (n	  958)	  350.	  
961	  ibid.	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  Gerber	  (n	  959).	  
963	  Robert	  H	  Bork,	  The	  Antitrust	  Paradox:	  A	  Policy	  at	  War	  with	  Itself	  (Basic	  Books	  1978)	  229.	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circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  vertically-­‐integrated	  facility	  owner	  would	  have	  the	  
incentive	  to	  refuse	  access	  to	  where	  it	  is	  prevented	  from	  earning	  a	  monopoly	  
profit	   in	   the	   market	   in	   which	   it	   owns	   the	   facility,	   such	   as	   by	   industry	  
regulation.964	  However,	  post-­‐Chicago	  School	  economic	  theory	  shows	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  a	  single	  monopoly	  profit	  does	  not	  always	  hold	  true.	  
	  
The	  “single	  monopoly	  profit”	  theory	  assumes:	  (i)	  a	  monopoly	  supplier	  whose	  
position	  is	  protected	  by	  barriers	  to	  entry;	  (ii)	  an	  unregulated	  monopoly;	  (iii)	  
perfect	   competition	   in	   the	   downstream	   output	   market;	   and	   (iv)	   the	  
technology	  for	  producing	  the	  output	  involves	  using	  all	  of	  the	  inputs	  in	  fixed	  
proportions.965	  Where	  these	  conditions	  do	  not	  hold	  true,	  it	  may	  be	  profitable	  
to	  refuse	  to	  supply.	  However,	  the	  refusal	  to	  supply	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  anti-­‐
competitive.	   It	  may	  be	  competitively	  neutral	  or	  pro-­‐competitive,	  especially	  
when	  the	  interests	  of	  consumers	  in	  dynamic	  competition	  are	  assessed	  over	  
the	   longer-­‐term.	  This	  means	  that	   in	  most	  cases	  vertical	   integration	  may	  be	  
motivated	  by	  monopoly	  power,	  economic	  efficiency	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  
two.966	   In	   imposing	   a	   duty	   to	   supply,	   the	   net	   competitive	   effects	   on	   the	  
market	  need	  to	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	  
	  
7.2.2	   Competitive	  effects	  of	  imposing	  a	  duty	  to	  supply	  
Imposing	  a	  duty	  to	  supply	  under	  general	  competition	  law	  or	  sector-­‐specific	  
legislation	   marks	   a	   departure	   from	   the	   fundamental,	   albeit	   not	   absolute,	  
principles	   of	   private	   property	   and	   freedom	   of	   contract.967	   Restricting	   the	  
freedom	  of	  dominant	  firms	  to	  choose	  with	  whom	  (and	  with	  whom	  not)	  to	  deal	  
and	  on	  what	   terms,	   also	   represents	   a	   qualification	  of	   the	   competition	   law	  
principle	  that	  there	  is	  no	  general	  duty	  to	  deal,	  even	  in	  respect	  of	  dominant	  
firms.	  This	  is	  said	  to	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  policy	  objective	  of	  enhancing	  consumer	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  Ratner	  (n	  958)	  354.	  
965	  Michael	  H	  Riordan	  and	  Steven	  C	   Salop,	   ‘Evaluating	  Vertical	  Mergers:	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  Post-­‐Chicago	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(1995)	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  Law	  Journal	  513,	  517.	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  Hilmer	  Report	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  242.	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welfare	  through	  vigorous	  competition.968	  Vigorous	  competition	  ensures	  that	  
firms	  retain	  incentives	  to	  operate	  efficiently	  and	  innovatively.969	  However,	  as	  
already	  identified,	  the	  definition	  of	  vigorous	  or	  effective	  competition	  varies	  
between	  markets.	  
	  
In	  innovation-­‐driven	  industries	  such	  as	  pay-­‐TV,	  imposing	  a	  duty	  to	  supply	  may	  
encourage	   free-­‐riding	   by	   new	   entrants.	   This	   may	   dampen	   the	   investment	  
incentives	  of	  facility	  owners	  and	  their	  competitors,970	  contrary	  to	  the	  longer-­‐
term	  interests	  of	  consumers	  in	  dynamic	  competition.971	  A	  duty	  to	  supply	  may	  
also	  be	  imposed	  on	  terms	  that	  do	  not	  protect	  or	  promote	  competition.	  For	  
instance,	  where	  a	  monopolist	  is	  required	  to	  deal	  and	  does	  so	  at	  a	  price	  that	  
reflects	  the	  monopoly	  price,	  downstream	  competition	  may	  be	  excluded	  in	  any	  
event.972	  
	  
As	  already	  indicated,	  monopoly	  pricing	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  constructive	  refusal	  
to	  supply.	  However,	  such	  pricing	  may	  not	  be	  identifiable	  in	  emerging	  markets,	  
in	  which	  appropriate	  counterfactuals	  are	  especially	  difficult	  to	  determine.	  It	  
will	  also	  be	  pertinent	  for	  determining	  the	  appropriate	  terms	  of	  access	  which,	  
in	   any	   given	   case,	   is	   typically	   no	   mean	   feat	   for	   courts	   or	   regulators,	   but	  
particularly	   in	  rapidly	  changing,	   innovation-­‐driven	  industries.	   It	  will	  be	  seen	  
how	   this	   reinforces	   the	   broader	   question	   of	   the	   respective	   roles	   for	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   Jonathan	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   and	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  States	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  Stephen	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  Competition	  and	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  Journal	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competition	   regulators	   and	   industry-­‐specific	   regulators,	   and	   the	   scope	   for	  
self-­‐regulation,	  in	  media	  markets	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  
	  
7.3	   Elements	  of	  the	  “Essential	  Facilities”	  Doctrine	  
The	  “essential	  facilities”	  doctrine	  originates	  from	  the	  US,973	  where	  it	  renders	  
a	  unilateral	  refusal	  to	  deal	  subject	  to	  the	  prohibition	  on	  monopolisation	  and	  
attempts	   to	   monopolise	   in	   Section	   2	   of	   the	   Sherman	   Act	   1890.974	   This	  
represents	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  freedom	  to	  deal	  that	  was	  
confirmed	   by	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Colgate.975	   There	   is	   no	   absolute	  
freedom	  to	  deal.976	  However,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  purpose	  to	  create	  or	  maintain	  
a	   monopoly,	   a	   private	   trader	   is	   free	   to	   “exercise	   his	   own	   independent	  
discretion	   as	   to	   parties	   with	   whom	   he	   will	   deal,	   and,	   of	   course,	   he	   may	  
announce	  in	  advance	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  he	  will	  refuse	  to	  sell.”977	  
The	  concept	  of	  “essential	  facilities”	  has	  been	  embraced,	  to	  some	  extent,	   in	  
the	  enforcement	  of	  UK/EU	  and	  Australian	  competition	  law,	  but	   in	  manners	  
that	  are	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  US	  “essential	  facilities”	  doctrine.	  
	  
7.3.1	   US	  origins	  of	  the	  “essential	  facilities”	  doctrine	  
The	   “essential	   facilities”	   doctrine	   is	   not	   explicitly	   referred	   to	   by	   the	   US	  
Supreme	  Court.	  However,	  lower	  courts	  have	  applied	  it	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts,	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  Need	  
of	  Limiting	  Principles’	  (1989)	  58(3)	  Antitrust	  Law	  Journal	  841.	  
974	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Sherman	  Act	  1890	  makes	  it	  unlawful	  for	  a	  person	  to	  “monopolize,	  or	  attempt	  to	  
monopolize,	  or	  combine	  or	  conspire	  with	  any	  other	  person	  or	  persons,	  to	  monopolize	  any	  part	  of	  the	  
trade	  or	  commerce	  among	  the	  several	  States,	  or	  with	  foreign	  nations”.	  The	  US	  “essential	  facilities”	  
doctrine	  may	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  monopolisation	  claim,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  independent	  cause	  of	  action.	  
Kramer	  v	  Pollock-­‐Krasner	  Found	  890	  F	  Supp	  250	  (1995)	  [257].	  
975	  United	   States	   v	  Colgate	  &	  Co	   250	  US	  300	   (1919).	   There	   is	   debate	   as	   to	  whether	   the	   “essential	  
facilities”	   doctrine	   represents	   an	   exception	   or	   a	   separate	   principle	   to	   the	   freedom	   to	   deal.	   Leigh	  
Hancher,	  ‘Case	  Note	  on	  Oscar	  Bronner’	  (1999)	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review	  1289.	  
976	   For	   instance,	   the	   refusal	   in	   Aspen	   involved	   discontinuing	   a	   “voluntary	   (and	   thus	   presumably	  
profitable)	  course	  of	  dealing	  which	  suggested	  a	  willingness	  to	  forsake	  short	  term	  profits	  to	  achieve	  an	  
anticompetitive	  end.”	  Aspen	  Skiing	  v	  Aspen	  Highlands	  Skiing	  472	  US	  585	  (1985),	  referred	  to	  in	  Verizon	  
Communications	  Inc	  v	  Law	  Offices	  of	  Curtis	  v	  Trinko	  540	  US	  398	  (2004)	  880.	  	  
977	  Colgate	  (n	  975)	  307.	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including	   in	  the	  telecommunications	  sector	   in	  MCI	  Communications.978	  This	  
case	   incidentally	   sets	   out	   the	   prevailing	   elements	   of	   the	   US	   “essential	  
facilities”	   doctrine.	   The	   Seventh	   Circuit	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   required	   a	  
monopolist	  telecommunications	  provider	  to	  allow	  access	  to	  its	  local	  service	  
network	   by	   competitors	   in	   long-­‐distance	   services.	   It	   determined	   that	   the	  
existence	  of	  an	  essential	  facility	  depends	  on	  whether:	  (i)	  access	  is	  essential	  to	  
enter	  the	  market;	  (ii)	  the	  monopolist	  controls	  the	  facility;	  (iii)	  the	  competitor	  
could	  practically	  or	  reasonably	  duplicate	  the	  facility;	  and	  (iv)	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  
the	  monopolist	   to	   provide	   access	   to	   the	   facility	   (such	   as	  where	   there	   is	   a	  
history	   of	   access).979	   The	   US	   Supreme	   Court	   appears	   unresponsive	   to	   the	  
question	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  “essential	  facilities”	  doctrine	  applies,	  including	  in	  
the	  telecommunications	  context.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Verizon	  v	  Trinko,980	  it	  stated	  
there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  recognise	  or	  repudiate	  it.981	  	  
	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  US	  “essential	  facilities”	  doctrine,	  it	  considers	  
whether	  it	  would	  be	  impractical	  for	  a	  new	  entrant	  to	  duplicate	  a	  facility	  under	  
the	  so-­‐called	  “private	  profitability”	  test.	  If	  it	  is	  privately	  profitable	  for	  a	  new	  
entrant	  to	  build	  its	  own	  facility,	  even	  at	  a	  higher	  cost,	  then	  the	  doctrine	  will	  
not	  be	  invoked.	  The	  rationale	  being	  that,	  if	  a	  potential	  entrant	  can	  practicably	  
and	  reasonably	  feasibly	  build	  its	  own	  facility,	  then	  the	  incumbent	  faces	  the	  
prospect	  of	  actual	  entry.	  This	  should	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  incumbent	  
will	  offer	  services	  to	  entrants	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  than	  they	  would	  otherwise	  face	  
if	  they	  were	  to	  build	  their	  own	  facilities.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  preserve	  investment	  
incentives	  by	  minimising	  the	  chilling	  effect	  of	  imposing	  a	  duty	  to	  supply.982	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
978	  MCI	  Communications	  v	  AT&T	  Co	  708	  F	  2d	  1081,	  1132-­‐1133	  (7th	  Cir	  1983).	  
979	  ibid;	  Aspen	  (n	  976).	  
980	  Trinko	  (n	  976).	  
981	  ibid	  [IV[7]].	  On	  the	  facts	  of	  this	  case	  there	  was	  provision	  for	  access	  under	  the	  Telecommunications	  
Act	  1996.	  
982	  Alison	  Jones	  and	  Brenda	  Sufrin,	  EU	  Competition	  Law:	  Text,	  Cases,	  and	  Materials	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press	  2016)	  540.	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7.3.2	   Concept	  of	  essential	  facilities	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  general	  duty	  to	  deal,	  occupying	  a	  dominant	  position	  does	  
not	  disentitle	  an	  undertaking	  from	  protecting	   its	  commercial	   interests.983	  A	  
dominant	   firm	   is	   entitled	   to	   take	   such	   reasonable	   steps	   as	   it	   deems	  
appropriate	  to	  protect	  such	  interests.984	  However,	  a	  refusal	  to	  supply	  in	  the	  
UK	  may	  constitute	  an	  abuse	  of	  dominance	  under	  the	  Chapter	  II	  prohibition	  of	  
the	   CA1998	   or	   Article	   102	   of	   the	   TFEU	  where	   there	   is	   an	   effect	   on	   trade	  
between	  Member	  States.985	  Following	  Commercial	  Solvents,986	  Article	  102	  will	  
be	   infringed	  where	  a	  dominant	  firm	  refuses	  to	  supply	  an	  existing	  customer	  
with	   a	   raw	   material,	   to	   reserve	   such	   material	   for	   manufacturing	   its	   own	  
derivatives,	  where	  the	  refusal	  to	  supply	  risks	  eliminating	  all	  competition	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  that	  customer.987	  Terminating	  an	  existing	  supply	  arrangement	  is	  
more	   likely	   to	   be	   considered	   abusive	   since	   a	   previous	   course	   of	   dealing	  
suggests	  no	  risk	  to	  the	  supplier	  in	  continuing	  to	  supply.988	  A	  previous	  course	  
of	  dealing	  may	  also	  be	   relevant	   in	  assessing	  whether	  a	   refusal	   to	   supply	   is	  
justified	  on	  efficiency	  grounds.989	  
	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  access	  to	  communications	  infrastructure,	  Articles	  102(b)	  and	  
102(c)	   are	   especially	   pertinent.	   These	   provisions	   prohibit	   the	   abuse	   of	   a	  
dominant	  position	  by	  limiting	  production	  or	  applying	  dissimilar	  conditions	  to	  
equivalent	  transactions,	  respectively.	  The	  latter	  is	  interpreted	  as	  prohibiting	  
the	   owner	   of	   infrastructure	   from	   denying	   access	   in	   order	   to	   suppress	  
competition,	   at	   least	  where	   capacity	   is	   available	   and	   a	   reasonable	   price	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
983	  United	  Brands	  (n	  32)	  [189]	  (UK/EU);	  Melway	  Publishing	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Robert	  Hicks	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2001]	  HCA	  
13;	  (2001)	  205	  CLR	  1	  [61]	  (AU).	  
984	  ibid.	  
985	   The	   focus	   in	   this	   section	   is	   on	   Article	   102	   as	   it	   is	   in	   relation	   to	   this	   provision	   that	   the	   general	  
principles	  on	  refusals	  to	  supply	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  UK/EU	  competition	  law	  originate.	  
986	   Joined	   Cases	   6/73	   &	   7/73	   Istituto	   Chemioterapico	   Italiano	   SpA	   and	   Commercial	   Solvents	  
Corporation	  v	  Commission	  (1974)	  ECR	  223;	  [1974]	  1	  CMLR	  309.	  
987	  ibid	  [25].	  
988	  European	  Commission	  Guidance	  on	  Article	  102	  (n	  40)	  para	  84.	  
989	  ibid	  para	  90.	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being	  offered	  for	  access.990	  This	  was	  enunciated	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  
in	   Sealink	   Harbours,991	   its	   first	   published	   decision	   to	   expressly	   refer	   to	  
essential	  facilities.	  
	  
Sealink	  was	  the	  port	  authority	  at	  Holyhead	  Harbour	  in	  Wales	  and	  a	  car	  ferry	  
operator.	   Its	   car	   ferry	   service	   faced	   competition	   from	   B&I,	   an	   Irish	   ferry	  
operator,	  whose	  berth	  was	  in	  the	  narrow	  harbour	  mouth.	  Sealink	  altered	  its	  
schedule	  of	   sailing	   times	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  B&I’s	   loading	  was	   interrupted	  
more	   frequently.	   This	   operated	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   B&I	   and	   in	   favour	   of	  
Sealink’s	  own	  services.	  The	  European	  Commission	  found	  that,	  as	  a	  dominant	  
harbour	  owner,	  Sealink	  was	  not	  free	  to	  discriminate	  in	  favour	  of	  its	  own	  car	  
ferry	   services.992	   It	   held	   that	   a	   dominant	   firm	  which	   controls	   and	   uses	   an	  
essential	   facility	  will	   infringe	  Article	  102	   if	   it	   refuses	  competitors	  access,	  or	  
offers	  access	  only	  on	  terms	  less	  favourable	  than	  those	  which	  it	  gives	  its	  own	  
services,	  unless	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  justification	  for	  the	  refusal.993	  	  
	  
In	   a	   second	   case	   involving	   Sealink,994	   essential	   facilities	   were	   defined	   as	  
facilities	   “without	   access	   to	  which	   competitors	   cannot	   provide	   services	   to	  
their	  customers.”995	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  European	  Commission	  concluded	  that,	  
by	   refusing	   access	   to	   the	   port	   of	   Holyhead	   on	   reasonable	   and	   non-­‐
discriminatory	  terms	  to	  Sea	  Containers	  (a	  potential	  competitor	  in	  the	  market	  
for	  ferry	  services	  between	  Britain	  and	  Ireland),	  Sealink	  abused	  its	  dominant	  
position	  in	  the	  market	  for	  port	  services.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  imposing	  interim	  
measures	   to	   avoid	   any	   danger	   of	   serious	   and	   irreparable	   harm	   to	   Sea	  
Containers,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  show	  that	  Sea	  Containers	  could	  not	  operate	  a	  
commercially	  viable	  service	  from	  the	  port	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Sealink’s	  conduct	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
990	  London	  European	  Airways	  v	  Sabena	  [1989]	  4	  CMLR	  662.	  
991	  B&I	  Line	  Plc	  v	  Sealink	  Harbours	  Ltd	  [1992]	  5	  CMLR	  255.	  
992	  ibid	  267.	  
993	  ibid	  265-­‐266.	  
994	  Commission	  Decision	  94/19/EC	  Sea	  Containers	  v	  Stena	  Sealink	  [1994]	  OJ	  L15/8.	  
995	  ibid	  [66].	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Sea	  Containers	  would	  therefore	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  enter	  the	  market.996	  As	  
the	   parties	   subsequently	   agreed	   the	   terms	   of	   access,	   the	   European	  
Commission	  was	  not	  required	  to	  determine	  whether	  Sea	  Containers	  would	  
suffer	  any	  such	  harm.	  
	  
In	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   EU	   “essential	   facilities”	   doctrine,	   the	   limited	  
circumstances	  in	  which	  access	  to	  a	  facility	  may	  be	  mandated	  under	  Article	  102	  
within	   the	   context	  of	   a	   refusal	   to	   supply	  were	   set	  out	  by	   the	  ECJ	   in	  Oscar	  
Bronner.997	   Mediaprint	   established	   a	   nationwide	   system	   for	   distributing	  
newspapers	   early	   in	   the	   morning	   to	   subscribers’	   homes.	   Oscar	   Bronner	  
argued	  the	  system	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  essential	  facility	  because	  it	  lacked	  
the	   economic	   ability	   to	   establish	   a	   competing	   one.	   It	   also	   alleged	   that	  
Mediaprint’s	  refusal	  to	  distribute	  Bronner’s	  newspapers	  constituted	  an	  abuse	  
of	   dominance.	   By	   way	   of	   a	   preliminary	   ruling,	   the	   ECJ	   held	   that	   it	   was	  
necessary	   to	   establish	   that:	   (i)	   the	   refusal	   was	   likely	   to	   eliminate	   all	  
competition	  in	  the	  downstream	  market	  (the	  market	  for	  daily	  newspapers)	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  the	  person	  seeking	  access;998	  (ii)	  the	  refusal	  was	  incapable	  of	  being	  
objectively	  justified;	  (iii)	  access	  was	  indispensable	  to	  carrying	  on	  that	  person’s	  
business;	  and	  (iv)	  there	  was	  no	  actual	  or	  potential	  substitute.999	  	  
	  
On	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  it	  was	  insufficient	  that	  establishing	  a	  second	  home-­‐
delivery	  scheme	  was	  not	  economically	  viable	  because	  of	  the	  small	  circulation	  
of	   the	   daily	   newspaper	   to	   be	   distributed.1000	   It	   was	   instead	   necessary	   to	  
demonstrate	  that	  it	  was	  not	  economically	  feasible	  to	  create	  a	  second	  home-­‐
delivery	   scheme	   for	   the	  distribution	  of	  daily	  newspapers	  with	  a	   circulation	  
comparable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  daily	  newspapers	  distributed	  by	  Mediaprint.1001	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
996	  ibid	  [79].	  
997	  Case	  C-­‐7/97	  Oscar	  Bronner	  GmbH	  &	  Co	  KG	  v	  Mediaprint	  Zeitungs-­‐und	  Zeitschriftenverlag	  GmbH	  &	  
Co	  KG	  (1998)	  ECR	  I-­‐7791;	  [1999]	  4	  CMLR	  112.	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test	  is	  an	  objective	  one,	  requiring	  that	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  any	  other	  
undertaking	  (not	  just	  the	  access	  seeker)	  to	  compete.1002	  Therefore,	  the	  issue	  
is	   whether	   the	   refusal	   to	   supply	   will	   lead	   to	   the	   monopolisation	   of	   a	  
downstream	  market.	  
	  
The	   significance	   of	   the	   condition	   of	   indispensability	   within	   the	   context	   of	  
refusals	  to	  supply	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  was	  confirmed	  in	  IMS	  Health.1003	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  ECJ	  laid	  down	  three	  cumulative	  conditions	  for	  a	  refusal	  by	  a	  
copyright	  owner	  to	  allow	  access	  to	  a	  product/service	  that	  is	  indispensable	  for	  
carrying	  on	  a	  particular	  business	  to	  be	  abusive.1004	  Firstly,	  the	  refusal	  prevents	  
the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   product	   for	   which	   there	   is	   potential	   consumer	  
demand.	  Secondly,	  the	  refusal	   is	  unjustified	  and,	  thirdly,	   it	  will	  exclude	  any	  
competition	  on	  a	  secondary	  market.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  technology	  sector	  that	  these	  
conditions	  have	  faced	  particular	  scrutiny,	  with	  issues	  concerning	  intellectual	  
property	  rights	  being	  fundamental	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  interoperability.	  
	  
The	  “new	  product”	  criterion	  in	  IMS	  Health	  implies	  a	  stricter	  approach	  towards	  
mandating	  the	  supply	  of	  inputs	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  intellectual	  property	  
rights.	   This	   is	   pertinent	   to	   this	   thesis,	   not	   least	   in	   terms	  of	   reinforcing	   the	  
distinction	  between	  premium	  sport	  and	  non-­‐sport	  content	  for	  rights	  owners	  
to	   monetise	   their	   content	   and	   for	   regulatory	   purposes.	   There	   is	   growing	  
interest	  in	  the	  role	  of	  intellectual	  property	  right	  protection	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  
coverage	  of	  live	  sporting	  events.1005	  It	  was	  confirmed	  in	  the	  Murphy	  case	  that	  
whilst	  matches	  themselves	  are	  not	  deemed	  subject	  to	  copyright,1006	  copyright	  
material	   in	   football	   broadcasts	   remains	   important	   to	   protect	   rights	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  Jacobs	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  May	  1998	  [66].	  
1003	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  Health	  GmbH	  &	  Co	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  v	  NDC	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  Co	  KG	  [2004]	  ECR	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  Raymond	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   ‘Copyright,	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  Media	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  Working	  Paper	  
2015/09,	  November	  2015)	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media-­‐rights/>	  accessed	  26	  August	  2017.	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  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐403/08	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  C-­‐429/08	  FA	  Premier	  League	  v	  QC	  Leisure	  and	  Karen	  Murphy	  v	  Media	  
Protection	  Services	  Limited	  [2011]	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  I-­‐09083	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holders.1007	  Intellectual	  property	  law	  does	  not	  grant	  copyright	  protection	  to	  
sporting	  events	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  rather	  the	  broadcast	  of	  such	  events.1008	  As	  the	  
nature	   of	   televising	   sporting	   events	   changes,	  more	   questions	   are	   likely	   to	  
arise	  regarding	  the	  applicability	  of	  this	  general	  principle,	  and	  the	  intersection	  
between	   intellectual	  property	   law	  and	  general	  competition	   law	  (and	  hence	  
the	  ability	  of	  rights	  owners	  to	  monetise	  their	  content).1009	  
	  
7.3.3	   Essential	  facility	  considerations	  in	  applying	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  CCA	  
In	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   “essential	   facilities”	   doctrine	   as	   such	   in	   Australia,	   a	  
refusal	   to	   supply	  may	   fall	   within	   the	   prohibition	   on	   the	  misuse	   of	  market	  
power	  in	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  CCA.	  This	  does	  not	  impose	  a	  general	  duty	  to	  supply	  
on	  facility	  owners.1010	  Given	  the	  need	  under	  the	  former	  Section	  46	  to	  establish	  
that	  the	  firm	  refusing	  access	  was	  a	  corporation	  with	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  
market	  power	  which,	  by	  refusing	  access,	  was	  taking	  advantage	  of	  such	  power	  
for	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  proscribed	  purposes,	  there	  have	  been	  few	  successful	  
cases.1011	  However,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  “purpose	  and	  effects”	  test	  in	  the	  
new	  Section	  46	  would	  appear	  to	  increase	  the	  scope	  for	  third	  parties	  to	  secure	  
access	  to	  facilities	  under	  Section	  46.	  
	  
7.4	   Concept	  of	  Essential	  Facilities	  in	  the	  Premium	  Pay-­‐TV	  Context	  
Consideration	   of	   the	   essential	   facility	   requirements	   of	   indispensability	   and	  
preventing	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  product	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context	  
reinforces	  questions	  about	  the	  competitive	  relationship	  between	  traditional	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  is	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in	  Blackshaw,	  Cornelius	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  Siekmann	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1009	  For	  example,	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	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  in	  Magill	  that	  “the	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  of	  an	  
exclusive	  right	  by	  the	  proprietor	  may,	  in	  exceptional	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  abusive	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  Joined	  
Cases	  C-­‐241/91	  P	  and	  C-­‐242/91	  P	  Radio	  Telefis	  Eireann	  (RTE)	  and	  Independent	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  Publications	  
Ltd	  (ITP)	  v	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [1995]	  ECR	  I-­‐00743	  [50].	  
1010	  For	   instance,	   in	  Melway,	   the	  HCA	  held	  that	  a	   firm	  with	  substantial	  market	  power	   is	  not	   legally	  
obliged	   to	  appoint	  new	  wholesale	  distributors	   (and	  non-­‐price	  vertical	   restraints	   in	  distribution	  can	  
promote	  interbrand	  competition).	  Melway	  (n	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1011	  Queensland	  Wire	  (n	  471);	  NT	  Power	  Generation	  v	  Power	  and	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  (2004)	  219	  CLR	  90,	  
[2004]	  HCA	  48	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pay-­‐TV	  and	  new	  media.	  Differing	  issues	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  premium	  sport	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  and	  premium	  movies	  and	  drama	  on	  the	  other.	  This	  supports	  
the	  distinctions	  made	  earlier	  in	  the	  thesis	  between	  premium	  sport	  and	  non-­‐
sport	  content.	  The	  shift	  in	  the	  competitive	  access	  problem	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  
from	  CAS	   technology	   to	  APIs	   and	   content	   rights	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	  
“premium	  content	  bottleneck”.1012	   It	   is	   argued,	  however,	   that	   the	   case	   for	  
treating	   premium	   content	   (especially	   non-­‐sport	   content)	   as	   an	   essential	  
facility	  remains	  arguably	  unconvincing.	  	  
	  
7.4.1	   Whether	  premium	  content	  is	  indispensable	  for	  pay-­‐TV	  competition	  
The	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  access	  to	  premium	  content	  is	  indispensable	  for	  
downstream	  competition	  has	  arisen	  at	   the	  EU	   level	   in	  relation	  to	  premium	  
sport	  and	  3G	  mobile	  technology.	  In	  its	  inquiry	  in	  2005	  into	  the	  provision	  of	  
sports	   content	   over	   third-­‐generation	   (“3G”)	   mobile	   networks,1013	   the	  
European	   Commission	   found	   that	   access	   to	   sports	   rights	   was	   not	  
indispensable	   to	   3G	  mobile	   operators	   in	   the	   development	   of	   3G	   network	  
services.	  This	  finding	  was	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  given	  the	  relative	  infancy,	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  inquiry,	  of	  sports	  coverage	  on	  mobile	  platforms.	  Nevertheless,	  
it	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  number	  of	  mobile	  operators	  that	  have	  launched	  3G	  (and	  
subsequently	   fourth-­‐generation)	   services,	   and	   continue	   to	   compete	  
aggressively	   in	   the	   retail	   supply	   of	   services	   to	   consumers.	   Interestingly,	   in	  
finding	  that	  television	  and	  3G	  content	  services	  form	  separate	  markets,1014	  the	  
European	  Commission	  did	  not	  define	  television	  or	  3G	  content	  services.	  It	   is	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   Law	  
International	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   2005)	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   accessed	   26	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2017.	  
1014	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  (3G):	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  (European	  
Commission,	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   2005)	   22	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   accessed	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   August	  
2017.	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therefore	  argued	  here	  that	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  without	  access	  to	  sports	  
rights	  downstream	  competition	  in	  the	  retail	  supply	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  services	  would	  
be	  eliminated.1015	  
	  
The	   case	   for	   regarding	   premium	   movies	   and	   drama	   as	   indispensable	   is	  
arguably	  even	  weaker.	  Notably,	  Ofcom	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  consider	  drama	  to	  
be	  indispensable.1016	  In	  its	  recent	  movie	  market	  investigation,	  Ofcom	  likens	  
dramas	   to	   soap	   operas.	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   being	   widely	   available	   on	   FTA	  
television,	  it	  finds	  that	  dramas	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  primary	  driver	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  
subscriptions.1017	   The	   implication	   of	   this	   finding	   that	   premium	   drama	   is	  
unlikely	  to	  be	  indispensable	  to	  the	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  welcomed.	  At	  
the	  same	  time,	  the	  distinction	  Ofcom	  continues	  to	  draw	  between	  premium	  
sport	   and	   movies	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   drama	   on	   the	   other,	   fails	   to	  
acknowledge	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   findings	   in	   the	   thesis	   on	   the	   rise	   of	  
premium	  drama	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  SVOD.	  This	  arguably	  reinforces	  the	  case	  
for	  reassessment	  of	  how	  premium	  content	  is	  defined.	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  
lies,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   thesis,	   in	   the	   potential	   implications	   for	   the	  
assessment	  of	   the	  market	  and	   the	  exercise	  of	  market	  power	  by	   traditional	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers.	  
	  
7.4.2	   New	  product	  criterion	  and	  definition	  of	  a	  separate	  downstream	  market	  
Applying	   the	   concept	   of	   essential	   facilities	   relies	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
separate	  downstream	  market,	  so	  much	  will	  depend	  upon	  how	  the	  relevant	  
market	  is	  defined.	  In	  the	  sport	  context,	  for	  instance,	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  mobile	  coverage	  (real-­‐time	  or	  near-­‐real-­‐time	  in	  highlight	  format)	  and	  
video-­‐streaming	   are	   to	   be	   defined	   as	   separate	   product	  markets.	   If	   so,	   the	  
broadcaster	  loses	  its	  important	  right	  of	  exclusive	  operation	  because	  parallel	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1015	  Pablo	  I	  Colomo,	  ‘Saving	  the	  Monopsony:	  Exclusivity,	  Innovation	  and	  Market	  Power	  in	  the	  Media	  
Sector’	  (College	  of	  Europe	  research	  paper	  7/2006)	  19	  <https://www.coleurope.eu/study/european-­‐
legal-­‐studies/research-­‐activities/research-­‐papers-­‐law>	  accessed	  26	  August	  2017.	  
1016	  Ofcom	  (n	  1)	  para	  A2.10.	  
1017	  ibid.	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commentary	   and	   video-­‐streaming	  are	   considered	  an	   indivisible	  part	  of	   the	  
intellectual	   property	   rights	   in	   sports	   broadcasts.1018	   As	   viewers	   can	  
increasingly	  choose	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  commentary,	  the	  same	  could	  
at	  some	  point	  apply	  to	  video-­‐streaming.	  
	  
The	  position	  of	  the	  ECJ	  in	  IMS	  Health	  on	  the	  “new	  product”	  criterion	  would	  
appear,	   in	  an	  era	  of	  multi-­‐media	  firms	  and	  bundling,	  to	  fortunately	  restrict	  
the	  scope	  for	  applying	  the	  concept	  of	  essential	  facilities	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐
TV	   context.	   Advocate	   General	   Tizzano	   interpreted	   the	   “new	   product”	  
criterion	  broadly	  by	  presupposing	  the	  possibility	  of	  applying	  the	  concept	  even	  
where	  a	  facility	  owner	  already	  operates	  in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  new	  product.1019	  
The	  refusal	  to	  grant	  a	  licence	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  abusive	  only	  if	  the	  requesting	  
firm	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  limit	  itself	  to	  duplicating	  the	  products	  already	  offered	  
on	  the	  secondary	  market	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  intellectual	  property	  right:	  
	  
but	  intends	  to	  produce	  goods	  or	  services	  of	  a	  different	  nature	  
which,	  although	  in	  competition	  with	  those	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  
right,	  answer	  specific	  consumer	  requirements	  not	  satisfied	  by	  
existing	  goods	  or	  services.1020	  
	  
The	   ECJ	   adopted	   a	   stricter	   approach	   that	   limits	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
“essential	  facilities”	  doctrine	  to	  situations	  where	  the	  owner	  does	  not	  operate	  
on	  the	  secondary	  market	  and	  hence	  does	  not	  produce	  the	  new	  product:1021	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1018	  Oles	  Andriychuk,	  ‘Whether	  the	  European	  Model	  of	  Essential	  Facilities	  Doctrine	  Might	  be	  Applied	  
to	  the	  Contemporary	  Telecasting	  of	  Premium	  Sports	  Content?’	  in	  Blackshaw,	  Cornelius	  and	  Siekmann	  
(n	  20)	  111.	  
1019	  ibid	  112.	  
1020	  Opinion	  of	  A-­‐G	  Tizzano	  in	  Case	  C-­‐418/01	  delivered	  on	  2	  October	  2003	  [62].	  
1021	  Oles	  Andriychuk,	  ‘Sports	  Broadcasting	  Rights	  in	  the	  Digital	  Epoch:	  Balancing	  between	  Traditional	  
(TV)	  and	  Alternative	  (3G)	  Subjects	  of	  the	  Market	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  European	  Competition	  
Law’	  in	  Blackshaw,	  Cornelius	  and	  Siekmann	  (n	  20)	  100.	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  [T]he	   refusal	   by	   an	   undertaking	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   to	  
allow	  access	  to	  a	  product	  protected	  by	  an	  intellectual	  property	  
right,	  where	  that	  product	  is	  indispensable	  for	  operating	  on	  a	  
secondary	  market,	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  abusive	  only	  where	  the	  
undertaking	  which	  requested	  the	   licence	  does	  not	   intend	  to	  
limit	   itself	   essentially	   to	   duplicating	   the	   goods	   or	   services	  
already	  offered	  on	  the	  secondary	  market	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  
intellectual	  property	  right,	  but	  intends	  to	  produce	  new	  goods	  
or	  services	  not	  offered	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  right	  and	  for	  which	  
there	  is	  a	  potential	  consumer	  demand.1022	  
	  
Aside	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   ECJ’s	   decision	   takes	   precedence,	   the	   stricter	  
approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  ECJ	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  preferable	  in	  the	  premium	  
pay-­‐TV	   context,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   prevalence	   of	   vertical	   integration,	   for	  
instance.	  From	  a	  market	  definition	  perspective,	  it	  also	  appears	  desirable	  given	  
the	   identified	   risk	   of	   markets	   being	   defined	   unduly	   narrowly.	   It	   has	   been	  
suggested	  that	  this	  is	  particularly	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
premium	  drama	  given	  the	  possibility	  of	  markets	  being	  defined	  for	  individual	  
series.	  The	  welcomed	  effect	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  to	  further	  limit	  the	  scope	  for	  
mandating	   the	   supply	   of	   premium	   content	   under	   the	   essential	   facilities	  
concept	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  refusal	  to	  supply.	  
	  
7.5	   Sector-­‐Specific	  Access	  Regulation	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  
Whilst	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  both	  operate	  sector-­‐specific	  access	  regimes,	  the	  
approaches	   to	   regulating	   the	   exercise	   of	   control	   over	   communications	  
infrastructure	   differ,	   most	   notably	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   level	   of	   prescription.	  
Regulation	  of	  access	  to	  communications	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  subject	  to	  
the	  EU	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  electronic	  communications	  (“EU	  Regulatory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1022	  IMS	  Health	  (n	  1003)	  [49].	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Framework”).1023	  This	  establishes	  a	  harmonised	  framework	  for	  the	  imposition	  
of	   access-­‐related	   measures	   throughout	   the	   EU	   in	   respect	   of	   electronic	  
communications	  networks.1024	  By	  contrast,	  under	  Part	  IIIA	  and	  Part	  XIB	  of	  the	  
CCA	   in	   Australia,	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   encouraging	   commercial	   negotiation.	  
However,	  neither	  approach	  is	  without	  its	  limitations	  as	  regards	  the	  ability	  to	  
respond	  efficiently	  and	  effectively	  to	  economic	  reality	  in	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  
communications	  industry.	  
	  
7.5.1	   Access	  regulation	  of	  control	  over	  carriage	  and	  content	  in	  the	  UK	  
The	   UK	   relies	   on	   ex	   ante	   regulatory	   measures	   regarding	   access	   to	  
communications	   infrastructure	   in	   the	   CA2003.	   This	   transposes	   the	   EU	  
Regulatory	   Framework,	   including	   the	   Authorisation	   Directive,1025	   and	   the	  
Access	   Directive,1026	   into	   UK	   law.	   Unlike	   the	   industry-­‐wide	   application	   of	  
similar	  measures	  in	  the	  US,1027	  access-­‐related	  measures	  in	  the	  UK	  apply	  only	  
in	  respect	  of	  specific	  broadcasters.	  Similarly,	  in	  relation	  to	  access	  to	  content,	  
a	  wholesale	  must-­‐offer	  (“WMO”)	  obligation	  has	  to	  date	  only	  been	  imposed	  
on	  Sky	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  wholesale	  supply	  of	  Sky	  Sports	  1	  and	  2.1028	  This	  has	  
been	  based	  on	  Sky’s	  control	  over	  content	  and	  carriage	  as	  both	  a	  broadcaster	  
and	  distributor,	  when	  satellite	  was	  the	  dominant	  pay-­‐TV	  platform	  in	  the	  UK.	  
The	  significant	  changes	  underway	  in	  the	  UK	  pay-­‐TV	  industry	  may	  not	  as	  yet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1023	  Directive	  2002/21/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  7	  March	  2002	  on	  a	  common	  
regulatory	   framework	   for	   electronic	   communications	   networks	   and	   services	   OJ	   L(2002)108	  
(“Framework	  Directive”).	  
1024	  This	  refers	  to	  systems	  that	  enable	  the	  transmission	  of	  signals	  containing	  information	  of	  any	  type	  
by	  wire,	  radio,	  optical	  or	  other	  electromagnetic	  means.	  
1025	  Directive	   2002/20/EC	  of	   the	   European	  Parliament	   and	  of	   the	  Council	   of	   7	  March	   2002	  on	   the	  
authorisation	   of	   electronic	   communications	   networks	   and	   services	  OJ	   L(2002)108	   (as	   amended	  by	  
Directive	   2009/140/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   25	   November	   2009	   OJ	  
L(2009)337).	  
1026	  Directive	  2002/19/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  7	  March	  2002	  on	  access	  
to,	   and	   interconnection	   of,	   electronic	   communications	   networks	   and	   associated	   facilities	   OJ	  
L(2002)108	  (as	  amended	  by	  Directive	  2009/140/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  
25	  November	  2009	  OJ	  L(2009)337)	  (“Access	  Directive”).	  
1027	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	  US,	  any	  cable	  operator	  with	  36	  or	  more	  channels	   is	   required	   to	  designate	  
channel	  capacity	  for	  commercial	  use	  by	  persons	  unaffiliated	  with	  the	  operator	  (with	  the	  percentage	  
of	  channel	  capacity	  to	  be	  designated	  increasing	  with	  the	  number	  of	  channels).	  47	  US	  Code	  §	  532(b)(1).	  
1028	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  s	  45(1).	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have	  seriously	  diminished	  Sky’s	  position,	  but	  they	  do	  call	   into	  question	  the	  
appropriateness	   of	   the	   asymmetric	   nature	   of	   the	   UK/EU	   regulatory	  
framework	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  
	  
7.5.1.1	  Intervention	  under	  the	  EU	  Regulatory	  Framework	  for	  communications	  
The	  substantive	  standard	   for	  market	   intervention	  under	   the	  EU	  Regulatory	  
Framework	  is	  typically	  lower	  than	  under	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU.	  Application	  
of	  the	  EU	  Regulatory	  Framework	  is	  triggered	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  position	  of	  
“significant	  market	   power”.	   This	   is	   defined	  by	   reference	   to	   the	   concept	  of	  
dominance	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   102.1029	   In	   the	   presence	   of	  
significant	  market	  power,	  a	  national	  regulatory	  authority	  may	  impose	  access	  
obligations	  where	   “denial	   of	   access	   or	   unreasonable	   terms	   and	   conditions	  
having	   a	   similar	   effect	   would	   hinder	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   sustainable	  
competitive	   market	   at	   the	   retail	   level,	   or	   would	   not	   be	   in	   the	   end-­‐user’s	  
interest.”1030	  	  
	  
In	  limited	  circumstances,	  access	  obligations	  may	  be	  imposed	  irrespective	  of	  
whether	  the	  facility	  owner	  has	  significant	  market	  power.	  Under	  Article	  6(1)	  of	  
the	   Access	   Directive,	   every	   operator	   of	   a	   CAS	  must	   offer	   all	   broadcasters	  
access	  on	  a	  fair,	  reasonable	  and	  non-­‐discriminatory	  basis.1031	  Member	  States	  
may	   determine	   whether	   the	   same	   obligations	   should	   be	   imposed	   on	  
operators	  of	   Electronic	  Programme	  Guides	   and	  APIs.1032	   This	  has	  been	   the	  
case	  in	  the	  UK	  where	  the	  BBC	  and	  other	  FTA	  channels	  are	  guaranteed	  the	  first	  
five	  slots	  of	  every	  Electronic	  Programme	  Guide	   in	  the	  country,	   in	  the	  same	  
order.1033	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1029	  Framework	  Directive	  (n	  1023)	  art	  14.	  
1030	  Access	  Directive	  (n	  1026)	  art	  12.	  
1031	  ibid	  annex	  1,	  pt	  1,	  para	  (b).	  
1032	  ibid	  art	  5(1)(b).	  	  
1033	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  s	  74(2).	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7.5.1.2	  Enforcing	  access-­‐related	  conditions	  under	  the	  Communications	  Act	  2003	  
The	   regulatory	   framework	   that	   applies	   to	   all	   electronic	   communications	  
networks,	  services	  and	  associated	  facilities	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  set	  out	  in	  Part	  2	  of	  the	  
CA2003.	   Pursuant	   to	   this,	   any	   person	   to	  whom	  Ofcom	  applies	   a	   condition	  
under	  Section	  46	  must	  comply	  with	  that	  condition.	  Section	  45(2)	  empowers	  
Ofcom	  to	  set	  general	  conditions	  and	  specific	  conditions.	  Conditions	  may	  only	  
be	  imposed	  or	  modified	  if	  Ofcom	  is	  satisfied	  that	  it	  is	  objectively	  justifiable,	  
non-­‐discriminatory,	   proportionate	   and	   transparent.1034	   Access-­‐related	  
conditions	   are	   a	   form	   of	   specific	   condition,	   which	   are	   authorised	   under	  
Section	   73,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   ensuring	   adequate	   network	   access	   within	  
communications	  infrastructure.1035	  This	  may	  include	  such	  conditions	  relating	  
to	   network	   access	   and	   service	   interoperability	   as	   appear	   to	   Ofcom	   to	   be	  
appropriate	  for	  achieving	  efficiency,	  sustainable	  competition	  and	  the	  greatest	  
possible	   benefit	   for	   end-­‐users	   of	   public	   electronic	   communications	  
services.1036	  	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  establish	  dominance	  or	  significant	  market	  power	  before	  
imposing	   access-­‐related	   conditions.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   previous	  
regulatory	  regime	  in	  the	  Telecommunications	  Act	  1984	  under	  which	  access	  
control	   regulation	   was	   first	   imposed	   on	   Sky	   by	   Ofcom’s	   predecessor,	   the	  
Office	  of	  Telecommunications.	  Access	  regulation	  previously	  took	  the	  form	  of	  
licence	   conditions	  which	   applied	   only	   to	   operators	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	  
within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  102	  of	  the	  TFEU.	  By	  a	  determination	  in	  2000,1037	  
Sky	   Subscribers	   Services	   Limited	   (a	   subsidiary	   of	   Sky	   plc)	  was	   found	   to	   be	  
dominant	   in	   the	   market	   for	   access	   control	   services	   for	   digital	   interactive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1034	  ibid	  s	  47.	  
1035	  ibid	  ss	  45(5)	  and	  73(1).	  
1036	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  s	  73(2).	  For	  the	  definition	  of	  “network	  access”,	  see	  Communications	  
Act	  2003,	  ss	  151(3)	  and	  151(4).	  
1037	  Decision	  as	  to	  the	  status	  of	  Sky	  Subscribers	  Services	  Limited	  as	  a	  Regulated	  Supplier	  in	  the	  market	  
for	  access	  control	  services	  for	  digital	  interactive	  TV	  services	  (Office	  of	  Telecommunications,	  20	  June	  
2000).	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television	   services.1038	   Licence	   conditions	   required	   Sky	   to	   provide	   access	  
control	   services	   for	   interactive	   services	   on	   fair,	   reasonable	   and	   non-­‐
discriminatory	  terms.1039	  	  
	  
With	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  Telecommunications	  Act	  1984	  at	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  
of	  the	  CA2003,	  as	  a	  transitional	  measure	  the	  access-­‐related	  licence	  conditions	  
were	   given	   continued	   legal	   effect	   by	   an	   Access	   Control	   Continuation	  
Notice.1040	   This	   required	   Sky	   to	   supply	   access	   control	   services	   on	   fair	   and	  
reasonable	  terms,	  and	  to	  not	  unduly	  discriminate	  or	  show	  undue	  preference	  
in	  relation	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  access	  control	  services.1041	  Upon	  the	  removal	  of	  
this	  Notice	  in	  2015,	  Ofcom	  decided	  not	  to	  impose	  replacement	  conditions.1042	  
It	   acknowledged	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   continued	   ability	   of	   third	   party	  
content	  providers	  to	  access	  Sky’s	  STB.1043	  It	  was	  satisfied,	  however,	  that	  the	  
contractual	  arrangements	  in	  place	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  voluntary	  commitments	  
by	   Sky	   to	   continue	   to	   allow	   broadcasters	   access	   on	   prevailing	   terms,1044	  
ensured	  that	  content	  providers	  would	  retain	  access.1045	  	  
	  
Sky’s	  willingness	  to	  continue	  to	  allow	  access	  supports	  the	  observation	  made	  
earlier	  that	  a	  dominant	  firm	  in	  control	  of	  a	  facility	  bearing	  natural	  monopoly	  
characteristics	  may	  well	  have	  incentives	  to	  promote	  its	  use	  by	  third	  parties.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1038	  ibid	  paras	  7-­‐8.	  
1039	  Pursuant	  to	  Condition	  9.7	  in	  Part	  A	  of	  Schedule	  1	  of	  Sky’s	  Licence,	  Conditions	  10	  to	  15	  of	  the	  same	  
came	  into	  immediate	  effect.	  
1040	  Continuation	  Notice	  to	  a	  class	  of	  persons	  defined	  as	  the	  licensee	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  provision	  
of	  access	  control	  services	  under	  paragraph	  9	  of	  Schedule	  18	  to	  the	  Communications	  Act	  2003,	  as	  set	  
out	   in	   ‘Review	   of	   Sky’s	   Access	   Control	   Services	   Regulation’	   (Ofcom,	   25	   July	   2013)	   annex	   5	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/77130/review-­‐sky-­‐access-­‐control.pdf>	  
accessed	  3	  February	  2017.	  
1041	  ibid	  42-­‐46.	  
1042	   ‘Review	   of	   Sky’s	   Access	   Control	   Services	   Regulation’	   (Ofcom,	   17	   March	   2015)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0025/57418/ac_statement.pdf>	   accessed	   3	  
February	  2017.	  
1043	  ibid	  48.	  
1044	  ‘Voluntary	  commitments	  by	  Sky	  UK	  Limited	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  access	  control	  services’	  
(Sky	   UK	   Limited,	   23	   April	   2015)	   <https://corporate.sky.com/documents/about-­‐sky/regulatory-­‐
information/voluntary-­‐commitments-­‐by-­‐sky-­‐in-­‐relation-­‐to-­‐the-­‐provision-­‐of-­‐access-­‐control-­‐
services.pdf>	  accessed	  3	  February	  2017.	  
1045	  Ofcom	  (n	  1042)	  48.	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In	  this	  case,	  Sky	  would	  presumably	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  encouraging	  the	  use	  of	  
its	   STB	   to	   capitalise	   on	   network	   effects	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	  
alternative	  STB	  providers.	   Increasing	  reliance	  on	  Sky’s	  STB	  could	  have	  been	  
detrimental	  to	  the	  consumer	  interest	  in	  dynamic	  competition	  by	  discouraging	  
competitors	   from	   investing	   in	   competing	   STBs.	   It	   has	   been	   suggested,	  
however,	  that	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  competitive	  access	  problem	  
in	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  shifting	  from	  hardware	  to	  software	  and	  apps.	  
	  
7.5.1.3	  Wholesale	  must-­‐offer	  obligation	  imposed	  on	  Sky	  in	  2010-­‐2015	  
Further	   to	   its	   investigation	   of	   the	   UK	   pay-­‐TV	   sector,1046	   in	   2010	   Ofcom	  
imposed	  a	  WMO	  obligation	  on	  Sky	  to	  offer	  Sky	  Sports	  1	  and	  2	  to	  competing	  
pay-­‐TV	  retailers	  on	  a	  wholesale	  basis	  at	  prices	  set	  by	  Ofcom.1047	  Underpinning	  
the	  imposition	  of	  the	  WMO	  obligation	  was	  that	  the	  content	  shown	  on	  these	  
channels	  was	  indispensable	  for	  downstream	  competition	  in	  the	  retail	  supply	  
of	   such	   content	   to	   viewers.	   The	   core	   competition	   concerns	  were	   that	   Sky	  
deliberately	   withheld	   the	  wholesale	   supply	   of	   its	   premium	   sport	   channels	  
and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   acted	   on	   strategic	   incentives	   unrelated	   to	   the	   normal	  
commercial	   considerations	  of	   revenue	  or	  profit-­‐maximisation.	   In	  2012,	   the	  
CAT	   found	   Ofcom’s	   core	   competition	   concern	   that	   Sky	   was	   not	   a	   willing	  
wholesaler	  of	  its	  sports	  content	  to	  be	  unfounded.1048	  With	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  
UK	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	   interim	  arrangements	  were	  put	   in	  place	  by	  the	  CAT	  to	  
maintain	  the	  WMO	  obligation	  in	  respect	  of	  BT	  Vision,	  Virgin	  Media,	  Top-­‐Up	  
TV	  and	  Real	  Digital.1049	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1046	   ‘Pay	   TV	   Second	   Consultation:	   Access	   to	   Premium	   Content’	   (Ofcom,	   30	   September	   2008)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/40862/condoc.pdf>	   accessed	   3	   February	  
2017.	  
1047	  Ofcom	  (n	  139).	  
1048	   Cases	   1156-­‐1159/8/3/10	   British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   Limited,	   Virgin	   Media	   Inc,	   The	   Football	  
Association	  Premier	  League	  and	  British	  Telecommunications	  PLC	  v	  Office	  of	  Communications	   [2012]	  
CAT	  20	  [27].	  
1049	   Order	   of	   the	   President	   in	   Case	   1152/8/3/10	   (IR)	   British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   Limited	   v	   Office	   of	  
Communications	  (Interim	  Relief)	  [2014]	  CAT	  17.	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In	  November	  2014,	  the	  CAT	  extended	  the	  interim	  arrangements	  to	  BT’s	  then	  
newly	  emerging	  IPTV	  YouView	  service	  (upon	  BT	  undertaking	  to	  maintain	  BT	  
Sport	   on	   Sky’s	   platform	   until	   the	   conclusion	   of	   Sky’s	   appeal	   or	   further	  
order).1050	   It	   considered	   that	   over	   the	   “wholly	   exceptional”	   time	   that	   the	  
appeal	  was	   taking,	   technical	  developments	  had	  rendered	  the	   interim	  relief	  
order	   largely	   ineffective	   as	   regards	  BT.1051	   Following	   the	  Court	   of	  Appeal’s	  
decision	  in	  February	  2014	  (which	  set	  aside	  the	  CAT’s	  2012	  decision),1052	  the	  
issue	   of	   whether	   Sky’s	   wholesale	   pricing	   gave	   rise	   to	   specific	   competition	  
concerns	  in	  their	  own	  right	  was	  remitted	  back	  to	  the	  CAT.	  In	  November	  2015,	  
Ofcom	  decided	  to	  remove	  the	  WMO	  obligation	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Sky	  made	  
channels	   Sky	   Sports	   1	   and	   2	   available	   under	   a	   number	   of	   commercial	  
arrangements	   with	   BT,	   TalkTalk	   and	   Virgin	  Media.1053	   Sky	   Sports	   was	   also	  
available	   on	   NowTV	   which	   can	   be	   accessed	   on	   a	   range	   of	   platforms	   and	  
devices.	  Notably,	  the	  launch	  of	  NowTV	  in	  2012	  marked	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  
Sky	  Movies	  and	  Sky	  Sports	  channels	  were	  unbundled.	  
	  
However,	  what	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  WMO	  obligation	  suggests	  about	  Ofcom’s	  
approach	   is	   inherently	   called	   into	   question	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   part	   of	   the	  
reasoning	   behind	   its	   removal	   was	   that	   Sky	   would	   continue	   the	   prevailing	  
supply	  arrangements.	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  this	  in	  view	  of	  market	  developments,	  
most	  notably	  BT’s	  entry	  into	  live	  sports	  broadcasting	  in	  2010,	  is	  questionable.	  
More	  broadly,	   it	  calls	   into	  question	  the	  appropriateness	  of	   the	  asymmetric	  
nature	  of	  WMO	  obligations.	  The	  WMO	  obligation	  imposed	  on	  Sky	  enabled	  BT	  
to	   opt	   to	   provide	   its	   sports	   channels	   to	   commercially	   attractive	   delivery	  
platforms	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  subscribers	  (namely	  Sky	  and	  Virgin	  Media),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1050	  ibid.	  
1051	  ibid	  [66].	  
1052	  British	   Telecommunicatons	   PLC	   v	   Office	   of	   Communications,	   British	   Sky	   Broadcasting	   Ltd,	   The	  
Football	  Association	  Premier	  League,	  Virgin	  Media	  Inc	  [2014]	  EWCA	  Civ	  133.	  
1053	   ‘Review	   of	   the	   Pay	   TV	   Wholesale	   Must-­‐Offer	   Obligation’	   (Ofcom,	   19	   November	   2015)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/76081/Review-­‐of-­‐the-­‐pay-­‐TV-­‐wholesale-­‐
must-­‐offer-­‐obligation-­‐.pdf>	  accessed	  3	  February	  2017.	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but	  not	  to	  smaller	  rivals	  platforms	  such	  as	  Talk	  Talk.1054	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  
that	   a	   WMO	   obligation	   should	   be	   imposed	   on	   BT.	   Indeed,	   in	   Tiercé	  
Ladbroke,1055	  the	  General	  Court	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  no	  duty	  to	  grant	  a	  licence	  
to	  a	  firm	  that	  is	  not	  only	  already	  present	  in	  the	  market	  but	  a	  market	  leader.	  
In	  that	  case,	  Ladbroke	  was	  not	  only	  present	  but	  held	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  the	  
relevant	  market	  (in	  which	  the	  licence	  holder	  did	  not	  compete).1056	  	  
	  
Despite	  securing	  premium	  sports	  rights,	  BT	  maintains	  that	  high	  and	  persistent	  
barriers	   to	  effective	  entry	  and	  expansion	   remain	  as	  a	   result	  of	  Sky’s	   larger	  
retail	   scale	   (including	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   bundling	   of	   content	   with	  
telecommunications	  services).1057	  Nevertheless,	   the	  piecemeal	  approach	   to	  
such	   asymmetric	   regulation	   inherently	   raises	   questions	   about	   consistency	  
and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  
new	  entrants.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  need	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  that	  pay-­‐TV	  
providers	  increasingly	  supply	  bundles	  of	  services	  across	  the	  communications	  
sector.	  Having	  regard	  to	  BT’s	  status	  as	  the	  UK’s	  biggest	  telecommunications	  
service	  provider	  with	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  the	  fixed	  UK	  broadband	  market,	  the	  
assumption	   that	   access	   to	   Sky	   Sports	   1	   and	   2	   is	   indispensable	   for	   BT	   to	  
compete	  effectively	  is	  highly	  questionable.	  	  
	  
7.5.2	   Regulation	  of	  access	  to	  communications	  infrastructure	  in	  Australia	  
The	  ACCC	   is	   responsible	   for	   enforcing	   the	   regulatory	   regimes	  on	   access	   to	  
communications	  infrastructure	  in	  Australia.	  This	  includes	  the	  national	  access	  
regime	   in	   Part	   IIIA	   of	   the	   CCA	   and	   the	   telecommunications-­‐specific	   access	  
regime	  in	  Part	  XIC	  of	  the	  CCA.	  These	  is	  also	  the	  telecommunications-­‐specific	  
anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  regime	  in	  Part	  XIB	  of	  the	  CCA.	  Central	  to	  the	  access	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1054	  Evens,	  Iosifidis	  and	  Smith	  (n	  368)	  545.	  
1055	  Tiercé	  Ladbroke	  SA	  v	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  [1997]	  ECR	  II-­‐923.	  
1056	  ibid	  [130].	  
1057	  ‘BT’s	  Response	  to	  Ofcom’s	  Discussion	  Document:	  “Strategic	  Review	  of	  Digital	  Communications”’	  
(BT,	   8	   October	   2015)	   76	   <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/37937/bt.pdf>	  
accessed	  3	  February	  2017.	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regimes	   in	  Part	   IIIA	  and	  Part	  XIC	   is	  the	  value	  of	  commercial	  negotiation.	  As	  
Hitchens	  notes,	  dependence	  on	  commercial	  negotiation	  can	  be	  problematic	  
in	  a	  market	  as	  small	  and	  concentrated	  as	  Australia.1058	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  
suggest	   that	   a	   more	   interventionist	   sector-­‐specific	   approach	   would	  
necessarily	   produce	   more	   efficient	   outcomes	   from	   a	   consumer	   welfare	  
perspective.	  In	  fact,	  reform	  proposals	  indicate	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  this	  towards	  
greater	  reliance	  on	  regulating	  refusals	  to	  supply	  access	  under	  Section	  46	  of	  
the	  CCA.	  
	  
7.5.2.1	  National	  access	  regime	  in	  Part	  IIIA	  of	  the	  CCA	  
Part	  IIIA	  of	  the	  CCA	  sets	  out	  an	  administrative	  access	  regime	  under	  which	  third	  
parties	  may	  seek	  access	  to	  nationally	  significant	  infrastructure.	  The	  objects	  of	  
the	  regime	  include	  to	  “promote	  the	  economically	  efficient	  operation	  of,	  use	  
of	   and	   investment	   in	   the	   infrastructure	   by	   which	   services	   are	   provided,	  
thereby	   promoting	   effective	   competition	   in	   upstream	   and	   downstream	  
markets.”1059	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  regime	  followed	  a	  recommendation	  by	  
the	  Hilmer	  Review	  in	  1993,1060	  that	  a	  new	  legal	  regime	  should	  be	  established	  
under	  which	  firms	  can	  access	  specified	  essential	  facilities.	  This	  was	  considered	  
necessary	  because	  of	  the	  perceived	  reluctance	  and/or	  inability	  of	  the	  courts	  
to	   engage	   in	   access	   pricing,1061	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   perceived	   limitations	   of	  
Section	  46.1062	  	  
	  
Declaration	   gives	   rise	   to	   an	   enforceable	   right	   to	   negotiate	   the	   terms	   and	  
conditions	  of	  access	  to	  the	  declared	  service	  with	  the	  relevant	  service	  provider.	  
Where	  the	  service	  provider	  and	  access	  seeker	  cannot	  agree	  such	  terms	  and	  
conditions,	  either	  party	  may	  request	  for	  the	  ACCC	  to	  arbitrate	  the	  dispute.	  A	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1058	  Hitchens	  (n	  315)	  218.	  
1059	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  44AA(a).	  
1060	  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36).	  
1061	  ibid	  243-­‐244.	  
1062	  ibid	  186.	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service	  may	  be	  “declared”	  where	  the	  criteria	  in	  Section	  44G(2)	  of	  the	  CCA	  are	  
satisfied:	  
	  
(a)	  access	  would	  promote	  a	  material	  increase	  in	  competition	  
in	  a	  market	  other	  than	  the	  market	  for	  the	  service;	  	  
(b)	  it	  would	  be	  uneconomical	  for	  anyone	  to	  develop	  another	  
facility	  to	  provide	  the	  service;	  
(c)	  the	  facility	  is	  of	  national	  significance;	  
(e)	   access	   is	   not	   already	   the	   subject	   of	   an	   effective	   access	  
regime;	  and	  
(f)	  access	  would	  not	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  public	  interest.	  
	  
As	  the	  above	  declaration	  criteria	  indicate,	  the	  national	  access	  regime	  is	  based	  
on	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  natural	  monopoly,	  bottleneck	  facility.	  Section	  44G(2)(b)	  
concerns	  whether	  a	  facility	  exhibits	  natural	  monopoly	  characteristics	  (i.e.	   it	  
would	  be	  uneconomical	  for	  anyone	  to	  develop	  another	  facility	  to	  provide	  the	  
service).	  Section	  44G(2)(a)	  addresses	  whether	  a	  facility	  that	  exhibits	  natural	  
monopoly	   characteristics	   is	   also	   a	   bottleneck	   facility	   (i.e.	   access	   would	  
promote	  a	  material	  increase	  in	  competition	  in	  a	  market	  other	  than	  the	  market	  
for	  the	  service).	  This	  reflects	  the	  observation	  of	  the	  Hilmer	  Committee	  that	  
some	  facilities	  exhibiting	  such	  natural	  monopoly	  characteristics	  are	  essential	  
facilities	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   access	   is	   required	   for	   third	   parties	   to	   compete	  
effectively	  in	  upstream	  or	  downstream	  markets.1063	  	  
	  
In	  2013,	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  reported	  on	  its	  review	  of	  the	  national	  
access	  regime.1064	  It	  recommended	  the	  amendment	  of	  Section	  44G(2)(a)	  to	  
become	  a	  comparison	  of	  competition	  with	  and	  without	  access	  on	  reasonable	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  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36)	  240.	  
1064	   ‘National	   Access	   Regime:	   Productivity	   Commission	   Inquiry	   Report	   No.66’	   (Commonwealth	   of	  
Australia,	   25	   October	   2013)	   <http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/access-­‐
regime/report/access-­‐regime.pdf>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	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terms	   and	   conditions	   through	   declaration.1065	   It	   also	   recommended	   the	  
amendment	  of	  Section	  44G(2)(b)	  to	  where	  total	  foreseeable	  market	  demand	  
over	  the	  declaration	  period	  could	  be	  met	  at	  least	  cost	  by	  the	  facility.1066	  “Total	  
market	  demand”	   is	  defined	  as	   including	   the	  demand	   for	   the	   service	  under	  
application,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  demand	   for	  any	   substitute	   services	  provided	  by	  
facilities	  which	   serve	   that	  market.1067	   The	  assessment	  of	   costs	   is	  meant	   to	  
include	  an	  estimate	  of	   any	  production	   costs	   incurred	  by	   the	   infrastructure	  
service	  provider	  from	  coordinating	  multiple	  users	  of	  its	  facility.1068	  
	  
This	   recommendation	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  HCA’s	   interpretation	   of	   Section	  
44G(2)(b)	   in	   2012	   in	   the	   Pilbara	   Infrastructure	   case,1069	   to	   require	   the	  
application	  of	  a	  “private	  profitability”	  test	  (which,	  as	  already	  noted	  in	  the	  US	  
context,	  depends	  on	   it	  not	  being	  profitable	   for	  anyone	  else	  to	  develop	  the	  
facility).	   The	   HCA	   identified	   three	   possible	   approaches	   to	   interpreting	   the	  
expression	  “uneconomical	  for	  anyone	  to	  develop	  another	  facility	  to	  provide	  
the	   service”.	   Under	   the	   “natural	   monopoly”	   approach,	   the	   question	   is	  
whether	   the	   facility	   “can	  provide	  society’s	   reasonably	   foreseeable	  demand	  
for	   the	   relevant	   service	   at	   a	   lower	   total	   cost	   than	   if	   it	  were	   to	   be	  met	   by	  
providing	   two	   or	   more	   facilities.”1070	   The	   “net	   social	   benefit”	   approach	  
questions	  whether	  “for	  a	  likely	  range	  of	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  demand	  for	  
the	  services	  provided	  by	  means	  of	  the	  [facility],	  it	  would	  be	  more	  efficient,	  in	  
terms	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  to	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  for	  one	  [facility]	  to	  
provide	   those	   services	   rather	   than	   more	   than	   one.”1071	   The	   “private	  
profitability”	  approach	  directs	  attention	   to	  “whether	  any	  person	   (including	  
the	  incumbent	  operator	  of	  the	  facility	  to	  which	  access	  is	  sought)	  would	  find	  it	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  ibid	  33.	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  ibid.	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  ibid.	  
1068	  ibid.	  
1069	  Pilbara	  Infrastructure	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Australian	  Competition	  Tribunal	  [2012]	  HCA	  36.	  
1070	  ibid	  [79].	  
1071	  ibid	  [80],	  citing	  Re	  Duke	  Eastern	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2001]	  ACompT	  2;	  (2001)	  162	  FLR	  1,	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  [137].	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profitable	  to	  establish	  a	  second	  or	  competing	  facility.”1072	  The	  HCA’s	  adoption	  
of	   this	   approach	   suggests	   closer	   alignment	   with	   the	   US	   approach	   in	  MCI	  
Communications.1073	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia	  supports	  the	  Productivity	  
Commission’s	   recommendations	   regarding	   Sections	   44G(2)(a)	   and	  
44G(2)(b).1074	   Pending	   amendment	   of	   the	   CCA,	   apparent	   inconsistency	   in	  
policy	   direction	   also	   arises	   in	   relation	   to	   Section	   44G(2)(a),	   following	   the	  
recent	  decision	  of	   the	  ACT	   in	  Application	  by	  Glencore	  Coal	  Pty	  Ltd.1075	  This	  
case	  concerned	  an	   increase	   in	  port	  charges	  at	   the	  newly	  privatised	  Port	  of	  
Newcastle,	  after	  it	  was	  acquired	  by	  Port	  of	  Newcastle	  Operations	  Pty	  Limited.	  
Glencore	  Coal	  Pty	  Ltd	  applied	  for	  declaration	  of	  the	  shipping	  channel	  service	  
at	  the	  port	  to	  limit	  future	  increases	  in	  port	  charges.	  It	  was	  not	  disputed	  that	  
the	  shipping	  channels	  were	  a	  natural	  bottleneck	  monopoly	  and	  access	  was	  
necessary	  for	  the	  export	  of	  coal	  from	  the	  Hunter	  Valley.1076	  In	  overturning	  the	  
decision	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	  Treasurer	  to	  not	  make	  the	  declaration,	   the	  
ACT	  found	   it	  sufficient	   for	   it	   to	  be	  shown	  that	  having	  enforceable	  rights	  of	  
access	   to	   the	   relevant	   service	   would	   promote	   a	   material	   increase	   in	  
competition	   in	   a	   dependent	   market	   compared	   to	   not	   having	   any	   such	  
rights.1077	  This	  appears	  to	  lower	  the	  threshold	  for	  access	  seekers.1078	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1072	  ibid	  [81].	  
1073	  MCI	  Communications	  (n	  978).	  
1074	  ‘Australian	  Government	  response	  to	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  and	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  




response_NAR.ashx>	  accessed	  13	  August	  2017.	  
1075	  Application	  by	  Glencore	  Coal	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2016]	  ACompT	  6.	  
1076	  ibid	  [7].	  
1077	  ibid	  [121].	  
1078	  This	  decision	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  FCA.	  Port	  of	  Newcastle	  Operations	  Pty	  Ltd	  CAN	  165	  
332	  990	  v	  The	  Australian	  Competition	  Tribunal	  &	  Anor,	  14	  July	  2016.	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7.5.2.2	  Relationship	  between	  Section	  46	  and	  Part	  IIIA	  of	  the	  CCA	  
As	  a	  general	  principle,	  the	  operation	  of	  Section	  46	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  Part	  IV	  
of	  the	  CCA,	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  Part	  IIIA	  of	  the	  CCA.1079	  The	  CCA	  does	  not	  state	  
that	  Section	  46	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  cases	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Part	  IIIA.	  
However,	   the	  Hilmer	  Committee	   indicated	  a	   residual	   role	   for	  Section	  46	   in	  
regulating	  access	  to	  communications	  infrastructure	  only	  where	  Part	  IIIA	  does	  
not	  apply.1080	  Whilst	  it	  was	  also	  noted	  that	  Part	  IIIA	  should	  apply	  sparingly,	  to	  
“key	   sectors	   of	   strategic	   significance	   to	   the	   nation.”1081	   Together	   with	  
electricity	   transmission	   grids	   and	   railway	   tracks,	   the	   Hilmer	   Committee	  
referred	   to	   telecommunications	   networks	   as	   the	   key	   infrastructure	   assets	  
that	  it	  envisaged	  as	  being	  potentially	  subject	  to	  the	  access	  regime.1082	  
	  
Albeit	   residual,	   the	   role	   for	   Section	   46	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   a	   limited	   set	   of	  
circumstances.1083	   Section	   46	  will	   apply	   to	   services	   that	   do	   not	   satisfy	   the	  
criteria	  for	  declaration	  or	  do	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Part	  IIIA.1084	  The	  most	  
contentious	   of	   the	   declaration	   criteria	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   that	   it	   would	   be	  
uneconomical	  to	  develop	  another	  facility	  to	  provide	  the	  service	  and/or	  the	  
facility	  is	  of	  national	  significance.	  Conversely,	  the	  first	  element	  of	  Section	  46	  
that	   there	   is	   a	   corporation	   with	   a	   substantial	   degree	   of	   market	   power	   is	  
generally	  unlikely	  to	  be	  controversial	  in	  essential	  facility	  cases	  because	  of	  the	  
tendency	  for	  essential	  facilities	  to	  bear	  natural	  monopoly	  characteristics.	  As	  
noted	  by	  the	  Hilmer	  Committee,	  if	  a	  facility	  is	  truly	  essential,	   its	  owner	  will	  
always	   have	   a	   substantial	   degree	   of	  market	   power	  within	   the	  meaning	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1079	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  44ZZNA.	  
1080	  Hilmer	  Report	  (n	  36)	  260.	  
1081	  ibid.	  
1082	  ibid.	  
1083	  It	  was	  envisaged	  that	  the	  national	  access	  regime	  would	  apply	  only	  where	  the	  facility	  owner	  and	  
access	  seeker	  could	  not	  agree	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  access,	  where	  the	  facility	  was	  of	  national	  significance,	  
and	   where	   there	   was	   no	   effective	   regime	   already	   in	   place.	   ‘National	   Competition	   Policy:	   Draft	  
Legislative	  Package’	  (Australian	  Government,	  September	  1994)	  Explanatory	  Memoranda,	  para	  1.16.	  
1084	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  4N(1).	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Section	  46.1085	  Whilst	  whether	  a	  corporation	  is	  found	  to	  possess	  substantial	  
market	  power	  will	  depend	  upon	  how	  the	  relevant	  market	  is	  defined.	  	  
	  
As	  regards	  the	  corporation	  taking	  advantage	  of	  its	  market	  power,	  the	  Hilmer	  
Committee	  considered	  that	  there	  would	  be	  little	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  that	  
a	   refusal	   to	   deal	   in	   an	   essential	   facility	   context	   involves	   the	   facility	   owner	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  its	  market	  power,	  since	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  market	  
power	   access	   to	   the	   facility	   would	   be	   available.”1086	   As	   regards	   the	   third	  
element	   of	   taking	   advantage	   of	   market	   power	   for	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	  
proscribed	   purposes,	   the	   Hilmer	   Committee	   acknowledged	   that	   denying	  
access	   to	   an	   essential	   facility	   could	   occur	   for	   any	   of	   the	   proscribed	  
purposes.1087	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  anticipated	  difficulty	  for	  access	  seekers	  in	  
demonstrating	   that	   facility	   owners	   had	   an	   anti-­‐competitive	   purpose	  when	  
denying	   access.1088	   It	   has	   been	   suggested	   elsewhere	   that	   the	   issue	   of	  
establishing	  a	  proscribed	  purpose	  is	  irrelevant	  since,	  in	  any	  event,	  the	  access	  
seeker	  has	  not	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  facility	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  refusal.1089	  
Pengilley	  contends	  that	  the	  appropriate	  basis	  for	  evaluation	  instead	  involves	  
considering	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   ownership	   rights	   may	   be	  
circumscribed	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  competition	  policy.1090	  However,	  the	  need	  to	  
undertake	  this	  inquiry	  will	  cease	  to	  exist	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  
Section	  46.	  
	  
The	  residual	  role	  for	  Section	  46	  in	  relation	  to	  Part	  IIIA	  also	  looks	  set	  to	  become	  
more	   significant	   with	   the	   proposed	   changes	   to	   the	   declaration	   criteria	   in	  
Section	  44G(2)	  of	   the	  CCA	  by	  the	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  Bill.	  The	  main	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




1089	  Samantha	  Hardy,	   ‘Misuse	  of	  Market	  Power	  –	  Purpose	  or	  Effect?’	   (1997)	  5	  Trade	  Practices	  Law	  
Journal	  114,	  117.	  
1090	  Warren	  Pengilley,	  ‘The	  Privy	  Council	  Speaks	  on	  Essential	  Facilities	  Access	  in	  New	  Zealand:	  What	  
are	  the	  Australasian	  Lessons?’	  (1995)	  3	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Law	  Journal	  26,	  43.	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changes	   relate	   to	   the	   criteria	   for	   promoting	   competition	   in	   a	   dependent	  
market	   in	   Section	   44G(2)(a),	   targeting	   infrastructure	   associated	   with	   the	  
economic	   problem	   in	   Section	   44G(2)(b),	   and	   improving	   the	   assessment	   of	  
public	  interest	  in	  Section	  44G(2)(d).	  The	  existing	  Section	  44G(2)(a)	  focuses	  on	  
the	   right	   of	   access,	   without	   any	   need	   for	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   effect	   of	  
declaration.	   The	   proposed	   amendment	   of	   Section	   44G(2)(a)	   is	   desirable	   in	  
that	   it	   will	   require	   consideration	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   declaration	   rather	   than	  
access.	   This	   will	   ensure	   that	   services	   will	   not	   be	   declared	   where	   there	   is	  
already	  effective	  competition	  in	  dependant	  markets	  when	  measured	  against	  
the	   likely	   state	   of	   competition	   in	   those	   markets.	   Where	   there	   is	   already	  
effective	  competition	  in	  dependent	  markets,	  the	  test	  should	  not	  be	  satisfied	  
because	   declaration	   would	   be	   unlikely	   to	   promote	   a	   material	   increase	   in	  
competition.1091	  
	  
The	   proposed	   amendment	   of	   Section	   44G(2)(b)	   would	   ensure	   that	  
declarations	   are	   limited	   to	   services	   that	   are	   provided	   by	   infrastructure	  
facilities	  which	  can	  meet	  total	  foreseeable	  demand	  for	  the	  service	  over	  the	  
period	  of	  declaration	  at	  a	   lower	  cost	   than	   two	  or	  more	   facilities.	  This	  may	  
provide	  welcome	  certainty	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  apparent	  inconsistency	  in	  policy	  
direction	  that	  followed	  the	  Pilbara	  Infrastructure	  case.1092	  Much	  will	  depend,	  
however,	   on	   the	   approach	   to	   determining	   total	   foreseeable	   demand	   and	  
relative	   costs,	   particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   emerging	   markets.	   Section	  
44G(2)(f)	  is	  proposed	  to	  become	  the	  new	  Section	  44G(2)(d).	  The	  existing	  test	  
that	  access	  would	  not	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  would	  be	  replaced	  to	  
ensure	  that	  third	  party	  access	  is	  only	  required	  where	  it	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  
This	  amendment	  is	  desirable	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  criterion	  which	  
provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  the	  overall	  consequences	  of	  declaration.	  
Reframing	  it	  into	  the	  positive	  should	  ensure	  that	  services	  will	  be	  declared	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1091	  Productivity	  Commission	  Inquiry	  Report	  (n	  1064)	  172.	  
1092	  Pilbara	  Infrastructure	  (n	  1069).	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where	   the	   community	   as	   a	   whole	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   better	   off	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
declaration.1093	  This	  should	  also	  permit	  greater	  consideration	  of	  the	  potential	  
chilling	  effects	  of	  declaration	  on	  investment	  incentives.	  
	  
7.5.2.3	  Telecommunications	  access	  regime	  in	  Part	  XIC	  of	  the	  CCA	  
Part	  XIC	  of	  the	  CCA	  sets	  out	  an	  access	  regime	  for	  the	  declaration	  of	  services	  
specific	   to	   the	   telecommunications	   sector.	   It	   was	   enacted	   following	   the	  
deregulation	  of	   the	  Australian	   telecommunications	   industry	   in	  1997.1094	  At	  
that	   time,	   the	  ACCC	  extended	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  telecommunications	  access	  
regime	   to	   broadcasting	   services	   over	   cable	   networks.1095	   The	   carriage	   of	  
analogue	  pay-­‐TV	  signals	  and	  the	  use	  of	  CAS	  technology	  were	  declared	  on	  1	  
September	   1999.1096	   It	  was	   considered	   that,	   due	   to	   substantial	   barriers	   to	  
entry	   and	   vertical	   integration,	   cable	   operators	  would	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	  
deny	  access	  to	  services	  that	  compete	  with	  their	  own.1097	  This	  could	  have	  led	  
to	  a	  narrower	  range	  of	  programming	  and	  higher	  prices	  for	  viewers.1098	  
	  
Once	  a	  service	  is	  declared,1099	  the	  relevant	  service	  provider	  must	  allow	  third	  
parties	  access	  pursuant	  to	  the	  standard	  access	  obligations.1100	  This	  requires	  
an	  access	  provider,	  upon	  the	  request	  of	  a	  service	  provider,	  to	  supply	  an	  active	  
declared	   service	   so	   that	   the	   service	   provider	   can	   provide	   carriage	   and/or	  
content	  services.1101	  The	  standard	  access	  obligations	  dictate	  the	  basic	  terms	  
of	   access	   and	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   access	   pending	   commercial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1093	  Productivity	  Commission	  Inquiry	  Report	  (n	  1064)	  176.	  
1094	  Allan	  Fels,	  ‘Regulating	  Access	  to	  Essential	  Facilities’	  (2001)	  8(3)	  Agenda	  195,	  199.	  
1095	  ibid.	  
1096	   ‘A	   Report	   on	   an	   Inquiry	   into	   the	   Declaration	   of	   an	   Analogue-­‐Specific	   Subscription	   Television	  
Broadcast	   Carriage	   Service	   under	   Part	   XIC	   of	   the	   Trade	   Practices	   Act	   1974’	   (ACCC,	   October	   1999)	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Declaration%20-­‐
%20analogue%20subscription%20TV%20broadcast%20carriage%20service.pdf>	   accessed	   13	   August	  
2017.	  
1097	  Productivity	  Commission	  Inquiry	  Report	  (n	  736)	  374.	  
1098	  ibid.	  
1099	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  152AL(3).	  
1100	  ibid	  ss	  152AR	  and	  152AXB.	  	  
1101	  ibid	  s	  152AR(3).	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negotiation.1102	   The	   access	   regime	   only	   applies	   if	   and	   when	   commercial	  
negotiations	   fail,	   with	   an	   emphasis	   on	   “promoting	   commercial	   and	   self-­‐
regulated	  outcomes.”1103	  	  
	  
The	  criteria	  for	  declaring	  a	  service	  under	  Part	  XIC	  differ	  from	  the	  declaration	  
criteria	  under	   the	  national	  access	   regime	   in	  Part	   IIIA.	   In	  declaring	  a	  service	  
under	  Part	  XIC,	  the	  ACCC	  must	  be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  declaration	  will	  promote	  
the	   long-­‐term	   interests	   of	   the	   end-­‐users	   of	   carriage	   services	   or	   services	  
supplied	  using	  carriage	  services.1104	  The	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  access	  can	  
be	  agreed	  between	   the	  parties,	  or	   take	   the	   form	  of	  an	  access	  undertaking	  
given	  by	   the	   service	   provider	   and	   approved	  by	   the	  ACCC.	  A	   special	   access	  
undertaking	  can	  be	  lodged	  by	  a	  person	  who	  is,	  or	  expects	  to	  be,	  a	  carrier	  or	  a	  
carriage	  service	  provider	  supplying	  specified	  services.1105	  Once	  accepted	  by	  
the	   ACCC,	   the	   service	   becomes	   a	   declared	   service.1106	   In	  March	   2007,	   the	  
ACCC	  accepted	  a	  special	  access	  undertaking	  from	  Foxtel	  relating	  to	  its	  digital	  
set	  top	  unit	  service.1107	  
	  
If	  the	  parties	  are	  unable	  to	  agree	  the	  terms	  of	  access	  and	  there	  is	  no	  access	  
undertaking,	  the	  ACCC	  can	  make	  a	  determination	  on	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  
of	  access.1108	  Initially,	  the	  ACCC’s	  arbitration	  determinations	  concerned	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1102	   Alasdair	   Grant,	   Australian	   Telecommunications	   Regulation	   (3rd	   edn,	   University	   of	   New	   South	  
Wales	  Press	  2004)	  95.	  
1103	  ibid	  88.	  
1104	   Competition	   and	  Consumer	  Act	   2010,	   s	   152AL(3)(d).	   End-­‐users	   are	   understood	   to	   be	   the	   final	  
consumers	  rather	  than	  the	  access	  seekers.	  ‘Telecommunications	  Competition	  Regulation’	  (Australian	  
Government	   Productivity	   Commission	   Inquiry	   Report,	   21	   December	   2001)	   257	  
<https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/telecommunications-­‐
competition/report/telecommunications2.pdf>	  accessed	  14	  August	  2017.	  
1105	  ibid	  s	  152CBA.	  
1106	  ibid	  s	  152AL(7).	  
1107	  ‘Assessment	  of	  Foxtel’s	  Special	  Access	  Undertaking	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Digital	  Set	  Top	  Unit	  Service:	  
Final	   Decision’	   (ACCC,	   March	   2007)	   12	  
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20final%20decision-­‐
Foxtel%27s%20SAU%20for%20the%20digital%20set%20top%20unit%20service%20%28March%2020
07%29.pdf>	  accessed	  30	  June	  2017.	  
1108	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010,	  s	  44V.	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the	  parties	  in	  question,	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  “negotiate-­‐arbitrate”	  model.1109	  
However,	   this	   model	   was	   considered	   ineffective	   in	   constraining	   Telstra’s	  
incentive	  to	  offer	  access	  to	  its	  network	  on	  terms	  less	  favourable	  than	  those	  
enjoyed	  by	  its	  own	  retail	  business.1110	  By	  the	  Telecommunications	  Legislation	  
Amendment	  (Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Safeguards)	  Act	  2010,	  the	  ACCC	  was	  
empowered	  to	  set	  up	  front	  price	  and	  non-­‐price	  terms	  for	  declared	  services,	  
to	   provide	   some	   security	   for	   access	   seekers	   and	   certainty	   for	   service	  
providers.1111	  
	  
7.5.2.4	  Telecommunications-­‐specific	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  regime	  in	  the	  CCA	  
Part	  XIB	  of	  the	  CCA	  sets	  out	  a	  telecommunications-­‐specific	  anti-­‐competitive	  
conduct	  regime	  under	  which	  the	  ACCC	  can	  issue	  a	  Competition	  Notice	  to	  a	  
carrier	  (i.e.	  a	  telecommunications	  corporation),	  if	  it	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  
the	  corporation	  has	  engaged	  in	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct.	  “Anti-­‐competitive	  
conduct”	  refers	  to	  the	  restrictive	  trade	  practices	  in	  Part	  IV	  of	  the	  CCA,	  which	  
includes	  Sections	  45	  and	  46.	   If	   the	  conduct	  persists,	   the	  ACCC	  can	  seek	  an	  
injunction	  and	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  financial	  penalty	  by	  the	  FCA.	  Part	  XIB	  was	  
intended	  to	  supplement	  Section	  46	  by	  increasing	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  ACCC	  to	  
respond	   quickly	   to	   evidence	   of	   anti-­‐competitive	   conduct	   in	  
telecommunications	  markets.	  However,	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  Part	  XIB	  in	  
1997,	   the	  ACCC	  has	   issued	  only	   five	  Competition	  Notices	  and	  they	  have	  all	  
been	  revoked.1112	  
	  
The	   most	   recent	   Competition	   Notice	   was	   issued	   in	   2006,	   in	   relation	   to	   a	  
Telstra	   wholesale	   line	   rental	   price	   increase.1113	   The	   increase	   caused	   some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




1112	   See,	   ACCC	   Competition	   Notices	   Register	  
<http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/323962>	  accessed	  10	  January	  2017.	  
1113	  Part	  A	  Competition	  Notice	  issued	  pursuant	  to	  Section	  151AKA(2)	  of	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act	  1974	  
to	  Telstra	  Corporation	  Limited,	  12	  April	  2006.	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retail	  prices	  for	  the	  line	  rental	  component	  of	  Telstra’s	  fixed	  voice	  products	  to	  
fall	  below	  the	  wholesale	  price.	  However,	  Telstra	  successfully	  challenged	  the	  
Notice	   on	   procedural	   grounds.1114	   The	   FCA	   held	   that	   the	   ACCC	   was	   not	  
entitled	  to	  issue	  the	  Notice	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  Notice	  differed	  from	  the	  
prior	  consultation	  notice	  as	  regards	  the	  description	  of	   the	  anti-­‐competitive	  
conduct,	  and	  Telstra	  had	  been	  denied	  procedural	  fairness	  and	  natural	  justice	  
by	  not	  being	  given	   the	  opportunity	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   invitation	   to	  make	  a	  
submission	  to	  the	  ACCC	  on	  the	  relevant	  conduct.1115	  The	  requirement	  for	  the	  
ACCC	  to	  issue	  consultation	  notices	  was	  removed	  by	  the	  Telecommunications	  
Legislation	  Amendment	   (Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Safeguards)	  Act	  2010.	  
However,	  the	  ACCC	  has	  not	  issued	  any	  further	  Competition	  Notices.	  
	  
It	   is	   suggested	   here	   that	   Part	   XIB	   is	   redundant.	   The	   repeal	   of	   the	  
telecommunications-­‐specific	  anti-­‐competitive	  conduct	  provisions	  in	  Part	  XIB	  
by	   the	   recently	   passed	   Misuse	   of	   Market	   Power	   Act	   is	   therefore	  
welcomed.1116	   The	   repeal	  of	   these	  provisions	   is	   also	  arguably	  necessary	   to	  
resolve	  the	  inconsistency	  that	  otherwise	  arises	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  new	  
Section	  46,	  given	  that	  it	  dispenses	  with	  the	  “taking	  advantage”	  requirement	  
that	  is	  presently	  common	  to	  Section	  46	  and	  Part	  XIB.	  It	  signals	  a	  shift	  away	  
from	   the	   enforcement	   of	   sector-­‐specific	   legislation	   by	   the	   ACCC	   towards	  
greater	  reliance	  on	  general	  competition	  law	  enforcement.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
competition	   concerns	   in	   the	  Australian	   telecommunications	   sector	  may	  be	  
thought	  to	  be	  mitigated	  by	  the	  ongoing	  structural	  separation	  of	  Telstra’s	  retail	  
business	  from	  its	  network	  business,1117	  and	  the	  migration	  of	  Telstra’s	  fixed-­‐
line	  services	  to	  the	  NBN.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1114	  Telstra	  Corporation	  Limited	  v	  Australian	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Commission	  (No.2)	  [2007]	  FCA	  
493.	  
1115	  ibid	  [262-­‐267].	  
1116	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Amendment	  (Misuse	  of	  Market	  Power)	  Act	  2017,	  sch	  2,	  para	  1.	  
1117	  Telecommunications	  (Structural	  Separation	  -­‐	  Networks	  and	  Services	  Exemption)	  Instrument	  (No.1)	  
2011;	  Telecommunications	  (Migration	  Plan	  Principles)	  Determination	  2011.	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NBN	   Co	   holds	   a	   de	   facto	   monopoly	   over	   the	   provision	   of	   wholesale	  
telecommunications	  infrastructure	  in	  Australia.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  
given	   the	   failed	  attempt	   to	   introduce	   facilities-­‐based	  competition	  between	  
Telstra	  and	  Optus	   in	   fixed-­‐line	   telecommunications.	  Experience	   shows	   that	  
technical	   limitations	  and	  economic	  reality	   in	  Australia	  render	  head-­‐to-­‐head	  
competition	   involving	   the	   duplication	   of	   facilities	   at	   the	   network	   level	  
impracticable.	   It	   is	   arguable,	   however,	   that	   the	   approach	   to	   Telstra’s	  
separation	   into	   “Telstra	   wholesale”	   and	   “Telstra	   retail”	   does	   not	   go	   far	  
enough,	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   legal	   separation	   of	   BT	   and	   Openreach.	  
Telstra’s	   separation	   could	   simply	   see	   it	   migrate	   its	   retail	   services	   from	   its	  
fixed-­‐line	  networks	  onto	  the	  NBN	  which	  it	  may	  in	  time	  acquire.	  
	  
7.6	   Conclusions	  
The	  thesis	  began	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  widely	  recognised	  role	  of	  premium	  
sport	  and	  movies	  as	  key	  drivers	  in	  the	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV.	  This	  chapter	  
has	   considered	   the	   policy	   implications	   of	   this	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   scope	   for	  
mandating	   supply	   under	   general	   competition	   law	   on	   unilateral	   refusal	   to	  
supply	   and	   sector-­‐specific	   access	   regulation.	   As	   regards	   sector-­‐specific	  
regulation,	   the	   proposed	   repeal	   in	   Australia	   of	   the	   telecommunications-­‐
specific	   anti-­‐competitive	   conduct	   provisions	   in	   Part	   XIB	   of	   the	   CCA	   is	  
welcomed,	  as	  are	  the	  proposed	  changes	  to	  the	  national	  access	  regime	  in	  Part	  
IIIA.	  The	  proposed	  changes	  under	  the	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  Bill	  to	  the	  
declaration	  criteria	  in	  Part	  IIIA	  would	  increase	  the	  residual	  role	  for	  Section	  46.	  
However,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   questions	   of	   consistency	   arise	   in	   relation	   to	  
policy	  direction	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Pilbara	  Infrastructure	  case.	  This	  may	  have	  
implications	   for	   the	   residual	   role	   for	   Section	   46	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	  
“purpose	  and	  effects”	  test	  in	  the	  new	  Section	  46.	  
	  
Whilst	   these	   developments	   would	   appear	   to	   render	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
relevance	  of	  the	  essential	  facilities	  concept	  especially	  pertinent	  in	  Australia,	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it	  equally	  arises	  in	  the	  UK	  given	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  competitive	  access	  problem	  
away	  from	  CAS	  technology	  and	  rise	  of	  the	  premium	  content	  bottleneck.	  It	  is	  
argued	  that	  the	  case	  for	  regulating	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  content	  as	  an	  essential	  
facility	  is	  weak.	  The	  general	  perception	  that	  premium	  sport	  and	  movies	  are	  
key	   to	   the	   development	   of	   pay-­‐TV	   does	   not	   necessarily	   render	   them	  
indispensable	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  applying	  the	  essential	  facilities	  doctrine.	  In	  
fact,	  the	  thesis	  identifies	  market	  developments	  which	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  
is	  not	  the	  case,	  particularly	  when	  the	  market	  is	  assessed	  from	  a	  multi-­‐media,	  
multi-­‐platform	   perspective.	   Another	   key	   issue	   in	   applying	   the	   concept	   of	  
essential	   facilities	   in	   the	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   context	   is	   satisfying	   the	   “new	  
product”	  criterion	  which	  relies	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  separate	  downstream	  
market	  into	  which	  market	  power	  is	  leveraged	  and	  abused.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  
establishing	  this	  is	  further	  limited	  by	  the	  suggestion	  made	  in	  Chapter	  4	  of	  the	  
broadening	  of	  market	  definitions	  in	  the	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  context.	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CHAPTER	  8	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  TO	  THE	  THESIS	  
	  
8.1	   Restatement	  of	  the	  Research	  Objective	  
As	   technological	   convergence	   continues	   to	   transform	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  
premium	   content	   is	   supplied	   and	   consumed,	   the	   task	   of	   ascertaining	   the	  
implications	   for	   the	   legacy	   regulatory	   frameworks	   of	   the	   analogue	   era	  
becomes	  increasingly	  pressing.	  Difficulty	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  regulation	  in	  the	  
broadcasting	  sector,	  including	  within	  the	  context	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV,	  is	  not	  
purely	  a	  matter	  of	  competition	  and	  economics.	  There	  are	  fundamental	  socio-­‐
cultural	   considerations,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   coverage	   of	   major	  
sporting	  events,	  which	  ultimately	  concern	  subjective	  judgment	  on	  the	  role	  for	  
the	   state	   in	   ensuring	   the	   effective	   functioning	   of	   media	   markets.	   Such	  
considerations	  underpin	  the	  complex	  systems	  of	  concurrent	  regulation	  under	  
sector-­‐specific	  legislation	  and	  general	  competition	  law	  which	  have	  developed	  
in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV.	  However,	  
the	  thesis	  recommends	  areas	  for	  regulatory	  reform	  and	  identifies	  issues	  for	  
further	   research	   in	   the	   quest	   to	   more	   effectively	   balance	   the	   goals	   of	  
protecting	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  maximising	  consumer	  welfare	  in	  the	  supply	  
of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  
	  
8.2	   Findings	  and	  Recommendations	  
The	   thesis	   has	   identified	   technological	   and	   market	   developments	   which	  
challenge	   the	  appropriateness	  of	   the	  existing	   intersection	  between	   sector-­‐
specific	   legislation	  and	  general	  competition	   law	  as	  they	  apply	  or	   impact	  on	  
the	  supply	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  Such	  developments	  
broadly	   relate	   to:	   (i)	   the	   entry	   of	   established	   telecommunications	   service	  
providers	  into	  the	  sports	  rights	  market;	  (ii)	  the	  rise	  of	  SVOD	  (and	  social	  media)	  
as	  audio-­‐visual	  broadcasting	  platforms;	  (iii)	  the	  growth	  of	  premium	  drama	  and	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the	  international	  television	  drama	  market;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  multi-­‐
media	  firm	  in	  an	  increasingly	  crowded,	  global	  communications	  sector.	  Central	  
to	  these	  developments	  are	  the	  increasing	  prevalence	  of	  the	  bundling	  of	  pay-­‐
TV	  with	  other	  communications	  services,	  and	  the	  increasing	  scope	  for	  multi-­‐
homing	   by	   viewers	   and	   advertisers.	   The	   cumulative	   effect	   of	   these	  
developments	   is	   to	   reinforce	   the	   network	   characteristics	   of	   the	   pay-­‐TV	  
industry	   and	   the	   resulting	   tendency	   towards	   the	   concentration	   of	   market	  
power.1118	   It	   also	   demonstrates	   the	   focus	   on	   dynamic	   competition	   by	  
traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  and	  new	  entrants	  alike.	  
	  
The	  reinforced	  tendency	  towards	  the	  concentration	  of	  market	  power	  must	  
therefore	   be	   assessed	   within	   the	   context	   of	   strong	   network	   effects	   and	  
dynamic	   competition.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   thesis	   recommends	   further	  
liberalisation	  of	  media	  ownership	  rules	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  access	  regulation	  
(which	  remain	  relatively	  more	  comprehensive	  in	  Australia),	  and	  the	  adoption	  
of	   a	   technologically-­‐neutral	   approach	   towards	   anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   in	  
both	  Australia	  and	  the	  UK.	  The	  overall	  implication	  is,	  by	  default,	  an	  increased	  
residual	   role	   for	   general	   competition	   law	  enforcement	   in	  both	   the	  UK	  and	  
Australia.	  However,	  the	  refinement	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  existing	  frameworks	  in	  
both	  countries	  could	  assist	  in	  minimising	  the	  likelihood	  of	  over-­‐enforcement	  
of	   the	  main	  provisions	   of	  UK/EU	  and	  Australian	   competition	   law,	  with	   the	  
attendant	   risk	   of	   unnecessarily	   dampening	   the	   investment	   incentives	   on	  
which	   the	   future	  development	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  and	  the	  broader	  communications	  
sector	  depend.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1118	   The	   identified	   tendency	   towards	   media	   market	   concentration	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   media	  
consolidations	  looks	  set	  to	  continue	  as	  firms	  seek	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  opportunities	  and	  incentives	  to	  
expand	   in	   the	   digital	   era.	   Eli	   M	   Noam,	  Media	   Ownership	   and	   Concentration	   in	   America	   (Oxford	  
University	  Press	  2009)	  5.	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8.2.1	   Merger	  control	  following	  the	  deregulation	  of	  media	  ownership	  rules	  
Tension	   can	   arise	   between	   regulating	   media	   mergers	   according	   to	   the	  
principles	  of	  competitive	  markets	  and	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  plurality.	  
Media-­‐specific	   ownership	   rules	   are	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   more	  
concentrated	  markets	  pose	  a	  greater	  risk	  to	  media	  plurality.	  However,	  it	  has	  
been	   identified	   that	   the	  precise	   impact	  of	  market	   concentration	  on	  media	  
plurality	   or	   content	   diversity	   remains	   unproven.	  Much	   also	   depends	   upon	  
how	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  plurality	  or	  diversity	  is	  defined.	  The	  likelihood	  
of	  such	  tension	  arising	   is	  not	  necessarily	   reduced	   in	   the	  digital	  era.	   In	   fact,	  
proceeding	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   there	   remains	   some	  merit	   (albeit	   how	  much	  
remains	  contentious)	   in	  this	  assumption,	   it	  may	  be	  higher.	  This	   is	  based	  on	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   tendency	   towards	   market	   consolidation	   across	   media	  
distribution	  platforms	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  reinforced	  by	  the	  economies	  of	  scope	  and	  
scale	  that	  are	  presented	  by	  technological	  convergence.	  This	  is	  evident	  from	  
the	  increasing	  number	  of	  cross-­‐media	  mergers	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  
	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	  however,	   technological	   convergence	  and	   the	   rise	  of	   the	  
multi-­‐media	   firm	   render	   media	   ownership	   rules,	   in	   their	   current	   form,	  
arguably	   unworkable	   and/or	   redundant.	   The	   continued	   administration	   of	  
technologically-­‐obsolete	   media	   ownership	   rules	   that	   inherently	   restrict	  
market	   forces	   risks	   engendering	   inefficiency,	   contrary	   to	   the	   consumer	  
interest	   in	   competition,	   and	   producing	   outcomes	   that	   undermine	   the	  
normative	  basis	  for	  such	  rules.1119	  Hence	  the	  proposed	  repeal	  in	  Australia	  of	  
the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  and	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rules	  under	  the	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  
Bill	   is	   supported.	   The	   repeal	   of	   these	   rules	   would	   represent	   a	   degree	   of	  
convergence	  with	  the	  deregulatory	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  UK.	  As	  already	  
indicated,	  the	  repeal	  of	  these	  rules	  could	  lead	  to	  more	  concentrated	  markets	  
in	   Australia,	   reinforcing	   its	   status	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   concentrated	  media	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1119	  This	  was	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Environment	  and	  Communications	  Legislation	  Committee	  in	  the	  Senate	  
on	  the	  Media	  Reform	  Bill.	   ‘Report	  on	  the	  Broadcasting	  Legislation	  Amendment	  (Media	  Reform)	  Bill	  
2016’	  (Senate	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Environment	  and	  Communication,	  7	  November	  2016)	  para	  2.73.	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markets	  in	  the	  Western	  world.1120	  However,	  this	  has	  to	  be	  assessed	  within	  the	  
context	   of	   Australia’s	   small	   market	   and	   low,	   geographically-­‐dispersed	  
population,	   which	   inherently	   beg	   the	   question	   of	   how	   much	   market	  
deconcentration	  is	  achievable	  in	  practice.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   by	   no	   means	   clear	   that	   Australia’s	   approach	   to	   media	   ownership	  
regulation	   has	   produced	   better	   outcomes,	   from	   a	   media	   plurality	   or	  
competition	  perspective,	  than	  would	  otherwise	  have	  prevailed	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  such	  regulation.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  
reach”	  and	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  rules	  could	  also	  importantly	  enable	  metropolitan	  and	  
regional	   broadcasters	   to	   achieve	   the	   necessary	   scale	   to	   compete	   more	  
effectively	  against	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  operating	  on	  a	  global	   scale.	  This	   could	  
increase	   concerns	   about	   the	   protection/promotion	   of	   local	   content.	   It	   is	  
suggested,	   however,	   that	   such	   concerns	   could	   be	   addressed	   through	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  a	  UK-­‐style	  media-­‐specific	  public	  interest	  
test.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  “75	  per	  cent	  reach”	  and	  “2	  out	  of	  3”	  
rules,	  the	  public	  interest	  would	  arguably	  lie	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  a	  test	  
(so	  as	  to	  facilitate	  a	  proper	  assessment	  of	  the	  proposed	  takeover	  of	  Ten	  by	  
Lachlan	  Murdoch	  and	  Bruce	  Gordon,	  for	  instance).	  
	  
The	  UK	  framework	  is	  not	  beyond	  criticism.	  This	  has	  been	  identified	  in	  relation	  
to	   Ofcom’s	   position	   on	   the	   proposed	   undertakings	   in	   lieu	   relating	   to	   the	  
proposed	   acquisition	   by	   Twenty-­‐First	   Century	   Fox	   of	   the	   remaining	  
shareholding	  in	  Sky.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  proposed	  acquisition	  should	  
be	  referred	  to	  the	  CMA	  for	  a	  Phase	  2	  investigation	  on	  media	  plurality	  grounds.	  
More	  broadly,	  this	  case	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  UK	  system	  is	  fit	  for	  
purpose,	  as	  regards	  the	  considerable	  discretion	  that	  is	  conferred	  in	  assessing	  
the	   sufficiency	   of	   plurality	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   public	   interest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1120	  ‘Reuters	  Institute	  Digital	  News	  Report	  2017’	  (Reuters	  Institute	  and	  University	  of	  Oxford,	  22	  June	  
2017)	   116	   <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital	   News	   Report	   2017	  
web_0.pdf>	  accessed	  17	  August	  2017.	  
	  	  269	  
considerations	   in	   Section	   58(2C)	   of	   the	   EA2002.	   This	   thesis	   contends	   that	  
these	  developments	   together	  make	   it	   all	   the	  more	   imperative	   that	   the	  UK	  
proceeds	  with	  the	  4-­‐yearly	  or	  5-­‐yearly	  review	  of	  media	  plurality	  that	  Ofcom	  
recommended	  in	  2012.1121	  
	  
8.2.2	   Towards	  technological-­‐neutrality	  in	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  
As	  a	  general	  principle,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  normative	  basis	  for	  retaining	  
the	  coverage	  of	  major	  sporting	  events	  on	  FTA	  television	  remains	  theoretically	  
sound.	  In	  fact,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  operating	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  
aiming	   content	   at	   a	   transcultural	   audience,	   it	   is	   arguable	   that	   the	   case	   for	  
protecting	  the	  FTA	  coverage	  of	  sporting	  events	  which	  are	  considered	  to	  foster	  
a	  sense	  of	  national	  or	  cultural	  identity	  is	  strengthened	  (though	  which	  events	  
and	   how	   many	   events	   this	   requires	   are	   subjective	   and	   will	   remain	  
contentious).	   There	   is	   also	   the	   fact	   that	   traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   penetration	   in	  
Australia	  in	  particular,	  remains	  relatively	  low	  (with	  around	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  
population	  still	  not	  able	  or	  willing	  to	  subscribe	  to	  a	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  service).	  
This	   could	  be	  mitigated	   to	   some	  extent	  by	   the	  growth	  of	  online	   streaming	  
(with	  SVOD	  subscriptions	  exceeding	  Foxtel	  subscriptions	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  
2016)	  at	  such	  time	  as	  SVOD	  platforms	  may	  enter	  the	  sports	  rights	  market.1122	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  takes	  particular	  issue	  with	  the	  distinctions	  that	  are	  presently	  drawn	  
between	  distribution	  platforms	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  applying	  the	  UK	  “listing”	  
rules	  and	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules.	  When	  the	  rules	  were	  introduced	  
in	  the	  analogue	  era,	  the	  structure	  and	  revenue	  models	  for	  FTA	  television	  and	  
traditional	   pay-­‐TV	   were	   relatively	   simple	   and	   distinguishable.	   Base	  
assumptions	   included	   that	   most	   viewers	   either	   wanted	   to	   watch	   sporting	  
events	  in	  their	  entirety	  when	  broadcast	  live	  (or	  not	  at	  all),	  and	  there	  was	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1121	  Ofcom	  (n	  649)	  para	  5.65.	  
1122	  In	  2016,	  28	  per	  cent	  of	  Australians	  had	  SVOD	  and	  27	  per	  cent	  had	  linear	  pay-­‐TV.	  ‘More	  Australians	  
now	   have	   SVOD	   than	   Foxtel’	   (Roy	   Morgan	   press	   release,	   8	   September	   2016)	  
<http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6957-­‐svod-­‐overtakes-­‐foxtel-­‐pay-­‐tv-­‐in-­‐australia-­‐august-­‐2016-­‐
201609081005>	  accessed	  17	  August	  2017.	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clear	  distinction	  between	   live	  and	  non-­‐live	  broadcasting.	   It	   has	  been	   seen,	  
however,	  that	  such	  assumptions	  do	  not	  necessarily	  hold	  true	  in	  the	  digital	  era.	  
This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  increasing	  range	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  
sports	  coverage	  is	  consumed,	  including	  live	  and	  near-­‐live	  coverage	  in	  highlight	  
format	   on	   mobile	   devices,	   to	   either	   substitute	   or	   supplement	   the	  
consumption	  of	  live	  coverage	  on	  traditional	  broadcast	  television.	  It	  begs	  the	  
question	  of	  how	  “live”	   is	   to	  be	  defined	   in	   this	  context.	  This	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  
matter	  of	  semantics.	  It	  will	  affect	  the	  scope	  and	  application	  of	  anti-­‐siphoning	  
rules	  which	  rely	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  live	  coverage	  and	  highlights,	  as	  with	  
the	   dual	   listing	   regime	   in	   the	   UK.	   It	   will	   also	   have	   wider	   implications	   for	  
defining	  the	  relevant	  market	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power.	  
	  
Governments	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia	   have	   each	   expressed	   reluctance	   to	  
reopen	  discussion	  on	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation.1123	  It	  is	  respectfully	  suggested	  
here,	  however,	  that	  with	  the	  digital	  switchover	  having	  been	  completed	  over	  
five	  years	  ago	  (in	  2012	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  in	  2013	  in	  Australia),	  a	  comprehensive	  
review	  of	  anti-­‐siphoning	   regulation	   in	  both	  countries	  would	  be	   timely.	  The	  
question	   of	   reviewing	   the	   Australian	   “anti-­‐siphoning”	   rules	   did	   arise	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  Media	  Reform	  Bill,	  but	  it	  was	  found	  to	  be	  a	  separate	  issue	  to	  
the	  matter	  of	  media	  ownership	  and	  control.1124	  By	  contrast,	  this	  thesis	  shows	  
a	  degree	  of	   interdependence	  between	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation	  and	  media	  
ownership	   rules	   as	   regards	   their	   overall	   impact	   on	   the	   broader	  
communications	  landscape.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1123	  ‘Sporting	  Future:	  A	  New	  Strategy	  for	  an	  Active	  Nation’	  (HM	  Government,	  December	  2015)	  41	  (UK)	  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486622/Sporting
_Future_ACCESSIBLE.pdf>	  accessed	  9	  August	  2017;	  Jake	  Mitchell,	  ‘Mitch	  Fifield	  hints	  that	  some	  anti-­‐




accessed	  9	  August	  2017.	  
1124	  Senate	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Environment	  and	  Communication	  (n	  1119).	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Proceeding	  on	  this	  basis,	  the	  anticipated	  passing	  of	  the	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  
Bill	   arguably	   reinforces	   the	   urgency	   for	   a	   review	   of	   the	   especially	  
comprehensive	  Australian	  “anti-­‐siphoning”	  rules.	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that,	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  2017	  Federal	  Budget,	  there	  is	  the	  proposal	  to	  remove	  100	  sporting	  
events	  from	  the	  list.1125	  In	  principle,	  this	  would	  increase	  the	  opportunities	  for	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  bid	  for	  sports	  rights.1126	  Although	  this	  must	  be	  seen	  within	  
the	   context	   of	   which	   events	   are	   proposed	   for	   removal,	   namely	   the	   less	  
popular	   events	   like	   golf.1127	   Also,	   the	   mere	   removal	   of	   events	   does	   not	  
address	   the	   more	   fundamental	   issues	   regarding	   the	   technologically	  
discriminatory	  nature	  of	  the	  prevailing	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐siphoning	  regulation.	  
	  
8.2.3	   Implications	  of	  the	  decreasing	  role	  for	  sector-­‐specific	  access	  regulation	  
In	  a	  climate	  of	  newly	  emerging	  technologies	  and	  markets,	  there	  is	  much	  to	  be	  
said	  for	  the	  emphasis	  that	  is	  placed	  in	  Australia	  on	  encouraging	  commercial	  
negotiation	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  access	  to	  communications	  infrastructure.	  In	  this	  
context,	   parties	   acting	   as	   rational,	   profit-­‐maximising	   firms	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  
better	  placed	  than	  regulators	  or	  courts	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  appropriate	  
terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  access.	  This	  was	  arguably	  the	  case	  with	  Sky	  in	  the	  UK,	  
where	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  WMO	  obligation	  and	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  Ofcom	  
decided	  to	  remove	  the	  WMO	  obligation	  in	  2015	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  
commercial	  reality.	  This	  thesis	  therefore	  welcomes	  the	  proposed	  reform	  of	  
the	   national	   access	   regime	   in	   Australia	   which,	   together	   with	   the	  
implementation	  of	   the	  new	  Section	   46	  of	   the	  CCA,	   indicates	   an	   increasing	  
residual	  role	  for	  Section	  46.	  However,	  with	  the	  recent	  passing	  of	  the	  Misuse	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1125	  ‘Amending	  the	  Anti-­‐Siphoning	  Scheme’	  (Department	  of	  Communications	  and	  the	  Arts	  fact	  sheet,	  
May	   2017)	   <https://www.communications.gov.au/sites/g/files/net301/f/factsheet_anti-­‐
siphoning_.pdf>	  accessed	  9	  August	  2017.	  
1126	   Dr	   Rhonda	   Jolly,	   ‘Broadcasting	   and	   Content	   Reform	   package:	   broadcasting	   licence	   fees’	  
(Parliament	   of	   Australia	   Budget	   Review	   2017-­‐18)	  
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pu
bs/rp/BudgetReview201718/Media>	  accessed	  9	  August	  2017.	  
1127	  Department	  of	  Communications	  and	  the	  Arts	  (n	  1125)	  4.	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of	  Market	  Power	  Act,	  a	  period	  of	  uncertainty	  will	  follow	  regarding	  how	  the	  
“purpose	  and	  effects”	  test	  in	  the	  new	  Section	  46	  will	  apply.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  revised	  explanatory	  memorandum	  to	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Market	  
Power	   Bill,	   it	   is	   intended	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	   “substantial	   lessening	   of	  
competition”	  and	  “purpose,	  effect	  or	  likely	  effect”	  in	  the	  new	  Section	  46	  will	  
be	  informed	  by	  existing	  jurisprudence	  relating	  to	  other	  provisions	  in	  Part	  IV	  
of	  the	  CCA	  which	  incorporate	  such	  concepts.1128	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Competition	  
Policy	  Review	  Bill	  provides	  that	  conduct	  which	  would	  otherwise	  contravene	  
Section	  46	  may	  be	  authorised	  by	  the	  ACCC	  where	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  substantially	  
lessen	  competition	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  a	  net	  public	  benefit.1129	  However,	  
enduring	   uncertainty	   regarding	   the	   assessment	   of	   net	   public	   benefit,	   for	  
instance,	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  especially	  problematic	  in	  relation	  to	  emerging	  markets,	  
including	   in	   the	   premium	   pay-­‐TV	   context.	   More	   generally,	   there	   is	   the	  
question	  of	  the	  possible	  chilling	  effect	  on	  competition	  of	  adopting	  an	  effects-­‐
based	  approach,	  which	  has	  long	  provoked	  debate	  in	  the	  EU.1130	  	  
	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   concept	  of	   essential	   facilities	   as	   a	   subset	  of	   refusal	   to	  
supply,	   it	   is	   proposed	   that	   the	   scope	   for	   regulating	  premium	  pay-­‐TV	  as	   an	  
essential	  facility	  is	  limited	  (even	  in	  the	  EU	  where	  the	  case	  law	  in	  this	  area	  is	  
more	  developed	  than	  in	  Australia).	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  other	  findings	  
in	  the	  thesis	  as	  to	  the	  diminishing	  ability	  and	  incentive	  for	  rights	  owners	  and	  
pay-­‐TV	  providers	  to	  refuse	  to	  supply	  third	  parties.	  Also,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  rivals	  
may	   well	   be	   indicative	   of	   incidental	   exclusion	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	  
competition	  on	  the	  merits	  where	  competition	  is	  for	  the	  market.	  Mandating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1128	   Revised	   Explanatory	  Memorandum	   to	   the	  Competition	   and	  Consumer	  Amendment	   (Misuse	  of	  
Market	  Power)	  Bill	  2017,	  paras	  1.22	  and	  4.4.	  
1129	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	   the	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Amendment	   (Competition	  Policy	  
Review)	  Bill	  2017,	  para	  9.24.	  The	  Competition	  Policy	  Review	  Bill	  passed	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  
on	  6	  September	  2017	  and	  is	  now	  before	  the	  Senate.	  
1130	  See,	  Liza	  L	  Gormsen,	  A	  Principled	  Approach	  to	  Abuse	  of	  Dominance	  in	  European	  Competition	  Law	  
(Cambridge	   University	   Press	   2010);	   Katharine	   Kemp,	   ‘“The	   Big	   Chill”?	   A	   Comparative	   Analysis	   of	  
Effects-­‐Based	  Tests	   for	  Misuse	  of	  Market	  Power’	   (2017)	  40(2)	  University	   of	  New	  South	  Wales	   Law	  
Journal	  (Advance).	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supply	   should	   not	   be	   used	   to	   assist	   new	   entry	   in	   a	  way	   that	   changes	   the	  
structure	  of	  the	  market	  as	  determined	  by	  its	  specific	  economic	  characteristics.	  
In	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  network	  effects	  and	  dynamic	  competition,	  this	  may	  
not	  only	  be	  ineffective	  but	  potentially	  counterproductive.	  	  
	  
8.3	   Areas	  for	  Further	  Research	  
The	  findings	  and	  recommendations	  in	  this	  thesis	  are	  based	  on	  observations	  
relating	  to	  technological	  and	  market	  developments	  over	  the	  relatively	  short	  
period	   of	   time	   since	   the	   onset	   of	   digitalisation	   and	   convergence.	  
Underpinning	  these	  developments	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  from	  
such	  developments	  are	  a	  number	  of	   fundamental	   issues	   in	  need	  of	   further	  
consideration	  from	  both	  a	  theoretical	  and	  an	  empirical	  perspective.	  A	  critical	  
factor	  is	  how	  sustainable	  the	  SVOD	  business	  model	  will	  prove	  to	  be.	  This	  will	  
have	   implications,	   for	   instance,	   for	   the	   future	   growth	   of	   the	   international	  
television	  drama	  market	  and	  the	  personalisation	  of	  television	  services.	  A	  key	  
issue	  that	  arises	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  global	  market	  for	  drama	  is	  
the	  impact	  on	  local	  content	  production	  and	  regulation.	  In	  connection	  with	  the	  
increasing	  personalisation	  of	  television	  services	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  extent	  
to	   which	   this	   truly	   empowers	   viewers	   in	   their	   capacity	   as	   consumers	   and	  
citizens	   in	   a	   global	   society.	   Critical	   to	   this	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	  
technological	  convergence	  and	  cultural	  convergence,1131	  and	  the	  possibility	  
of	   an	   existential	   crisis	   between	   the	   local	   and	   the	   global	   in	   the	   supply	   of	  
premium	  pay-­‐TV.	  
	  
8.3.1	   Premiumisation	  of	  local	  content	  in	  the	  global	  market	  for	  drama	  
The	   opportunities	   presented	   by	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   international	   television	  
market	   for	   monetising	   premium	   drama	   are	   apparent.	   Less	   clear	   is	   the	  
question	  of	  the	  opportunity	  that	  local	  content	  presents	  for	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1131	  On	  the	  various	  processes	  of	  media	  convergence,	  see	  Henry	  Jenkins,	  ‘Convergence?	  I	  Diverge.’	  MIT	  
Technology	   Review	   (1	   June	   2001)	   <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/401042/convergence-­‐i-­‐
diverge/>	  accessed	  10	  September	  2017.	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providers	  and	  new	  entrants	  to	  differentiate	  their	  services	  in	  the	  increasingly	  
crowded	  global	  marketplace.	  Local	  content	  production	  was	  reportedly	  a	  part	  
of	   Netflix’s	   international	   strategy	   from	   the	   outset,1132	   which	   is	   significant	  
given	  the	  continuing	  rapid	  growth	  of	  online	  streaming	  and	  its	  global	  scale.	  It	  
is	   suggested	   that	   local	   content	   production	   may	   become	   increasingly	  
important	  as	  a	  means	  of	  differentiating	  services	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  increasing	  
amount	  of	  content	  from	  global	  operators	  aimed	  at	  a	  transcultural	  audience.	  	  
	  
This	   is	  subject	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  viewers	  detracting	  from	  local	  content	  to	  
the	   lower	  prices	  of	  pay-­‐TV	  providers	  operating	  on	  a	  global	  scale.1133	   It	  also	  
assumes	  that	  global	  operators	  will	  not	  seek	  to	  appeal	  to	   local	   interests.1134	  
However,	   the	   thesis	  presents	  evidence	   to	   the	  contrary	   in	  both	   the	  UK	  and	  
Australia,	  as	  firms	  begin	  to	  “premiumise”	  local	  content.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  
of	  the	  intersection	  between	  premium	  content	  and	  local	  content.	  In	  addition	  
to	  definitional	   issues,	  this	   is	  significant	  because	   it	  will	  have	   implications	  for	  
the	  scope	  of	  local	  content	  quotas,	  which	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  reform	  proposals	  
in	  the	  UK/EU	  and	  Australia.	  
	  
8.3.2	   Practicalities	  of	  extending	  local	  content	  quotas	  to	  online	  streaming	  
Recognition	  of	  the	  enduring	  significance	  of	  local	  content	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  
recent	   proposal,	   as	   part	   of	   the	  modernisation	  of	   the	  AVMSD,	   to	   impose	   a	  
European	  content	  quota	  of	  at	  least	  20	  per	  cent	  on	  VOD	  services.1135	  Similarly,	  
the	   imposition	  of	  Australian	   content	  quotas	  on	  VOD	  platforms	   is	   currently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1132	  Ed	  Meza,	   ‘Netflix	   Invests	  Nearly	  $2	  Billion	   in	  European	  Productions,	  Promises	  More’	  Variety	   (1	  
March	   2017)	   <http://variety.com/2017/biz/global/reed-­‐hastings-­‐netflix-­‐berlin-­‐100-­‐million-­‐
subscribers-­‐1201999745/>	  accessed	  10	  August	  2017.	  
1133	   Theodore	   Levitt,	   ‘The	   Globalization	   of	   Markets’	   Harvard	   Business	   Review	   (May	   1983)	  
<https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-­‐globalization-­‐of-­‐markets>	  accessed	  10	  September	  2017.	  
1134	  ibid.	  
1135	  ‘Commission	  updates	  EU	  audiovisual	  rules	  and	  presents	  targeted	  approach	  to	  online	  platforms’	  
(European	   Commission	   press	   release	   IP/16/1873,	   25	   May	   2016)	   <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐
release_IP-­‐16-­‐1873_en.htm>	   accessed	   10	   August	   2017;	   Proposal	   for	   a	   Directive	   of	   the	   European	  
Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   amending	   Directive	   2010/13/EU	   on	   the	   coordination	   of	   certain	  
provisions	   laid	  down	  by	   law,	   regulation	  or	   administrative	   action	   in	  Member	   States	   concerning	   the	  
provision	  of	  audiovisual	  media	  services	  in	  view	  of	  changing	  market	  realities	  COM(2016)	  287.	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being	  considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Australia’s	  review	  of	  
Australian	  and	  children’s	  screen	  content.1136	  At	  the	  EU	  level,	  VOD	  services	  are	  
required	  to	  promote	  European	  works	  but	  no	  local	  content	  quota	  is	  imposed	  
on	  online	  streaming	  services	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  proposal	  to	  extend	  local	  content	  
quotas	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   therefore	   represents	   another	   area	   of	   potential	  
divergence	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  following	  Brexit.	  
	  
As	  a	  general	  principle,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   imposing	  a	   simple	   local	   content	  
quota	  would	  add	   little	  value	   to	   the	  protection/promotion	  of	   local	   content.	  
Such	  a	  quota	  could	  be	  met	  by	  a	  SVOD	  platform	  simply	  acquiring	  the	  rights	  to	  
old	   British/Australian	   content.	   This	   could	   present	   particular	   problems	   in	  
Australia	  given	  the	  ownership	  links	  between	  the	  commercial	  FTA	  networks,	  
Foxtel,	  and	  Stan	  and	  Presto.	  Given	  Nine’s	  interest	  in	  Stan,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  
Presto	  is	  jointly	  owned	  by	  Seven	  and	  Foxtel,	  a	  local	  content	  quota	  could	  lead	  
to	   such	   broadcasters	   simply	   redistributing	   the	   same	   locally-­‐made	   FTA	  
programmes	   online.	   For	   the	   extension	   of	   local	   content	   quotas	   to	   online	  
streaming	   services	   to	   effectively	   protect/promote	   the	   production	   of	   local	  
content,	  there	  would	  therefore	  need	  to	  be	  at	  least	  a	  requirement	  to	  fund	  the	  
production	  of	  local	  content	  that	  is	  original.	  	  
	  
8.3.3	   Definition	  of	  local	  content	  in	  a	  global	  communications	  sector	  
The	  definition	  of	  “local”	  will	  inherently	  vary	  between	  areas	  and	  localness	  of	  
content	   is	   ultimately	   a	   subjective	   concept.	   However,	   current	   proposals	  
regarding	  the	  extension	  of	  local	  content	  quotas	  to	  online	  streaming	  services	  
reinforce	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  local	  content	  in	  a	  
global	  communications	  sector.	  This	  falls	  within	  the	  broader	  question	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1136	   ‘Australian	   and	   Children’s	   Screen	   Content	   Review:	   Terms	   of	   Reference’	  
<https://www.communications.gov.au/australian-­‐childrens-­‐screen-­‐content-­‐review>	   accessed	   10	  
August	  2017.	  The	  Review	  is	  expected	  to	  report	  to	  Government	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2017.	  See,	  Jason	  Bosland,	  
‘Regulating	  for	  Local	  Content	  in	  the	  Digital	  Audiovisual	  Environment	  -­‐	  A	  View	  from	  Australia’	  (2007)	  
18(3)	  Entertainment	  Law	  Review	  103.	  As	  already	  acknowledged,	  local	  content	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  
same	  as	  Australian	  content.	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impact	  of	  technological	  convergence	  on	  cultural	  convergence	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  broadcast	  media	  content.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  definition	  of	  local	  content	  
is	  significant	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  sector-­‐specific	  rules	  
and	  the	  resulting	  structure	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  will	  in	  turn	  have	  implications	  
for	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power.	  Central	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  local	  content	  
will	  be	  ascertaining	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  globalisation	  of	  broadcast	  media	  on	  the	  
economics	  of	  local	  media	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  	  
	  
Further	  research	  in	  this	  area	  should	  build	  on	  Ofcom’s	  consideration	  in	  2009	  
of	  local	  and	  regional	  media	  in	  the	  UK.1137	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  study	  was	  on	  news	  
and	  it	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  issue	  of	  localness	  within	  the	  context	  of	  premium	  
content.	   Even	  within	   the	  news	   context,	   the	   subsequent	  premiumisation	  of	  
content	  by	  suppliers	  charging	  for	  content	  online	  makes	  it	  more	  important	  that	  
the	   issue	   of	   localness	   of	   content	   is	   also	   assessed	   in	   relation	   to	   premium	  
content.	   Interestingly,	   in	   Australia,	   the	  meaning	   of	   local	   content	   does	   not	  
feature	  in	  the	  Broadcasting	  Reform	  Bill.	  However,	  this	  may	  still	  represent	  an	  
opportunity	  for	  it	  to	  be	  included	  within	  the	  current	  reform	  debate.	  
	  
8.3.4	   Personalisation	  of	  television	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  viewer	  empowerment	  
In	  an	  era	  of	  content	  abundance	  when	  most	  viewers	  can	  access	  an	  increasing	  
amount	  of	  content	  from	  around	  the	  World,	  the	  fundamental	  question	  arises	  
as	   to	   whether	   the	   increasing	   opportunities	   for	   viewers	   to	   personalise	  
television	   services	   provides	   them	   with	   real	   choice	   or	   whether	   it	   simply	  
provides	  the	  illusion	  of	  choice.	  This	  question	  is	  critical	  because	  it	  goes	  to	  the	  
heart	  of	  whether	  viewers	  are	  truly	  being	  empowered	  in	  the	  digital	  era	  to	  make	  
choices	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  different	  platforms	  are	  substitutable	  on	  the	  
demand-­‐side.	  From	  a	  competition	  perspective,	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1137	   See,	   ‘Local	   and	   Regional	   Media	   in	   the	   UK’	   (Ofcom,	   22	   September	   2009)	  
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/15957/lrmuk.pdf>	  accessed	  10	  September	  
2017.	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viewers	  to	  switch	  suppliers.	  This	  will	  inherently	  have	  implications	  for	  market	  
definition	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  market	  power.	  
	  
The	  increasing	  number	  of	  services	  available	  on	  the	  market	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
represent	   substitutable	   services	   for	   viewers.	   For	   example,	   with	   the	   rising	  
number	  of	  standalone	  and	  bundled	  services	  comes	  an	  increasing	  multitude	  of	  
possible	  tariffs.	  The	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  available	  tariffs	  is	  magnified	  by	  
the	  prevalence	  of	  time-­‐limited	  promotional	  discounts	  for	  new	  customers	  and	  
a	  host	  of	  tariff	  add-­‐ons.	  Assuming	  that	  services	  are	  substitutable	  implies	  that	  
all	  viewers	  are	  engaging	  effectively	  in	  the	  market	  as	  consumers	  to	  select	  the	  
services	   that	   best	   suit	   their	   requirements.	   It	   also	   disregards	   the	   effects	   of	  
information	   asymmetry	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   consumers	   to	   make	   informed	  
decisions.	  There	  would	  be	  benefits	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  research	  on	  
the	   impact	   of	   online	   streaming	   on	   viewers’	   consumption	   preferences	   and	  
advertisers’	  decisions	  regarding	  budget	  allocations.	  This	  should	  cover	  viewer	  
engagement	  of	  second	  screens,	  and	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  of	  advertising	  
on	  traditional	  broadcast	  media	  and	  online.1138	  	  
	  
8.3.5	   Whether	  new	  media	  is	  substitutable	  for	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  
Despite	   the	   increasing	   popularity	   of	   new	   media	   in	   the	   supply	   and	  
consumption	  of	  premium	  content,	  the	  effect	  on	  viewer	  preferences	  and	  the	  
implications	  for	  rights	  owners	  and	  advertisers,	  are	  not	  yet	  well	  understood.	  
The	   thesis	   has	   indicated	   areas	   in	   which	   the	   relevant	   concept	  may	   not	   be	  
substitutability	   but	   rather	   complementarity.	   This	   is	   significant	   because,	   as	  
discussed,	   the	   existing	   regulatory	   frameworks	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia	   are	  
based	   on	   the	   assessment	   of	   substitution	   possibilities.	   In	   terms	   of	   market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1138	  This	  is	  amidst	  claims	  from	  Google	  that	  in	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  cases	  adverts	  on	  video	  website	  are	  more	  
effective	  in	  driving	  sales.	  Mark	  Sweney,	  ‘Google	  claims	  YouTube	  ads	  are	  more	  effective	  than	  TV’	  The	  
Guardian	   (20	   April	   2016)	   <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/apr/20/google-­‐youtube-­‐ads-­‐
tv>	  accessed	  1	  August	  2017.	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definition,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  functional	  market	  definition	  is	  likely	  to	  
be	  more	  important	  than	  is	  otherwise	  generally	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  
	  
As	  discussed,	  functional	  considerations	  generally	  form	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  
the	   relevant	   product	   and	   geographic	   dimensions	  of	   a	  market,	   through	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  SSNIP	  test.1139	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  UK	  where	  
functional	  considerations	  are	  typically	  subsumed	  within	  the	  product	  market	  
definition.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  relevant	  in	  Australia	  where,	  despite	  the	  ACCC	  
treating	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  functional	  dimension	  of	  the	  relevant	  market	  as	  
a	  distinct	  exercise,1140	  the	  functional	  (and	  temporal)	  dimensions	  are	  identified	  
as	  relatively	  neglected	  aspects	  of	  market	  definition.1141	  It	  has	  also	  been	  noted	  
that	   the	   different	   functional	   levels	   are	   often	   complements	   rather	   than	  
substitutes.	  	  
	  
Further	  research	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  new	  media	  and	  traditional	  pay-­‐
TV	  should	  importantly	  be	  carried	  out	  from	  the	  advertiser-­‐side,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
viewer-­‐side.	  Whether	  new	  media	  is	  substitutable	  for	  traditional	  pay-­‐TV	  is	  also	  
relevant	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  plurality.	  Lack	  of	  clarity	  as	  to	  
the	  meaning	  of	   the	  sufficiency	  of	  plurality	   therefore	   reinforces	  uncertainty	  
regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  media	  plurality	  in	  the	  digital	  
era.	  
	  
8.4	   Concluding	  Remarks	  
In	  the	  converged	  digital	  environment,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  adopt	  a	  multi-­‐media,	  
multi-­‐platform	  approach	  towards	  the	  economic	  regulation	  of	  premium	  pay-­‐
TV.	  The	  public	  interest	  and	  consumer	  welfare	  need	  to	  be	  assessed	  within	  the	  
broader	   context	   of	   the	   competitive	   environment	   in	   the	   global	  
communications	  sector.	  It	  is	  arguable	  that	  such	  interests	  are	  converging,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1139	  ibid.	  
1140	  ACCC	  Media	  Merger	  Guidelines	  (n	  91)	  23-­‐25.	  
1141	  Caron	  Beaton-­‐Wells,	  Proof	  of	  Antitrust	  Markets	  in	  Australia	  (Federation	  Press	  2003)	  26.	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this	  should	  be	  reflected	  at	  the	  intersection	  between	  sector-­‐specific	  regulation	  
and	  general	  competition	  law.	  That	  said,	  the	  UK	  and	  Australian	  markets	  remain	  
unique	  and	  specific	  changes	  to	  the	  regulatory	  frameworks	  in	  the	  respective	  
jurisdictions	  must	  reflect	  this.	  Overall,	  the	  findings	  and	  recommendations	  in	  
this	  thesis	  produce	  a	  model	  of	  regulation	  which	  more	  effectively	  balances	  the	  
interests	   of	   UK	   and	   Australian	   viewers	   as	   citizens	   of	   a	   global	   society	   and	  
consumers	   in	   international	   communications	   markets.	   In	   addition	   to	  
promoting	   the	   future	   development	   of	   pay-­‐TV,	   this	   may	   ensure	   the	  
competitiveness	  of	  UK	  and	  Australian	  broadcasters	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	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APPENDIX	  1	  -­‐	  New	  Section	  46	  of	  the	  Competition	  and	  Consumer	  Act	  2010	  
	  
(Referred	  to	  on	  page	  30)	  
	  
	  
1)	  A	  corporation	  that	  has	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  power	  in	  a	  market	  must	  not	  engage	  
in	  conduct	  that	  has	  the	  purpose,	  or	  has	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  effect,	  of	  substantially	  
lessening	  competition	  in:	  
	  
(a)	  that	  market;	  or	  
	  
(b)	  any	  other	  market	  in	  which	  that	  corporation,	  or	  a	  body	  corporate	  that	  is	  
related	  to	  that	  corporation:	  
(i)	  supplies	  goods	  or	  services,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  supply	  goods	  or	  services;	  
or	  
(ii)	  supplies	  goods	  or	  services,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  supply	  goods	  or	  services,	  
indirectly	  through	  one	  or	  more	  other	  persons;	  or	  
	  
(c)	  any	  other	  market	   in	  which	  that	  corporation,	  or	  a	  body	  corporate	  that	   is	  
related	  to	  that	  corporation:	  
(i)	  acquires	  goods	  or	  services,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  acquire	  goods	  or	  services;	  
or	  
(ii)	  acquires	  goods	  or	  services,	  or	  is	  likely	  to	  acquire	  goods	  or	  services,	  
indirectly	  through	  one	  or	  more	  other	  persons.	  
	  
(3)	  A	  corporation	  is	  taken	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section	  to	  have	  a	  substantial	  degree	  
of	  power	  in	  a	  market	  if:	  
	  
(a)	   a	   body	   corporate	   that	   is	   related	   to	   that	   corporation	   has,	   or	   2	   or	  more	  
bodies	  corporate	  each	  of	  which	  is	  related	  to	  that	  corporation	  together	  have,	  
a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  power	  in	  that	  market;	  or	  
	  
(b)	  that	  corporation	  and	  a	  body	  corporate	  that	  is,	  or	  that	  corporation	  and	  2	  
or	   more	   bodies	   corporate	   each	   of	   which	   is,	   related	   to	   that	   corporation,	  
together	  have	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  power	  in	  that	  market.	  
	  
(4)	  In	  determining	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section	  the	  degree	  of	  power	  that	  a	  body	  
corporate	  or	  bodies	  corporate	  have	  in	  a	  market:	  
	  
(a)	   regard	   must	   be	   had	   to	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   body	  
corporate	  or	  of	  any	  of	  those	  bodies	  corporate	  in	  that	  market	  is	  constrained	  
by	  the	  conduct	  of:	  
(i)	  competitors,	  or	  potential	  competitors,	  of	  the	  body	  corporate	  or	  of	  
any	  of	  those	  bodies	  corporate	  in	  that	  market;	  or	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(ii)	  persons	  to	  whom	  or	  from	  whom	  the	  body	  corporate	  or	  any	  of	  those	  
bodies	  corporate	  supplies	  or	  acquires	  goods	  or	  services	  in	  that	  market;	  
and	  
	  
(b)	  regard	  may	  be	  had	  to	  the	  power	  the	  body	  corporate	  or	  bodies	  corporate	  
have	  in	  that	  market	  that	  results	  from:	  
(i)	   any	   contracts,	   arrangements	   or	   understandings	   that	   the	   body	  
corporate	   or	   bodies	   corporate	   have	   with	   another	   party	   or	   other	  
parties;	  or	  
(ii)	  any	  proposed	  contracts,	  arrangements	  or	  understandings	  that	  the	  
body	  corporate	  or	  bodies	  corporate	  may	  have	  with	  another	  party	  or	  
other	  parties.	  
	  
(5)	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  a	  body	  corporate	  may	  have	  a	  substantial	  degree	  
of	  power	  in	  a	  market	  even	  though:	  
	  
(a)	  the	  body	  corporate	  does	  not	  substantially	  control	  that	  market;	  or	  
	  
(b)	  the	  body	  corporate	  does	  not	  have	  absolute	  freedom	  from	  constraint	  by	  
the	  conduct	  of:	  
(i)	  competitors,	  or	  potential	  competitors,	  of	  the	  body	  corporate	  in	  that	  
market;	  or	  
(ii)	  persons	  to	  whom	  or	  from	  whom	  the	  body	  corporate	  supplies	  or	  
acquires	  goods	  or	  services	  in	  that	  market.	  
	  
(6)	  Subsections	  (4)	  and	  (5)	  do	  not	  limit	  the	  matters	  to	  which	  regard	  may	  be	  had	  in	  
determining,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   section,	   the	   degree	   of	   power	   that	   a	   body	  
corporate	  or	  bodies	  corporate	  has	  or	  have	  in	  a	  market.	  
	  
(7)	  To	  avoid	  doubt,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  section,	  more	  than	  one	  corporation	  may	  
have	  a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  power	  in	  a	  market.	  
	  
(8)	  In	  this	  section:	  
	  
(a)	  a	  reference	  to	  power	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  market	  power;	  and	  
	  
(b)	  a	  reference	  to	  a	  market	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  a	  market	  for	  goods	  or	  services;	  
and	  
	  
(c)	  a	  reference	  to	  power	  in	  relation	  to,	  or	  to	  conduct	  in,	  a	  market	  is	  a	  reference	  
to	  power,	  or	  to	  conduct,	  in	  that	  market	  either	  as	  a	  supplier	  or	  as	  an	  acquirer	  
of	  goods	  or	  services	  in	  that	  market.	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APPENDIX	  2	  -­‐	  Key	  indicators	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	  
	  





	   UK	   Australia	  
Total	  population	  (millions)1142	   65.64	   24.13	  
Population	  growth	  (annual	  per	  
cent)1143	  
0.8	   1.4	  
Surface	  area	  (sq	  km	  thousands)1144	   243.6	   7,741.2	  
Population	  density	  (ppl	  per	  sq	  km)1145	   271.3	   3.1	  
GDP	  (US$	  millions)1146	   2,618,886	   1,204,616	  
GDP	  (US$	  per	  capita)1147	   42	  651	   47	  770	  
GDP	  World	  ranking1148	   5	   14	  
GDP	  growth	  (annual	  per	  cent)1149	   1.8	   2.8	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1142	  These	  figures	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  country	  profiles	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  Australia	   in	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  




1146	   These	   figures	   are	   taken	   from	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   GDP	   world	   ranking	  
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>	  accessed	  25	  July	  2017.	  
1147	   These	   figures	   are	   taken	   from	   the	   OECD’s	   country	   profiles	   for	   the	   UK	   and	   Australia	  
<https://data.oecd.org>	  accessed	  25	  July	  2017.	  
1148	  World	  Bank	  (n	  1142).	  
1149	  World	  Bank	  (n	  1146).	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APPENDIX	  3	  -­‐	  UK	  Listed	  Events	  
	  
(Referred	  to	  on	  page	  195)	  
	  
	  
Group	  A	   The	  Olympic	  Games	  
	  
The	  FIFA	  World	  Cup	  Finals	  Tournament	  
	  
The	  FA	  Cup	  Final	  
	  
The	  Scottish	  FA	  Cup	  Final	  (in	  Scotland)	  
	  




The	  Wimbledon	  Tennis	  Finals	  
	  
The	  European	  Football	  Championship	  Finals	  Tournament	  
	  
The	  Rugby	  League	  Challenge	  Cup	  Final	  	  
	  
The	  Rugby	  World	  Cup	  Final	  
	  
	  
Group	  B	   Cricket	  Test	  Matches	  played	  in	  England	  
	  
Non-­‐Finals	  play	  in	  the	  Wimbledon	  Tournament	  
	  
All	  Other	  Matches	  in	  the	  Rugby	  World	  Cup	  Finals	  Tournament	  	  
	  
Six	  Nations	  Rugby	  Tournament	  Matches	  involving	  Home	  Countries	  
	  
The	  Commonwealth	  Games	  	  
	  
The	  World	  Athletics	  Championship	  	  
	  
Cricket	   World	   Cup	   –	   the	   Final,	   Semi-­‐Finals	   and	   Matches	   involving	  
Home	  Nations’	  Teams	  
	  
The	  Ryder	  Cup	  	  
	  
The	  Open	  Golf	  Championship	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APPENDIX	  4	  -­‐	  Australian	  Anti-­‐Siphoning	  List	  
	  





1.1	   Each	  event	  held	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Summer	  Olympic	  Games,	  including	  the	  Opening	  
Ceremony	  and	  the	  Closing	  Ceremony,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	  	  any	  event	  held	  between	  6	  August	  2016	  and	  22	  August	  2016	  (Australian	  
time)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2016	  Summer	  Olympic	  Games,	  including	  the	  Opening	  
Ceremony	  and	  the	  Closing	  Ceremony.	  
	  
1.2	   Each	  event	  held	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Winter	  Olympic	  Games,	  including	  the	  Opening	  




2.1	   Each	  event	  held	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  Games,	  including	  the	  Opening	  




3.1	   Each	  running	  of	  the	  Melbourne	  Cup	  organised	  by	  the	  Victoria	  Racing	  Club.	  
	  	  
Australian	  Rules	  Football	  
	  	  
4.1	   Each	   match	   in	   the	   Australian	   Football	   League	   Premiership	   competition,	  
including	  the	  Finals	  Series,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	  	  all	  matches	  to	  be	  played	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2017	  Australian	  Football	  League	  
Premiership	   competition,	   including	   the	   Finals	   Series	   but	   excluding	   the	  
Grand	  Final.	  
	  
Rugby	  League	  Football	  
	  	  
5.1	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  National	  Rugby	  League	  Premiership	  competition,	  including	  
the	  Finals	  Series,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   all	   matches	   to	   be	   played	   as	   part	   of	   the	   2017	   National	   Rugby	   League	  
Premiership	   competition,	   including	   the	   Finals	   Series	   but	   excluding	   the	  
Grand	  Final.	  
	  	  
5.2	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  National	  Rugby	  League	  State	  of	  Origin	  Series,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	  	  any	  of	  those	  matches	  to	  be	  played	  between	  31	  May	  2017	  and	  12	  July	  2017.	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5.3	   Each	  international	  rugby	  league	  “test”	  match	  involving	  the	  senior	  Australian	  
representative	  team,	  played	  in	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  or	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  
except	  for:	  
(a)	  	  the	  match	  to	  be	  played	  on	  5	  May	  2017.	  
	  	  
5.4	   Each	  match	  of	  the	  Rugby	  League	  World	  Cup	  involving	  the	  senior	  Australian	  
representative	  team.	  
	  
Rugby	  Union	  Football	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
6.1	   Each	  international	  “test”	  match	  involving	  the	  senior	  Australian	  representative	  
team	   selected	   by	   the	   Australian	   Rugby	   Union,	   played	   in	   Australia,	   New	  
Zealand,	  South	  Africa	  or	  Europe,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   the	  match	  to	  be	  played	  in	  Australia	  on	  16	  September	  2017	  between	  the	  
senior	  Australian	  representative	  team	  selected	  by	  the	  Australian	  Rugby	  
Union	  and	  the	  senior	  Argentine	  representative	  team.	  
	  
6.2	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  quarter-­‐finals,	  semi-­‐finals	  and	  the	  final	  of	  the	  Rugby	  World	  
Cup	  tournament,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   any	  match	  to	  be	  played	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2015	  Rugby	  World	  Cup	  tournament	  
that	  is	  a	  quarter-­‐final,	  semi-­‐final	  or	  final.	  
	  	  
6.3	   Each	   match	   of	   the	   Rugby	   World	   Cup	   tournament	   involving	   the	   senior	  
Australian	   representative	   team	   selected	   by	   the	   Australian	   Rugby	   Union,	  
except	  for:	  
(a)	   any	  match	  to	  be	  played	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2015	  Rugby	  World	  Cup	  tournament	  
involving	   the	   senior	   Australian	   representative	   team	   selected	   by	   the	  




7.1	   Each	   “test”	   match	   involving	   the	   senior	   Australian	   representative	   team	  
selected	  by	  Cricket	  Australia	  played	  in	  Australia,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	  	  each	  “test”	  match	  played	  between	  3	  November	  2016	  and	  7	  January	  2017.	  
	  	  
7.2	   Each	   “test”	   match	   between	   the	   senior	   Australian	   representative	   team	  
selected	   by	   Cricket	   Australia	   and	   the	   senior	   English	   representative	   team,	  
played	  in	  Australia	  or	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  
	  	  
7.3	   Each	   one-­‐day	   cricket	  match	   involving	   the	   senior	   Australian	   representative	  
team	  selected	  by	  Cricket	  Australia	  played	  in	  Australia,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   each	  one	  day	  cricket	  match	  played	  between	  4	  December	  2016	  and	  26	  
January	  2017.	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7.4	   Each	  Twenty20	  cricket	  match	  involving	  the	  senior	  Australian	  representative	  
team	  selected	  by	  Cricket	  Australia	  played	  in	  Australia,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   each	   Twenty20	   cricket	   match	   involving	   the	   men’s	   senior	   Australian	  
representative	   team	  played	   between	   26	   January	   2016	   and	   31	   January	  
2016;	  and	  
(b)	   each	   Twenty20	   cricket	  match	   involving	   the	  women’s	   senior	   Australian	  
representative	   team	  played	   between	   26	   January	   2016	   and	   31	   January	  
2016.	  
	  	  
7.5	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  semi-­‐finals	  and	  the	  final	  of	  the	  International	  Cricket	  Council	  
One	  Day	  International	  World	  Cup.	  
	  	  
7.6	   Each	  match	  of	  the	  International	  Cricket	  Council	  One	  Day	  International	  World	  
Cup	  involving	  the	  senior	  Australian	  representative	  team	  selected	  by	  Cricket	  
Australia.	  
	  	  
7.7	   The	  final	  of	  the	  International	  Cricket	  Council	  Twenty20	  World	  Cup,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	  	  the	  final	  of	  the	  2016	  International	  Cricket	  Council	  Twenty20	  World	  Cup.	  
	  
7.8	   Each	   match	   of	   the	   International	   Cricket	   Council	   Twenty20	   World	   Cup	  
involving	   the	   senior	   Australian	   representative	   team	   selected	   by	   Cricket	  
Australia,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   any	   of	   those	   matches	   to	   be	   played	   as	   part	   of	   the	   2016	   International	  




8.1	   The	  English	  Football	  Association	  Cup	  final.	  
	  	  
8.2	   Each	  match	  of	  the	  Fédération	   Internationale	  de	  Football	  Association	  World	  
Cup	  tournament.	  
	  	  
8.3	   Each	  match	   in	   the	  Fédération	   Internationale	  de	  Football	  Association	  World	  
Cup	  Qualification	  tournament	  involving	  the	  senior	  Australian	  representative	  
team	  selected	  by	  the	  Football	  Federation	  Australia,	  except	  for:	  




9.1	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  Australian	  Open	  tennis	  tournament,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   any	  match	  held	  as	  part	  of	  the	  2016,	  2017,	  2018	  and	  2019	  Australian	  Open	  
tennis	  tournaments	  that	  is	  not	  a	  men’s	  or	  women’s	  singles	  final.	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9.2	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  men’s	  and	  women’s	  singles	  quarter-­‐finals,	  semi-­‐finals	  and	  
finals	   of	   the	   Wimbledon	   (the	   Lawn	   Tennis	   Championships)	   tournament,	  
except	  for:	  
(a)	   any	   of	   those	   matches	   held	   as	   part	   of	   the	   2017	   Wimbledon	   tennis	  
tournament.	  
	  
9.3	   Each	  match	  in	  the	  men’s	  and	  women’s	  singles	  quarter-­‐finals,	  semi-­‐finals	  and	  
finals	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Open	  tennis	  tournament,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   any	   matches	   held	   as	   part	   of	   the	   2016	   United	   States	   Open	   tennis	  
tournament.	  
	  	  
9.4	   Each	  match	  in	  each	  tie	  of	  the	  International	  Tennis	  Federation	  Davis	  Cup	  World	  
Group	  tennis	  tournament	  involving	  an	  Australian	  representative	  team,	  except	  
for:	  
(a)	   any	  match	   in	  any	  tie	  of	  the	  2017	  International	  Tennis	  Federation	  Davis	  





10.1	   Each	   international	   netball	   match	   involving	   the	   senior	   Australian	  
representative	  team	  selected	  by	  the	  All	  Australian	  Netball	  Association,	  played	  
in	  Australia	  or	  New	  Zealand,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   the	   matches	   to	   be	   played	   on	   30	   August	   2017,	   3	   September	   2017,	  
5	   October	   2017	   and	   11	   October	   2017	   involving	   the	   senior	   Australian	  
representative	  team.	  
	  	  
10.2	   The	  semi-­‐final	  of	   the	  Netball	  World	  Championships	   if	   it	   involves	   the	  senior	  
Australian	   representative	   team	   selected	   by	   the	   All	   Australian	   Netball	  
Association.	  
	  	  
10.3	   The	   final	   of	   the	   Netball	   World	   Championships	   if	   it	   involves	   the	   senior	  





11.1	   Each	   round	   of	   the	   Australian	   Masters	   tournament,	   played	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
Professional	  Golfers	  Association	  Tour	  of	  Australasia,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   each	  round	  of	  the	  2015	  Australian	  Masters	  tournament,	  played	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  Professional	  Golfers	  Association	  Tour	  of	  Australasia.	  
	  	  
11.2	   Each	   round	   of	   the	   Australian	   Open	   tournament,	   played	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
Professional	  Golfers	  Association	  Tour	  of	  Australasia,	  except	  for:	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(a)	   each	  round	  of	  the	  2017	  Australian	  Open	  tournament,	  played	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  Professional	  Golfers	  Association	  Tour	  of	  Australasia.	  
	  	  
11.3	   Each	  round	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Masters	  tournament,	  played	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
Professional	  Golfers	  Association	  Tour,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   each	  round	  of	  the	  2017	  United	  States	  Masters	  tournament,	  played	  as	  part	  




12.1	   Each	  race	  in	  the	  Fédération	  Internationale	  de	  l’Automobile	  Formula	  1	  World	  
Championship	  (Grand	  Prix)	  held	  in	  Australia.	  
	  	  
12.2	   Each	  race	  in	  the	  Fédération	  Internationale	  de	  Motocyclisme	  Moto	  GP	  held	  in	  
Australia,	  except	  for:	  
(a)	   each	   race	   in	   the	   Federation	   Internationale	   de	  Motocyclisme	  Moto	   GP	  
held	  in	  Australia	  in	  2016.	  
	  	  
12.3	   Each	   race	   in	   the	   V8	   Supercar	   Championship	   Series,	   including	   the	   Bathurst	  
1000.	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